Imperfect Self‑Defense as Mitigation Only: State v. Kindred and New Mexico’s Treatment of Rap Lyrics, Social Media, and Voir Dire

Introduction

The Supreme Court of New Mexico’s nonprecedential decision in State v. Kindred, No. S‑1‑SC‑40395 (Dec. 4, 2025), affirms a first‑degree (willful and deliberate) murder conviction arising from the shooting death of Lavon King. Although the Court expressly issues the decision under Rule 12‑405(B) NMRA as a nonprecedential disposition, the opinion is analytically rich and reveals how the Court currently understands several important doctrines:

• The role of imperfect self‑defense within New Mexico’s voluntary manslaughter framework and why it does not warrant a separate jury instruction;
• The evidentiary treatment of a defendant’s rap lyrics and social media video under Rule 11‑403 NMRA;
• The limits of prosecutorial voir dire analogies touching on “reasonableness” and “reasonable doubt,” and the importance of timely objections;
• Practical guidance on appellate briefing standards, including record citation requirements and harmless‑error arguments.

While Kindred does not create new binding precedent, it strongly reaffirms existing law—especially State v. Abeyta, 1995‑NMSC‑051, and State v. Henley, 2010‑NMSC‑039—on imperfect self‑defense, and illustrates how New Mexico trial courts are expected to apply Rule 11‑403 in the context of cultural and racially charged evidence.

Factual and Procedural Background

The underlying events occurred on June 27, 2023. According to the defendant’s own testimony ({¶3}):

• A friend called Defendant Breon Lamont Kindred to report that the decedent, King, was seen riding Defendant’s stolen custom bicycle, allegedly while armed.
• Defendant rode his moped (“scooter”) to confront the rider, drew a firearm as he approached, and crashed his scooter.
• Upon regaining his footing, Defendant claimed he fired after perceiving King reaching across his body for a firearm.
• Surveillance video captured the entire confrontation, which lasted about six seconds ({¶4}).
• Defendant then took the bicycle home and later returned to collect his scooter.

The State charged Defendant with an open count of first‑degree murder, second‑degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter ({¶5}). The State also sought to introduce:

• Portions of a rap song (from a music video Defendant posted online) referencing, among other things, riding a scooter, shooting someone multiple times in the chest, and putting someone or something “in a cooler” ({¶7}); and
• Portions of a Facebook Live video in which Defendant talked about his stolen bicycle and suggested that the thief was afraid to bring it outside, implying Defendant would take matters into his own hands ({¶8}).

The district court admitted limited, redacted portions of both items after an extended Rule 11‑403 discussion ({¶6}–{¶8}). Before jury selection concluded, Defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming the prosecutor’s “campfire” analogy during voir dire improperly defined or diluted the reasonable‑doubt standard ({¶9}). The motion was denied as untimely and substantively unfounded.

At the instruction conference, Defendant requested a specific jury instruction on imperfect self‑defense, arguing that the jury needed an explicit explanation that an unreasonable but honest belief in the need to defend oneself could reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter ({¶10}). The district court, relying on existing Supreme Court precedent, declined. Instead, it instructed the jury on:

• First‑degree murder,
• Second‑degree murder,
• Voluntary manslaughter (including sufficient provocation), and
• Self‑defense, including first‑aggressor doctrine ({¶10}).

The jury convicted Defendant of first‑degree murder. A motion for new trial, again premised on the absence of an express imperfect self‑defense instruction, was denied ({¶11}), and Defendant appealed, raising three claims:

1. Reversible error in refusing his proposed imperfect self‑defense instruction;
2. Abuse of discretion in admitting parts of the rap lyrics and Facebook Live video; and
3. Abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial based on voir dire questioning ({¶12}).

Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court (Justice Bacon writing for a unanimous Court) affirmed the conviction on all grounds, by nonprecedential decision under Rule 12‑405(B) NMRA ({¶1}).

1. No error in refusing a standalone imperfect self‑defense instruction. The Court:
   • Reaffirmed that imperfect self‑defense in New Mexico is a mitigating concept, not a separate defense;
   • Held that the existing voluntary manslaughter and self‑defense instructions adequately covered the law ({¶16}–{¶18}); and
   • Declined to overrule Abeyta and Henley under the stare decisis standards set out in Padilla and Trujillo ({¶19}–{¶23}).
2. No abuse of discretion in admitting rap lyrics and Facebook Live content.
   • The rap lyrics were relevant to Defendant’s intent and plan regarding the theft of his bicycle and were not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 11‑403 ({¶27}–{¶30}).
   • The Facebook Live audio, including repeated uses of the N‑word, was admitted after careful balancing; given its probative value on intent and Defendant’s own colloquial use of the term, the district court’s Rule 11‑403 ruling was upheld ({¶31}–{¶33}).
3. No abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on voir dire analogy.
   • The motion was untimely and deprived the court of a chance to cure any confusion about the transition from “reasonable doubt” to “reasonable” ({¶38}–{¶40}).
   • On the merits, the campfire analogy was used only to elicit jurors’ views on “reasonableness,” not to define reasonable doubt in a way that conflicted with UJI 14‑5060 ({¶39}–{¶41}).

The Court also emphasized two practice points: (1) the importance of proper record citation in appellate briefs under Rule 12‑318(A)(3) ({¶2}); and (2) the limited reach of State v. Tollardo, 2012‑NMSC‑008, on harmless‑error burdens, which applies only when a constitutional error has first been established ({¶34}).

Detailed Analysis

I. Imperfect Self‑Defense and Jury Instructions

A. Doctrinal Background: Abeyta, Henley, Benally, and Chavez

New Mexico has long recognized a form of imperfect self‑defense: when a defendant honestly but unreasonably believes deadly force is necessary in self‑defense, that belief can mitigate what would otherwise be murder to voluntary manslaughter. As the Court reiterated, quoting Abeyta:

“New Mexico has long recognized that ‘heat of passion’ includes fear for one’s own safety that may result in an unreasonable belief in the need to defend oneself.” ({¶16} (quoting Abeyta, 1995‑NMSC‑051, ¶ 15)).

But Abeyta did more than recognize imperfect self‑defense; it held that this doctrine is not a separate legal defense warranting its own instruction:

“Although the unreasonable belief in the need for self‑defense may well be termed imperfect self‑defense, this label is somewhat misleading. Such conduct is not a true defense and does not justify the killing. Rather, the claim of imperfect self‑defense simply presents an issue of mitigating circumstances that may reduce murder to manslaughter.” ({¶16} (quoting Abeyta, ¶ 17 & n.4)).

And critically:

“Since 1917 this ‘imperfect’ self-defense has been adequately covered under our jury instructions on manslaughter. We see no reason to change our jury instructions to accommodate a new phrase covering a legal concept that has long been a part of New Mexico law.” (Abeyta, quoted at {¶16}).

Henley reaffirmed this framework, explaining that imperfect self‑defense mitigates a murder charge only to voluntary manslaughter; an instruction on involuntary manslaughter is inappropriate where the defendant intentionally shoots someone in imperfect self‑defense ({¶16}, quoting Henley, 2010‑NMSC‑039, ¶ 24).

The Court’s general instruction‑error jurisprudence—Ellis, Benally, and Cunningham—provides that:

• A jury instruction omitting an essential element or legal theory necessary for conviction constitutes reversible error ({¶14}, quoting Ellis, 2008‑NMSC‑032, ¶ 14).
• The test is whether a reasonable juror would have been “confused or misdirected” by the instructions, including omissions or misstatements that fail to provide an accurate rendition of the law ({¶14}, quoting Benally, 2001‑NMSC‑033, ¶ 12; Cunningham, 2000‑NMSC‑009, ¶ 14).

More recently, State v. Chavez, 2022‑NMCA‑007, relied on Abeyta to hold that a defendant asserting imperfect self‑defense was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction, because imperfect self‑defense “mitigates a homicide so that the crime is voluntary manslaughter rather than murder” ({¶22}).

B. Kindred’s Argument and the Court’s Response

Defendant argued that without an explicit “imperfect self‑defense” instruction, the jury lacked an adequate legal framework to relate his fear‑based justification theory to the provocation‑based voluntary manslaughter instruction, causing “jury confusion” ({¶13}, {¶17}–{¶18}). He also urged the Court to abandon Abeyta and related precedent.

The Court rejected this argument on several grounds:

1. No misstatement or omission of law. The parties did not dispute that the standard UJIs on first‑degree murder, second‑degree murder, voluntary manslaughter (including sufficient provocation), and self‑defense were correctly given ({¶15}). Under Wilson, 1994‑NMSC‑009, uniform jury instructions are presumed correct ({¶15}).
2. No showing of actual juror confusion. Defendant relied on Benally and Cunningham but “offer[ed] no meaningful argument showing juror confusion or misdirection occurred” ({¶15}). He asserted that the provocation instruction was “disconnected” from self‑defense but cited no binding authority for the proposition that a separate imperfect‑self‑defense instruction is required ({¶16}, {¶20}).
3. Abeyta and Henley still control. The Court reaffirmed:
   • Imperfect self‑defense is a mitigating circumstance within voluntary manslaughter, not a stand‑alone defense ({¶16}); and
   • Where imperfect self‑defense is at issue, murder may be mitigated only to voluntary manslaughter, not involuntary manslaughter ({¶16}, quoting Henley, ¶ 24).
4. Jernigan’s concurrence not controlling. Defendant relied on Justice Minzner’s concurrence/dissent in State v. Jernigan, 2006‑NMSC‑003, suggesting that provocation instructions must specifically accommodate imperfect self‑defense. The Court noted this was a nonbinding concurrence and that Defendant provided no developed argument showing its relevance here ({¶17}, citing Dominguez v. State, 2015‑NMSC‑014, ¶ 15).

Thus, the Court held that the voluntary manslaughter instruction, as given, “suffices to instruct the jury regarding a valid claim of imperfect self‑defense” ({¶16}), and that the absence of a separate imperfect‑self‑defense instruction did not misstate or omit any essential law.

C. Stare Decisis: Why the Court Refused to Overrule Abeyta

Defendant also argued that New Mexico should join other jurisdictions that recognize imperfect self‑defense as an affirmative defense or give a dedicated jury instruction, citing statutes and cases from thirteen states and the District of Columbia ({¶21}).

Invoking Padilla v. State Farm, 2003‑NMSC‑011, and Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998‑NMSC‑031, he claimed two “compelling reasons” to overrule Abeyta ({¶19}):

1. The current instructional framework is “so unworkable as to be intolerable”; and
2. Developments in other jurisdictions have left Abeyta’s rule a “remnant of abandoned doctrine.”

The Court held Defendant failed to satisfy either prong:

• Unworkability. Defendant pointed to UJI 14‑5190 (duty to retreat) as evidence of a “complicated web” of self‑defense instructions but:
  • Duty to retreat was not at issue in this case; and
  • He did not explain how a new imperfect‑self‑defense instruction would remedy any alleged complications ({¶20}).
  His claim that provocation was “completely disconnected” from self‑defense was unsupported by authority ({¶20}).
• Doctrinal abandonment. Citing other jurisdictions merely showed that New Mexico treats imperfect self‑defense differently. It did not demonstrate “subsequent changes or development in the law” that render Abeyta obsolete or inconsistent with broader legal principles ({¶21}, quoting Trujillo and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union).
• Chavez supports the existing framework. Chavez relied on Abeyta to confirm that imperfect self‑defense entitles a defendant to a voluntary manslaughter instruction, not a separate instruction ({¶22}). Far from undermining Abeyta, it endorsed the same conceptual structure.

Consequently, the Court concluded Defendant had:

“not shown either that the district court erred in denying his proposed instruction or that our precedent in this area must be overruled.” ({¶23}).

II. Rule 11‑403 and the Admission of Rap Lyrics and Facebook Live Content

A. The Rule 11‑403 Framework

The Court reviewed the evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion ({¶25}) and applied Rule 11‑403 NMRA, which permits exclusion of relevant evidence when its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by dangers including “unfair prejudice” ({¶26}).

Relying on State v. Bailey, 2017‑NMSC‑001, ¶ 16, the Court reiterated that “unfair prejudice” means:

“an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one … [evidence that is] sensational or shocking, provoking anger, inflaming passions, … provoking hostility or revulsion or punitive impulses, or appealing entirely to emotion against reason.” ({¶26} (quoting Bailey)).

Trial courts have “much leeway” in weighing probative value against such dangers, though appellate courts will not “rubber stamp” their determinations ({¶26}).

B. Rap Lyrics as Evidence of Intent and Plan

The prosecution argued that Defendant’s rap lyrics were relevant because they included:

• References to riding a scooter,
• Shooting a person multiple times in the chest, and
• Putting someone or something “in a cooler,” asserted to mean killing someone ({¶7}).

The significance of timing was contested. The State initially suggested the lyrics might be confessional if written after the killing. When it emerged that the lyrics pre‑dated the homicide, the State argued they were still probative of a plan to seek violent retribution for the theft of Defendant’s bicycle ({¶7}, {¶27}).

The district court admitted only a limited portion of the lyrics, to be read aloud by the lead detective as part of the investigative narrative ({¶7}). It found that the lyrics “ha[d] a nexus and a tie to the allegations in this case” ({¶7}), characterizing them as “indicative statements by a party opponent of intent and intent that’s specific to this case” ({¶27}).

Defendant argued on appeal that:

• Because the lyrics were written before the shooting, they could not reasonably be treated as confessional ({¶27}).
• “Injecting rap lyrics and the hip hop culture into the trial was highly inflammatory,” citing secondary authorities and United States v. Bey, 2017 WL 1547006 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2017) ({¶28}).

The Supreme Court rejected these arguments:

1. Relevance. The Court emphasized that the district court did not admit the lyrics on a confessional theory but on an intent/plan theory. Under the State’s alternative theory, if the lyrics pre‑dated the killing, they still tended to show Defendant’s mindset and willingness to shoot a person connected to the theft of his bicycle ({¶27}).
2. Unfair prejudice not shown. While acknowledging scholarship that rap lyrics can carry powerful prejudicial associations, the Court held that Defendant had not demonstrated that the narrowly admitted excerpt was:

   “sensational or shocking, provoking anger, inflaming passions, … or appealing entirely to emotion against reason.” ({¶29}, quoting Bailey).

   The lyrics were connected to the specific facts (bicycle theft, scooter, shooting), and any prejudice was tempered by:
   • The limited scope of the admitted excerpt; and
   • Defendant’s own choice to post the music video twice on social media after the homicide ({¶29}).

In sum, the Court concluded that Defendant “does not show the district court abused its discretion” in admitting the limited portion of the lyrics ({¶30}).

C. Facebook Live Video and the Use of the N‑Word

The Facebook Live video contained Defendant’s own statements that:

• He left his bike out,
• The bike was stolen, and
• The thief was afraid to bring it outside, implying Defendant would handle the situation personally ({¶8}).

Defendant conceded that this was at least minimally probative of his motive and intent ({¶31}). His appeal instead focused on the assertion that the audio’s inclusion of the N‑word four times rendered it unfairly prejudicial ({¶31}–{¶32}).

The district court admitted only the audio portion of the video, finding that:

• Defendant used the N‑word “interchangeably to refer to various individuals, including himself” ({¶32}).
• The term was used colloquially, not as a racial epithet directed at a victim or group.
• Redacting the word could “creat[e] more [jury] prejudice rather than less” by drawing attention to the redaction ({¶32}).
• Defendant’s use of the word, and his attitude toward multiple individuals (potentially including the decedent), bore directly on his intent, a disputed issue at trial ({¶32}).

The Supreme Court highlighted the district court’s “careful consideration” of:

• The negative power and history of the word;
• Its colloquial use by Defendant; and
• Its relevance to Defendant’s attitude and threats linked to the bicycle theft ({¶32}).

On that record, Defendant failed to show that the court’s Rule 11‑403 balancing was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case” ({¶33}, applying Smith, 2016‑NMSC‑007, ¶ 27). The admission of the audio portion was therefore upheld.

D. Harmless Error and Tollardo

The State argued that even if there were error in admitting the lyrics or Facebook Live audio, Defendant had not shown that any such error was harmful. Tollardo holds that improperly admitted evidence warrants a new trial only if the error is harmful ({¶34}, quoting Tollardo, 2012‑NMSC‑008, ¶ 25).

The Court did not reach harmless error because it found no abuse of discretion in the first instance ({¶34}). Nonetheless, it corrected Defendant’s misreading of Tollardo:

• The State bears the burden to prove harmlessness only after a defendant has established an error and that the error is constitutional in nature ({¶34}).
• Here, the alleged errors were nonconstitutional evidentiary rulings; Tollardo’s constitutional‑error framework was therefore inapposite ({¶34}).

III. Prosecutorial Voir Dire, Reasonable Doubt, and Mistrial

A. The Campfire Analogy and Timeliness of Objection

During voir dire, the prosecutor:

• First stated the State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt ({¶39}); and
• Then turned to a discussion of what constitutes “reasonable” steps to safely manage a campfire—asking about having water, shovels, a fire pit, and contrasting reasonable with unreasonable (building a fire under a tree or requiring the fire department on site) ({¶39}).

Defense counsel later moved for a mistrial, contending the analogy improperly lowered or defined the reasonable‑doubt standard ({¶9}). The motion was made more than an hour after the questioning ({¶40}).

The district court:

• Denied the motion as untimely, noting that an immediate objection would have allowed the court to cure any confusion stemming from the transition between “reasonable doubt” and generic “reasonableness” ({¶38}, {¶40}).
• Found that the campfire questions themselves did not purport to define “reasonable doubt” but sought only to explore jurors’ views on “reasonable” ({¶9}, {¶38}–{¶39}).
• Concluded any possible confusion was cured by giving UJI 14‑5060, the standard reasonable‑doubt instruction ({¶9}).

The Supreme Court affirmed. On timeliness, the Court underscored that because the possible impropriety lay in the transition rather than the campfire analogy itself, a contemporaneous objection during voir dire would likely have been sustained and would have enabled a curative instruction ({¶38}–{¶40}). Raising the issue an hour later provided no such opportunity.

B. Substantive Limits: Montoya and Astorga

Defendant invoked State v. Montoya, 2016‑NMCA‑098, which held that counsel may not deviate from the definition of reasonable doubt in UJI 14‑5060, and State v. Astorga, 2016‑NMCA‑015, emphasizing that voir dire is a critical stage ({¶35}).

The Supreme Court did not dispute these principles. It agreed that:

• Jury selection is a critical stage;
• Counsel may not redefine “beyond a reasonable doubt” in contradiction to UJI 14‑5060; and
• An erroneous instruction on the burden of proof can be prejudicial.

But it held that Montoya was not triggered because:

• The district court reasonably found that the prosecutor did not purport to define “reasonable doubt” with the campfire analogy, but only solicited views on what is “reasonable” in everyday life; and
• Defendant’s briefing focused solely on the impropriety of redefining reasonable doubt, without directly challenging the district court’s factual premise that no such redefinition occurred ({¶41}).

Only in his reply brief did Defendant assert that “the discussion of reasonableness in criminal trials is connected only to reasonable doubt [,] [a]nd there is no doubt that the prosecutor was asking about reasonable doubt” ({¶41}). The Court found this belated assertion unpersuasive in light of the district court’s factual findings and Defendant’s failure to argue that the analogy itself misstated the law.

Accordingly, the Court held that the district court’s denial of the mistrial motion was not:

“clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case.” ({¶42}, citing Smith, 2016‑NMSC‑007, ¶ 27).

IV. Procedural and Advocacy Lessons

A. Record Citation Requirements under Rule 12‑318(A)(3)

At the outset, the Court admonished Defendant for violating Rule 12‑318(A)(3), which requires that the appellant’s brief in chief “shall contain … a summary of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review” with citations to the record, transcript, or exhibits supporting each factual representation ({¶2}).

Because Defendant’s brief lacked such citations in multiple instances, the Court:

• Explicitly declined to rely on his unsupported representations of the factual and procedural background; and
• Reminded that a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence “shall be deemed waived” if the required factual summary with citations is absent ({¶2}).

This is a sharp warning to appellate counsel: noncompliance with Rule 12‑318(A)(3) can effectively strip the appellant’s version of events of persuasive force.

B. Nonprecedential Decisions under Rule 12‑405(B)

The Court invoked Rule 12‑405(B) to issue a nonprecedential decision and cited its recent similar practice in State v. Byram ({¶1}). The Court stated that it would “limit [its] discussion of the law and the facts to that necessary to decide the merits of this appeal” ({¶1}, quoting Byram).

Although nonprecedential under New Mexico rules (and subject to citation restrictions in Rule 12‑405 NMRA), Kindred is still instructive for:

• How the Supreme Court currently views imperfect self‑defense within the UJI framework;
• How it expects Rule 11‑403 balancing to be conducted with respect to rap lyrics and racially charged language; and
• What it considers an adequate record and argument to justify overruling precedent under Padilla and Trujillo.

Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Perfect vs. Imperfect Self‑Defense

• Perfect self‑defense: The defendant reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. If accepted, it is a complete defense and leads to acquittal.
• Imperfect self‑defense: The defendant honestly but unreasonably believes deadly force is necessary. In New Mexico, this is not a “defense” but a mitigating factor that can reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter ({¶16}).

2. Voluntary Manslaughter and “Sufficient Provocation”

Voluntary manslaughter involves an intentional killing that would otherwise be murder, but is reduced because it occurred in the “heat of passion” caused by “sufficient provocation.” New Mexico treats an unreasonable fear for one’s safety as a form of sufficient provocation ({¶16}). Thus, imperfect self‑defense and traditional “heat of passion” share the same doctrinal home in voluntary manslaughter.

3. Uniform Jury Instructions (UJIs)

New Mexico’s UJIs are standardized jury instructions promulgated by the Supreme Court. They:

• Are presumed to correctly state the law (Wilson, cited at {¶15});
• Are generally mandatory absent exceptional circumstances; and
• Include instructions on homicide degrees, self‑defense, provocation, and reasonable doubt (e.g., UJI 14‑5060 for reasonable doubt, UJI 14‑5190 for duty to retreat).

4. Rule 11‑403 and “Unfair Prejudice”

Rule 11‑403 NMRA allows courts to exclude relevant evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers such as unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Not all prejudice is barred; criminal evidence is almost always prejudicial. The line is crossed when:

• The evidence invites decision on an emotional or improper basis;
• It is needlessly inflammatory, shocking, or highly likely to provoke hostility or revulsion; or
• It contributes little to a legitimately disputed issue while posing a serious risk of bias.

Kindred illustrates how courts should carefully weigh cultural and racial dimensions (rap lyrics; the N‑word) against probative value ({¶28}–{¶33}).

5. Stare Decisis and Overruling Precedent

Under Padilla and Trujillo, the Supreme Court will overturn its prior decisions only for “compelling reasons,” such as:

• The prior rule has become unworkable;
• Subsequent legal developments have rendered the rule obsolete or inconsistent; or
• The rule undermines coherence and consistency in the law.

Citing other jurisdictions that follow a different approach is not, by itself, enough to justify overruling New Mexico precedent ({¶21}).

6. Nonprecedential Decisions

A “nonprecedential decision” under Rule 12‑405(B) is not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports and is subject to special citation rules. Such decisions:

• Do not establish binding precedent; but
• May still reveal how the Court is likely to resolve similar issues when presented in a precedential case.

Potential Impact on Future Cases

1. Imperfect Self‑Defense Instructions

Even though Kindred is nonprecedential, it strongly signals that the Supreme Court remains committed to the Abeyta/Henley framework:

• Trial courts may continue to refuse stand‑alone imperfect‑self‑defense instructions so long as the jury is properly instructed on voluntary manslaughter (with sufficient provocation) and self‑defense.
• Defense counsel should focus on:
  • Ensuring that the evidence supporting imperfect self‑defense entitles the defendant to a voluntary manslaughter “step‑down” instruction; and
  • Using closing argument—not additional instructions—to explain to jurors how unreasonable fear fits within “heat of passion” or provocation.

Any future effort to persuade the Court to adopt a separate imperfect‑self‑defense instruction will likely require a more substantial showing of unworkability or doctrinal inconsistency than was offered in Kindred.

2. Rap Lyrics and Artistic Expression

Kindred fits into a national trend of courts allowing carefully limited use of defendants’ artistic expressions (especially rap) when:

• The lyrics are tightly linked to specific facts of the charged offense (e.g., same weapon, same modus operandi, same motive); and
• The trial court narrowly tailors the admitted portions and explicitly weighs the danger of cultural or racial bias.

Defense counsel can expect courts to scrutinize:

• Whether the lyrics are genuinely probative of intent, plan, or motive, rather than simply introducing negative character or stereotypes; and
• Whether any inflammatory or gang‑related themes can be redacted while preserving probative value.

3. Social Media, Racial Epithets, and Intent

The Facebook Live portion of the opinion underscores that:

• Defendants’ own social media statements about disputes, threats, or thefts are powerful evidence of motive and intent;
• Even highly charged language like the N‑word may be admissible when:
  • It is part of the defendant’s own expressive context,
  • Used colloquially rather than as a direct racial slur against the victim, and
  • Closely tied to the events or mental state at issue.

Trial courts will be expected to explain on the record:

• The probative value of such language;
• Why redaction would or would not reduce prejudice; and
• Any limiting instructions given to the jury.

4. Voir Dire Analogies and Reasonable Doubt

Kindred illustrates the narrow space prosecutors have to use “reasonableness” analogies in voir dire:

• Exploring jurors’ views of what is “reasonable” in everyday contexts appears permissible, provided the analogy is not expressly tied to defining “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Any attempt to quantify or analogize reasonable doubt itself remains fraught and is likely to be restricted under Montoya.
• Defense counsel must object contemporaneously to problematic questions to preserve the issue and allow for curative instructions.

5. Appellate Practice

Finally, Kindred reinforces best practices for appellate advocacy in New Mexico:

• Meticulous record citation in the statement of facts and procedural history is mandatory under Rule 12‑318(A)(3) ({¶2}).
• Arguments for overruling precedent must meaningfully engage with stare decisis factors—unworkability, doctrinal development, and systemic coherence—rather than simply pointing to other states.
• Harmless‑error analysis must be framed appropriately:
  • If alleging constitutional error, the State bears the burden to show harmlessness (Tollardo);
  • If alleging nonconstitutional evidentiary error, the appellant must show that any error affected substantial rights, and Tollardo’s specific burden‑shifting framework does not automatically apply ({¶34}).

Conclusion

Although officially nonprecedential, State v. Kindred offers a clear reaffirmation of New Mexico’s current homicide and self‑defense framework and provides concrete illustrations of how the Supreme Court expects trial courts to:

• Handle imperfect self‑defense as a mitigating concept embedded in voluntary manslaughter, not as a stand‑alone defense requiring its own jury instruction;
• Apply Rule 11‑403 to modern forms of defendant expression, including rap lyrics and social media videos, with careful attention to both probative value and cultural or racial prejudice;
• Maintain the integrity of the reasonable‑doubt standard while allowing limited voir dire exploration of jurors’ concepts of “reasonableness”; and
• Enforce procedural rules governing record citations, timeliness of objections, and the proper framing of harmless‑error arguments.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores that existing uniform jury instructions—properly requested and supported by evidence—remain the primary vehicle for presenting imperfect self‑defense theories to juries in New Mexico, and that efforts to expand or alter that framework face a high stare‑decisis bar. At the same time, the decision provides a roadmap for litigating the admissibility of expressive and digital evidence in serious violent crime prosecutions.