Immaterial Discovery Errors and Post-Plea Conduct:
The Milam Standard for Guilty-Plea Withdrawal and Acceptance-of-Responsibility Credits

Introduction

United States v. David Milam, Nos. 23-4527/28/29 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2025), arose from three separate criminal proceedings that were ultimately consolidated for sentencing: (1) possession of a firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), (2) conspiracy and substantive counts involving methamphetamine and heroin (21 U.S.C. §§ 846 & 841), and (3) assault on persons assisting federal officers (18 U.S.C. § 111(b)). David Milam—identified as the leader of the “Aryan Kings” white-supremacist gang—sought to:

• Withdraw his first two guilty pleas after discovering the government had produced an incompletely scanned search-warrant affidavit.
• Receive a three-level sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility, which the government had initially supported in a plea agreement and the Presentence Report (PSR).
• Obtain a lower, “more reasonable” sentence than the 300-month downward variance imposed.

The Fourth Circuit (Judges Niemeyer, Richardson, and Senior Judge Floyd) rejected each argument and affirmed across the board. The decision crystallises two principal rules, herein dubbed the “Milam Standard”:

1. Immaterial Discovery Errors Rule: An inadvertent, non-material defect in the government’s discovery production—such as missing pages of a warrant affidavit—cannot constitute a “fair and just reason” for withdrawal of a guilty plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B) when (i) the plea colloquy was otherwise thorough and (ii) the omitted material would not have altered the defendant’s strategic calculus.
2. Post-Plea Conduct Rule for Acceptance Credit: A district court retains independent authority to deny U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 acceptance-of-responsibility credit when a defendant’s post-plea conduct (e.g., drug distribution or violence in jail) is inconsistent with genuine acceptance—regardless of any prior government recommendation or silence in the PSR.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit held:

1. The district court correctly denied Milam’s motions to withdraw his 2019 and 2020 guilty pleas. The missing pages were not “material” under Rule 11(d)(2)(B); Milam’s own attorney testified he was eager to plead guilty, and a complete affidavit would only have strengthened the probable-cause showing.
2. The district court did not err by refusing § 3E1.1 credit. Milam’s smuggling and sale of narcotics in jail, plus assaults on deputies, undercut any genuine contrition. The court could consider the government’s untimely objection because Milam raised no prejudice, and the court had an independent duty to apply the Guidelines correctly.
3. The 300-month sentence—60 months below the Guidelines minimum—was substantively reasonable given Milam’s leadership of a violent gang, extensive drug weight, long criminal history, and violent & drug-trafficking behaviour while on pre-sentence detention.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) – Establishes that a guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary; clarifies that imperfect predictions do not vitiate voluntariness.
• United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1991) – Lists the six factors for assessing a motion to withdraw a plea.
• Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) – Governs challenges to search-warrant affidavits containing alleged falsehoods or omissions.
• United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc) – Recognises the “strong presumption” of finality after a valid Rule 11 colloquy.
• United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30 (4th Cir. 1993) – Upholds denial of acceptance credit where defendant continued criminal conduct post-plea.
• United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 2012) – Allows courts to consider late objections to a PSR upon a finding (explicit or implicit) of good cause.
• Recent 2024-25 Fourth Circuit cases (Puckett, Mayberry, Garrett, Oliver, Fitzpatrick) – Elaborate the evolving materiality test and reasonableness review; Milam incorporates and extends these principles.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Plea-Withdrawal Issue
   • Rule 11(d)(2)(B) requires a “fair and just reason.” • Materiality: The omitted pages actually corroborated—not undermined—the probable-cause nexus to Milam’s residence. • Causation: Attorney Godwin testified Milam was “adamant” about pleading guilty to avoid a possible life sentence; thus, the scan error did not influence the plea. • Competent Counsel: Even if counsel missed the error, Milam could not show prejudice—i.e., that he would have litigated suppression or Franks motions successfully.
2. Acceptance-of-Responsibility Credit
   • The sentencing court must make an “independent, factual determination” under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. • Post-plea conduct is central: continued illegality reflects lack of acceptance. • Procedural posture: Although the government failed to object within Rule 32(f)(1)’s 14-day window, Milam voiced no objection to the late argument, so the court could (implicitly) find good cause to entertain it.
3. Substantive Reasonableness
   • The 300-month term already reflected a 60-month variance. • Offence gravity: leadership role in a violent gang; large drug weight; armed presence; assaults on officers. • Need for deterrence, protection of the public, and respect for the law outweighed mitigating factors. • Therefore, no abuse of discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

C. Impact

Milam’s holding will resonate in three doctrinal areas:

1. Rule 11 Plea Withdrawals. District courts (and practitioners) now have a clear framework for evaluating discovery-related “defects.” Unless the omitted or late-disclosed material plausibly changes the defendant’s decision-making calculus, withdrawal is unlikely.
2. Discovery Practices. The ruling implicitly encourages early, complete production, but it cushions inadvertent government errors when the defence suffers no prejudice.
3. Acceptance-of-Responsibility Litigation. Prosecutors may revisit earlier concessions if the defendant misbehaves post-plea. Defence counsel must warn clients that § 3E1.1 credit is revocable; post-plea conduct is under the microscope.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 11(d)(2)(B) “Fair and Just Reason”: Think of this as a high bar. After a defendant says “I did it” in court, he can only undo that admission if something fundamentally undermined the fairness of the proceeding—e.g., coercion, gross misinformation, or ineffective counsel that changed his decision.
• Materiality (in this context): Not every mistake matters. A defect is “material” only if it probably would have led the defendant to make a different choice—such as going to trial rather than pleading guilty.
• Franks Hearing: A special hearing where a defendant tries to show that police lied or recklessly omitted facts in a warrant application. To win, he must make a strong preliminary showing of intentional falsehoods and that probable cause disappears if those falsehoods are removed.
• Acceptance-of-Responsibility (§ 3E1.1): A Guidelines reduction (usually 2–3 levels) rewarding genuine contrition. It can evaporate if the defendant commits new crimes, obstructs justice, or otherwise shows he hasn’t truly accepted guilt.
• Implicit Finding of Good Cause: Courts don’t always say “good cause found.” If they allow late objections without defense protest, appellate courts treat it as though the trial judge implicitly found the reason compelling enough.

Conclusion

United States v. Milam cements two pragmatic but powerful propositions in Fourth Circuit jurisprudence. First, administrative missteps in discovery—here, a scanning error—will not upend duly entered guilty pleas unless the defendant can show real, outcome-altering prejudice. Second, a plea is only the starting point in earning acceptance-of-responsibility credit; subsequent conduct must align with professed contrition, or the discount disappears. These twin holdings, coupled with Milam’s affirmation of a substantial (yet below-Guidelines) sentence, emphasise the judiciary’s intolerance for gamesmanship after plea entry and its insistence that sentencing remain anchored in both past misconduct and present behaviour. Practitioners should advise clients accordingly: remorse must be lived, not merely pled; and discovery anomalies, without prejudice, will rarely reopen closed doors.