Imitation Permitted, Duplication Required: Seventh Circuit Holds Sound Recording Copyrights Are Infringed Only by Actual Copying of Fixed Sounds

Introduction

In Eddie Richardson v. Karim Kharbouch, the Seventh Circuit resolved a question of first impression in the circuit about what a plaintiff must show to establish infringement of a sound recording copyright: a plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant actually duplicated the fixed sounds of the recording (e.g., by digital sampling), not merely that the defendant imitated or recreated the musical content. The ruling aligns the Seventh Circuit with the national consensus that 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) limits sound recording protection to the actual recorded sounds and does not reach independent re-performances that merely resemble those sounds.

The case arises from a dispute over the beat to rapper French Montana’s chart-topping "Ain’t Worried About Nothin" (AWAN). The plaintiff, Eddie Richardson, known as Hotwire the Producer, alleged the beat infringed his instrumental, "Hood Pushin Weight" (HPW). He had registered a sound recording copyright in HPW, but not a musical composition copyright. After two rounds of summary judgment briefing in which both sides repeatedly violated local Rule 56.1, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the merits and later denied the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees (while awarding costs). On consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed across the board: the district court’s discretionary management of local rules, its merits ruling requiring proof of duplication for sound recording infringement, and its denial of fees notwithstanding the circuit’s strong presumption favoring fee awards to prevailing defendants in copyright cases.

Summary of the Opinion

Local rules: The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to deem the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements admitted notwithstanding repeated noncompliance by both sides. The court’s even-handed approach was permissible.
Merits (copyright): To prove sound recording infringement, a plaintiff must produce evidence the defendant duplicated the actual fixed sounds of the recording. Similarity or imitation of the underlying music is not enough. Richardson offered no evidence of sampling or duplication, only similarity and an expert’s opinion about industry practices; summary judgment for the defendant was proper.
Injunction: Without success on the merits, injunctive relief necessarily fails.
Attorney’s fees: Although prevailing defendants are strongly presumed entitled to fees, the district court’s fact-specific application of the Fogerty factors supported denial here; the suit was not frivolous or objectively unreasonable, and a fee award would not further compensation or deterrence under the circumstances.

Background and Procedural Posture

At age sixteen, Richardson produced HPW and uploaded it to a music-sharing site, including a digital vocal "producer tag." Months later, he heard what he believed was the same beat in AWAN and registered a sound recording copyright in HPW the next day. He sued in 2019 under the Copyright Act, seeking to recover live-performance proceeds (limited by the three-year statute of limitations) and an injunction. Following two rounds of summary judgment—initiated in part because the district court, sua sponte, requested briefing on the nature of the asserted copyright—the court entered judgment for the defendant. It later denied the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees (filed one day late) after a factor-by-factor Fogerty analysis. Richardson appealed the Rule 56.1 management and the merits ruling; Kharbouch cross-appealed the fee denial. The Seventh Circuit consolidated the appeals and affirmed.

Issues Presented

Whether the district court abused its discretion by not strictly enforcing Local Rule 56.1 to deem uncontroverted statements admitted when both parties failed to comply.
Whether a plaintiff holding only a sound recording copyright can defeat summary judgment without evidence of duplication (sampling) of the fixed sounds, relying instead on similarity and expert views about industry practice.
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the prevailing defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505.

The Court’s Holdings

Local Rule 56.1: No abuse of discretion. District courts may overlook transgressions and need not enforce local rules in a draconian way, particularly where both sides violated the rules and enforcement was even-handed.
Sound recording infringement: Affirmed summary judgment for the defendant. Evidence of duplication of the actual recorded sounds is required; imitation of the musical content is not actionable under § 114(b). Plaintiff offered no direct or indirect evidence of sampling or duplication.
Permanent injunction: Denied as a matter of course given failure on the merits.
Fees: Affirmed denial. Despite the strong presumption favoring fee awards to prevailing defendants, the district court reasonably found the Fogerty factors weighed against fees on this record.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Driving the Decision

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991): Two elements of infringement—ownership and copying of original elements. Ownership was undisputed; the case turned on the nature of "copying."
Design Basics, LLC v. Signature Construction, Inc., 994 F.3d 879, 887 (7th Cir. 2021): Two-step copying analysis—(1) did the defendant copy rather than independently create; and (2) did the copying rise to improper appropriation. Also sets out modes of proof (direct vs. indirect) for copying, with indirect proof typically requiring access and substantial similarity.
Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington Homes, Inc., 858 F.3d 1093, 1099–1100, 1108 (7th Cir. 2017): Access-plus-similarity framework; "uncanny resemblance" can occasionally substitute for access; public availability on the internet alone does not establish access.
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982): Improper appropriation standard.
17 U.S.C. § 106 and § 114(b): The statutory dichotomy—composition copyrights grant broad rights; sound recording copyrights protect only against duplication of the actual fixed sounds. Section 106(6) limits public performance rights in recordings to digital audio transmissions.
Legislative history: H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 106 (1976): Sound recording rights extend "only to the particular sounds" and do not prevent "imitation of a recorded performance."
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 883, 886–87 (9th Cir. 2016): No infringement by imitation without copying; also articulates a de minimis threshold for sampling in the Ninth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit cites VMG Salsoul for the imitation principle and notes (without adopting) the de minimis standard.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800–01 (6th Cir. 2005): Any unauthorized sampling of a sound recording—no matter how small—constitutes infringement ("get a license or do not sample"). The Seventh Circuit expressly does not choose sides in the Bridgeport/VMG de minimis split because the plaintiff failed to show any sampling at all.
Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 2020): A sound recording plaintiff must show actual sampling, not merely that songs "sound" similar.
District cases in the circuit: Capitol Records, Inc. v. Koyate, 2008 WL 2857237 (N.D. Ind. July 22, 2008); Janky v. Farag, 2006 WL 8441604 (N.D. Ind. May 15, 2006): Sound recording infringement turns on duplication of fixed sounds.
Local rule enforcement: Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2002); Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 2013); Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 887 (7th Cir. 2011): District courts have discretion to relax or enforce local rules; no party can demand strict enforcement; it matters that enforcement be even-handed.
Injunctive relief: Chathas v. Local 134 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 233 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2000): No injunction absent success on the merits.
Attorney’s fees: Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) (non-exhaustive factors); Live Face on Web, LLC v. Cremation Society of Ill., Inc., 77 F.4th 630, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2023) (strong presumption favoring fees for prevailing defendants); Woodhaven Homes & Realty, Inc. v. Hotz, 396 F.3d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 2005) (rationale for fee shifting); Timothy B. O’Brien LLC v. Knott, 962 F.3d 348, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2020) (presumption is strong but rebuttable; review is for abuse of discretion).

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) The ownership and copying elements

Ownership was uncontested because a registration certificate is prima facie evidence of validity. The dispute centered on "copying" and, more specifically, on what constitutes actionable copying for a sound recording as opposed to a musical composition. Following the Seventh Circuit’s own two-step framework (copying and improper appropriation) and the common indirect proof path (access plus similarity), the court first clarified that the meaning of "copying" depends on the category of copyright asserted.

2) The composition/recording divide

The Copyright Act makes a deliberate distinction between musical compositions (a song’s notes, rhythm, and lyrics) and sound recordings (the fixation of a particular recorded performance). Compositions enjoy expansive rights under § 106(1)–(5). By contrast, § 114(b) limits sound recording rights to preventing duplication of the "actual sounds fixed in the recording." Therefore, a plaintiff whose only registered rights are in a sound recording cannot prevail merely by showing that the defendant’s later recording sounds similar or even highly similar—unless the plaintiff can tie that similarity to duplication of the original fixed sounds (e.g., by sampling).

3) Applying § 114(b): duplication, not imitation

Emphasizing both statutory text and legislative history, the court adopted the majority view: imitation of a recorded performance is lawful; duplication of the fixed sounds is not. It joined the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and echoed district courts within the circuit in requiring proof that the defendant actually copied the recorded sounds to establish sound recording infringement.

The opinion carefully noted the circuit split on whether any amount of sampling suffices (Sixth Circuit) or only sampling beyond a de minimis threshold (Ninth Circuit) but expressly declined to choose a side because Richardson failed to show that any duplication occurred.

4) Why Richardson’s proof failed

No direct evidence: There was no admission of sampling, and the record lacked production evidence showing AWAN incorporated HPW’s fixed sounds (e.g., DAW session files, stems, sample credits, or producer testimony).
No indirect evidence of duplication: While Richardson’s expert opined that the two beats were "shockingly similar" and sampling is common in hip-hop, he did not opine that AWAN actually sampled HPW, nor did he analyze the recordings to identify copied waveforms or audio fingerprints.
Access inadequate: Posting HPW on the internet does not, by itself, establish access under Lexington Homes, and it certainly does not show access to the fixed digital file as opposed to access sufficient only to replicate musical ideas by ear.
Similarity alone insufficient: Even striking similarity cannot resolve the dispositive question for a sound recording claim—whether there was duplication of the actual fixed sounds rather than independent recreation.

Because Richardson failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find duplication or sampling, summary judgment for the defendant was appropriate. Without a merits win, Richardson’s request for a permanent injunction necessarily failed.

5) Local Rule 56.1 enforcement

The appellate court rejected Richardson’s bid to have his unopposed factual assertions deemed admitted while the defendant’s were not. District judges have substantial discretion to manage local rules and can overlook transgressions, especially when both parties are at fault and the court acts even-handedly. There was no unequal enforcement or other abuse of discretion.

6) Attorney’s fees under § 505

The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed a strong presumption that prevailing defendants are entitled to fees to discourage plaintiffs from pressing weak claims that impose heavy defense costs. But the presumption is not irrebuttable. Here, the district court performed a factor-by-factor Fogerty analysis and reasonably found:

Frivolousness: The suit was not frivolous; the beats sounded highly similar to the lay ear, and Richardson plausibly conflated composition and recording rights.
Motivation: No improper motive was shown; Richardson genuinely believed his work had been copied.
Objective reasonableness: The claims were not objectively unreasonable, especially given that the defendant himself did not develop the dispositive § 114(b) issue until prompted by the court.
Compensation and deterrence: Awarding fees would not meaningfully further compensation or deterrence under these case-specific facts, particularly given the defense’s own lack of diligence and even a late fee motion.

On that record, denying fees was within the district court’s discretion notwithstanding the presumption.

Impact and Significance

1) Clear rule for sound recording claims in the Seventh Circuit

The decision provides a bright-line evidentiary requirement: a sound recording plaintiff must put forth evidence of duplication of the actual fixed sounds (e.g., digital sampling). Proof limited to similarity and industry custom is insufficient. This will shape both pleading and proof:

Plaintiffs should expect to present production-oriented evidence, such as DAW session files, stems, plugin histories, sample-library provenance, and expert audio-forensic analysis (spectral comparison, waveform fingerprinting) that identifies sampled segments.
Defendants can obtain early resolution if discovery reveals no evidence of actual duplication.

2) Strategic registration choices matter

Richardson registered only a sound recording, not the musical composition. Under this decision, plaintiffs who want to pursue claims based on melodic, rhythmic, or structural similarity should secure and assert composition rights. Absent a composition claim, independent recreation—even when it sounds nearly indistinguishable—does not infringe a sound recording under § 114(b).

3) Alignment with national consensus; open question preserved

The Seventh Circuit joins the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in requiring proof of duplication for sound recording infringement, while expressly reserving the Bridgeport/VMG de minimis question for another day. Litigants should therefore continue to preserve arguments on whether any amount of sampling is actionable in this circuit.

4) Local rules: even-handed discretion

The court underscores district judges’ discretion to manage Rule 56.1 compliance. Parties should not bank on technical defaults; courts may forgive mutual noncompliance, especially where strict enforcement would be inequitable or unhelpful.

5) Fees: strong presumption, but facts matter

The opinion harmonizes the robust presumption favoring fee awards to prevailing defendants with the district court’s duty to weigh Fogerty factors case by case. Where the plaintiff’s suit is non-frivolous and the defense’s own litigation conduct was uneven, denial of fees can be sustained.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Musical composition copyright: Protects the underlying music (melody, harmony, rhythm, lyrics). Rights include reproduction, derivative works, distribution, public performance, and display. Substantial similarity in musical expression can be actionable.
Sound recording copyright: Protects the particular recorded performance (the audio fixation). It bars duplication of the “actual sounds” fixed in the recording. Independent re-performance or imitation—no matter how close—does not infringe unless actual copying of the fixed sounds occurs. Public performance right is limited to digital audio transmissions.
Sampling: Incorporating all or part of an existing sound recording into a new recording (e.g., lifting a drum loop or vocal phrase). Sampling is duplication. Recreating a similar sound from scratch is imitation, not duplication.
Direct vs. indirect evidence of copying: Direct evidence includes admissions or production files showing incorporation of the plaintiff’s recording. Indirect evidence typically requires (a) proof of access to the plaintiff’s work and (b) substantial similarity suggesting copying. On the internet, mere public availability does not establish access.
Rule 56.1 statements: Local summary-judgment procedures require parties to set out and respond to numbered statements of material fact. Failure can lead to deeming facts admitted, but courts have discretion to relax enforcement, especially if both sides err.
Fogerty factors for fees: Courts consider frivolousness, motivation, objective reasonableness, and the need for compensation/deterrence. In the Seventh Circuit, prevailing defendants enjoy a strong presumption of fee entitlement, but district courts can deny fees with a reasoned, fact-specific analysis.

Practice Pointers

Choose registrations wisely: If you want to challenge a later track for musical similarity, register the musical composition (and, ideally, the sound recording too). A sound recording registration alone narrows the litigation path to duplication evidence.
Build a duplication record: For sound recording claims, develop proof such as producer depositions, DAW session files, stems, metadata, sample library licenses, email chains, and expert audio-forensic opinions pinning down copied waveforms.
Expert focus: Experts should go beyond "sounds alike" and industry norms to opine whether particular segments of the defendant’s track are sampled from the plaintiff’s recording, ideally with technical corroboration.
Access evidence: Document how and when the defendant or producers could have obtained the specific recording file (not just heard the track), including links sent, downloads logged, or shared sessions.
Local rules discipline: Treat Rule 56.1 as substantive. Noncompliance can be forgiven but is risky; clear, supported statements and responses sharpen the record and reduce judicial frustration.
Fees strategy: Prevailing defendants should timely move for fees and build a record supporting compensation/deterrence. Plaintiffs should be prepared to show reasonableness of their claims to rebut the presumption.
Timing of registration: Separate from liability, the timing of registration affects eligibility for statutory damages and fees under § 412. Early registration can materially change remedies.

Conclusion

This decision squarely establishes in the Seventh Circuit that sound recording infringement requires proof of duplication of the fixed sounds—not just similarity or imitation of the underlying musical content. The court harmonizes its approach with the statutory text of § 114(b), the legislative history’s explicit distinction between duplication and imitation, and the prevailing views of other circuits. It also clarifies district court discretion over local summary-judgment procedures and reaffirms that the Copyright Act’s fee-shifting regime involves a strong but rebuttable presumption favoring prevailing defendants.

For the music industry and copyright litigators, the message is practical and precise: in sound recording cases, bring evidence of sampling or other duplication, not just "sounds alike" opinions; and if you intend to litigate musical similarity, ensure you have and assert composition rights. The opinion will likely streamline summary judgment in similar disputes and encourage more targeted discovery and expert analysis focused on the provenance of recorded sounds rather than generalized similarity.