In re G.A.: West Virginia High Court Reaffirms Written-Motion Prerequisite for Improvement Periods and Clarifies That Less Restrictive Alternatives Are Not Required When Statutory Termination Criteria Are Met

In re G.A.: Reaffirming the Written-Motion Requirement for Improvement Periods and the Permissibility of Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

Introduction

In a memorandum decision issued on September 30, 2025, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed a Mercer County circuit court order terminating the parental rights of A.A. to her child, G.A. The case, In re G.A., No. 24-533 (Mercer County CC-28-2021-JA-40), centers on two core appellate issues:

  • Whether the circuit court erred in declining to grant the mother a “full” post-adjudicatory or post-dispositional improvement period; and
  • Whether the circuit court erred by terminating parental rights instead of employing a less restrictive dispositional alternative (e.g., termination of custodial rights only or guardianship/permanent placement without severing parental rights).

The Court held that (1) because no written motion for an additional improvement period was filed, the circuit court could not grant one; and (2) termination was appropriate given the finding of no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, coupled with the necessity of termination for G.A.’s welfare. The decision is grounded in established statutes and precedents, including W. Va. Code §§ 49-4-604 and 49-4-610, and cases such as State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, In re Kristin Y., and In re R.J.M.

Background and Procedural History

The proceedings began in January 2021 after allegations that A.A. and the child’s father left then six-month-old G.A. alone in a motel room on New Year’s Eve while they went out partying. When located, A.A. was highly intoxicated and admitted to consuming alcohol and Xanax; the father was later arrested on multiple charges including domestic assault, attempted kidnapping, child abuse, and drug-related offenses. The matter originated in Virginia but was transferred to West Virginia under the UCCJEA on inconvenient forum grounds. See W. Va. Code § 48-20-207(a).

A.A. stipulated to adjudication as an abusive and neglectful parent and was granted an improvement period. An amended petition in December 2021 alleged ongoing concerns, including homelessness and substance misuse; the petitioner tested positive for alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine in September 2021. The court monitored her progress, which remained sporadic. By August 2022, testimony indicated she had not drug-screened for eight months and had made little progress aside from housing. Although A.A. made an oral request at that time for another improvement period relating to the amended petition, the court took the matter under advisement and noted her post-adjudicatory improvement period for G.A. was already nine months along.

A tragic event occurred in December 2023, when A.A.’s estranged boyfriend murdered her oldest child, N.C., and then died by suicide at the home of a familial placement for N.C. and M.C. (two older children not at issue in the appeal). Neither A.A. nor G.A. was present when this occurred. At the dispositional hearing in June 2024, evidence showed that A.A. had not completed mental health or substance abuse treatment, remained inconsistent with employment and drug screening, continued marijuana use, and had a DUI arrest (July 2022) and probation for Virginia charges. DHS recommended termination, noting that G.A. had been out of A.A.’s custody since six months old and the bond was weak.

A.A. testified that she had recently started counseling, had a month of employment, and had begun medication-assisted treatment, but conceded noncompliance with the case plan, sporadic screening, and continued marijuana use. Crucially, she admitted she was not ready to resume care and asked the court to terminate only her custodial and guardianship rights—effectively requesting a less restrictive alternative to termination of parental rights. The circuit court found no reasonable likelihood that the conditions could be corrected in the near future and that termination was necessary for G.A.’s welfare; it terminated A.A.’s parental rights. The father’s rights were also terminated, and the permanency plan is adoption in the current placement.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying a clear error standard to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions (see Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)), the Supreme Court:

  • Rejected A.A.’s claim that she should have received a “full” post-adjudicatory or post-dispositional improvement period because she did not file a written motion as required. Citing Syl. Pt. 4 of State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, 247 W. Va. 235, 878 S.E.2d 730 (2021), the Court reiterated that a circuit court may not grant an improvement period under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610 absent a written motion. It also noted a Rule 10(c)(7) deficiency: A.A.’s brief lacked record citations showing when and how the issue was preserved in the circuit court.
  • Affirmed termination of parental rights as a proper disposition under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) because the record supported the findings that (a) there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3)), and (b) termination was necessary for G.A.’s welfare. The Court emphasized it is not required to employ less restrictive alternatives once those statutory criteria are met. See Syl. Pt. 5 (in part), In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)).

The Court therefore affirmed the September 4, 2024 dispositional order terminating A.A.’s parental rights to G.A.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Standard of Review: Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) — factual findings are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
  • Written-Motion Requirement for Improvement Periods: Syl. Pt. 4 (in part), State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, 247 W. Va. 235, 878 S.E.2d 730 (2021) — a circuit court may not grant an improvement period under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610 unless the respondent files a written motion. The Court relied directly on this rule to dispose of A.A.’s request premised on oral motions.
  • Appellate Briefing Requirements: W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7) — an appellant’s brief must contain specific citations to the appendix record showing where and how the issues were raised below. The absence of such citations undermined A.A.’s improvement-period arguments.
  • Dispositions and Less Restrictive Alternatives:
    • In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), Syl. Pt. 5 (in part), quoting In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980), Syl. Pt. 2 — termination may be employed without resort to less restrictive alternatives when the statutory criteria are met.
    • W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) — authorizes termination of parental rights upon findings of no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and necessity for the child’s welfare.
    • W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3) — defines “no reasonable likelihood” to include a parent’s failure to respond to or follow through with a reasonable family case plan or rehabilitative efforts.
  • Improvement Periods Statute: W. Va. Code § 49-4-610 — governs pre-adjudicatory, post-adjudicatory, and post-dispositional improvement periods, including their duration and prerequisites (e.g., the respondent’s clear and convincing evidence of likelihood of full participation).
  • Jurisdictional Background: W. Va. Code § 48-20-207(a) — UCCJEA inconvenient forum provision, cited to explain the transfer from Virginia to West Virginia (not disputed on appeal).

Legal Reasoning

1) Improvement Period: Oral Request Is Insufficient

The Court’s reasoning on the improvement-period claim proceeded in two steps:

  • Record Preservation and Briefing: The petitioner did not direct the Court to any part of the record demonstrating she filed the required written motion for an additional post-adjudicatory improvement period (as to the amended petition) or for a post-dispositional improvement period. This shortcoming violated Rule 10(c)(7), which alone supports rejecting the claim.
  • Substantive Requirement Under Wilson: Even if preserved, an oral motion could not suffice. Wilson unequivocally requires a written motion before a circuit court may grant any improvement period under § 49-4-610. Because A.A. did not file one, the circuit court could not grant the relief she sought as a matter of law.

The Court’s application is straightforward: without a written motion, and absent record support to the contrary, the denial (or, more precisely, the failure to grant an additional improvement period) is unassailable.

2) Disposition: Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

On the dispositional choice, the circuit court made two pivotal findings:

  • No reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future — evidenced by years of sporadic service participation, ongoing drug use, failure to complete substance abuse and mental health treatment, inconsistent employment, minimal compliance with the case plan, and a DUI arrest.
  • Necessity of termination for the child’s welfare — supported by the extended out-of-home placement since infancy and a weak parent–child bond.

Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), once those findings are supported, termination is authorized. And under Kristin Y./R.J.M., the court is not obligated to try less restrictive alternatives. The mother’s late-stage efforts (recent counseling, brief employment, beginning medication-assisted treatment) did not overcome three-plus years of noncompliance. Nor did her explanation that a violent relationship impeded her progress negate the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” finding: § 49-4-604(d)(3) looks to whether the parent followed through with a reasonable case plan “on their own or with help,” and the record supported that she did not.

Finally, although the mother sought a partial measure (termination of custodial/guardianship rights only), the statute permits—indeed, prioritizes—permanency through termination where the required findings are made. The circuit court’s choice of disposition therefore aligned with statute and precedent.

Impact and Significance

A. Practical Effects for Litigants and Counsel

  • Strict Compliance With Written-Motion Requirement: In re G.A. underscores a bright-line rule: improvement periods require a written motion. Counsel should never rely on oral requests at hearings; failure to file will forfeit the relief and the appellate argument.
  • Appellate Record Discipline: The decision reiterates the importance of Rule 10(c)(7). Even meritorious claims can fail without pinpoint record citations showing how the issue was preserved below.
  • Timing and Substance of Efforts Matter: The Court evaluates progress across the lifespan of the case. Late-breaking improvements will not compel a less restrictive disposition where the long-term record shows noncompliance and continued substance use.
  • Less Restrictive Alternatives Are Not a Default: Where § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d)(3) are satisfied, courts may proceed to termination without attempting guardianship or custody-only dispositions.

B. Child Welfare and Permanency

  • Permanency for Very Young Children: When a child has been out of parental custody since infancy and the evidence shows a weak bond and prolonged instability, the decision emphasizes permanency via adoption as consistent with the child’s welfare.
  • Trauma and External Events: The Court acknowledged the mother’s account of an abusive relationship and the tragic homicide of an older child, but kept its focus on statutory criteria and the child’s best interests. The opinion signals that even sympathetic circumstances do not supersede the statutory analysis when sustained noncompliance persists.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Improvement Periods (W. Va. Code § 49-4-610): Opportunities for a parent to address issues identified in an abuse/neglect case with services and supports. They are not automatic; a parent must show by clear and convincing evidence a likelihood of full participation. There are pre-adjudicatory, post-adjudicatory, and post-dispositional improvement periods, each with statutory time limits. A written motion is required.
  • “No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction in the Near Future” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)): A legal threshold met when, for example, the parent fails to follow through with a reasonable case plan or other rehabilitative efforts. The court looks at demonstrated capacity over time, not isolated efforts.
  • “Necessary for the Welfare of the Child” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)): A finding that termination is needed to protect the child’s well-being, stability, and permanency, based on the totality of evidence (e.g., bond, time out of home, risk factors, prognosis).
  • Less Restrictive Alternatives: Options such as awarding custody or guardianship to a caretaker while preserving residual parental rights. Under Kristin Y./R.J.M., courts need not employ these alternatives if the § 49-4-604(c)(6) criteria are otherwise satisfied.
  • Standard of Review: “Clear error” for factual findings means the appellate court defers to the circuit court unless left with a firm conviction a mistake was made; legal questions are reviewed anew (“de novo”).
  • UCCJEA Inconvenient Forum (W. Va. Code § 48-20-207): A uniform rule allowing transfer between states if one is a more appropriate forum. Here, it explains why West Virginia exercised jurisdiction though the matter began in Virginia.

Practice Pointers

  • Always file a written motion for any improvement period and ensure it is docketed and included in the appendix record.
  • In briefs, comply strictly with Rule 10(c)(7): provide pinpoint citations to the record showing preservation and the trial court’s rulings.
  • When proposing a less restrictive alternative, build a robust record demonstrating meaningful, sustained compliance and a realistic near-term prognosis for correction; last-minute efforts generally will not suffice.
  • Document and present trauma-informed evidence, but tie it expressly to compliance, capacity, and prognosis with expert input where possible; courts still apply the statutory criteria.

Conclusion

In re G.A. is a clear reaffirmation of two settled principles in West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence:

  1. A written motion is a mandatory prerequisite to granting any improvement period under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610; oral requests do not suffice (Wilson).
  2. When the record supports findings of no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and that termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, the circuit court may terminate parental rights without employing less restrictive alternatives (Kristin Y./R.J.M.; W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), (d)(3)).

Against a backdrop of prolonged noncompliance, continued substance use, and a weak bond with a child who had been out of the home since infancy, the Court’s affirmance advances the statutory imperatives of safety, stability, and timely permanency. For practitioners, the decision is a pointed reminder that procedure matters—particularly the written-motion requirement and meticulous record preservation—while, substantively, it underscores that courts are not obliged to try lesser alternatives when the statutory termination criteria are met.

Case Details

  • Case: In re G.A., No. 24-533 (Mercer County CC-28-2021-JA-40)
  • Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
  • Disposition: Affirmed (Memorandum Decision under W. Va. R. App. P. 21)
  • Filed: September 30, 2025
  • Counsel: Petitioner Mother A.A. by David B. Kelley; DHS by Attorney General John B. McCuskey and AAG Andrew T. Waight; Guardian ad Litem Thomas Janutolo, Jr.
  • Panel: Chief Justice William R. Wooton; Justices C. Haley Bunn, Charles S. Trump IV, Thomas H. Ewing; Senior Status Justice John A. Hutchison — all concurring.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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