In re F.S.: Compelled Treatment, Aggravated Circumstances, and the Written-Motion Requirement for Improvement Periods

Introduction

In this memorandum decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the termination of Petitioner Mother K.T.’s parental rights to her child, F.S. The case arises out of a 2022 abuse and neglect petition alleging extensive prenatal substance abuse resulting in the infant’s treatment with methadone for withdrawal symptoms. The circuit court found aggravated circumstances based on the mother’s prior involuntary terminations, adjudicated abuse and neglect, and ultimately terminated parental rights.

On an earlier appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for a compliant dispositional order under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6). On remand, the circuit court reaffirmed termination, making additional findings that the mother’s entry into inpatient treatment was compelled by probation (not voluntary) and that she had not made meaningful progress since the earlier termination five years prior. The mother again appealed, asking for additional time to continue treatment and challenging the denial of an improvement period.

The Court affirmed, emphasizing: (1) the aggravated-circumstances exception to reasonable-efforts, (2) the “no reasonable likelihood” standard in the face of ongoing substance abuse, (3) that termination may proceed without less restrictive alternatives when statutory criteria are met, and (4) that an improvement period cannot be granted absent a written motion and proper record preservation on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reviewed the circuit court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo (Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)). It held:

Given aggravated circumstances arising from the mother’s prior involuntary termination of parental rights, DHS was not required to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(C).
Despite the reasonable-efforts exception, the circuit court had ordered DHS to assist the mother in obtaining inpatient treatment, but she continued to use drugs during the proceedings and entered treatment only after violating probation.
There was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(1).
Termination of parental rights was necessary for the child’s welfare, and courts may terminate without intervening less restrictive alternatives upon such findings. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6); Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011).
The mother’s request for additional time was properly denied under the principle that courts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement when a child’s welfare is at risk. See Syl. Pt. 4, In re Cecil T. (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)).
The improvement-period argument failed because the record contained no written motion; a circuit court may not grant an improvement period absent a written motion. See Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, 247 W. Va. 235, 247 S.E.2d 730 (2021). The mother’s brief also lacked the record citations required by Rule 10(c)(7) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s August 19, 2024 amended dispositional order terminating parental rights.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
Provides the standard of review: clear error for facts, de novo for law (Syl. Pt. 1). It also supplies the oft-cited principle that courts need not pursue every speculative possibility of parental improvement when doing so would threaten child welfare (Syl. Pt. 4, quoting In re R.J.M.). Here, it supports declining additional time where the parent’s ongoing drug use persisted into the proceedings.
In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)
Longstanding authority for terminating parental rights when further delay would jeopardize the child, and—together with Kristin Y.—for allowing termination without less restrictive alternatives once the statutory no-reasonable-likelihood finding is made.
In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011)
Confirms that termination may be employed without intervening less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected (Syl. Pt. 5). This principle squarely fits the circuit court’s findings adopted by the Supreme Court.
State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, 247 W. Va. 235, 247 S.E.2d 730 (2021)
Holds that a circuit court may not grant an improvement period unless the parent files a written motion requesting it (Syl. Pt. 4). The mother’s failure to file such a motion, coupled with briefing deficiencies under Rule 10(c)(7), foreclosed relief on that issue.
West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(C)
Establishes “aggravated circumstances,” including prior involuntary termination of parental rights, relieving DHS of the duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family. This exception anchored the Court’s rejection of the mother’s argument for more services or time.
West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(1)
Defines “no reasonable likelihood” of correction where the parent has habitually abused controlled substances to the extent parenting skills are seriously impaired and has not responded to or followed through with recommended treatment. The mother’s continued drug use—admitted as recently as one month before disposition—fit this subsection.
West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)
Authorizes termination if there is no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. This was the dispositional endpoint on remand after the first appeal required a compliant order.
West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure 21 and 10(c)(7)
Rule 21 allows memorandum decisions without oral argument when the law is settled and no substantial question is presented; the Court invoked it here. Rule 10(c)(7) requires specific record citations in appellate briefs; the mother’s failure to support the improvement-period claim with record citations violated this rule.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds along several interlocking lines:

1) Aggravated Circumstances and the Reasonable-Efforts Exception

The case was expressly adjudicated as one of aggravated circumstances due to the mother’s prior involuntary termination of parental rights (2019). Under § 49-4-604(c)(7)(C), this relieves DHS of the statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify. The Court highlighted that, notwithstanding this exception, the circuit court ordered DHS to assist the mother in obtaining inpatient treatment—a discretionary measure above the statutory floor. The mother’s continued drug use while receiving this assistance undermined her request for more time and weighs heavily in the “no reasonable likelihood” calculus.

2) Ongoing Substance Abuse and Compelled Treatment

A pivotal finding on remand was that the mother’s entry into inpatient treatment was not voluntary rehabilitation but a condition of probation following a violation. The Court underscored this fact in affirming termination. When a parent continues using illegal substances through adjudication and disposition—and only seeks inpatient care after a probation violation—such timing and compulsion tend to indicate that the parent has not developed the insight, stability, or compliance necessary to alter the conditions of abuse or neglect. This reasoning is consistent with § 49-4-604(d)(1), which denies “reasonable likelihood” where substance abuse persists and the parent has not responded to appropriate treatment.

3) No Reasonable Likelihood of Substantial Correction

The circuit court found that the mother had made no meaningful progress since her earlier termination five years prior and continued to abuse substances up to one month before the dispositional hearing. The statute provides a clear pathway for courts in such circumstances: habitual substance abuse impairing parenting, coupled with a failure to respond to treatment, supports a finding of no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction. Once satisfied, § 49-4-604(c)(6) authorizes termination if necessary for the child’s welfare.

4) Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

The Court relied on In re Kristin Y. to reaffirm that when no reasonable likelihood of correction exists, termination may proceed without intervening less restrictive alternatives. This addresses concerns that the court might otherwise have to try additional time-limited measures, such as a post-adjudicatory improvement period, before terminating. Not so; when statutory criteria are met and the child’s welfare so requires, termination is legally proper.

5) “Not Required to Exhaust Every Speculative Possibility”

Echoing Cecil T. and R.J.M., the Court reiterated that child welfare cannot be held hostage to indefinite prognostication. Where risks to the child’s safety and need for permanence are manifest, the law does not compel open-ended, speculative opportunities for improvement, particularly after a history of failed interventions and ongoing drug use.

6) Procedural Gatekeeping: Written-Motion Requirement and Record Citations

The mother’s improvement-period argument faltered for two separate reasons:

There was no written motion for an improvement period in the record. Under State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, a circuit court may not grant an improvement period unless the parent files a written motion. Put simply, there is no sua sponte improvement period.
The mother’s brief failed to comply with Rule 10(c)(7), lacking the pinpoint record citations necessary to preserve and substantiate appellate claims.

These procedural shortcomings independently foreclosed relief and reinforce that litigants must observe the statutory and appellate rules to obtain review.

7) Standard of Review and Deference

The Supreme Court applied clear-error review to the circuit court’s factual findings, deferring to credibility determinations and inferences about the mother’s progress, or lack thereof. De novo review for legal conclusions did not alter the outcome because the circuit court’s decision tracked the statutory framework, and the facts—particularly the timing and compulsion of treatment, continued drug use, and prior terminations—fit squarely within the statutory grounds for termination.

Impact and Significance

Although issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21, the Court’s analysis provides valuable guidance likely to shape practice in West Virginia abuse and neglect cases:

Compelled treatment is not the same as rehabilitation. Entry into treatment only after a probation violation may be insufficient to demonstrate the parent’s capacity for sustained change. Courts may accord limited weight to such evidence when assessing “reasonable likelihood” of correction.
Aggravated circumstances narrow the reunification lane. When a parent has prior involuntary terminations, DHS is relieved of reasonable-efforts obligations. Practically, parents face a higher burden to show real-time, voluntary improvement capable of protecting a child now.
Strict compliance with improvement-period procedures. Counsel must file written motions for any improvement period and support appellate arguments with pinpoint record citations. Failure to do so is outcome-determinative.
Termination without less restrictive alternatives remains available. Where the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” finding is supported, the court need not attempt lesser measures that would prolong uncertainty for the child.
Orders must be dispositional-compliant. The case’s procedural history—vacatur and remand for a compliant dispositional order under § 49-4-604(c)(6)—is a reminder that circuit courts must make the specific findings required by statute. Practitioners should ensure orders clearly address each statutory element.
Memorandum decisions can still guide practice. Even without syllabus points, Rule 21 memorandum decisions may be cited as legal authority and offer practical insight into how settled principles apply to recurring fact patterns.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Aggravated circumstances: Statutory conditions (e.g., prior involuntary termination of parental rights) that trigger exceptions to reunification requirements. Here, DHS was not obligated to provide reasonable efforts because of the mother’s prior TPR. See § 49-4-604(c)(7)(C).
Reasonable efforts: Services and supports ordinarily required of DHS to help a family remedy conditions of abuse/neglect. In aggravated circumstances, this duty can be excused by statute.
Improvement period: A court-ordered period during which a parent works a case plan under court supervision. A written motion is required, and the parent must prove a likelihood of full participation. No written motion, no improvement period.
No reasonable likelihood of substantial correction: A key statutory threshold for termination. It means the parent is unlikely to correct the underlying conditions in the near term. Persistent substance abuse with failure to respond to treatment is a classic example. See § 49-4-604(d)(1).
Termination without less restrictive alternatives: If no reasonable likelihood of correction exists and termination serves the child’s welfare, the court need not try other measures first. See In re Kristin Y.
Memorandum decision (Rule 21): A short appellate decision issued without oral argument when existing law controls the outcome. It is citable authority and indicates the Court viewed the legal questions as settled.

Conclusion

In re F.S. reinforces several settled, yet critical, pillars of West Virginia abuse and neglect law. Where aggravated circumstances apply, DHS is excused from reasonable efforts; late, compelled treatment will rarely satisfy a parent’s burden to show meaningful and sustained rehabilitation; and termination may proceed without less restrictive alternatives once the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” finding is made and the child’s welfare so requires. Equally important are the procedural lessons: an improvement period requires a written motion, and appellate arguments must be grounded in the record with precise citations.

The decision emphasizes the judiciary’s central charge—prioritizing the child’s safety and permanency—over speculative prospects of parental improvement, especially against a backdrop of ongoing substance abuse and prior terminations. For practitioners, the case underscores the necessity of early, voluntary, and verifiable treatment engagement, meticulous preservation of issues, and precise statutory compliance at every stage.