Immunity Boundaries in University Disciplinary Actions: Sovereign and Qualified Immunity Preclude Damages; Ex parte Young Permits Prospective Relief

Introduction

This commentary examines the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jacob Doe v. The University of North Carolina System, No. 24-1301 (4th Cir. Apr. 4, 2025). Jacob Doe, a former UNC-Chapel Hill student, was found responsible for sexual misconduct in two separate campus disciplinary processes and expelled from the entire UNC system. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Fourteenth Amendment due-process violations, under Title IX for sex-discrimination in the disciplinary outcome, and on multiple North Carolina state law grounds. The district court denied most of the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part—establishing a nuanced rule on when sovereign immunity and qualified immunity bar damages claims, while prospective injunctive relief may proceed under Ex parte Young.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit’s published opinion, authored by Judge Wilkinson, resolved three principal issues:

Sovereign Immunity: The Court held that the UNC entities (the UNC System, UNC-Chapel Hill, the UNC Board of Trustees, and the UNC Board of Governors) are protected by state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and North Carolina law. Consequently, Doe’s § 1983 and state-law claims for money damages against them must be dismissed.
Qualified Immunity: University officials sued in their personal capacities also enjoy qualified immunity from Doe’s § 1983 due-process damages claims, because the right to cross-examination in university disciplinary hearings was not “clearly established” at the time of Doe’s proceedings.
Prospective Equitable Relief: Despite the immunity doctrines that bar money damages, the Court held Doe may pursue prospective injunctive relief (vacating findings, expunging records, and readmission) against the officials in their official capacities under the Ex parte Young exception for ongoing due-process violations. The Fourth Circuit declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the denial of UNC-Chapel Hill’s motion to dismiss the Title IX claim and dismissed that portion of the appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Huang v. Board of Governors of University of North Carolina, 902 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1990): Held UNC entities immune from § 1983 and state-law suits in federal court, construing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-3 as preserving sovereign immunity.
Maryland Stadium Authority v. Ellerbe Becket Inc., 407 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2005): Instructs that state university arms-of-the-state must be evaluated on their “unique characteristics” to determine Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Biggs v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety, 953 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2020): Clarifies waiver of sovereign immunity by removal only if the State consents to suit in its own courts.
Ridpath v. Board of Governors of Marshall University, 447 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2006): Discusses the two-step qualified immunity inquiry under § 1983.
Virginia Tech (Doe v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), 77 F.4th 231 (4th Cir. 2023): Recognizes the circuit split on cross-examination rights in campus disciplinary settings and that the Fourth Circuit had not clearly established such a right.
Supreme Court cases on immunity and due process: Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).

Legal Reasoning

Sovereign Immunity of the UNC Entities: Relying on Huang, the Court concluded that the UNC System and its component institutions are “arms of the State” entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. It rejected Doe’s attempt to distinguish Huang and his argument that moving venue waived immunity. Venue transfer is a defensive procedural request, not a waiver of immunity by voluntarily invoking the court’s jurisdiction.

Qualified Immunity for Individual Officials: Under the two-pronged analysis, the Court assumed a due-process violation might exist but held the right at issue—cross-examination in a campus sexual-misconduct hearing—was not “clearly established” in Fourth Circuit law at the time of Doe’s hearings. Although the Court emphasized the importance of cross-examination for credibility determinations, it recognized a split among circuits and that its opinion in Virginia Tech declined to mandate cross-examination.

Ex parte Young and Prospective Relief: The Court held that immunity does not bar equitable relief for ongoing constitutional violations. Doe alleged a lasting liberty interest in his reputation and academic standing, stigmatized by a permanent expulsion notation. Under Ex parte Young, injunctive relief to vacate findings, expunge records, and reinstate Doe is prospective and properly tailored to prevent continuing harm.

Impact on Future Cases and the Law

This decision refines the immunity landscape for campus disciplinary litigation:

It reaffirms that state universities and system boards enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court unless a clear waiver exists.
It confirms that campus officials have qualified immunity against money-damages claims for due-process defects unless precedent has clearly established the right (e.g., the precise contours of cross-examination) at the time of their conduct.
It underscores that a student’s challenge to ongoing reputational harm from disciplinary records can proceed in equity against officials in their official capacities under Ex parte Young. This avenue remains open even when damages are foreclosed.
It signals that lower courts should carefully distinguish between damages and prospective relief and assess immunity defenses accordingly.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Eleventh Amendment/Sovereign Immunity: States and their “arms”—including many public universities—cannot be sued for money damages in federal court without consent.
Qualified Immunity: Protects government officials from personal liability under § 1983 unless they violated a right that was “beyond debate” at the time. It balances accountability with official discretion in unsettled legal areas.
Ex parte Young Exception: Allows lawsuits against state officials in their official capacities for injunctive relief to stop ongoing violations of federal law, bypassing sovereign immunity.
Cross-Examination Right: In criminal trials, the Sixth Amendment guarantees confrontation; in campus disciplinary hearings the due-process guarantee is less clearly defined, and courts have split on whether formal cross-examination is required.
Property vs. Liberty Interests: A property interest arises from an entitlement (e.g., enrollment contract with a university). A liberty interest arises when a government action stigmatizes a person in a way that impairs legal rights or reputational standing.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit in Jacob Doe v. The University of North Carolina System clarified the interplay of sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and the Ex parte Young doctrine in university disciplinary litigation. Public universities in the UNC system remain shielded from federal-court money-damages suits under the Eleventh Amendment. Individual campus officials are similarly insulated by qualified immunity as long as the contours of a claimed due-process right—such as cross-examination in a sexual-misconduct hearing—were not clearly established at the time. Yet, students alleging ongoing reputational harm may still obtain prospective equitable relief against officials in their official capacities, ensuring that fundamental fairness in disciplinary processes can be remedied even when damages are foreclosed. This decision will guide both campus administrators and student-plaintiffs in structuring disciplinary procedures and constitutional challenges going forward.