“In Connection With” Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B): Constructive Facilitation and the Presumption from Knowing Possession During an Armed Robbery

Introduction

In United States v. Demarion Nelson (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 37-month sentence for unlawful possession of a machinegun, rejecting the defendant’s challenge to a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (noting the Opinion’s parenthetical that the provision has been recompiled as U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) in the most recent Guidelines).

The case arose from three armed robberies in Montgomery, Alabama, linked by a maroon vehicle—ultimately identified as a maroon Nissan Altima with a particular license plate. Police later attempted a traffic stop of a matching car, which led to a high-speed chase. Nelson fled on foot, discarded an AR-style firearm later determined to be a fully automatic machinegun due to a “drop-in auto-sear,” and hid in a shed where he was found. He admitted possessing the Glock and the AR-style rifle and knowing the rifle had been converted to a machinegun, but denied involvement in the robberies.

The key sentencing issue was whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Nelson possessed the AR-style firearm “in connection with” an armed robbery—despite no indication that an AR-style rifle was displayed during the robberies and despite Nelson’s denial of participation.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Applying clear-error review to the “in connection with” finding, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that:

Nelson was involved in the third armed robbery because he was driving the exact vehicle identified by victims only hours later and fled from police; and
Nelson possessed the AR-style firearm in the Altima during the robberies because he discarded it while fleeing from the crashed Altima shortly after the stop attempt.

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent giving “in connection with” an expansive construction, the firearm need only facilitate or have the potential to facilitate the other felony. The court concluded the AR-style firearm in the car during an armed robbery could have facilitated the robbery; therefore the enhancement applied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Opinion is principally an application of well-established Eleventh Circuit sentencing principles rather than an announcement of a new doctrinal test. It draws on two lines of authority: (1) the standard of review and burden of proof at sentencing, and (2) the meaning of “in connection with” in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

1) Review standards and sentencing proof

United States v. Martinez, 964 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2020): supplies the framework—Guidelines interpretation/application reviewed de novo; factual findings reviewed for clear error; and specifically states that a finding that a defendant possessed a gun “in connection with” another felony is a factual finding reviewed for clear error. It also provides the “definite and firm conviction” formulation for clear error (via other cases).
United States v. Dimitrovski, 782 F.3d 622 (11th Cir. 2015): cited in Martinez for the standard of review formulation (de novo vs. clear error).
United States v. Askew, 193 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 1999): confirms the government’s burden at sentencing is a preponderance of the evidence for enhancement facts, citing:
- United States v. Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1995)
- United States v. Shriver, 967 F.2d 572 (11th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Bishop, 940 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2019): cited (through Martinez) for the proposition that “in connection with” is a factual finding reviewed for clear error.
United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007): contribute the articulation of clear-error review used in Martinez and repeated here.

These authorities mattered because Nelson’s challenge was framed as insufficiency of evidence tying him and the firearm to the robbery. Under preponderance plus clear-error deference, the appellate question became whether the district court’s narrative inference (vehicle match + temporal proximity + flight + firearm discard) was permissible—not whether a different inference might also have been plausible.

2) The “in connection with” construction under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

United States v. Brooks, 112 F.4th 937 (11th Cir. 2024): anchors the substantive rule that “mere possession” can suffice under certain circumstances and that the phrase “in connection with” receives an “expansive construction.”
United States v. Matos-Rodriguez, 188 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999) and United States v. Young, 115 F.3d 834 (11th Cir. 1997): cited via Brooks as the origins of the “expansive construction” approach.
United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82 (11th Cir. 2013): supplies the core facilitation test—possession is “in connection with” another felony if the firearm “facilitates, or has the potential of facilitating” the other offense—and the “strong presumption” that the weapon has such potential when the defendant is aware of its presence.

The Opinion uses these cases to treat the enhancement as turning less on whether the firearm was displayed and more on whether its known presence could support the felony’s commission (e.g., emboldening, protection, escalation potential).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two linked steps: (1) factual linkage to the other felony, and (2) the legal nexus between the firearm and that felony.

1) Factual linkage to the third armed robbery

Nelson argued the suspect descriptions were vague, there was no direct proof he was in the Altima during the robberies, there were hours between the robbery and stop, and no one reported an AR-style rifle. The district court nonetheless found sufficient evidence connecting Nelson to the third robbery, emphasizing:

the car Nelson drove matched the robbery vehicle description (including the same license plate referenced in the robberies);
the stop occurred only hours after the robbery; and
Nelson’s immediate flight and high-speed chase behavior supported consciousness of guilt.

On appeal, under clear-error review (as framed through United States v. Martinez), the panel held these inferences were not implausible on the record and therefore not clearly erroneous.

2) Nexus: “in connection with” through potential facilitation

Having accepted the district court’s factfinding that Nelson possessed the AR-style firearm in the Altima during the robbery, the panel applied the Eleventh Circuit’s expansive reading of “in connection with.” Under United States v. Brooks and United States v. Carillo-Ayala, it is enough that the firearm could facilitate or potentially facilitate the other felony; and when the defendant knows the gun is present, there is a “strong presumption” of that potential.

The district court’s logic—adopted by the panel—was that having an AR-style firearm in the car during an armed robbery could embolden participants, protect them, deter resistance, or otherwise make the felony easier or safer to carry out (even if not displayed). On that understanding, the enhancement does not require that the AR-style rifle be the weapon seen by victims; it requires that the firearm the defendant possessed had facilitative potential with respect to the felony.

3) Alternative sentence note

The district court stated it would have imposed the same 37-month sentence even without the four-level enhancement. The panel affirmed on the primary merits ground (no clear error in applying the enhancement) and did not need to rely on the alternative-sentence statement.

Impact

Although unpublished, the decision illustrates how the Eleventh Circuit’s “expansive construction” of “in connection with” operates in practice:

Presence-in-vehicle can be enough: A firearm’s known presence in a getaway or offense vehicle can satisfy the nexus where the predicate felony is inherently confrontational (here, armed robbery), even if the gun at issue is not the one brandished.
Circumstantial evidence can carry the government’s burden: Matching vehicle identifiers, temporal proximity (“hours later”), flight, and possession/discarding of the firearm can support the preponderance standard for linking the defendant, the firearm, and the felony.
Appellate deference is decisive: Because the nexus determination is treated as fact-bound (per United States v. Martinez), defendants face an uphill climb on appeal when the district court has made a coherent inferential chain grounded in record facts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Preponderance of the evidence”: The government must show something is more likely true than not (just over 50%) to support a sentencing enhancement. This is lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
“Clear error” review: The appellate court will not reverse a factual finding unless it is left with a “definite and firm conviction” a mistake was made. If the district court’s inference is plausible, the finding typically stands.
“In connection with”: In this circuit’s Guidelines jurisprudence, the firearm need not be fired or even displayed. It is enough if the firearm facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the other felony—such as by emboldening an offender or protecting the offender during the crime.
Guidelines “enhancement”: A rule that increases the advisory sentencing range when certain facts are found (here, possession of a firearm “in connection with” another felony offense).

Conclusion

United States v. Demarion Nelson reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s broad understanding of “in connection with” in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B): when a defendant knowingly possesses a firearm contemporaneously with a felony like armed robbery, the enhancement may apply even absent proof the firearm was displayed, so long as the gun could have facilitated the offense. The Opinion’s practical significance lies in its endorsement of circumstantial, temporally proximate evidence—and its reminder that, under clear-error review, sentencing courts retain substantial room to draw common-sense inferences about how firearms can support the commission of violent felonies.