In re G.J.: Refusal to Engage in Services Justifies Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives and Supports Denial of Post‑Termination Visitation

Introduction

In a memorandum decision dated September 30, 2025, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the termination of Petitioner Father M.J.’s parental rights to his child, G.J., and upheld the denial of post‑termination visitation. The appeal arose from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s July 18, 2024, dispositional order. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) initiated the case in September 2023 alleging that the petitioner engaged in domestic violence against G.J.’s mother; physically and emotionally abused another child in the home, T.J.; and neglected his children’s basic needs. The child’s guardian ad litem supported the termination and opposed post‑termination contact.

On appeal, the petitioner advanced two principal arguments: (1) the circuit court erred by terminating his parental rights rather than employing less restrictive alternatives (e.g., simply limiting his contact with G.J. while the child remained with the nonabusing mother), and (2) the court erred by denying post‑termination visitation. The Supreme Court rejected both arguments, concluding that the record supported termination without resort to lesser alternatives and that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that post‑termination contact would be in G.J.’s best interests.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying clear‑error review to the circuit court’s factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions (Syllabus Point 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)), the Court affirmed the termination order. Two pillars undergird the decision:

Less restrictive alternatives were unnecessary where there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect could be corrected in the near future. The Court emphasized the petitioner’s refusal to engage in ordered services, his repeated violations of no‑contact orders (including attending G.J.’s birthday party and sporting events), his denial of responsibility, and a high relapse risk per a parental fitness evaluation. These facts placed the case squarely within the rule allowing termination without intervening alternatives (In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011); In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)).
Denial of post‑termination visitation was proper. Applying the longstanding best‑interest test from Syllabus Point 5 of In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995), as reiterated in Syllabus Point 11 of In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147 (2002), the Court found no evidence that continued contact would serve G.J.’s welfare. To the contrary, the petitioner’s refusal to comply with services, repeated order violations, and risk factors demonstrated a threat to the child. While the Court noted that it has recently provisionally amended Rule 15 governing post‑termination visitation considerations (In re Z.D.-1, 251 W. Va. 743, 916 S.E.2d 375 (2025)), it applied the standards in place when the circuit court ruled.

The Court also underscored two additional points. First, termination of one parent’s rights is permitted even if the other parent retains custody and parental rights (In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000)). Second, abuse of one child in the home can support adjudication and disposition as to a sibling (W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201’s definition of “abused child” includes harm or threatened harm where a parent inflicts physical or emotional injury upon “the child or another child in the home” (emphasis added)).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) (Syllabus Pt. 1): Establishes the bifurcated standard of review in abuse and neglect appeals—clear error for fact findings and de novo for legal conclusions. Here, the petitioner did not meaningfully challenge the core factual findings (service refusal, no‑contact violations, denial of responsibility), undercutting his appeal under the deferential standard.
In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), and In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980) (quoted in Kristin Y., Syllabus Pt. 5): Authorize termination “without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” when no reasonable likelihood exists that abuse or neglect conditions can be substantially corrected (as defined by W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604). The Court applied this settled law to conclude that the petitioner’s persistent noncompliance and denial made lesser measures inappropriate.
In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013), quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004): Reiterates that “[f]ailure to acknowledge the existence of a problem … results in making the problem untreatable.” The petitioner’s steadfast refusal to accept responsibility for domestic violence exposure and physical abuse (admitting only to “swatting” a child with a belt) was pivotal in finding uncorrectable conditions.
In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000): Clarifies that a court may terminate one parent’s rights while leaving the nonabusing parent’s rights intact. The petitioner’s reliance on the mother’s intact rights and custody did not preclude termination of his rights.
In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995) (Syllabus Pt. 5), and In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147 (2002) (Syllabus Pt. 11): Set the pre‑2025 framework for post‑termination visitation. Courts must weigh the child’s best interests, including the parent‑child bond, the child’s wishes (if mature), and whether contact would be detrimental. Here, the record lacked evidence of a close bond or any indication that contact would be non‑detrimental; instead, the petitioner’s conduct evidenced risk.
In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025), and State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995): Emphasize that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility. This constrained review posture supported affirmance in light of the circuit court’s credibility calls and the unchallenged factual record.
W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201 (definition of “abused child”): The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that there was no evidence he abused G.J. by highlighting that abuse to “another child in the home” suffices for adjudication and disposition regarding a sibling when the child’s health or welfare is harmed or threatened.
W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604: Governs dispositional alternatives, including termination where no reasonable likelihood of correction exists and termination serves the child’s welfare. Although not quoted at length, the statute’s standards animate the Kristin Y./R.J.M. line of cases relied on here.
In re Z.D.-1, 251 W. Va. 743, 916 S.E.2d 375 (2025): Cited for the Court’s recent provisional amendment of Rule 15, adopting “appropriate standards for consideration of post‑termination visitation outside of a fact‑based context.” The Court applied the pre‑amendment rule because the circuit court’s ruling predated the amendment, but flagged the new framework prospectively.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in two steps—first, termination; second, post‑termination visitation.

On termination, the circuit court found that there was “no reasonable likelihood” the conditions leading to abuse and neglect could be corrected in the near future, and that termination served G.J.’s best interests. That finding rested on:

Noncompliance with services: With the sole exception of undergoing a parental fitness evaluation, the petitioner refused to participate in ordered drug/alcohol screening, parenting classes, and supervised visitation. He also refused to provide DHS with his address, impeding oversight and safety planning.
Repeated violations of court orders: Despite the circuit court’s explicit denial of visitation pending engagement in services, the petitioner attended G.J.’s birthday party and sporting events and allowed G.J. to spend a weekend with him—direct contraventions demonstrating disregard for court authority and safety boundaries.
Denial of responsibility and risk profile: The forensic evaluator reported the petitioner failed to accept responsibility for domestic violence exposure and physical abuse, had not benefited from prior parenting services, and presented a high risk of relapse. The circuit court also found the petitioner likely remained in active addiction and exhibited unresolved anger and domestic violence issues, coupled with an “apparent detachment” from the child.
Legal principle of untreatability: Consistent with Timber M./Charity H., the petitioner’s refusal to acknowledge problems rendered them effectively untreatable in the short term, thereby meeting the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” standard.

Against this evidentiary backdrop, “less restrictive alternatives” such as simple limits on contact were not warranted. The petitioner’s pattern of circumventing orders and refusing services indicated that milder dispositional measures could not safely protect G.J. The Court rejected the suggestion that the mother’s intact rights obviated the need for termination, invoking In re Emily to confirm that one parent’s rights may be terminated even when the other parent remains a safe custodian.

On post‑termination visitation, the Court applied the pre‑2025 Christina L./Daniel D. standard. The dispositive considerations included:

Absence of record support: There was no competent evidence of a close emotional bond between the petitioner and G.J. sufficient to overcome the safety concerns. Nor did the record reflect the child’s wishes (or a maturity‑based preference) favoring contact.
Detriment and risk: The petitioner’s unwillingness to abide by supervised visitation protocols and continuous violations of no‑contact orders showed that contact would pose a threat to the child’s well‑being. The circuit court’s best‑interest finding was thus well supported.

The Supreme Court refused to reweigh these determinations, noting the appellate function does not encompass credibility decisions and evidence rebalancing (In re D.S.; Guthrie). Although the Court flagged its recent provisional updates to Rule 15 (In re Z.D.-1), it expressly applied the standards in place when the circuit court ruled—underscoring a transitional moment in West Virginia practice while keeping this case within established, fact‑driven best‑interest analysis.

Impact

The decision’s practical and doctrinal effects include:

Reaffirmation of termination without lesser alternatives: Where a parent refuses to engage in services, violates court orders, and denies responsibility, termination may be pursued without first exhausting lesser measures (e.g., restricted contact), provided the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” and best‑interest benchmarks are met.
Emphasis on compliance as a gateway to visitation: Conditioning visitation on participation in reunification services is validated by this case’s logic. Noncompliance—especially combined with order‑violating, unsupervised contact—will weigh heavily against both reunification and post‑termination visitation.
Sibling‑abuse doctrine remains robust: Abuse directed at one child (e.g., T.J.) can support adjudication and disposition concerning a sibling (G.J.) when the child’s welfare is threatened by the parent’s conduct, consistent with W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201. Parents cannot evade accountability by arguing the absence of direct harm to the child who is the subject of the proceeding.
One‑parent termination is viable even with the other parent intact: The Court’s reliance on In re Emily confirms that a safe custodial arrangement with the nonabusing parent does not bar termination of the abusive or neglectful parent’s rights where statutory criteria are met.
Transitional note on post‑termination visitation: Although the Court applied pre‑amendment standards (Christina L./Daniel D.), it acknowledged the provisional amendment of Rule 15 (In re Z.D.-1). Going forward, parties should be prepared to brief and develop the record under the updated Rule 15 framework. This case suggests that, under either regime, safety, compliance, and demonstrable benefit to the child remain determinative.
Appellate practice point: Failure to challenge the circuit court’s factual findings on appeal—especially in the face of a deferential standard of review—significantly reduces the likelihood of reversal. The petitioner’s legal arguments could not overcome unassailed findings of noncompliance and risk.

Complex Concepts Simplified

No reasonable likelihood that conditions can be corrected: A statutory conclusion (under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604) that, given the parent’s current behavior and circumstances, the problems leading to abuse or neglect cannot be corrected in the near term. Persistent denial, noncompliance with services, and continued risk factors often support this finding.
Less restrictive alternatives: Dispositional measures short of termination (e.g., improvement periods, supervised visitation, custodial arrangements with another parent) aimed at remediation. Courts need not implement these if the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” threshold is met and termination serves the child’s welfare.
Post‑termination visitation: Limited contact that may be allowed after parental rights are terminated, but only if proven to be in the child’s best interest, non‑detrimental, and supported by evidence of a meaningful bond and, when appropriate, the child’s wishes. It is not a right; it is purely discretionary and child‑focused.
Parental fitness evaluation: A forensic assessment exploring parenting capacities, insight into harm, substance use or mental health risks, and the likelihood of benefiting from services. Here, it identified a high relapse risk and lack of accountability.
Best interests of the child: The lodestar of abuse and neglect proceedings, centering the child’s safety, stability, and developmental needs over parental preferences.
In camera testimony: Testimony taken privately (often with the judge and counsel) to protect a child witness. T.J.’s in camera testimony described intoxicated yelling and physical punishment with a belt.
Appellate standards: “Clear error” means the appellate court will not overturn factual findings unless left with a firm conviction a mistake has been made. De novo review applies to legal questions. Appellate courts do not reassess credibility or reweigh evidence.
Sibling abuse principle: Under § 49‑1‑201, harm or threatened harm to one child can prove abuse regarding another child in the same home. The law recognizes that a parent’s conduct toward one child can endanger siblings.

Conclusion

In re G.J. reinforces core tenets of West Virginia abuse and neglect law. When a parent refuses to engage in services, violates court orders, and denies responsibility, a circuit court may terminate parental rights without employing less restrictive alternatives, provided termination is in the child’s best interests and statutory criteria are satisfied. The case also confirms that post‑termination visitation is not presumed; absent clear evidence that contact would be safe, beneficial, and consistent with the child’s welfare, courts may deny such requests. The presence of a safe, nonabusing parent does not insulate the abusive parent’s rights from termination.

Finally, the decision signals a transitional moment for post‑termination visitation jurisprudence: while the Court applied the Christina L./Daniel D. framework here, practitioners should prepare for Rule 15’s updated standards post‑In re Z.D.-1. Even under evolving rules, however, this case makes plain that compliance, accountability, and child safety will remain decisive. The affirmance thus stands as a clear message: courts will not delay permanency or compromise safety where a parent refuses services and flouts court orders.