Implied License to Knock and Trespass-Based Terry Stops:
A Detailed Commentary on Gonzalez v. Brunnemer (10th Cir. 2025)
I. Introduction
This commentary analyzes the Tenth Circuit’s unpublished but citable order and judgment in Gonzalez v. Brunnemer, No. 24‑1200 (10th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025). The case addresses whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to detain a man for suspected trespass when that man was standing on the front steps of a house that the officer believed might be vacant or abandoned.
The decision is significant for three intertwined reasons:
- It tightly links the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable-suspicion requirement to the well-established “implied license” allowing any person to approach a home’s front door and knock.
- It clarifies that mere presence at the front door of a possibly vacant or “abandoned-looking” home, without more, does not create reasonable suspicion of trespass.
- It holds that this limitation was already clearly established for qualified-immunity purposes, thus exposing the officer to liability in a § 1983 suit.
The plaintiff, Victor Manuel Trevizo Gonzalez, sued Officer Kody Brunnemer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in Gonzalez’s favor on the unlawful-seizure claim, awarded $1 in nominal damages, and denied qualified immunity. Officer Brunnemer appealed; the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Events Leading to the Encounter
On January 29, 2021, Officer Kody Brunnemer received an anonymous call about a house in Greeley, Colorado. The caller reported:
- They had seen several people coming and going from the home;
- The house appeared to have been vacant for approximately eighteen months;
- No description of those people was provided; and
- Critically, no specific criminal activity was reported.
In response, Officer Brunnemer:
- Visited the property;
- Saw no people and no sign of criminal activity;
- Knocked on the door—no one answered;
- Looked through windows and saw a couch but little else; and
- Concluded the property looked “kind of abandoned” and “gave the appearance that it was a vacant house,” but he did not verify this status with any owner, records, or neighbors.
About six days later, around 10:00 p.m., during routine patrol, he again passed the property. He saw Gonzalez and another man near the front door, on a three-step stoop. Importantly, the house was on a corner lot with two doors accessible from public sidewalks; the court refers to the relevant entry as the “front door.”
The undisputed record shows:
- Neither man was peering into windows, manipulating locks, trying doors, or otherwise attempting forced entry.
- Gonzalez was simply standing on the top step of the front stoop; his companion was at the bottom.
B. The Seizure and Arrest
Officer Brunnemer:
- Drove into the driveway, shining his patrol car’s headlights directly at them;
- Approached and asked why they were there and for identification;
- Heard from the companion that they did not live there but had come because a friend named John had invited them;
- Received Gonzalez’s name and date of birth; and then
- Ordered both men to “hang out right there” and not move while he returned to his squad car to run their information.
Gonzalez complied and remained where ordered—this, the district court held (and the officer did not contest on appeal), constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. When the officer began walking back toward them, Gonzalez attempted to leave on his bicycle. Officer Brunnemer caught up to him and arrested him.
C. The Civil Rights Action and District Court Ruling
Gonzalez brought a § 1983 action against:
- Officer Kody Brunnemer (individual and official capacities);
- Another officer (Kevin Douglas); and
- The City of Greeley, Colorado.
He asserted, among other things:
- An unreasonable-seizure claim, based on the contention that the initial detention lacked reasonable suspicion;
- An excessive-force claim based on the arrest.
The district court:
- Held that the seizure began when the officer “initially contacted [Gonzalez] and began questioning him,” and at the latest when he ordered the men to “hang out right there” and not move;
- Concluded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify this Terry stop;
- Held that the violation was clearly established, thus rejecting qualified immunity; and
- Awarded Gonzalez $1 in nominal damages on this claim.
The excessive-force claim was resolved in the officer’s favor on qualified-immunity grounds and was not at issue on appeal. Officer Brunnemer appealed only the seizure/qualified-immunity ruling. The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirmed.
III. Summary of the Opinion
The Tenth Circuit (Judge Moritz writing, joined by Judges Kelly and Rossman) held:
- Constitutional violation: Officer Brunnemer seized Gonzalez without reasonable suspicion that he was committing trespass or any other crime, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment.
- Clearly established law: At the time of the incident, it was clearly established that:
- Any occupant or visitor—and likewise any officer—has an implied license to approach the front door of a residence and knock; and
- Merely being present at such a front door—even of a house that appears vacant—cannot, without more, supply reasonable suspicion of trespass.
- Disposition: The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Gonzalez and the award of nominal damages.
Though designated an “Order and Judgment” and nonprecedential (except for law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), the decision may be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Substantively, it offers an important and concrete application of the “implied license to knock” doctrine in the reasonable-suspicion and qualified-immunity context.
IV. Detailed Analysis
A. The Fourth Amendment Framework Applied
The court grounds its analysis in familiar Fourth Amendment doctrine:
- Type of seizure: The encounter was an investigatory detention or Terry stop—more intrusive than a voluntary encounter but less intrusive than an arrest.
- Standard: Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), an officer can conduct a brief investigative detention if he has reasonable suspicion—a particularized, objective basis for suspecting criminal activity “may be afoot,” based on articulable facts and the totality of circumstances.
- Reasonable suspicion: As reiterated from cases like United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266 (2002), and United States v. Young, 99 F.4th 1136 (10th Cir. 2023),
reasonable suspicion is:
- More than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” yet
- Less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Importantly, following Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), the court reiterates that mere presence in an area of suspected or actual criminal activity, standing alone, cannot supply reasonable suspicion. There must be some fact or combination of facts particular to the individual stopped.
B. Application: Why the Court Found No Reasonable Suspicion
Officer Brunnemer asserted that he detained Gonzalez on suspicion of trespass, defined under Colorado law and Greeley’s municipal code as unlawfully entering or remaining on the premises of another. The problem, as the Tenth Circuit explains, is that nothing about Gonzalez’s conduct at the time of the encounter reasonably suggested an unlawful presence.
Key facts weighed by the court:
- Gonzalez was standing on the stoop by the front door, an area routinely accessible to the public.
- He was not:
- Trying door handles;
- Peering into windows;
- Manipulating locks; or
- Engaging in evasive behavior.
- The property was suspected—not confirmed—to be vacant or abandoned, based on prior observation and an anonymous tip that indicated no specific criminal activity.
- The officer himself had previously approached the same door and knocked, behaving as any citizen would and thereby implicitly recognizing that this was a place where people could lawfully go.
The court emphasizes that:
“[I]t is not unlawful for someone to approach a residence and knock on the door or ring the doorbell, even at night.”
Thus, the officer’s belief that the house “looked abandoned” or that “there should not be people there” at that hour of night was, at best, an amorphous, generalized hunch. He had no facts particularized to Gonzalez suggesting that Gonzalez was not permitted to be there or that a trespass offense was occurring.
The court offers several plausible innocent explanations that a reasonable officer should have considered:
- Gonzalez might simply have had the wrong address;
- The home might have been occupied but in poor condition;
- A friend might recently have purchased the home and invited Gonzalez.
These possible lawful explanations—combined with the known implied license to approach a door—rendered the conduct too innocuous to justify a Terry stop, especially absent any corroborating indicia of unlawful entry or remaining.
C. The Implied License to Approach a Home and Knock
The linchpin of the opinion is the doctrine of the implied license to knock, drawn from Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), and the Tenth Circuit’s own decision in United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 2016).
In Jardines, the Supreme Court explained that societal customs create an implied license that allows anyone—including officers—to:
“[A]pproach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.”
Jardines stressed that this is such a basic social norm that “the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick‑or‑treaters” rely on it without difficulty. The Tenth Circuit in Carloss reiterated: a police officer, like any private citizen, may approach a home, knock, and seek to speak with occupants.
In Gonzalez, the Tenth Circuit applies this doctrine in a novel but logically straightforward way:
- Because the implied license exists for the public—and explicitly for police—to approach and knock, a person who is simply exercising that license by standing at a front door is, by default, engaged in presumptively lawful conduct.
- The fact that the house appears vacant or “kind of abandoned” does not automatically negate the license, particularly where the officer himself had done the same thing (knocking on the door) just days earlier.
- Absent additional, particularized facts—such as “No Trespassing” signs, a clear revocation of the license, a complaint by an identified property owner, or overt attempts at forced entry—standing on the stoop falls squarely within the implied license and cannot, on its own, be construed as suspicious.
The court notes that even posted “No Trespassing” signs did not revoke the implied license in Carloss, a more property-protective scenario than the one here. If explicit signage did not eliminate the implied license in Carloss, then mere appearance of vacancy certainly could not do so in Gonzalez.
From this, the court reasons: the officer’s suspicion collapses once the implied license is acknowledged. The only articulated basis for suspicion was that “no one should be” at the house at that hour, but the Fourth Amendment requires more than that kind of generalized unease, especially where the law itself endorses the very conduct observed (approaching and knocking).
D. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
1. Core Fourth Amendment and Terry Cases
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) — These cases provide the basic structure: an officer must have “reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts” that “criminal activity may be afoot” before conducting a limited stop. The Tenth Circuit applies this formulation to the trespass context.
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) — Emphasizes evaluation of the “totality of the circumstances.” The Tenth Circuit acknowledges this command but finds the “totality” here is still devoid of particularized suspicion: everything Gonzalez did was consistent with lawful behavior protected by the implied license to knock.
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) — Establishes that presence in an area of expected criminal activity cannot, standing alone, support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that someone is committing a crime. The Tenth Circuit invokes this principle to reinforce that “innocent conduct in a suspicious location” is not enough.
- United States v. Young, 99 F.4th 1136 (10th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374 (10th Cir. 2015) — Reinforce that reasonable suspicion must rest on a “particularized and objective basis” and that while officers may draw on their experience and training, their inferences must still be tethered to concrete facts.
2. Presence in Suspicious Places and Innocent Conduct
- United States v. Dell, 487 F. App’x 440 (10th Cir. 2012) — In Dell, officers observed individuals peering into car windows in an area known for car break‑ins. Despite the suspicious context, the Tenth Circuit held there was no reasonable suspicion because looking through car windows—without more—was “so innocuous and so very much in the realm of ordinary behavior” that it would not suggest a car break-in. The court draws a direct parallel: if even peering into car windows in a high-crime area was too mild to justify a stop, then simply standing on a front stoop (where an implied license clearly exists) is even less suspicious.
- United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465 (10th Cir. 1996)
- United States v. Hernandez, 847 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2017)
- Romero v. Story, 72 F.3d 880 (10th Cir. 1995)
- Proximity to a crime-prone place (e.g., a bar with a criminal reputation, a construction site with theft problems, a parking lot where vandalism occurred) plus innocuous behavior (walking, standing, being present) does not amount to reasonable suspicion, even when the detained individuals have criminal histories or match some very general description.
These earlier Tenth Circuit cases collectively stand for the proposition that:
The district court in Gonzalez relied on this “innocent conduct in a suspicious place” line of cases to find both a violation and clearly established law. The Tenth Circuit affirms the violation on somewhat narrower grounds (focusing on the implied license) but does not reject the district court’s reading of this precedent.
3. Trespass and Property-Based Reasonable Suspicion
- Jones v. Manriquez, 811 F. App’x 482 (10th Cir. 2020) — Officers saw Jones sitting in a car at 1:30 a.m. in a private garage in a high-crime area, in a reserved business parking spot. After running the license plate, they learned the car was not registered to that address. The Tenth Circuit held that reasonable suspicion was present, emphasizing that these were facts particularized to Jones: he was in a reserved spot, and records showed no connection between him and the property. This contrasts with Gonzalez, where the officer had no such particularized facts linking Gonzalez to unlawful presence on the property.
- Montgomery v. Bliley, No. 19‑cv‑02042, 2021 WL 1207442 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2021) — A district court case (cited for comparison) where officers had reasonable suspicion of trespass because panhandlers were on a private median next to “private property,” “no trespassing,” and “no soliciting” signs. Here, by contrast, there were no such signs or explicit limitations on access to the front stoop.
The court also distinguishes various out-of-circuit cases cited by the officer (e.g., Gonzalez v. City of Huntington Beach, Easley v. County of Santa Clara, Rogers v. City of Stuart Police Department, Lollie v. Johnson, Tarhaqa Allen v. N.Y.C. Police Department) on a common ground: in each of those cases, officers had specific, individualized reasons to connect the plaintiff to an actual or reported trespass or other offenses—such as a named complainant identifying the suspect, observed intoxication and admission of no connection to the property, entry without a key into a secured building, or refusal to cooperate with private security. The absence of such personalized indicators in Gonzalez is decisive.
4. The Implied License Cases: Jardines and Carloss
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) — Recognizes and describes the implied license for anyone (including police) to approach a home and knock. The Court there used the doctrine to limit police: bringing a drug-sniffing dog onto the porch exceeded the scope of this customary license and was a search. In Gonzalez, the Tenth Circuit uses the same doctrine to protect civilians: if officers may, as private citizens, approach and knock under this license, then civilians who do so cannot automatically be treated as presumptive trespassers.
- United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 2016) — Holds that even “No Trespassing” signs in the yard did not clearly revoke the implied license for an officer to approach the front door and knock. Gonzalez extends this logic: if explicit signage in Carloss did not strip civilians of the implied license, then the mere appearance of vacancy, with no signage or owner complaint, cannot do so either.
E. Qualified Immunity and Clearly Established Law
Qualified immunity shields officers from monetary liability unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right. The Tenth Circuit applies its usual standard, drawing on:
- McCoy v. Meyers, 887 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 2018)
- Mayfield v. Bethards, 826 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2016)
- Perea v. Baca, 817 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2016)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015)
- Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011)
- Est. of Smart ex rel. Smart v. City of Wichita, 951 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2020)
- Halley v. Huckaby, 902 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2018)
- Krueger v. Phillips, Nos. 24‑7035, 24‑7037, 24‑7066, 2025 WL 2424209 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025)
Key principles reiterated:
- Clearly established law must not be defined “at a high level of generality” (e.g., stating only that “officers may not detain without reasonable suspicion” is not specific enough).
- But courts do not require a “scavenger hunt” for a prior case with identical facts; a sufficiently analogous body of law can clearly establish the rule.
- Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent must make the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct apparent to “every reasonable officer.”
In Gonzalez, the officer argued that there was no case “on point” involving reasonable suspicion of trespass based on a person’s presence on private property—as opposed to public streets or sidewalks. The Tenth Circuit rejects this framing as too crude. The crucial factor is where on the property Gonzalez was located: at the front door, within the ambit of the implied license.
The court’s clearly-established analysis rests on two interlocking strands of precedent:
- Implied License Doctrine
Cases like Jardines and Carloss clearly establish:
- Any member of the public, including police, has an implied license to approach a front door and knock.
- This license is basic, widely understood, and not easily revoked.
- Innocent Conduct in Suspicious Areas Cases such as Davis, Hernandez, Romero, and Dell clearly establish that innocent-seeming conduct (walking, standing, peering without touching) in a location associated with crime does not, without particularized indicators, create reasonable suspicion. In Gonzalez, standing on a stoop at a possibly vacant house is just such innocent conduct, and there were no individualized facts to elevate it.
The Tenth Circuit notes it could rely entirely on this “innocent conduct in suspicious places” line of cases, but instead focuses on the even more robust implied-license rationale. The central holding on clearly established law is:
Because any reasonable officer would know that merely being at the front door of a home does not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, Officer Brunnemer’s conduct violated clearly established law.
In other words, by 2021 it should have been obvious to any reasonable officer in the Tenth Circuit that:
- Approaching a front door is licensed and presumptively lawful;
- Merely being on the stoop of a possibly vacant house, without more, does not supply reasonable suspicion of trespass; and
- A Terry stop based solely on that generalized concern is unconstitutional.
F. Impact and Future Implications
Although nonprecedential, Gonzalez will likely be influential in several ways:
1. Trespass-Based Terry Stops
The opinion tightens the standards for using trespass as the predicate offense justifying a stop. Officers must point to specific facts indicating:
- The individual lacks permission or any plausible connection to the property, or
- The property has clearly revoked the implied license (e.g., locked gated entry, clear “No Trespassing” or “No Solicitation” signs at the point of approach, or specific knowledge of prior explicit revocation).
Simply being on a property that “looks” vacant or in a neighborhood known for trespass is insufficient. Officers will need to articulate concrete indicia—such as:
- Forcing entry or tampering with locks;
- Remaining on the property in defiance of explicit instructions to leave;
- Specific complaints from identified owners or tenants naming the person as a trespasser;
- Misuse of restricted-access structures (e.g., locked garages, fenced yards, secured lobbies).
2. Protection for Everyday Knock-and-Talk Activity
The decision reinforces protection for routine door-to-door activities:
- Visitors and guests arriving at a residence;
- Door-to-door political canvassers and religious missionaries;
- Salespeople and charity solicitors (subject, of course, to local solicitation regulations);
- Neighbors checking on each other’s homes, even in late hours under certain circumstances.
It makes explicit that people engaged in such ordinary knock-and-talk activity cannot be singled out for Terry stops merely because an officer suspects the house might be vacant or the area has seen trespass issues.
3. Integration of Property Concepts into Fourth Amendment Analysis
Gonzalez is a noteworthy example of how property concepts (implied license, trespass, private property versus public ways) intersect with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable-suspicion requirement. It confirms that:
- Courts will look not just at the binary public/private property distinction, but at the social expectations regarding particular spaces on property (e.g., the front path and stoop versus a fenced backyard or inside a garage).
- The implied license to knock is not just a search-law doctrine; it also informs what counts as “innocent conduct” for purposes of seizure.
Defendants and civil-rights plaintiffs can cite this order to argue that police must respect the same social norms about access to homes that everyone else must respect—and cannot treat ordinary use of those norms as inherently suspicious.
4. Qualified Immunity Litigation
The opinion underscores several points likely to recur in qualified-immunity disputes:
- Clever re-labeling of facts (e.g., “he was on private property”) cannot obscure more specific, controlling doctrines (e.g., “he was at the front door under an implied license”).
- Courts may reject attempts to demand factually identical precedent and instead look to whether existing doctrine, when applied at the correct level of specificity, clearly covers the conduct.
- Officers’ subjective beliefs about reasonable suspicion carry no weight; the standard is objective.
In combination with decisions like Krueger and Estate of Smart, Gonzalez demonstrates that qualified immunity does not protect officers who ignore settled, fundamental principles—here, the basic legality of approaching a front door.
V. Key Concepts Simplified
1. Terry Stop / Investigatory Detention
An investigatory detention (often called a “Terry stop”) is when an officer briefly detains a person to investigate possible criminal activity, even without probable cause to arrest. It must be:
- Brief in duration;
- Narrowly tailored to confirming or dispelling suspicion; and
- Supported by reasonable suspicion—more than a hunch, less than proof.
In Gonzalez, ordering the men to “hang out right there” and not move, while the officer ran their information, converted the encounter from a consensual conversation into a Terry stop.
2. Reasonable Suspicion
Reasonable suspicion is:
- An objective standard: what would a reasonable officer think, given all the facts?
- Based on specific and articulable facts, not gut feelings alone.
- “Particularized”: it must relate to the specific person being stopped, not just the general environment.
In a trespass context, officers must have some reason to think a particular person is unlawfully on the property—not just “someone could be trespassing at that property generally.”
3. Implied License to Knock
The “implied license to knock” is a social and legal principle: by custom, homeowners implicitly permit the public to:
- Walk up the usual entry path to the front door;
- Knock or ring the bell;
- Wait briefly for a response; and
- Leave if not invited in or asked to stay.
This license is ordinary and widespread—so much so that it is invoked to explain Girl Scouts selling cookies and children trick-or-treating. Police officers share this same license; they do not have greater rights than citizens in this respect. It also means that people using this license are, in general, doing something lawful, not suspicious.
4. Trespass
Trespass (in this case, criminal trespass under Colorado law and Greeley’s code) generally involves:
- Entering or remaining on property;
- Without permission (or contrary to express conditions);
- With requisite mental state (often knowingly or intentionally).
Merely being physically present somewhere on private property is not automatically trespass—particularly in areas where the public is customarily allowed (front steps, driveways not clearly restricted, etc.). The implied license is a major source of that permission.
5. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials (including police officers) from damages liability unless:
- They violated a constitutional right; and
- The right was “clearly established” at the time, such that every reasonable officer would know the conduct was unlawful.
“Clearly established” generally requires:
- Supreme Court or controlling circuit precedent; or
- A weight of authority that makes the rule obvious in context.
In Gonzalez, the combination of the implied-license doctrine and prior “innocent conduct in suspicious areas” cases meant any reasonable officer should have known that detaining someone solely for standing on a front stoop was unconstitutional.
VI. Conclusion
Gonzalez v. Brunnemer crystallizes an important and intuitive principle: people are allowed to stand at the front door of a home and knock, even if the house appears vacant, and police may not treat that ordinary conduct as inherently suspicious. The implied license to knock, firmly recognized in Jardines and Carloss, functions here not just as a limit on police searches of homes, but as a shield against unwarranted seizures of people who exercise that license.
The decision rests on two key holdings:
- Officer Brunnemer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Gonzalez. He acted on a generalized hunch based on a vaguely suspicious location, without any particularized facts connecting Gonzalez to unlawful activity.
- This lack of reasonable suspicion violated clearly established law. By 2021, Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent made clear that ordinary knock-and-talk behavior at a front door, even in an area linked to crime or a house that appears vacant, cannot by itself justify a Terry stop.
In practice, Gonzalez strengthens the protection given to everyday social and civic activities that involve going to someone’s front door—visits, deliveries, canvassing, welfare checks—and it narrows the permissible use of trespass as a basis for stops absent concrete, individualized suspicion. Even though nonprecedential, it offers a clear, analytically rigorous roadmap that future courts—and officers—are likely to find persuasive in drawing the line between a proper hunch-led investigation and an unconstitutional seizure.
Comments