Introduction

The case of The People of the State of Illinois v. Alan Greer (79 Ill.2d 103) presents a pivotal examination of the legal status of unborn fetuses within the ambit of criminal homicide statutes in Illinois. Alan Greer was charged with the murders of Sharon Moss and her 8 1/2-month-old fetus, resulting in his conviction and subsequent death sentence. However, upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, significant portions of his convictions were affirmed, reversed, and remanded, particularly concerning the fetal death charge.

The primary legal issue revolved around whether the intentional killing of an unborn, viable fetus constitutes murder under Illinois law, thereby justifying a capital punishment sentence. This case is notable as it addressed a question of first impression in Illinois, navigating the intersection of common law, statutory interpretation, and evolving societal and medical understandings of fetal viability.

Summary of the Judgment

In a detailed opinion delivered by Justice Underwood, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed Alan Greer's conviction for the murder of Sharon Moss but reversed his conviction for the murder of the unborn fetus. The Court vacated Greer's death sentence and remanded the case for re-sentencing. The Court reasoned that under the prevailing Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, the killing of a fetus does not equate to murder unless the fetus is born alive and subsequently dies as a result of the inflicted injuries.

The majority emphasized adherence to the "born alive" rule, a longstanding common law principle stipulating that murder charges require the victim to be a live-born individual. While acknowledging the State's arguments, including advancements in medical science and legislative intent to protect viable fetuses in tort contexts, the Court determined that without explicit statutory language extending the homicide statute to include viable fetuses, the traditional common law interpretation prevails. Consequently, Greer's death sentence was vacated due to the absence of qualifying aggravating factors under the statute.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court extensively referenced historical common law precedents, including works by Coke and Blackstone, which established that murder necessitates the victim being born alive. Cases from various jurisdictions were cited, such as KEELER v. SUPERIOR COURT (California), STATE v. GYLES (Louisiana), and STATE v. BROWN (La.), all reinforcing the principle that unborn fetuses do not qualify as murder victims unless born alive.

Additionally, the Court considered Illinois-specific precedents in tort law that recognize fetuses as persons for wrongful death actions when viability is established, such as RENSLOW v. MENNONITE HOSPITAL and GREEN v. SMITH. However, these did not extend to criminal statutes, highlighting a divergence between tort and criminal law interpretations.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's reasoning hinged on statutory interpretation of the Illinois Criminal Code and the "born alive" rule entrenched in common law. Despite acknowledging medical advancements that blur the lines of fetal viability and legal debates surrounding fetal personhood, the Court concluded that without explicit legislative amendments to include viable fetuses within the homicide statute, traditional definitions remain applicable.

The Court also examined legislative intent, noting that while the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 recognized the fetus as a legal person for certain purposes, it did not explicitly extend homicide protections. The absence of specific statutory language meant that the established common law rule stood firm.

Furthermore, the Court addressed procedural issues raised by Greer, including the admissibility of fetal death evidence and the propriety of the death penalty. It found no reversible error in admitting fetal death evidence and determined that procedural missteps did not result in substantial prejudice warranting a new trial.

Impact

This judgment reinforces the "born alive" rule in Illinois criminal law, maintaining a clear boundary between wrongful death torts and criminal homicide charges. While fetuses are afforded certain protections under tort law when viability is established, they do not qualify as murder victims unless born alive. This decision underscores the necessity for explicit legislative action to alter established common law principles if the protection of viable fetuses under criminal statutes is desired.

Furthermore, the Court's handling of procedural defenses and the death penalty provides guidance on the admissibility of evidence and the conditions under which capital punishment may be re-evaluated, particularly when fundamental aspects of the charge (such as the status of the victim) are reconsidered.

Complex Concepts Simplified

"Born Alive" Rule

The "born alive" rule is a legal doctrine stating that for an individual to be considered a victim of murder, they must be born alive. Under this rule, injuries or death inflicted upon a fetus do not meet the legal threshold for murder charges unless the fetus survives birth.

Fetal Viability

Fetal viability refers to the stage of pregnancy at which a fetus can survive outside the womb with or without medical assistance. Legally, viability often serves as a threshold in various statutes to determine the rights and protections afforded to a fetus.

Wrongful Death Tort

A wrongful death tort is a civil legal action brought when a person dies due to the negligence or intentional act of another. Unlike criminal charges, wrongful death actions seek compensation for the survivors rather than punishment for the perpetrator.

Capital Punishment

Capital punishment refers to the lawful imposition of the death penalty as a punishment for certain crimes deemed severe, such as murder. Its application is subject to stringent legal standards and safeguards to ensure fairness and proportionality.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Illinois' decision in The People of the State of Illinois v. Alan Greer serves as a reaffirmation of the "born alive" rule within the state's criminal homicide statutes. By delineating the boundaries between criminal and tort law protections for fetuses, the Court emphasizes the importance of explicit legislative language in redefining legal definitions and protections. This judgment has significant implications for future cases involving fetal viability and the criminal responsibility associated with fetal deaths. It underscores the ongoing legal and ethical debates surrounding fetal personhood and the necessity for clear statutory directives to navigate these complex issues.