In re C.W.: Reaffirming Parental Preference and Limiting Grandparent Visitation After Abuse-and-Neglect Reunification

I. Introduction

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals’ memorandum decision in In re C.W., No. 24-769 (Nov. 4, 2025), addresses a recurring and sensitive problem: what happens when a relative who has been a child’s kinship caregiver during abuse-and-neglect litigation seeks grandparent visitation after the child has been successfully reunified with a fit parent who objects to further contact.

The petitioner, G.H., is the child’s maternal step-grandfather. After the child was removed from the maternal grandmother’s home during abuse-and-neglect proceedings, the child was placed with G.H. in a kinship foster placement. The child’s mother, previously incarcerated, obtained an improvement period and was working toward reunification. Over time, the Department of Human Services (DHS) and the circuit court concluded that G.H. was undermining reunification, including by interfering with visitation and speaking negatively about the mother in the child’s presence. DHS ultimately removed the child from G.H. and later the circuit court returned custody to the mother.

G.H. then sought ongoing contact with the child under West Virginia’s Grandparent Visitation Act (W. Va. Code art. 10, ch. 48). Although he never filed a formal grandparent visitation petition, the circuit court nonetheless analyzed the thirteen statutory factors in W. Va. Code § 48‑10‑502 and denied visitation. On appeal, G.H. (self-represented) argued that the circuit court misapplied the statutory factors, misweighed the evidence, and violated his due process rights.

The Supreme Court affirmed. While this is a memorandum decision issued under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure (i.e., the Court perceived no need for oral argument and no novel question of law), it provides important clarification at the intersection of:

the abuse-and-neglect system (kinship placements and reunification), and
the Grandparent Visitation Act and the constitutional “parental preference” doctrine.

The decision reinforces that once a child is reunified with a fit parent, that parent’s opposition to grandparent visitation carries “special weight,” and that prior kinship caregiving—even over a substantial period—does not by itself overcome the statutory presumption against court-ordered grandparent visitation when the fit parent has custody and objects.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

DHS filed an abuse-and-neglect petition in August 2022, naming the maternal grandmother and mother as respondents.
The maternal grandmother held guardianship; the mother was incarcerated at the child’s birth but later paroled.
Upon removal from the grandmother, the child was placed with G.H., the maternal step-grandfather, in a kinship placement.
The mother was adjudicated in January 2023, granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period (later extended), and began supervised visitation.
DHS and the court concluded G.H. was interfering with or undermining reunification.
In January 2024, DHS removed the child from G.H. and placed the child with a maternal aunt to facilitate reunification.
At an April 2024 dispositional hearing, the circuit court ordered that legal and physical custody be restored to the mother at the end of the school year.
After G.H. filed multiple objections, the court held an evidentiary hearing in September 2024 on his request for continued contact.
The circuit court entered a “Final Order Denying Grandparent Visitation” on November 27, 2024.
G.H. appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals.

B. Core Holdings

The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of visitation and held, in substance, that:

Under W. Va. Code §§ 48‑10‑501, 502, and 702(b), a grandparent (or step-grandparent) must rebut a statutory presumption against visitation when the parent through whom the grandparent is related has custody, by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the child’s best interests and will not substantially interfere with the parent–child relationship. G.H. did not meet this burden.
The circuit court properly weighed the thirteen statutory factors in § 48‑10‑502, giving constitutionally required “special weight” to the fit mother’s wishes and to evidence that visitation would destabilize the child’s relationship with her.
The appellate court would not reweigh evidence or second-guess the circuit court’s credibility determinations; because the circuit court’s findings were “plausible in light of the record” and supported by evidence, there was no clear error.
There was no due process violation. Due process required notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard—which G.H. received— but did not require advance notice of opposing parties’ arguments, nor did the record show that G.H. was denied an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.
A party may not raise new assignments of error in a reply brief; G.H. was confined to the errors set out in his principal brief.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory Framework: West Virginia’s Grandparent Visitation Act

1. The Basic Rule – W. Va. Code § 48‑10‑501

Section 48‑10‑501 directs circuit courts to grant reasonable visitation to a grandparent only if two conditions are met:

Visitation is in the best interests of the child; and
Visitation would not substantially interfere with the parent–child relationship.

To make this determination, the court must consider the thirteen factors enumerated in W. Va. Code § 48‑10‑502. While the opinion does not list them one by one, they generally include:

the prior relationship and emotional ties between the grandparent and child,
the relationship between the grandparent and the parent,
the parent’s and grandparent’s motivations,
the effect of visitation (or denial of visitation) on the child’s stability and well-being,
the child’s adjustment to home, school, and community,
the mental and physical health of the parties, and
any history of abuse, neglect, or interference with the parent–child relationship.

Thus, the statute builds a two-step filter:

A broad, child-centered “best interests” inquiry structured around 13 factors; and
A more specific protection for the parent–child relationship: even if visitation is arguably beneficial, it must be denied if it would “substantially interfere” with that relationship.

2. The Parental Preference Presumption – W. Va. Code § 48‑10‑702(b)

Section 48‑10‑702(b) codifies a strong presumption in favor of a fit parent’s decision to deny or restrict grandparent visitation when that parent has custody:

“[T]here is a presumption that visitation privileges need not be extended to [a] grandparent if the parent through whom the grandparent is related to the grandchild has custody of the child,” since that arrangement allows the grandparent to have contact “if the parent so chose.”

This presumption can be overcome, but only by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the child’s best interests. Thus, a grandparent seeking court-ordered visitation over a fit parent’s objection faces a heightened evidentiary burden.

In In re C.W., that presumption squarely applied: the mother, through whom G.H. was related, had legal and physical custody after reunification and strongly opposed visitation. The central appellate question was whether G.H. had produced clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption and satisfy § 48‑10‑501.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

Cited for the standard of review in abuse-and-neglect appeals, Cecil T. provides:

Findings of fact by the circuit court are reviewed for clear error.
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

This framework structures the Court’s approach: while it examines the legal interpretation of the Grandparent Visitation Act afresh, it gives substantial deference to the circuit court’s factual findings about G.H.’s conduct, the mother’s credibility, the nature of their relationship, and the potential impact of visitation on the child.

2. In re Visitation of A.P., 231 W. Va. 38, 743 S.E.2d 346 (2013)

A.P. is central because it explains that West Virginia’s grandparent visitation statutes must be applied in a way that respects federal constitutional constraints, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).

In Troxel, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause protects a fit parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Any statute authorizing third-party visitation over a parent’s objection must give “special weight” to the parent’s wishes.

A.P. confirms that West Virginia’s statutory scheme (including § 48‑10‑501 and § 48‑10‑502) must be applied in a way that reconciles:

the interests of grandparents who often play important roles in children’s lives, and
the constitutional primacy of a fit parent’s decisions.

In In re C.W., the Court explicitly invokes A.P. to emphasize that the mother’s opposition to visitation must carry substantial weight in the analysis, particularly when DHS and the circuit court have deemed her a fit parent and returned custody to her.

3. In re Visitation of L.M., 245 W. Va. 328, 859 S.E.2d 271 (2021)

L.M. similarly underscores that the best-interest factors in § 48‑10‑501 and § 48‑10‑502 are designed to implement, not undermine, the constitutional requirement that a fit parent’s wishes receive “special weight.”

The Court in C.W. cites L.M. to reaffirm that circuit courts considering grandparent visitation cannot treat the parent’s opposition as just one factor among many. Instead, a fit parent’s position is a heavily weighted consideration grounded in constitutional law. This is particularly salient where the parent has recently undergone a successful reunification process following abuse-and-neglect proceedings; undermining that reunification by forcing unwanted grandparent contact risks conflict with both constitutional norms and child-protection policy.

4. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)

Though not discussed in detail, Troxel is the constitutional foundation underlying A.P. and L.M.. The plurality in Troxel invalidated a Washington statute that allowed “any person” to seek visitation at “any time,” with only a general best-interest standard, because it failed to accord sufficient deference to a fit parent’s decisions.

In In re C.W., the Court uses Troxel through A.P. and L.M. to justify:

the statutory presumption in § 48‑10‑702(b) that a fit parent with custody need not be overridden by a court-ordered visitation regime; and
the requirement that any rebuttal of that presumption must be by “clear and convincing” evidence.

5. In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025), and In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996)

These cases are cited in rejecting G.H.’s argument that the circuit court’s factual findings were against the clear weight of the evidence. The Court quotes its own prior explanation:

Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations.
An appellate court must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record.

Applying this doctrine, the Supreme Court holds that the circuit court’s findings—that G.H. attempted to undermine reunification, viewed himself as a parent with decision-making authority, and posed a risk of continued parental alienation—were all supported by testimony and other evidence considered at a full evidentiary hearing. As such, the appellate court would not disturb them.

6. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 218 W. Va. 340, 642 S.E.2d 777 (2005)

G.H. invoked Fernandez to claim that he had a due process right not only to notice of the hearing itself but also to advance notice of the other parties’ arguments opposing visitation. The Court rejects this expansive reading.

Fernandez stands for the familiar rule that due process requires “both notice and the right to be heard.” That is, a litigant must have:

timely notice of the hearing; and
a meaningful opportunity to appear and present evidence and argument.

In C.W., G.H. undisputedly had notice of the evidentiary hearing and appeared. There is no authority, the Court notes, for a constitutional right to advance disclosure of the legal arguments the opposing parties intend to make at that hearing. Nor does the record show that G.H. asked to present rebuttal evidence and was denied.

7. In re L.G., No. 19‑0940, 2020 WL 3447464 (W. Va. June 24, 2020) (memorandum decision)

This case is cited in connection with Rule 10(d) and (g) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure. Those rules require:

that a respondent’s brief specifically respond to each assignment of error, and
that a reply brief adhere to the same structural rules as a respondent’s brief, meaning it must address the assignments of error already raised; it cannot introduce new ones.

The Court uses L.G. to reiterate that a petitioner cannot raise new assignments of error in a reply brief, which is limited to replying to arguments made in the response. Therefore, any new claims G.H. attempted to add in his reply were disregarded.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning Applied to the Facts

1. The Circuit Court’s Findings on the § 48‑10‑502 Factors

The circuit court, despite noting that G.H. never filed a formal petition under Article 10 of Chapter 48, nonetheless:

treated his objections as a de facto request for grandparent visitation, and
conducted a “thorough consideration” of all thirteen statutory factors in § 48‑10‑502.

Key findings included:

The mother was found to be a fit and suitable parent, and she strongly opposed visitation between the child and G.H.
The relationship between G.H. and the mother was “complicated, tumultuous, and toxic.”
G.H. perceived himself not as an extended relative but effectively as a parent “with the right to dictate what happens to [the child].”
G.H. had made negative comments about the mother to the child, among other conduct that the court characterized as efforts to interfere with or undermine reunification.
DHS and service providers offered opinions and testimony that corroborated concerns about G.H.’s interference and the risk of continued parental alienation.
The court concluded that visitation would have a “significant destabilizing effect” on the child’s relationship with his mother.

On this basis, the circuit court made two decisive determinations:

G.H. failed to rebut the presumption in favor of parental preference in § 48‑10‑702(b) by clear and convincing evidence that visitation was in the child’s best interests.
Visitation would substantially interfere with the parent–child relationship and pose a risk of continued parental alienation.

Either determination, standing alone, is sufficient under § 48‑10‑501 and § 48‑10‑702(b) to deny grandparent visitation. Together, they provide a robust legal basis for the denial.

2. Balancing Prior Caregiving Against Parental Preference

G.H. argued that several statutory factors weighed in his favor, especially his longstanding caregiving relationship before and during the proceedings, and his role as a kinship foster caregiver. The Supreme Court does not deny that these factors can, in general, support grandparent visitation.

However, the Court emphasizes that the circuit court had weighed those positive factors against:

the mother’s strong opposition;
the toxic relationship between G.H. and the mother; and
the risk that ongoing visitation would destabilize the newly restored parent–child bond and continue dynamics of parental alienation.

The Supreme Court underscores that this weighing process is precisely what § 48‑10‑502 requires and that the circuit court’s resolution of the competing evidence fell squarely within its discretion.

Importantly, the Court signals that prior kinship caregiving does not override:

the statutory presumption favoring the fit custodial parent’s decision; and
evidence of present interference with reunification or the parent–child relationship.

3. Clear and Convincing Evidence and the Failure to Rebut the Presumption

“Clear and convincing evidence” is a higher standard than “preponderance of the evidence” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It requires evidence that is highly and substantially more likely to be true than not and that produces a firm belief or conviction in the mind of the fact-finder.

Applying this standard, the Court agrees with the circuit court that G.H. did not:

prove by clear and convincing evidence that visitation with him was in the child’s best interests in light of the specific risks identified, or
dispel concerns that visitation would interfere with the mother’s parenting or the stability of the reunited household.

Thus, the statutory presumption in § 48‑10‑702(b) remains intact, and G.H. cannot obtain court-ordered visitation over the mother’s objection.

4. No Appellate Reweighing of Evidence

G.H. also challenged the factual findings that he:

attempted to undermine reunification,
viewed himself as the child’s parent, and
was inappropriately held responsible for the grandmother’s actions.

The Supreme Court, invoking In re D.S. and Tiffany Marie S., explains that these arguments rest on a “fundamental misunderstanding” of the Court’s role. The appellate court:

does not retry the case,
does not reassess witness credibility, and
does not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the trial court.

Instead, it asks whether the circuit court’s account is plausible in light of the record. Here, the circuit court heard testimony from multiple witnesses and made detailed, record-based findings about G.H.’s conduct. Because those findings are more than merely plausible— they are affirmatively supported by the record—the Supreme Court refuses to disturb them.

5. Due Process Claim Rejected

G.H. argued that he was denied due process because:

he allegedly was not given advance notice of the other parties’ arguments opposing his request for visitation, and
he claimed he had no opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.

The Court responds in three steps:

Notice of the hearing: It is undisputed that G.H. had advance notice of the evidentiary hearing and appeared. Therefore, the baseline due process requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard, as discussed in Fernandez, was satisfied.
No right to advance notice of arguments: The Court notes that G.H. cites no authority establishing a constitutional or statutory right to be informed in advance of the particular arguments that other parties intend to raise at the hearing.
Opportunity to present rebuttal evidence: The record does not show that G.H. asked to present rebuttal evidence and was denied. The Court thus rejects his claim that he was prevented from doing so.

6. No New Assignments of Error in Reply

Finally, the Court addresses G.H.’s attempt to raise new errors in his reply brief. Under Rule 10(d) and (g), as clarified in In re L.G., a reply brief must respond to issues previously raised; it cannot introduce new assignments of error. The Court therefore confines its review to the assignments raised in G.H.’s initial brief and ignores any new ones appearing for the first time in reply.

D. Impact of the Decision

1. Reinforcement of Parental Preference After Reunification

In re C.W. strongly reinforces that once a parent has been found fit and granted custody—particularly after a formal abuse-and-neglect process and government-supervised reunification—the parent’s decisions about third-party contact receive extraordinary deference.

Even where:

a grandparent (or step-grandparent) has served as a kinship foster caregiver, and
the child has formed significant bonds during that placement,

the court will not override the fit parent’s reasoned opposition absent clear and convincing evidence that:

visitation is affirmatively in the child’s best interests, and
visitation will not destabilize the new parent–child relationship.

2. Guidance for Kinship Caregivers and Relatives in Abuse-and-Neglect Cases

This decision offers practical guidance for kinship caregivers (including grandparents and step-grandparents) who:

step in during an abuse-and-neglect case,
develop deep emotional ties with the child, and
later face reunification with a parent with whom they may have strained relationships.

In re C.W. signals that:

Kinship caregivers must support, not undermine, reunification efforts, or they risk both removal of the child from their care and disqualification from later seeking visitation on the ground that their conduct threatens the parent–child relationship.
Viewing oneself as the “real” or preferred parent in competition with the biological parent—especially in the presence of the child— will count heavily against a request for post-reunification visitation.
Negative talk about the parent to the child, or behavior suggestive of parental alienation, is particularly damaging.

3. Clarifying the Role of the Grandparent Visitation Act in Abuse-and-Neglect Contexts

The case confirms that when an abuse-and-neglect proceeding concludes with a reunification order, any continuing visitation claims by relatives—including those who served as kinship placement providers—must still be assessed under the Grandparent Visitation Act (W. Va. Code art. 10, ch. 48), with:

the statutory presumption of § 48‑10‑702(b) in favor of the custodial parent; and
the best-interest and non-interference requirements of § 48‑10‑501 and § 48‑10‑502.

Moreover, the Court implicitly approves the circuit court’s willingness to evaluate the statutory factors even when the grandparent has not filed a technically correct or formal petition—particularly where the party is self-represented. But that leniency in procedure does not translate into leniency in substantive standards; the high burdens remain.

4. Due Process in Family-Related Hearings

The decision also clarifies that:

Due process in these settings focuses on notice of the hearing and an opportunity to present evidence and argument at that hearing.
There is no recognized constitutional right to advance notice of opposing counsel’s legal theories or argumentation, unless specifically created by statute or rule.
Self-represented litigants are held to the same basic procedural rules, including the restrictions on raising new arguments in a reply brief.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Best Interests of the Child”

This is the core standard in child-related cases. It asks: What arrangement will most benefit this child’s safety, stability, emotional well-being, and overall development? It is not about what is fairest to adults, but what is best for the child—considering factors like the child’s relationships, adjustment, and the risks of conflict or instability.

2. “Parental Preference” and “Special Weight”

“Parental preference” means that, as long as a parent is fit (not abusive or neglectful, and capable of parenting), the law presumes the parent’s decisions about the child are in the child’s best interests. Courts give those decisions “special weight,” meaning:

they start from the assumption that the parent is right, and
they require strong proof to override the parent’s choice.

This is rooted in federal constitutional law: the Due Process Clause protects a parent’s right to direct the upbringing of their child.

3. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

This is a demanding standard of proof. A grandparent asking the court to overrule a fit parent’s decision must present evidence that:

is highly persuasive,
leads the court to a firm belief or conviction in its truth, and
goes well beyond “slightly more likely than not.”

In In re C.W., G.H. needed to meet this standard to show that visitation was in the child’s best interests despite the mother’s opposition. The courts concluded he did not.

4. “Substantial Interference with the Parent–Child Relationship”

Even if visitation might provide some benefit (e.g., continuity of a relationship with a grandparent), it must be denied if it would substantially interfere with the parent–child relationship. Examples of substantial interference include:

undermining the parent’s authority or rules;
disparaging the parent to the child;
encouraging the child to view the grandparent as the “real” parent; or
exposing the child to ongoing adult conflict that destabilizes their home life.

The circuit court found, and the Supreme Court accepted, that G.H.’s visitation would pose precisely these kinds of risks.

5. “Parental Alienation”

“Parental alienation” refers to behavior by an adult that causes a child to unjustifiably reject or fear a parent. It can involve:

constant criticism of the parent,
false allegations, or
subtle manipulation that portrays the parent as unloving or unsafe.

The circuit court concluded that G.H.’s conduct risked “continued efforts at parental alienation.” In other words, allowing visitation could continue to erode the child’s relationship with his mother—the very relationship that the abuse-and-neglect system had worked to restore.

6. “Kinship Placement”

A kinship placement is when a child removed from parental custody (for example, in an abuse-and-neglect case) is placed with a relative or close family friend, rather than with a non-relative foster family. Kinship placements:

are often favored for continuity and cultural reasons, but
do not automatically confer long-term custody or visitation rights once the child is reunified with a parent.

In re C.W. illustrates that prior kinship caregiving is an important factor but is not decisive when weighed against a fit parent’s opposition and evidence of interference.

V. Conclusion

In re C.W. is a memorandum decision, but it meaningfully clarifies and reinforces several key principles of West Virginia law on grandparent visitation, especially in the context of abuse-and-neglect proceedings and subsequent reunification:

The Grandparent Visitation Act is firmly subordinated to the constitutional parental preference doctrine and the requirement to give special weight to a fit parent’s wishes.
When the parent through whom the grandparent is related has custody, § 48‑10‑702(b) creates a strong presumption against court-ordered grandparent visitation, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the child’s best interests.
Even substantial prior caregiving by a grandparent or step-grandparent—such as a kinship placement during an abuse-and-neglect case— does not automatically overcome that presumption, particularly where the grandparent has undermined reunification or the parent’s authority.
The “best interests of the child” determination is intertwined with the question of whether visitation would substantially interfere with the parent–child relationship; evidence of potential parental alienation or destabilization weighs heavily against visitation.
On appeal, factual findings are strongly protected; appellate courts will not reweigh evidence or revisit credibility so long as the circuit court’s account is plausible and supported by the record.
Due process in these hearings requires notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard—not advance disclosure of all legal arguments the opposing side plans to raise.
Appellate procedure rules limiting new issues in reply briefs apply equally to self-represented litigants.

In short, In re C.W. underscores that the lodestar of West Virginia’s child-related jurisprudence remains the combination of the child’s best interests and the constitutionally protected primacy of a fit parent’s decisions. Grandparent or relative caregivers who step in during a crisis are invaluable, but once the state has determined that a parent is fit and reunification is complete, the law will rarely force unwanted ongoing visitation that risks undermining that restored parent–child bond.