Implicit Findings and Strategic Choices:
Residual Hearsay, Juror Substitution, and Speedy‑Trial Ineffectiveness in Lee v. State

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Lee v. State, S25A1002 (Dec. 9, 2025), arises from a decades‑old domestic homicide that was prosecuted as a “cold case” after the victim’s remains were discovered nearly twenty years after her disappearance. The case is doctrinally significant not because it dramatically reshapes Georgia law, but because it clarifies and reinforces several important principles:

• How Georgia’s circumstantial evidence statute, OCGA § 24‑14‑6, applies when a defendant posits an “alternate killer.”
• How trial courts may use the residual hearsay exception (OCGA § 24‑8‑807, “Rule 807”) without making formulaic, on‑the‑record findings at the moment of the ruling.
• When a juror’s refusal or failure to appear constitutes “good cause” for substitution under OCGA § 15‑12‑172.
• How strongly Georgia courts defer to strategic decisions of trial counsel on:
  • whether to pursue a constitutional speedy‑trial plea in bar, and
  • how plea offers are explained and recorded.

The opinion thus functions as a practical guide on the evidentiary and procedural management of long‑delayed homicide prosecutions, especially those grounded in domestic violence and largely circumstantial evidence.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Disappearance and Discovery of the Body

In 1991, Ann Berry disappeared while living in Georgia with her husband, appellant Kevin James Lee, and their children. The State’s theory was that Berry was trying to leave an abusive marriage and flee with the children to live with her sister, Sheila Story. On the night of July 31, 1991, Berry called Story, audibly distressed; Story heard Lee yelling and the children crying. Berry said she and the children wanted to come live with Story. Story offered to come help, but Berry insisted on packing herself and taking her own car. She never arrived and was never heard from again.

In the immediate aftermath:

• Story tried repeatedly to reach Berry. After several days, Lee answered the phone and said Berry had left him and the children for another man.
• Friends and family, including Story and Denise Harvard, later testified that Berry never went anywhere without her children and that they knew of no other man in her life.
• Story cleaned out the marital home about a week later and found nearly all of Berry’s belongings still there—clothes, jewelry, pictures—contradicting Lee’s story of a voluntary departure.
• Lee moved with the children to Kansas shortly after Berry’s disappearance.

Law enforcement efforts in the 1990s were apparently sporadic; Story’s early attempt to file a missing‑person report was not processed, and Berry was not officially listed as missing until 1997.

In April 2011, teenagers digging a firepit in the woods less than 100 yards from the former Lee‑Berry residence unearthed a trash bag containing skeletal remains. DNA testing confirmed the remains were Berry’s, and the medical examiner ruled her death a homicide.

B. Indictment, Delay, and Trial

A Coweta County grand jury indicted Lee on June 4, 2012 for:

• Count 1: Malice murder (OCGA § 16‑5‑1), and
• Count 2: Concealing the death of another.

Because Lee was then living in California and had not yet been arrested, the trial court granted the State’s motion to place the case on the “dead docket” on June 11, 2012. This meant the case was administratively suspended, to be reactivated if and when Lee was apprehended.

After Lee’s arrest in California, the State successfully moved on October 26, 2018 to return the case to active status. A jury trial took place March 7–9, 2022, resulting in guilty verdicts on both counts. The trial court sentenced Lee to:

• Life imprisonment for malice murder, plus
• 12 months consecutive imprisonment on the concealing‑a‑death charge.

C. Post‑Trial Proceedings

Lee filed a motion for new trial, later amended by new counsel. At the hearing, the State conceded a critical indictment flaw:

• Count 2 (concealing the death) was not timely indicted within the applicable statute of limitations, and
• the indictment did not allege any tolling exception to salvage it.

On October 18, 2024, the trial court:

• Set aside the sentence for concealing the death (Count 2), but
• Denied the remainder of the motion for new trial.

Lee appealed, raising four primary issues. The Supreme Court affirmed the malice murder conviction and made clear that, because Count 2 had been set aside, the sufficiency of evidence on that count was not before it. The Court also noted that the trial court remains free on remand to enter a corrected sentencing disposition reflecting the vacatur of Count 2.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected each of Lee’s appellate claims:

1. Sufficiency of the evidence (OCGA § 24‑14‑6):
   • The conviction for malice murder, though based entirely on circumstantial evidence, satisfied Georgia’s stringent circumstantial evidence rule.
   • The jury was entitled to reject as unreasonable Lee’s alternative hypothesis that a friend, Larry Cook, was the killer.
2. Residual hearsay (Rule 807, OCGA § 24‑8‑807):
   • The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Berry’s statements to her sister, Story, under Rule 807.
   • As to Harvard and Riley, the Court agreed with the trial court that the State did not elicit hearsay from them about the relationship, so Lee’s Rule 807 challenge as to those witnesses failed factually.
3. Juror substitution (OCGA § 15‑12‑172):
   • The trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing Juror 4—who arrived late on day two and announced she would not attend day three—and replacing her with an alternate.
4. Ineffective assistance of counsel (Strickland):
   • Counsel’s decision not to file a constitutional speedy‑trial plea in bar was a reasonable strategic choice, not deficient performance.
   • The record contradicts Lee’s claim that counsel inadequately explained or mishandled the State’s extraordinarily favorable plea offer (an Alford plea to a misdemeanor with time served). The Court credited counsel’s testimony and the plea‑colloquy record and held that Lee failed to show deficient performance.

With no individual error found, the Court also rejected Lee’s claim of cumulative prejudice.

IV. Key Legal Issues and Precedents

A. Circumstantial Evidence and Alternate Suspects
(OCGA § 24‑14‑6; Rashad, Nichols, Brown, Jackson)

1. The Statutory Standard

OCGA § 24‑14‑6 provides:

“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”

This is a longstanding, defendant‑favoring rule. Two clarifications repeatedly emphasized by the Court, and reaffirmed here, are:

• Not every conceivable hypothesis must be excluded—only every reasonable one.
• Whether an alternative hypothesis is reasonable is primarily a jury question, reviewed deferentially on appeal.

The Court cites Rashad v. State, 318 Ga. 199 (2024), for the proposition that circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a conviction if reasonable alternate hypotheses are excluded, and that not every speculative or fanciful hypothesis qualifies as “reasonable.” It also cites:

• Nichols v. State, 292 Ga. 290 (2013) – emphasizing that questions about the reasonableness of competing hypotheses (including alternative perpetrators) are for the jury.
• Jackson v. State, 307 Ga. 770 (2020), and
• Brown v. State, 301 Ga. 728 (2017) – reinforcing the same deference to jury assessments of alternative explanations.

2. Application in Lee: The “Alternate Suspect” Theory

Lee’s core sufficiency argument: the circumstantial evidence left two plausible suspects—himself and Larry Cook—and did not exclude the “reasonable hypothesis” that Cook was the killer. Cook, notably, was incarcerated for a different murder in which he had killed and buried a woman—factually reminiscent of Berry’s case.

The Court nevertheless identified multiple facts supporting the jury’s rejection of Cook as a reasonable alternative:

• Berry’s last known communication was a distress call to her sister, seeking to leave Lee—and take the children—with Lee yelling and the children crying in the background.
• Berry never arrived at her sister’s home and disappeared immediately after this conflict with Lee.
• Lee gave multiple inconsistent stories over the years, including that Berry had left the family and run off with a drug dealer, and that she used cocaine.
• Friends and family testified Berry virtually never went anywhere without her children and that they knew of no secret boyfriend.
• Berry’s personal belongings remained in the house, undermining Lee’s claim that she voluntarily left.
• Berry’s body was found buried less than 100 yards from the marital home—from which she was trying to escape that night—strong circumstantial evidence tying the crime to that location and thus to Lee.
• Evidence of a history of domestic violence by Lee against Berry (arguments, bruises, “knocked” into the parking lot, clothing choices masking injuries) provided a motive and pattern of behavior consistent with the State’s theory.
• Cook testified he and Berry did not have a romantic relationship, denied any involvement in her disappearance or death, and the jury was entitled to credit that testimony despite knowledge of his prior murder conviction.

Given this record, the Court concluded there was “ample evidence” to allow the jury to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis that Cook was the killer. Thus, under OCGA § 24‑14‑6 and the cited precedents, the verdict was supported by the evidence.

3. Simplified Concept: What Does “Exclude Every Other Reasonable Hypothesis” Really Mean?

A common misunderstanding is that any possible alternative scenario—no matter how speculative—defeats circumstantial proof. That is not the law. In practice:

• The prosecution must show that rational, evidence‑based alternative explanations are ruled out by the totality of the evidence.
• The defense can point to other potential suspects or scenarios, but the jury decides whether those alternatives are truly reasonable in light of all the facts.
• On appeal, the reviewing court does not re‑weigh the evidence, but asks whether the jury’s rejection of the alternative is “insupportable as a matter of law.” That is a high bar for defendants.

4. Impact on Future Circumstantial Cases

Lee solidifies a practical approach: where there is strong circumstantial evidence of domestic violence, immediate disappearance following an attempt to leave, and a body located near the marital home, appellate courts will be extremely reluctant to overturn convictions on the ground that another person might have done it—especially when that other person testifies denying involvement and no substantial evidence ties them to the specific crime.

Defendants mounting OCGA § 24‑14‑6 challenges based on “alternate perpetrator” theories will need far more than speculative possibilities or character similarities to prevail.

B. Residual Hearsay (OCGA § 24‑8‑807 / Rule 807)

1. The Residual Hearsay Exception in Georgia

Hearsay is an out‑of‑court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, generally inadmissible because the declarant cannot be cross‑examined. Evidence law, however, recognizes many exceptions (e.g., excited utterance, present sense impression, statement of then‑existing state of mind).

Rule 807, the “residual hearsay” exception, is a safety valve. It allows admission of a hearsay statement not fitting a specific enumerated exception if:

1. The statement relates to a material fact;
2. It is more probative on that point than other reasonably available evidence; and
3. It has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, and admission serves the interests of justice and the purposes of the evidence rules.

The Georgia Supreme Court has previously described Rule 807 as a “rare” and “extraordinary” exception, requiring “exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness.” See Miller v. State, 303 Ga. 1 (2018). It has also addressed how trial courts must analyze and articulate those guarantees, e.g., in Jacobs v. State, 303 Ga. 245 (2018).

2. The Statements at Issue in Lee

The State gave pretrial notice that it intended to offer “residual hearsay” from Berry through:

• Her sister, Sheila Story, detailing Berry’s descriptions of the relationship and especially the July 31, 1991 phone call.
• Friends Denise Harvard and Tammy Riley, concerning what Berry told them about her relationship and daily life.

At the pretrial hearing:

• The State argued that Story’s testimony about the night of July 31 could qualify as:
  • An excited utterance,
  • A statement of Berry’s then‑existing state of mind, or
  • Residual hearsay under Rule 807.
• The State also proffered Berry’s statements to Story describing prior “fights” and incidents of abuse, and Berry’s conversations with Harvard and Riley about the state of her relationship.
• Both sides specifically argued about Rule 807’s requirement of “exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness.”

The trial court concluded that:

• Some statements could fit ordinary exceptions (e.g., excited utterance), but
• It would allow the statements “under 807,” while cautioning that Rule 807 should be used sparingly (expressly acknowledging Miller).

In its later written order denying a new trial, the court explained why Story’s testimony satisfied Rule 807’s trustworthiness requirement:

• Story and Berry were sisters, “very close,” and spoke daily, sharing intimate details of their lives up until Berry’s death.
• The context and nature of Berry’s statements to Story supported their reliability.

The trial court also found that, with respect to Harvard and Riley, no hearsay about the relationship was actually elicited.

3. The Appellate Challenge and Ruling

On appeal, Lee advanced two main arguments:

1. The State’s Rule 807 notice lacked sufficient “particulars” of the statements; and
2. The trial court failed to make explicit on‑the‑record findings that the statements had “exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness,” thereby abusing its discretion under Rule 807.

The Supreme Court rejected both points:

• The record showed that:
  • The parties fully argued the “exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness” standard prior to trial, and
  • The trial court’s later written order articulated why Story’s testimony met the Rule 807 criteria.
• The absence of an explicit “magic words” finding in the initial in limine ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion in light of that broader record. The Court cited Jacobs as supporting this practical, record‑based review.
• Regarding Harvard and Riley, the Court endorsed the trial court’s factual conclusion that no relationship‑related hearsay from Berry was actually admitted. For example:
  • Harvard, when asked if Berry ever told her she was abused, simply answered “No.”
  • Riley’s testimony about a statement Berry made regarding going to the dentist had nothing to do with the state of the relationship.

Because Lee’s appellate premise—that hearsay about the relationship came in through Harvard and Riley—was incorrect, his challenge as to those witnesses necessarily failed.

4. Simplified Concept: How “Implicit” Rule 807 Findings Can Still Be Sufficient

The decision is important for what it does not require. It confirms:

• Trial courts need not recite a formula such as “I find exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness” at the exact moment they rule.
• What matters is whether the overall record—arguments, rulings, and later written orders—shows that the court considered:
  • The relationship between declarant and witness,
  • The circumstances of the statements, and
  • The relative probative value and necessity of the hearsay.

Lee thus clarifies that reviewing courts will look holistically at whether the Rule 807 standard was met, rather than imposing a rigid, transcript‑formula requirement.

5. Impact: Domestic Violence Homicides and Victim Statements

Practically, this case is part of a line of authority facilitating the use of a deceased victim’s statements to close confidants in domestic violence homicides:

• Sisters and close friends who regularly discuss intimate relationship matters can be powerful vehicles for evidentiary proof of abuse and the victim’s intent to leave.
• When the victim is deceased and no stronger non‑hearsay proof of the relationship’s dynamics is reasonably available, Rule 807—carefully applied—can supply a path to admission.
• Defense counsel must therefore be prepared to challenge trustworthiness in concrete terms (e.g., bias, inconsistent accounts), rather than rely on procedural arguments about the form of the trial court’s ruling alone.

C. Juror Substitution for “Good Cause” (OCGA § 15‑12‑172)

1. The Legal Framework

OCGA § 15‑12‑172 authorizes a trial court to replace a seated juror with an alternate if the juror:

• Dies,
• Becomes ill,
• Is found “unable to perform” duty for “good cause,” or
• Is discharged for other “legal cause.”

The Supreme Court has long held that the statute gives trial courts substantial discretion. See, e.g.:

• Smith v. State, 307 Ga. 680 (2020) – approving substitution when a juror’s tardiness threatened to delay trial.
• Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 14 (2006) – recognizing juror tardiness as a “sound basis” for dismissal.

2. Facts and Ruling in Lee

In Lee:

• Juror 4 was late on the second day of trial.
• On the third day, she called the clerk stating she would not be coming to court at all due to a conflict with her college class schedule.
• The court directed the clerk to inform her she was still required to appear.
• After waiting over two hours with no sign of the juror, and with uncertainty whether she would ever appear, the court:
  • Announced its intent to replace her with an alternate unless given a legal reason not to,
  • Heard only a general objection from Lee (unsupported by authority), and
  • Proceed to substitute an alternate juror and continue the trial.

The Supreme Court held this was not an abuse of discretion:

• Juror 4’s repeated tardiness and declared refusal to attend constituted “good cause” within the meaning of OCGA § 15‑12‑172.
• Relying on Smith, the Court reiterated that avoiding unnecessary delay is a legitimate reason to replace a juror who cannot or will not fulfill her obligations.

3. Practical Effect

The ruling confirms that:

• Non‑medical reasons—such as deliberate absence or refusal to attend—can suffice as “good cause” for substitution.
• Trial judges are not obliged to jeopardize trial continuity or fairness by waiting indefinitely for a juror who, according to her own statements, does not intend to appear.
• Defense counsel mounting a challenge must do more than simply object; they should be ready to cite OCGA § 15‑12‑172 and precedent, and to argue why the juror’s absence does not constitute good or legal cause.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Strickland and Related Georgia Cases)

Lee raised two claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):

1. Counsel failed to file a constitutional speedy‑trial plea in bar, and
2. Counsel inadequately presented or explained the State’s plea offer.

Under Strickland and Georgia decisions such as Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322 (2022), and Blocker v. State, 316 Ga. 568 (2023), Lee had to prove both:

• Deficient performance: Counsel acted outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, and
• Prejudice: A reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different.

If either prong fails, the claim fails. The Court ended its analysis at the first prong in both sub‑claims.

1. Failure to File a Constitutional Speedy‑Trial Plea in Bar

a. Context and Counsel’s Strategy

The timeline:

• Crime: 1991
• Indictment: June 2012
• Case placed on dead docket: June 2012
• Case reactivated after arrest: October 2018
• Trial: March 2022

Lee repeatedly expressed a desire for a speedy trial. Counsel eventually moved (in 2021) for permission to file an out‑of‑time statutory speedy‑trial demand, which was denied. They did not file a motion to dismiss the indictment based on a constitutional speedy‑trial violation (under the Sixth Amendment).

At the motion‑for‑new‑trial hearing, both trial attorneys testified that they:

• Researched statutory and constitutional speedy‑trial law.
• Recognized that a constitutional speedy‑trial claim requires accounting for delays attributable to the defendant, including difficulty locating him.
• Feared a constitutional claim would fail in light of:
  • Evidence that Lee moved frequently and did not remain in one location,
  • The legitimate need for time to investigate a decades‑old case and locate witnesses, and
  • Their own need for additional preparation time before trial.
• Thus made a conscious, strategic decision not to file a constitutional speedy‑trial plea in bar.

The Court noted Georgia cases holding that whether to demand a speedy trial is usually a matter of strategy, because delay sometimes benefits a defendant. See:

• Jones v. State, 296 Ga. 561 (2015)
• Smith v. State, 297 Ga. 214 (2015), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 876 (2023)
• Bowling v. State, 289 Ga. 881 (2011) – approving counsel’s choice not to demand speedy trial in order to continue investigating.

The Court emphasized that such strategic decisions are not to be judged in hindsight. On this record, counsel’s choice was plainly within the broad range of reasonable professional judgment.

b. Simplified Concept: Statutory vs Constitutional Speedy Trial & “Plea in Bar”

• Statutory speedy trial in Georgia (under OCGA §§ 17‑7‑170 and 17‑7‑171) involves:
  • A formal written demand by the defendant,
  • Strict time limits for bringing the case to trial, and
  • Automatic discharge and acquittal if the State fails to comply.
• Constitutional speedy trial (Sixth Amendment, applied through Barker v. Wingo) applies even without a statutory demand and requires a multi‑factor balancing test (length of delay, reasons for delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice).
• A plea in bar is a pretrial motion asserting that some legal bar—such as double jeopardy or unconstitutional delay—prevents the State from prosecuting at all.

In Lee, counsel reasonably concluded that the constitutional factors were not favorable enough to risk an all‑or‑nothing plea in bar when they still needed more preparation time.

c. Holding

Because counsel’s decision was plainly strategic and supported by reasonable professional considerations, the Court held there was no deficient performance. That ended the analysis; prejudice did not need to be considered.

2. Alleged Failure to Adequately Present the Plea Offer

a. The Plea Offer and On‑the‑Record Colloquy

Before jury selection, the State placed a remarkably lenient offer on the record:

• Lee could enter an Alford plea (North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)) to:
  • Only Count 2, concealing the death of another—a misdemeanor in this posture,
  • Receive credit for time served, and
  • “Walk away.”
• The murder charge (Count 1) would be dismissed.

The trial court carefully explained what an Alford plea meant: Lee could plead guilty “in his best interest” while continuing to assert he “didn’t do it,” thereby avoiding the risk of a life sentence for murder.

Lee acknowledged:

• He had discussed the offer and potential sentence with counsel, and
• He still refused the plea and wished to go to trial.

Lee’s stated reasoning revolved around his belief that:

• Prior investigative reports—especially those by Investigator Ricky Atkins—documented another possible suspect and motive (apparently Cook), and
• He was “praying” those materials would “come to light” and be presented at trial.

In Lee’s presence, trial counsel explained:

• They had spoken with former Investigator Atkins, who now lived in Florida.
• Atkins did “not remember anything about anything” related to the case.
• The defense therefore concluded that calling Atkins would not be helpful.

The State added that much of the hearsay material in Atkins’s reports would be inadmissible. The trial judge told Lee plainly:

“I’m not going to let that in.”

Even with these warnings, Lee emphatically chose to “put [his] life in the juror[s’] hands” and proceed to trial.

b. Lee’s Ineffectiveness Claim and the Court’s Response

Lee did not argue that counsel failed to convey the offer. Instead, he claimed:

• He believed Atkins would be a defense witness at trial, and
• He would have accepted the plea offer had he understood that Atkins would not testify or support his alternate‑suspect theory.

At the motion‑for‑new‑trial hearing, trial counsel testified that:

• Based on their conversations with Atkins, they concluded he would not “provide substantive value” to the defense.
• They informed Lee of this assessment while the plea offer was pending.

The Supreme Court:

• Noted that Lee’s own comments at the plea hearing showed he knew Atkins was “not here” and that counsel did not plan to call him.
• Emphasized that the trial court was entitled to credit counsel’s testimony over Lee’s self‑serving post hoc assertions, citing:
  • Robinson v. State, 322 Ga. 279 (2025) – upholding trial court’s credibility decisions where defendant’s testimony about a plea offer was contradicted by other evidence.
  • Bryant v. State, 306 Ga. 687 (2019) – acknowledging trial court’s discretion to disbelieve a defendant’s claims that counsel did not advise him of risks.

On this record, the Court held that Lee failed to show deficient performance under Strickland. Everyone—including the judge—clearly explained the plea terms and the inadmissibility of the evidence Lee was relying on. Lee knowingly elected to go to trial despite understanding those realities.

c. Simplified Concept: Alford Pleas and Plea‑Stage Ineffectiveness

• An Alford plea lets a defendant plead guilty while maintaining factual innocence, if it is in his best legal interest (usually to avoid a harsher sentence after trial).
• To establish ineffective assistance in plea bargaining, a defendant must show not only that counsel’s advice was deficient but also that:
  • He would have accepted the offer but for that deficiency, and
  • The court would have accepted the plea and the State would not have withdrawn it.
• Courts treat later claims of “I would have pled guilty” with skepticism when the contemporaneous record shows the defendant fully understood the offer and rejected it on principle or optimism about trial.

Lee is a textbook example of the difficulty of overturning a conviction on the claim that counsel mishandled plea advice when the record shows detailed on‑the‑record explanations and a clear, voluntary rejection by the defendant.

V. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts in the Opinion

1. “Dead Docket”

Placing a case on the “dead docket” is an administrative act whereby the court effectively suspends active prosecution without dismissing the indictment. The case can be reactivated later—typically when the defendant is located, new evidence emerges, or the State is otherwise ready to proceed. In Lee, the case was dead‑docketed from 2012 until Lee’s 2018 arrest.

2. Statute of Limitations and Tolling

Criminal charges must be brought within a statutory time limit unless an exception “tolls” (pauses) the running of that period. The State conceded that Count 2 (concealing the death of another) was not indicted within the applicable limitation period and that no tolling exception was alleged. As a result, the trial court correctly set aside the conviction and sentence on that count.

3. “Plea in Bar”

A “plea in bar” is not a plea of guilty or not guilty; it is a procedural motion arguing that, for some legal reason, the State may not lawfully proceed. Examples include double jeopardy, prior adjudication, or unconstitutional delay violating speedy‑trial rights. In Lee, the argued deficiency was counsel’s failure to file a constitutional speedy‑trial plea in bar.

4. Malice Murder in Georgia

Under OCGA § 16‑5‑1, malice murder occurs when a person unlawfully and with “malice aforethought, either express or implied,” causes the death of another human being. “Implied” malice can arise from circumstances showing an abandoned and malignant heart—such as killing during a pattern of domestic abuse coupled with efforts to conceal the body.

VI. Broader Impact and Significance

1. Domestic Violence, Cold Cases, and Circumstantial Proof

Lee underscores that:

• Domestic violence homicides frequently leave no direct eyewitnesses or clear forensic traces linking the perpetrator to the body.
• Time delays—particularly where the defendant moves out of state—may be inevitable.
• Nonetheless, strong circumstantial evidence (abuse history, flight, inconsistent explanations, body location) can support a malice murder conviction even decades later.

Future appellants challenging such convictions on the ground that “someone else could have done it” will face substantial headwinds unless they can demonstrate that the alternate suspect theory is grounded in concrete, credible evidence rather than conjecture.

2. Evidentiary Strategy: Residual Hearsay in Violent‑Relationship Homicides

The decision continues an emerging evidentiary pattern:

• Victims of intimate‑partner violence often confide in close relatives and friends about abuse and their plans to leave.
• When such victims are later killed, those confidants become crucial witnesses.
• Rule 807, applied carefully with attention to trustworthiness, provides a doctrinal basis for admitting these statements even when they do not squarely fit enumerated exceptions.

Prosecutors in similar cases should:

• Give clear, timely Rule 807 notice,
• Develop a thorough record on the relationship between declarant and witness, and
• Be prepared with alternative hearsay theories (excited utterance, state of mind) in case Rule 807 is rejected or limited.

3. Documentation of Strategy and Plea Discussions

For defense counsel, Lee is a strong reminder of the importance of:

• Documenting strategic decisions (e.g., not filing speedy‑trial motions) and the reasons for them.
• Ensuring plea offers and their risks/benefits are fully explained on the record where possible.

When such documentation exists, appellate courts are highly reluctant to second‑guess counsel’s professional judgment or to credit a defendant’s later claims that he was misinformed or uninformed.

4. Trial Management and Juror Control

Finally, the ruling on juror substitution reinforces that:

• Trial courts have broad authority to keep proceedings on track.
• Juror tardiness and refusal to appear can be treated as “good cause” for dismissal and substitution.
• Defense objections to such actions must be grounded in specific legal arguments to stand a realistic chance on appeal.

VII. Conclusion

Lee v. State does not revolutionize Georgia criminal law, but it meaningfully clarifies several recurring issues in serious felony practice:

• It reaffirms that Georgia’s circumstantial evidence rule, OCGA § 24‑14‑6, leaves the reasonableness of alternative hypotheses—such as the involvement of another suspect—largely to the jury, subject to highly deferential appellate review.
• It confirms that Rule 807’s residual hearsay exception may be applied based on a holistic examination of the record, without talismanic phrases at the moment of ruling, and that close familial relationships can furnish strong guarantees of trustworthiness.
• It endorses trial courts’ practical use of OCGA § 15‑12‑172 to dismiss and replace unreliable jurors to prevent trial disruption.
• It strongly reinforces deference to trial‑counsel strategy on speedy‑trial decisions and plea negotiations, emphasizing the defendant’s burden to overcome a presumption of reasonable performance.

In the broader legal context, Lee stands as an instructive example of how appellate courts handle cold‑case domestic homicides, evidentiary issues surrounding a deceased victim’s statements, and post‑conviction attacks on counsel’s tactical decisions. It signals continuity and stability in Georgia criminal jurisprudence, particularly on circumstantial evidence, hearsay exceptions, juror management, and ineffective assistance claims.