Implicit Proof of the MDLEA “Request” Requirement for Stateless-Vessel Jurisdiction in the EEZ

Commentary on United States v. Francisco Rijo-Rijo, et al. (consolidated), Nos. 23-12779, 23-12828, 23-12842 (11th Cir. Oct. 21, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished)

Introduction

In these consolidated, non-argument calendar appeals from the Southern District of Florida, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of three defendants—Santo Rosario-Rivera, Francisco Rijo-Rijo (a.k.a. David Ernand), and Placido Rivera-Rodriguez—for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 70506(b), and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B), with aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2.

The Coast Guard interdicted an unflagged vessel approximately 130 nautical miles off Aruba—within Aruba’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ)—and discovered 18 bales of cocaine. Although each defendant asserted Haitian nationality for himself, none identified as the master of the vessel and no claim of nationality or registry was made for the vessel. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing: (1) the MDLEA is unconstitutional as applied in an EEZ because it is not the “high seas” under the Felonies Clause; (2) due process requires a nexus to the United States; and (3) the government failed to establish the statutory jurisdictional predicate that the “master or individual in charge” failed, “on request” of a U.S. officer, to make a claim of nationality for the vessel, 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B).

The district court denied the motion, accepted guilty pleas, and imposed 57-month concurrent sentences with five years of supervised release. On appeal, the panel rejected the constitutional challenges as foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit precedent and held that the district court did not clearly err in implicitly finding that the Coast Guard made the necessary “request,” thereby establishing MDLEA jurisdiction over a stateless vessel.

Summary of the Opinion

• Constitutional challenges foreclosed: The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that the MDLEA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Felonies Clause power without a U.S. “nexus” and that a nation’s EEZ qualifies as the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes. See United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025).
• Statutory jurisdiction satisfied: The court held the government met its burden to show the vessel was “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” under 46 U.S.C. §§ 70502(c)(1)(A), 70502(d)(1)(B). The district court’s implicit finding that a Coast Guard “request” for a nationality claim was made was not clearly erroneous, given testimony regarding standard “right of visit” procedures and the defendants’ stipulations that they made no claim of nationality for the vessel and that no master was identified.
• Disposition: Convictions affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion rests squarely on three Eleventh Circuit authorities:

• United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 809–10 (11th Cir. 2014): Campbell establishes that the MDLEA is a valid exercise of the Felonies Clause even absent a specific nexus to the United States. Drug trafficking on the high seas—particularly on stateless vessels—is within Congress’s authority to define and punish, and due process does not impose a nexus requirement in this context.
• United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 586–88 (11th Cir. 2020): Cabezas-Montano confirms the MDLEA’s constitutionality as applied to extraterritorial drug offenses without a U.S. nexus and clarifies standards of review: de novo for legal and constitutional questions, and clear error for factual findings relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry.
• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025): Alfonso holds that a coastal state’s EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes. This resolves the defendants’ contention that being in Aruba’s EEZ took the case outside the Clause. Alfonso, reinforced by the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, anchors the panel’s rejection of the EEZ-based constitutional challenge.

Together, these precedents foreclose the appellants’ constitutional arguments and frame the panel’s narrow statutory holding on MDLEA jurisdiction.

Legal Reasoning

The panel structures its reasoning in two steps: constitutional and statutory.

1) Constitutional step: The court notes the appellants “concede” that circuit law forecloses their challenges:

• No nexus required: Under Campbell and Cabezas-Montano, the MDLEA validly applies to drug-trafficking conspiracies and possessions on the high seas without any U.S. nexus.
• EEZ equals high seas for the Felonies Clause: Alfonso squarely holds an EEZ is part of the “high seas,” eliminating the argument that Congress’s Felonies Clause power is inapplicable in an EEZ.

2) Statutory step: The MDLEA criminalizes drug-trafficking offenses committed “while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1). “Vessel[s] subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” include “vessel[s] without nationality,” id. § 70502(c)(1)(A), and, critically here, “a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge fails, on request of [an authorized U.S.] officer, to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel,” id. § 70502(d)(1)(B).

The appellants did not dispute that they made no claim of nationality for the vessel and did not identify any master. Instead, they argued the record failed to establish that the Coast Guard ever made the required “request” prompting such a claim, as § 70502(d)(1)(B) contemplates. The lieutenant’s testimony described standard Coast Guard “right of visit” procedure—asking whether anyone is the master and whether anyone claims nationality or registry for the vessel—but did not explicitly recount the question being asked in this particular boarding.

Applying the correct standards of review—de novo for the legal framework and clear error for factual findings—the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in implicitly finding that the “request” was made. The district court credited the lieutenant’s testimony about standard boarding practice and accepted the defendants’ stipulations that no master was identified and no claim of nationality for the vessel was made. In combination, those facts permitted a reasonable inference that the Coast Guard made the customary “request” and that the “master or individual in charge” failed to respond with a claim—rendering the vessel stateless under § 70502(d)(1)(B).

The court also underscored that the government bears the burden to establish MDLEA jurisdiction, citing Cabezas-Montano, and that jurisdictional issues are reviewed with deference to the district court’s factual determinations. Against that backdrop, the panel concluded the government carried its burden through credible evidence of standard operating procedure plus the appellants’ admissions.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and thus non-precedential in the Eleventh Circuit, the opinion is instructive in several respects:

• Implicit proof of the “request” element: The decision signals that the § 70502(d)(1)(B) “on request” requirement can be satisfied without an explicit, verbatim recitation that the Coast Guard asked the question during the specific boarding, if the district court credibly credits testimony about standard “right of visit” procedures and the defendants stipulate they made no claim of nationality and identified no master.
• Reinforcement of EEZ-as-high-seas: By applying Alfonso, the opinion further normalizes extraterritorial MDLEA prosecutions in EEZs, forestalling attempts to carve out EEZs from the Felonies Clause’s scope in this circuit.
• No nexus litigation: The panel reiterates that nexus and due-process arguments, at least on stateless or high-seas vessels, are non-starters in the Eleventh Circuit. Defense strategies premised on nexus are unlikely to gain traction absent an en banc or Supreme Court intervention.

Practice notes:

• For the government: While this decision accepts implicit proof, the safer course is to elicit explicit testimony that the boarding team asked the master/individual in charge to identify the vessel’s nationality or registry, and to embed that fact in factual proffers and plea colloquies.
• For the defense: To preserve a meaningful challenge under § 70502(d)(1)(B), focus on building a record that the “request” was not made to the master/individual in charge, or that the boarding deviated from standard procedure. Cross-examination should test whether anyone with apparent authority was identified and whether a specific request was directed as the statute contemplates.
• For district courts: Make explicit factual findings on the “request” to reduce appellate uncertainty, especially where testimony is framed in terms of “standard practice” rather than specific recollection.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• MDLEA (46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq.): A federal statute that criminalizes drug trafficking on the high seas, including aboard stateless vessels or foreign vessels where jurisdictional predicates are met. It applies extraterritorially. See 46 U.S.C. § 70503(e)(1).
• Vessel “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”: Includes stateless vessels. One pathway to statelessness is when the “master or individual in charge” fails, upon a U.S. officer’s “request,” to make a claim of nationality or registry for the vessel. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70502(c)(1)(A), 70502(d)(1)(B).
• Claim of nationality for a vessel: Under the MDLEA, a claim may be made by possession of registration documents, flying a flag, or a verbal claim by the master/individual in charge. Personal nationality of crew members is not the same as a vessel’s nationality.
• “Right of visit” boarding: A concept from the law of the sea. When a vessel is suspected of being without nationality (or otherwise subject to verification), the Coast Guard may board to verify status, typically asking who is the master and whether a claim of nationality or registry is made.
• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime area extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline. The coastal state has sovereign rights over resources, but the waters remain part of the high seas for navigation and, as the Eleventh Circuit holds, for Felonies Clause analysis. See Alfonso.
• Felonies Clause: U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 10, empowers Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The Eleventh Circuit recognizes MDLEA prosecutions without a U.S. nexus as valid exercises of this power.
• Due Process “nexus”: Some extraterritorial criminal statutes require a connection to the United States to satisfy due process. The Eleventh Circuit holds no nexus is required for MDLEA prosecutions of high-seas drug offenses on stateless vessels.
• Standards of review:
  • De novo: The appellate court independently reviews legal issues, including constitutional questions and statutory interpretation, without deference.
  • Clear error: The appellate court defers to the district court’s factual findings unless left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake occurred. Here, it applied to the finding that the Coast Guard made the “request.”

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in United States v. Francisco Rijo-Rijo et al. reaffirms two pillars of MDLEA jurisprudence in this circuit: (1) Congress may criminalize high-seas drug trafficking without a U.S. nexus, and a coastal state’s EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; and (2) the government can establish stateless-vessel jurisdiction under § 70502(d)(1)(B) through credible, circumstantial proof—here, standard Coast Guard “right of visit” procedures combined with defendants’ stipulations that no master was identified and no nationality claim was made for the vessel.

While not precedential, the opinion offers concrete guidance in MDLEA prosecutions: build a record showing that the master or person in charge was asked to make a nationality or registry claim. For defense counsel, the lesson is symmetrical—probe whether the “request” contemplated by § 70502(d)(1)(B) was actually made to the appropriate person. In the broader legal landscape, the case continues the Eleventh Circuit’s consistent approach to extraterritorial drug enforcement: EEZ interdictions are treated as high-seas cases, and nexus-based due-process defenses remain foreclosed.