Illinois Supreme Court Clarifies: A Certificate of Innocence Requires Proving Innocence of Every Offense Charged—Including Nol-Prossed Counts from Plea Deals

Certificates of Innocence Now Require Proof of Innocence of Every Offense Charged—even Nol-Prossed Counts

Executive Summary

In People v. Reed, 2025 IL 130595 (Ill. Oct. 23, 2025), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a petitioner seeking a certificate of innocence (COI) under 735 ILCS 5/2-702 must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, innocence of all offenses charged in the indictment or information—not just the offense of conviction and incarceration. This includes charges that were nol-prossed by the State as part of a negotiated plea agreement. The Court affirmed the denial of Reed’s COI because, although his aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) conviction was vacated under People v. Aguilar, he could not prove innocence of separate AUUW counts premised on possessing a firearm without a FOID card—offenses that remained valid post-Aguilar. The Court overruled contrary appellate authority (notably Green and McClinton, and dicta in Smith) and endorsed the reasoning of Warner. A special concurrence urged caution about rigidly applying this “all charges” rule in different factual settings and invited legislative clarification.

Introduction

James Reed pleaded guilty in 2003 to one count of AUUW, as part of a negotiated plea in which the State nol-prossed three other AUUW counts. Years later, this Court’s decision in People v. Aguilar declared unconstitutional the statutory provision underlying Reed’s conviction. Reed successfully vacated his conviction and then petitioned for a COI, arguing that once his conviction was void, he should be declared innocent of the offense for which he had been incarcerated. The State opposed, asserting that the COI statute requires Reed to prove innocence of all offenses charged in the information, including the two AUUW counts premised on lacking a FOID card, which remained constitutionally valid and factually supported.

The central question: Does 735 ILCS 5/2-702 require COI petitioners to prove innocence only of the offense(s) for which they were incarcerated, or of every offense charged in the indictment or information—including nol-prossed counts resolved by plea?

The circuit court and appellate court denied relief. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, articulating a definitive construction of the statute’s proof requirements and addressing related issues involving plea-based nolle prosequi, statutory canons, hypotheticals about absurd results, and the presumption of innocence.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Holding: The COI statute requires a petitioner to prove innocence of every offense charged in the charging instrument (indictment or information), not just the offense that led to incarceration. This includes counts nol-prossed as part of a negotiated plea agreement.
  • Textual anchor: The Court relied on the plain language in subsections 2-702(d) and (g)(3), which require proof that the petitioner is “innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or information,” distinguishing this from subsections (b) and (h), which describe the relief (a COI declaring innocence of “offenses for which [the petitioner] was incarcerated”).
  • Application: Reed could not prove innocence of AUUW counts premised on possessing a gun without a FOID card. Because those counts were charged in the information, he failed subsection (g)(3) and was not entitled to a COI.
  • Overrulings:
    • People v. Green, 2024 IL App (2d) 220328: Overruled for reading subsection (g)(3) as limited to offenses of incarceration.
    • People v. McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648: Overruled to the extent it misread subsection (b) and effectively rewrote subsections (d) and (g)(3) to limit proof to offenses of incarceration.
    • People v. Smith, 2021 IL App (1st) 200984: Dicta suggesting nol-prossed charges are irrelevant to a COI is rejected to the extent inconsistent with Reed.
  • Key distinctions and clarifications:
    • People v. Palmer, 2021 IL 125621, does not limit proof to convictions of incarceration; it holds only that a petitioner need not disprove uncharged theories of guilt (e.g., accountability theory raised for the first time in COI proceedings).
    • Nolle prosequi entered as part of a plea is not a concession of innocence and does not erase a charge from “offenses charged” for COI purposes.
    • The Court indicated that the phrase “the indictment or information” in subsection (g)(3) reasonably refers to charges against the petitioner (not codefendant-only counts), avoiding absurd results.

Detailed Analysis

A. The Statutory Framework and the Court’s Textual Approach

The COI statute (735 ILCS 5/2-702) contains both eligibility/relief provisions and proof requirements. The Court’s reasoning turns on keeping those functions distinct:

  • Subsections (b) and (h): Describe the nature of the relief—what the petition should request and what the court enters if the petitioner prevails. Both use the phrase “innocent of all offenses for which he or she was incarcerated.”
  • Subsections (d) and (g)(3): Specify what must be alleged and proven by a preponderance—innocence of “the offenses charged in the indictment or information” (or, alternatively, that the charged “acts or omissions” did not constitute any crime). The word “offenses” is plural, and the statute does not limit the proof obligation to only the offense(s) of incarceration.

The Court insisted that a broad reading designed to “sweep away technical obstacles” (as noted in prior cases) cannot override clear, unambiguous statutory text. It refused to insert into subsections (d) and (g)(3) a limitation appearing only in subsections (b) and (h).

B. Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

  • People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116: Declared a form of AUUW unconstitutional. Reed’s original conviction fell under this provision and was vacated. However, counts premised on lacking a FOID card remained valid post-Aguilar and were not vacated.
  • People v. Palmer, 2021 IL 125621: COI petitioner need not disprove “uncharged theories of culpability.” The Court focused on the modifier “charged in the indictment or information” to reject the State’s attempt to introduce an accountability theory first raised in COI proceedings. Reed clarifies that Palmer did not convert subsection (g)(3) into a “convictions of incarceration only” requirement.
  • People v. Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260: Endorsed. Warner held that nol-prossed counts in a negotiated plea remain within the “offenses charged” and must be addressed in a COI petition.
  • People v. Green, 2024 IL App (2d) 220328: Overruled. The appellate majority limited (g)(3) to the offense of incarceration, leaning on Palmer; the Supreme Court rejected that reading and noted Palmer never addressed whether acquitted or dismissed charges needed to be proven.
  • People v. McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648: Overruled to the extent it treated subsection (b) as defining the universe of charges relevant to (g)(3)’s proof. The Supreme Court held McClinton effectively rewrote the statute by adding “of which [the petitioner] was convicted and for which [the petitioner] was incarcerated.”
  • People v. Smith, 2021 IL App (1st) 200984: To the extent Smith suggested nol-prossed charges are irrelevant because the State cannot obtain a finding of guilt on them, the Supreme Court rejected that principle here, particularly in the negotiated-plea context.
  • People v. Smollett, 2024 IL 130431: Cited for the point that the form of dismissal matters less when it is the product of a nonprosecution agreement (i.e., the plea context is controlled by contract principles).
  • People v. Washington, 2023 IL 127952, and earlier authorities: While reaffirming that COI statutes are to be construed broadly to ameliorate obstacles, the Court reiterated that broad construction cannot ignore plain statutory text.
  • Canons and collateral cases: The Court applied standard canons (e.g., avoiding surplusage and adding no unwritten conditions) and briefly referenced Tanthorey (joint indictments are several as to each defendant) to quell concerns about codefendant-only counts.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

  1. Text controls; relief and proof are different. The statute’s relief language (b), (h) cannot be imported into the proof elements (d), (g)(3). The repeated modifier “charged in the indictment or information” is decisive.
  2. Plural “offenses” matters. Subsection (g)(3) uses “offenses” (plural) when defining what must be proven. Reed’s information charged four AUUW counts; he therefore had to prove innocence of all four.
  3. Nolle prosequi in a plea is not a concession of innocence and does not erase a count. Because the nol-pros was part of a negotiated plea, it remains an “offense charged” that must be addressed in a COI petition. Whether the State later reinstated the count is immaterial to the (g)(3) burden.
  4. No judicial estoppel. The State’s plea-driven nol-pros is not inconsistent with later insisting the petitioner must now prove innocence of those counts for COI purposes.
  5. Presumption of innocence arguments rejected. COI proceedings are civil creations of statute, with their own proof requirements (preponderance). The presumption of innocence in a criminal case does not rewrite the civil COI statute.
  6. Hypotheticals and absurdity concerns. The Court acknowledged concerns but found the text unambiguous. It noted that “the indictment or information” in (g)(3) can reasonably be read to mean charges against the petitioner (not codefendant-only counts), and it declined to adopt policy-based exceptions not found in the statute.

D. Disposition

Because Reed could not prove he was innocent of counts premised on possessing a firearm without a FOID card—offenses that remained lawful to prosecute post-Aguilar—he failed subsection (g)(3) and was not entitled to a COI. The Court affirmed the appellate court.

E. The Special Concurrence (Justice Rochford, joined by Justices Neville and O’Brien)

The concurrence agreed with the result on these facts but expressed significant reservations about a universal “all charges” rule. It emphasized that:

  • Rigid application can lead to absurd and unjust results in other contexts, especially where minor or unrelated nol-prossed counts would block relief for a long-term wrongful incarceration on a serious charge (e.g., murder).
  • Some appellate judges have flagged difficult scenarios (e.g., separate indictments resolved in one plea; acquitted counts; minor charges; old evidence problems), and amici described real-world cases where proving innocence of other charges would be virtually impossible decades later.
  • The concurrence suggested a “reasonable nexus” approach in which only charges reasonably connected to the conviction of incarceration would need to be proven for (g)(3) and strongly invited the legislature to clarify the statute’s reach and how it operates in plea contexts.

While not controlling, the concurrence signals that future cases may test the limits of Reed’s textual rule, and legislative action could be helpful.

Impact and Implications

1) Immediate practical effects

  • COI petitions will face a higher evidentiary bar. Petitioners must marshal evidence to prove innocence of every offense charged, including nol-prossed counts from plea bargains, unless those counts were never charged against the petitioner.
  • Plea bargains matter. Where defendants pled to an offense later invalidated (e.g., AUUW under Aguilar) in exchange for dismissal of other valid counts, they must now prove innocence of those dismissed counts to obtain a COI. Many cannot do so.
  • Vacatur is not enough. A vacated conviction—whether for constitutional invalidity or otherwise—does not automatically translate to a COI. Petitioners must meet the independent innocence burden in (g)(3).
  • Record-based strategies will be critical. Subsection (f) allows courts to take judicial notice of prior sworn testimony and admitted evidence. Petitioners should leverage the criminal record to address all charged counts.

2) Likely areas of litigation post-Reed

  • Scope of “offenses charged” for multi-defendant indictments: Reed indicates charges must be “against the petitioner,” not codefendant-only counts. Expect disputes at the margins.
  • Acquitted counts: Reed distinguished Palmer partly because burglary there had led to acquittal and the issue was never presented. Whether a petitioner must prove “innocence” of an acquitted count remains unresolved by a holding; expect litigation.
  • Multiple indictments resolved by a single plea: The concurrence flags this as an open question; Reed’s text-centric approach suggests all offenses “charged” and resolved as part of the plea may count.
  • “Reasonable nexus” theory: Not adopted by the majority, but the concurrence’s invitation may prompt creative arguments or legislative response.

3) Policy and legislative arena

  • Legislative clarification is invited. The concurrence urges the legislature to define which additional charged offenses must be proven and how the statute operates when charges are dismissed in negotiated pleas.
  • Compensation policy refined by courts’ reading. Reed’s rule narrows the class of petitioners who can access the Court of Claims compensation by interposing the (g)(3) “all charged offenses” proof requirement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Certificate of Innocence (COI): A civil finding from circuit court that the petitioner was innocent of the offense(s), which serves as conclusive evidence in the Court of Claims to pursue compensation for wrongful imprisonment.
  • Subsections (b) and (h) vs. (d) and (g)(3): (b) and (h) describe what the petitioner asks the court to find and what the court enters if the petitioner wins (limited to offenses of incarceration). (d) and (g)(3) describe what the petitioner must allege and prove—innocence of all “offenses charged in the indictment or information.”
  • Nolle prosequi (nol-pros): A dismissal of a charge by the State. When done as part of a negotiated plea, it is not a concession of innocence and does not remove that charge from the set of “offenses charged” for COI proof.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: More likely than not. This is the COI petitioner’s burden of proof.
  • “Acts or omissions did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor” clause: An alternative way to satisfy (g)(3). For example, if the statute was void ab initio or the conduct was decriminalized, the petitioner can prove that the charged acts were not criminal at all.
  • Facial unconstitutionality and void ab initio: A statute declared facially unconstitutional is treated as having no legal force from the outset. But if other valid charges remain based on the same conduct, the petitioner must still prove innocence of those charges for a COI.
  • Judicial estoppel: Prevents a party from taking inconsistent positions across proceedings to gain advantage. The Court held it did not apply to the State’s plea-based nol-pros and later COI opposition.

Practice Pointers

  • For defense counsel/petitioners:
    • When preparing a COI petition, identify every offense originally charged and plan to prove innocence (or that the charged acts were not criminal) for each count, including plea-based nol-prossed counts.
    • Leverage subsection (f) to bring in the existing record; develop additional affidavits or evidence, especially for non-convicted counts.
    • Consider whether an “acts not criminal” theory under (g)(3)’s second clause applies (e.g., statutory invalidity or decriminalization) to any charged counts.
    • Anticipate arguments over whether particular charges were “against the petitioner” in multi-defendant indictments, and address them proactively.
  • For prosecutors:
    • In opposing COIs, focus on any valid counts originally charged (even if dismissed by plea) and whether petitioner can carry the preponderance burden as to those counts.
    • Be mindful that arguments relying on uncharged theories of liability are unavailable under Palmer.

Key Takeaways

  • Reed establishes a clear rule: proving innocence for a COI means proving innocence of all offenses originally charged in the indictment or information (subsections (d) and (g)(3)), even if some counts were nol-prossed in a negotiated plea.
  • Subsections (b) and (h) limit the relief awarded by a COI to the offenses for which the petitioner was incarcerated, but they do not limit the petitioner’s proof obligations under (d) and (g)(3).
  • Contrary appellate approaches are overruled; Warner’s reading is effectively embraced; Palmer remains good law on uncharged theories.
  • Open issues remain (e.g., acquitted counts; multiple indictments; outer boundaries of “offenses charged”), and a special concurrence invites legislative clarification to avoid injustice in edge cases.

Conclusion

People v. Reed is a foundational statutory-interpretation decision for Illinois COI practice. By drawing a bright line between the statute’s relief provisions and its proof requirements, the Court held that petitioners must prove innocence of all initially charged offenses, including counts dismissed in plea negotiations. This ruling will significantly shape the strategy and feasibility of future COI petitions, particularly in cases where convictions were vacated on constitutional or legal grounds but other validly charged offenses remain factually supported. While a special concurrence warns of potential injustices under a rigid application and encourages legislative refinement, Reed’s rule now governs: a COI is available only when the petitioner can meet subsection (g)(3)’s comprehensive innocence requirement.

Case Snapshot

  • Case: People v. Reed, 2025 IL 130595
  • Court: Supreme Court of Illinois
  • Date: October 23, 2025
  • Author: Justice Overstreet
  • Joined by: Chief Justice Theis and Justices Holder White and Cunningham
  • Special Concurrence: Justice Rochford, joined by Justices Neville and O’Brien
  • Result: Judgment of the appellate court affirmed; COI denied.
  • New Rule: Proof under 735 ILCS 5/2-702(d), (g)(3) requires demonstrating innocence of all offenses charged in the indictment or information—including nol-prossed counts from negotiated pleas. Relief, if granted, remains limited to the offenses of incarceration.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

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