In re D.T.: Statutory Limits on Successive Improvement Periods and the Parent’s Duty to Proactively Remedy Noncompliance

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re D.T., No. 24-592 (Nov. 12, 2025), affirms the termination of a father’s parental, custodial, and guardianship rights to his minor daughter after a prolonged abuse and neglect proceeding. Although issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, the opinion provides a particularly clear and structured application of the statutory scheme governing “improvement periods,” the statutory time-limits on foster care, and the threshold for terminating parental rights without resorting to less restrictive dispositional alternatives.

The case centers on petitioner father O.T., who lived out of state (Georgia, later Pennsylvania, then Florida) and who suffered from significant medical issues, including diabetes, vascular disease, and osteomyelitis. He argued that these circumstances, along with financial hardship and alleged deficiencies by the Department of Human Services (DHS), excused his failure to comply with his court-ordered post-adjudicatory improvement period and should have entitled him to a further post-dispositional improvement period instead of termination.

The Court rejected these arguments and affirmed termination. In doing so, it reinforced several important principles:

The discretionary nature of improvement periods and the statutory prerequisites for additional (post-dispositional) improvement periods.
The parent’s affirmative duty to initiate and complete all terms of an improvement period, including timely alerting the court and DHS to obstacles.
The operation of the “15 of the most recent 22 months” foster care limit in West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(9).
The rule that termination may be ordered without less restrictive alternatives when there is “no reasonable likelihood” of correction of the underlying conditions, coupled with the controlling role of the child’s best interests and need for permanency.

While the decision does not announce a brand-new legal doctrine, it synthesizes and applies existing precedent in a factually complex scenario involving out-of-state residence, severe health problems, and prolonged foster care. It thus functions as a practical template for how West Virginia courts are expected to handle requests for successive improvement periods and defenses based on alleged uncontrollable circumstances.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Parties and Underlying Allegations

The child at issue, D.T., entered the abuse and neglect system at approximately three years of age. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (then recently restructured from the former Department of Health and Human Resources) filed its initial petition in May 2021 in the Circuit Court of Ohio County.

The DHS alleged that:

The petitioner father, then residing in Georgia, had abandoned D.T.
He failed to protect her from abuse and neglect by her mother and stepfather.
By his absence, he deprived the child of necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, and supervision.

The proceedings involved other children and respondents (not part of this appeal). Notably, D.T.’s mother’s parental rights were terminated in December 2021, leaving the father as the only remaining biological parent with any conceivable path to reunification.

B. Adjudication and Grant of a Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

At the adjudicatory hearing in January 2022, the father appeared telephonically and stipulated that he had failed to protect his daughter. Based on this stipulation, the circuit court adjudicated him as an abusing or neglecting parent. He requested a post-adjudicatory improvement period, which the court granted in March 2022.

However, over one year elapsed before the terms of that improvement period were finalized and implemented in June 2023. The record attributes this in part to:

A transfer of the case to a different circuit judge in May 2022.
Difficulty locating the father, who had by then moved from Georgia to Pennsylvania and ultimately to Florida.

The June 2023 improvement plan required the father to:

Participate in two supervised video calls with D.T. each week.
Submit to drug screening every fourteen days.
Travel to West Virginia for an in-person visit in August 2023, with advance notice to DHS of his intended date by mid-July.
Comply with other case plan requirements not detailed in the memorandum decision but typical of abuse and neglect cases (e.g., maintaining contact, cooperation with services).

C. Noncompliance During the Improvement Period

By the September 2023 status hearing, DHS reported substantial noncompliance:

The father had failed to visit his daughter in person in August 2023 as ordered.
He was not maintaining two weekly video calls; DHS reported only one call per week.
DHS had received no documentation of the required biweekly drug screens.

The father did not attend the September hearing but was represented by counsel, who attributed the missed August visit to medical problems. In November 2023, DHS filed a written status update reiterating the absence of drug test results. The father responded in his own filing, asserting:

He had been drug testing through LabCorp in Florida but did not realize the results were not being forwarded to DHS.
He faced medical restrictions on long-distance ground travel.
He could not afford air travel plus rental car and lodging to attend court or visit his daughter in person.

Separately, the circuit court had previously directed DHS (in an October 2023 order memorializing a June 2023 hearing) to locate a Florida-based agency for drug screening and to pay for those screenings—an effort to facilitate compliance over distance.

D. Dispositional Hearing and Evidence

DHS moved for a dispositional hearing, which occurred in May 2024. Key evidence included:

CPS worker testimony: The father had not visited his daughter in person at any time during the proceedings and had not provided proof of the required biweekly drug screenings.
CPS supervisor testimony: The central problem was the absence of any in-person relationship between father and child. D.T. had been with her foster family for several years; that family had become her primary source of stability.
Foster mother testimony: The child was very bonded to the foster family, had been in their care for about three years, and the foster mother desired to adopt.

The father appeared in person at the dispositional hearing (having traveled from Florida) and testified that:

He had physical custody of D.T. until she was about eighteen months old, when he was incarcerated for a probation violation arising from Maine.
His subsequent contact with the child was limited.
He experienced severe medical problems beginning in November 2021, leading to multiple hospitalizations and inability to work.
He relied solely on Social Security disability benefits and had relocated several times to live with relatives who could assist with his care.
He failed to attend the August 2023 visit due to health and financial constraints.
He did not complete all required drug screens but blamed DHS for failing to set up a Florida-based facility, claiming he had done some tests at a physician’s office and assumed the physician was forwarding results.

The father’s counsel proffered the results of four drug tests, all negative except for prescribed oxycodone; the court accepted this proffer as true. The father concluded his testimony by asserting that his health had improved and that he was now willing to do “whatever was necessary” for reunification.

E. Circuit Court’s Dispositional Order

After the hearing, the father moved for a post-dispositional improvement period. In its September 4, 2024 dispositional order, the circuit court:

Found the father failed to comply with his post-adjudicatory improvement period.
Noted specifically that:
- He never visited his daughter in person at any point in the proceedings, including the ordered August 2023 visit or thereafter.
- He did not consistently maintain the required video contact.
- He failed to provide evidence of random drug screens every fourteen days.
Concluded there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future. The court emphasized that the father had not been present to protect the child from maternal abuse and had not been present at all during much of the case.
Found that the child did not know the father, was uncomfortable around him, and that returning her to his custody would be very upsetting to her.
Observed that D.T. had been in foster care for more than three years, was bonded with her foster family, and needed permanency. Termination of the father’s parental rights was deemed necessary for her welfare.

The court declined to grant a post-dispositional improvement period and terminated the father’s parental, custodial, and guardianship rights. He appealed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order in all respects. Applying the usual standards of review for abuse and neglect cases (clear error for factual findings; de novo for legal conclusions, per In re Cecil T.), the Court addressed three preserved issues:

Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying a post-dispositional improvement period.
Whether termination of parental rights was improper because it was not the “least restrictive” alternative available.
Whether the evidence failed to show a serious threat to the child’s welfare sufficient to justify termination.

The Court’s core holdings include:

A post-dispositional improvement period was unavailable because the father:
- Had already received a post-adjudicatory improvement period.
- Did not demonstrate (or even argue) the “substantial change in circumstances” required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(3)(D) for an additional improvement period.
- Could not avoid the statutory foster care time-limits in § 49-4-610(9) without a clear and convincing finding of compelling circumstances, which the circuit court did not make.
The circuit court acted within its discretion in finding that the father’s noncompliance with the improvement period was not due to circumstances beyond his control; rather, he failed to fulfill his statutory responsibility to initiate and complete all terms and to promptly inform the court and DHS of any obstacles.
Termination of parental rights was permissible without employing less restrictive alternatives because the circuit court properly found “no reasonable likelihood” that the conditions of neglect or abuse could be substantially corrected in the near future under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(3) and In re R.J.M.
Considering the child’s best interests—the controlling standard under In re B.H.—the child’s long placement and strong bond with her foster family, lack of bond with the father, and need for permanency supported termination as necessary for her welfare.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s September 4, 2024 order terminating the father’s parental rights.

IV. Statutory and Precedential Framework

A. Standards of Review – In re Cecil T.

The Court reiterates the standard of review articulated in syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011):

Factual findings of the circuit court in abuse and neglect cases are reviewed for clear error.
Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

This framework is crucial: the Supreme Court does not reweigh evidence but ensures that the record supports the lower court’s factual determinations and that correct legal standards were applied.

B. Improvement Periods and Judicial Discretion – In re Tonjia M. and W. Va. Code § 49-4-610

The concept of an “improvement period” is central to West Virginia abuse and neglect practice. It is a court-ordered window of time in which a parent is given an opportunity to address the conditions that led to the petition, while the child remains in state custody or a foster placement.

In In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002), the Court emphasized:

The granting of an improvement period is discretionary with the circuit court.
An improvement period need not be granted—and may be denied or terminated—when no meaningful improvement is likely.

West Virginia Code § 49-4-610 structures these periods. Of particular relevance:

§ 49-4-610(3)(D) governs post-dispositional improvement periods when a parent has already participated in a prior improvement period (here, a post-adjudicatory one). It allows a further improvement period only if the parent demonstrates:
- A “substantial change in circumstances” since the initial period, and
- That this change makes the parent “likely to fully participate” in the additional period.
§ 49-4-610(4)(A) imposes a clear responsibility: “[T]he respondent shall be responsible for the initiation and completion of all terms of the improvement period.”
§ 49-4-610(9) incorporates the federal permanency benchmark (commonly known as the “15 of the most recent 22 months” rule), prohibiting combinations of improvement periods that keep a child in foster care beyond that timeframe, unless there are “compelling circumstances” shown by clear and convincing evidence that such an extension is in the child’s best interests.

C. Reasonable Efforts and the Parent’s Role – In Interest of Carlita B.

The Court also cites In Interest of Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991), which is often quoted for two related propositions:

DHS (or its predecessor) is obligated to make “reasonable efforts” to preserve and reunify families, including providing appropriate services.
However, the parent’s role and response to those efforts are equally critical; a parent cannot be passive.

In In re D.T., the Court explicitly balances DHS’s duties with the statutory requirement that the respondent parent must take responsibility for initiating and completing services and must bring obstacles to the court’s attention in a timely manner.

D. Termination and the “Least Restrictive Alternative” – W. Va. Code § 49-4-604 and In re R.J.M.

Disposition in abuse and neglect proceedings is governed by West Virginia Code § 49-4-604, which authorizes a range of outcomes—from returning the child home, to granting legal guardianship to another, to terminating parental rights.

Syllabus point 2 of In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980), remains the seminal statement:

Termination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under [§ 49-4-604(c)(6)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.

Section 49-4-604(d) elaborates what “no reasonable likelihood” means. It includes, as one enumerated situation:

§ 49-4-604(d)(3): when the abusing parent has “not responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts.”

Thus, the failure to comply with improvement period conditions can itself support a finding that further remedial efforts are unlikely to succeed, obviating any obligation to try less restrictive dispositional options.

E. Visitation as a Proxy for Potential Improvement – In re Katie S.

In a footnote in In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996), the Court observed:

[T]he level of interest demonstrated by a parent in visiting his or her children while they are out of the parent’s custody is a significant factor in determining the parent’s potential to improve sufficiently and achieve minimum standards to parent the child.

In In re D.T., the Supreme Court relies on this principle to underscore the importance of the father’s failure to conduct any in-person visits and his inconsistent compliance with video visitation, despite the long duration of the case and the opportunities provided.

F. Best Interests as the Controlling Standard – In re B.H.

The Court reiterates the settled rule from syllabus point 4 of In re B.H., 233 W. Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 743 (2014):

The controlling standard that governs any dispositional decision remains the best interests of the child.

This principle frames the entire analysis in In re D.T.. Even if a parent raises sympathetic issues—serious health problems, limited income, interstate moves—the ultimate question is whether maintaining or restoring that relationship serves the child’s long-term safety, stability, and emotional well-being.

G. Appellate Preservation and Abandoned Issues – State v. LaRock

The opinion also briefly invokes State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996), for the proposition that this Court will not consider issues:

“mentioned only in passing,” or
unsupported by pertinent authority on appeal.

Although the petitioner initially listed five assignments of error, the Court notes that only three were actually briefed with argument and authority; the others were deemed abandoned. This underscores the importance of focused appellate briefing and proper preservation of issues.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in In re D.T.

A. Denial of a Post-Dispositional Improvement Period

1. Statutory Eligibility Under § 49-4-610(3)(D)

The father’s primary argument was that the circuit court should have granted him a post-dispositional improvement period instead of terminating his parental rights, especially given his medical and financial hardships.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps:

Because the father already had a post-adjudicatory improvement period, any further improvement period would be governed by West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(3)(D).
Under that section, a parent must show:
- A substantial change in circumstances since the prior improvement period, and
- A likelihood of full participation in the new improvement period due to that change.

Critically, the Court notes that the father never argued—either in the circuit court or on appeal—that he had experienced such a “substantial change in circumstances” after his failed post-adjudicatory improvement period. Instead, he focused on why he did not or could not comply with the original improvement plan (health, finances, DHS’s alleged failures). The Court treats this as a failure to meet the threshold statutory requirement for any post-dispositional improvement period.

2. The Foster Care Time-Limit and Lack of “Compelling Circumstances”

The Court further invokes West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(9), the “15 of the most recent 22 months” rule. This provision generally bars combinations of improvement periods that cause a child to remain in foster care for more than fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, unless:

The circuit court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “compelling circumstances” make extending the time limits in the child’s best interests.

By the time of disposition, D.T. had been in foster care for over three years, far exceeding the 15-month benchmark. The court made no finding of “compelling circumstances” justifying further delay in permanency, and the Supreme Court did not disturb that omission. Thus, even apart from § 49-4-610(3)(D), § 49-4-610(9) creates an independent barrier to further improvement periods absent a heightened best-interests finding.

3. Parent’s Duty to Proactively Address Obstacles

The Court responds directly to the father’s claim that his noncompliance with the improvement plan was due to circumstances beyond his control (serious health problems and poverty).

While recognizing DHS’s duty to provide reasonable reunification efforts, the Court underscores:

Under § 49-4-610(4)(A), the respondent parent “shall be responsible for the initiation and completion of all terms” of the improvement period.
The circuit court had been “highly patient” with the father. If health or financial issues were genuinely impeding compliance, those issues should have been promptly raised through counsel so that the court could adjust the plan or compel DHS to offer assistance.
Instead, the father repeatedly waited until after he was out of compliance to disclose his problems, thereby depriving the court and DHS of an opportunity to remedy them in real time.

The Supreme Court accepts the circuit court’s assessment that the father’s noncompliance was not wholly attributable to circumstances beyond his control; rather, he failed to fulfill his affirmative duty to communicate and to take full advantage of the accommodations that might have been available.

Thus, the denial of a post-dispositional improvement period falls squarely within the circuit court’s discretion and comports with the statutory framework.

B. Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

1. “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Correction – § 49-4-604(d)(3)

Turning to disposition, the father argued that termination was not the “least restrictive” option and that the court should have considered less drastic measures.

The Supreme Court reiterates the longstanding rule from In re R.J.M.: when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future, termination may be ordered without intermediate less restrictive alternatives.

Here, the circuit court:

Found the father did not follow through with the court-approved improvement period.
Relied on § 49-4-604(d)(3), which deems “no reasonable likelihood” when the parent has not responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts.
Considered the father’s history of limited contact with the child, his lack of visitation (especially in-person), and his inconsistent video calls.

The Supreme Court highlighted the principle from In re Katie S. that a parent’s level of interest and effort in visiting a child while the child is out of the parent’s custody is a key predictor of future parental improvement. The record here showed:

No in-person visits during the entirety of the case, despite a specific court order to have an August 2023 in-person visit.
Incomplete compliance even with the less burdensome requirement of two weekly video calls.

These failures, in the context of a multi-year proceeding, were sufficient to support a finding that further efforts were unlikely to succeed in a reasonable timeframe.

2. No Obligation to Try Less Restrictive Alternatives

Having upheld the “no reasonable likelihood” finding, the Supreme Court’s application of R.J.M. is straightforward: because the statutory threshold of § 49-4-604(d) was met, the circuit court was not obligated to consider or attempt less restrictive dispositional alternatives (such as long-term guardianship, another improvement period, or further delayed reunification planning).

C. Best Interests, Permanency, and the Claimed Lack of “Serious Threat”

The father also argued that termination was improper because there was no “serious threat” to the child’s welfare, presumably suggesting that his own conduct did not present an imminent physical or emotional danger.

The Court reframes the analysis using its established doctrine:

The controlling standard in disposition is the child’s best interests (In re B.H.).
Best interests are not limited to assessing current “danger”; they include the need for permanency, stability, and emotional security.

The circuit court’s key findings regarding best interests include:

D.T. had been in her foster placement for over three years, a significant portion of her young life.
She was strongly bonded with her foster family, for whom she viewed as “her family” and source of stability.
She had no real relationship or bond with her father and was uncomfortable around him.
Returning her to his custody “would be very upsetting to the child.”

These findings, well supported by testimony from CPS personnel and the foster mother, led the Supreme Court to conclude that maintaining the legal parent-child relationship with the father was contrary to D.T.’s best interests. Further delay in permanency would harm, rather than protect, her welfare.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. What Is an Improvement Period?

An “improvement period” is a court-supervised period during which a parent is given an opportunity to address and remedy the conditions that led to an abuse and neglect petition, while the child remains in out-of-home care. There are several types:

Post-adjudicatory improvement period: Begins after the parent has been adjudicated as abusing or neglecting but before final disposition.
Post-dispositional improvement period: Granted after an initial dispositional order where parental rights are not yet terminated, used when the court believes additional time may realistically lead to correction of conditions.

Each improvement period has time limits and statutory prerequisites, particularly when a parent seeks successive periods.

B. “Substantial Change in Circumstances”

For a parent who has already had one improvement period (as in this case), requesting another (post-dispositional) improvement period triggers § 49-4-610(3)(D). The parent must show:

Some meaningful, concrete change in their life circumstances since the prior improvement period (e.g., sobriety, stable housing, completion of treatment), and
That this change makes it likely they will fully participate and succeed in the additional improvement period.

Simply arguing that prior failures were not entirely the parent’s fault is not enough. There must be new, positive facts indicating that the next attempt will be different.

C. The “15 of 22 Months” Rule

West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(9) incorporates a federal permanency guideline: generally, a child should not remain in foster care for more than fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months while the system waits for parents to improve.

This time-limit is not absolute, but to exceed it the court must find—by clear and convincing evidence—that there are “compelling circumstances” making it in the child’s best interests to do so (for example, a parent who has very nearly completed necessary treatment and is on the cusp of safe reunification).

In In re D.T., the child had been in foster care for over three years, with no such compelling circumstances found.

D. “No Reasonable Likelihood” That Conditions Can Be Corrected

When the statute refers to “no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future,” it is asking a predictive question:

Based on the parent’s past behavior and response to services, is it realistic to believe that they will fix the problems that endangered the child within a timeframe that is acceptable for the child’s development?

Factors include:

Compliance with improvement periods.
Participation in treatment or services (substance abuse, mental health, parenting, etc.).
Consistency in visitation and maintaining contact.
Stability of housing, employment, and lifestyle.

Failure to follow a reasonable family case plan is itself a statutory basis for concluding that no reasonable likelihood of correction exists.

E. “Least Restrictive Alternative” and Termination

In many legal contexts, courts are required to use the least restrictive means of achieving a legitimate goal. In the child welfare context, however, once a court finds that there is no reasonable likelihood the abuse/neglect conditions can be corrected, it is not required to cycle through lesser dispositional options such as temporary guardianship or additional improvement periods.

That is because those lesser measures delay permanency and may prolong instability for the child, which can itself be harmful. The law prioritizes the child’s right to a stable and permanent home.

F. Best Interests of the Child

“Best interests” is a holistic standard. It includes:

Physical safety and protection from abuse or neglect.
Emotional and psychological well-being.
Continuity and stability in caregiving relationships.
The child’s attachments and bonds with current caregivers.
The child’s need for permanency (a sense of being safely “home” and not in limbo).

Best interests can sometimes require terminating parental rights even where a parent’s failures are not malicious, but stem from illness, poverty, or other hardships, if those hardships cannot reasonably be resolved within a timeframe that is acceptable for the child.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Implications for Parents in Abuse and Neglect Cases

In re D.T. sends several clear signals to parents involved in West Virginia abuse and neglect proceedings:

Improvement periods are opportunities, not guarantees. Receiving one improvement period does not entitle a parent to another. Successive improvement periods require a demonstrated substantial change in circumstances and are constrained by foster care time-limits.
Parents must be proactive. It is not enough to passively hope DHS will solve logistical or financial obstacles. Parents must:
- Maintain regular communication with their attorneys.
- Inform the court promptly—before noncompliance occurs—about any difficulties (health, transportation, finances).
- Seek modifications or assistance proactively rather than raising problems only after missing deadlines or visits.
Visitation is crucial. Courts view a parent’s effort to visit—especially in-person, where feasible—as a key indicator of potential for successful reunification. Lengthy periods with little or no contact weigh heavily against the parent at disposition.
Out-of-state residence and medical issues do not suspend statutory timelines. While such factors can and should influence the design of services (e.g., video visits, local drug testing), they do not stop the clock on the child’s need for permanency or on the statutory time-limits.

B. Implications for DHS and the Courts

For DHS and trial courts, the decision reinforces:

The need to document the reasonable efforts made to facilitate parental compliance (e.g., arranging out-of-state services, coordinating video visits).
The importance of clearly stating in orders that the respondent parent is responsible for initiating and completing terms of an improvement period and for bringing barriers to the court’s attention.
The obligation to monitor foster care duration and to justify any deviations from the 15-of-22-month statutory framework with explicit “compelling circumstances” findings if they are to be made.

The case also suggests that appellate courts will give substantial deference to circuit courts that demonstrate patience with parents yet ultimately prioritize the child’s need for permanency when improvement periods fail.

C. Children’s Rights and Foster Families

From a child-centered perspective, In re D.T. underscores the law’s recognition of:

The significance of a child’s bond with foster caregivers, particularly after multi-year placements.
The harm that can arise from keeping children in extended legal limbo while parental rehabilitation remains uncertain.
The legitimacy of moving toward adoption by a long-term foster family when biological parents have not timely remedied the conditions of abuse or neglect.

The Court implicitly acknowledges that by the time of disposition, the foster family had become the child’s de facto family, and forcing a return to a parent who is essentially a stranger could be emotionally damaging.

D. Status as a Memorandum Decision

Under West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 21, a memorandum decision is generally issued where the case does not present a new or significant issue of law. While less formally precedential than a full published opinion, such decisions still reflect how the Court is applying existing statutes and precedents and are frequently cited for persuasive value.

In re D.T. is best understood as a robust application of established principles—rather than a doctrinal innovation—on:

Statutory prerequisites for successive improvement periods.
Interaction between parental hardships and the parent’s duty to proactively remedy noncompliance.
The decisive role of foster care time-limits and best interests in determining whether termination is appropriate.

VIII. Conclusion

In re D.T. illustrates, in a concrete and fact-sensitive way, the limits of the system’s ability to wait for parental improvement when a child has already spent years in foster care and formed primary attachments elsewhere. The decision reinforces that:

Improvement periods are conditional and bounded by statute; successive periods are not granted absent clear, positive changes and compliance with time-limits.
Parents bear a statutory responsibility to initiate and complete improvement period terms and to alert the court promptly to any barriers.
Failure to follow through with a reasonable case plan can itself justify a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood of correcting the underlying conditions.
Once such a finding is made, termination of parental rights may be ordered without further recourse to less restrictive alternatives.
The best interests of the child—especially the need for stability, permanency, and respect for existing bonds—ultimately control disposition.

While sympathetic to the father’s medical and financial difficulties, the Supreme Court ultimately affirms that the child’s right to a secure and permanent home cannot be subordinated indefinitely to protracted, uncertain attempts at parental rehabilitation. In re D.T. thus stands as a clear reaffirmation of statutory permanency goals, the strict requirements for successive improvement periods, and the centrality of the child’s best interests in West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence.