In-Person Notification Requirement as an Essential Element of Sex Offender Registration Violations

Introduction

State of Iowa v. Ronald Eugene Cooley (No. 23-1375, Iowa Supreme Court, May 16, 2025) addresses whether the statutory requirement that a sex offender “appear in person to notify the sheriff” of a change of residence under Iowa Code § 692A.104(2) constitutes an essential element of the crime of failing to register. After Cooley moved in January 2021—during the COVID-19 pandemic—he attempted to register his new address but encountered a closed sheriff’s office and phone-system difficulties. Charged with two registration violations, Cooley was acquitted of residing falsely at one address but convicted of failing to register his move to Cedar Rapids within five business days. The jury instructions omitted the “in person” element. On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded for a new trial, holding that personal appearance is an indispensable statutory element.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Iowa unanimously held that:

Section 692A.104(2) unambiguously requires a sex offender, within five business days of changing residence, to “appear in person to notify the sheriff.”
That in-person appearance is a statutory element of the offense of failing to register a change of address; jury instructions must include all elements of the crime.
The district court erred by omitting the “in person” requirement from the marshaling instruction (Instruction 15), thereby misstating the law.
The instructional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the jury might have believed Cooley’s testimony that he did attempt to appear in person.
The conviction under count II is reversed, sentence vacated, and the case remanded for a new trial with proper instructions.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The court relied on foundational principles and prior decisions to define elements of crime, interpret statutes, and govern jury instructions:

Statutory Elements and Jury Instructions:
- State v. Billings, 242 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1976): All essential elements must appear in a marshaling instruction.
- Conner v. State, 362 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1985): Defines a marshaling instruction as setting forth constituent parts of a crime.
- State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 2018): Standard of review on jury instructions.
Statutory Construction:
- State v. White, 545 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa 1996): Elements of offense derived from statute.
- State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 2018): Contextual reading of statutory text.
- Bribriesco-Ledger v. Klipsch, 957 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa 2021): Material variations in statutory terms indicate variations in meaning.
Strict Construction of Penal Statutes:
- State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 2011): Crimes must be defined by the legislature; strict construction promotes fair warning.
- Maxwell v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 903 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 2017): Penal provisions in chapter 692A construed strictly.
COVID-19 Jurisprudence:
- Rivas v. Brownell, 18 N.W.3d 211 (Iowa 2025): Tolling statutes of limitations during pandemic.
- State v. Basquin, 970 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 2022): Temporarily suspending procedural rules during pandemic.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded in two main steps:

Statutory Interpretation of § 692A.104: Reading subsections (1)–(7) in full reveals that the legislature expressly mandated “appear in person” for initial registrations (subsection 1), changes in residence (subsection 2), moves across counties (subsection 5), and the in-office appearance requirement (subsection 7). By contrast, subsection 3—addressing changes to Internet accounts, phone numbers, and cohabitants—permits notification by rule, telephone, or electronic means. The choice to omit “in person” in subsection 3 and include it elsewhere reflects deliberate legislative design.
Jury Instruction Principles: Under Billings and Conner, jury instructions that marshal the offense elements must include every element. Here, the district court’s Instruction 15 recited Cooley’s knowledge of his duty to register and the five-day deadline but failed to specify that the State must prove non-appearance in person. This omission misstates the law and deprives the jury of a required component of the crime.

The State’s argument that the pandemic-related closure allowed telephone registration cannot override the clear statutory text. Criminal statutes cannot be rewritten by administrative practice or exigent circumstances; only the legislature may alter statutory elements.

3. Impact

This decision has several significant ramifications:

It reaffirms that administrative modifications (such as office closures or phone-system alternatives) cannot excise statutory elements of criminal offenses.
It underscores the necessity for trial courts to include all statutory elements in jury instructions, particularly in complex registration statutes.
It signals that courts will strictly construe penal provisions, even when public health emergencies disrupt normal procedures.
It guides prosecutors and defense counsel to focus on each statutory requirement, anticipating challenges when administrative practices diverge from statutory text.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Marshaling Instruction: A jury instruction that lists the elements the prosecution must prove to secure a conviction. It “marshals” or organizes those elements into a clear format for the jury.
Essential Element: A constituent part of a crime defined by statute. The prosecution must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Harmless Error Doctrine: An appellate standard asking whether an error in the trial—such as a missing jury‐instruction element—was so inconsequential that it did not affect the verdict.
Strict Construction: A principle requiring penal statutes to be interpreted narrowly and in favor of the defendant, ensuring that people have fair warning of prohibited conduct.

Conclusion

State of Iowa v. Cooley establishes that the “appear in person” requirement in Iowa Code § 692A.104(2) is an indispensable element of the crime of failing to register a change of address. The ruling enforces strict statutory fidelity, mandates precise jury instructions, and limits the capacity of administrative practices to alter criminal elements. On remand, the district court must instruct the jury that the State bears the burden of proving Cooley’s failure to appear in person within five business days—ensuring that the defendant’s constitutional right to a properly instructed jury is preserved.