Introduction

In Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael B. Padden, 2025 WI 47, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed a core question in reciprocal attorney discipline: what sanction in Wisconsin constitutes “identical discipline” to a disbarment imposed by another jurisdiction—in this case, Minnesota. The case arose after the Minnesota Supreme Court disbarred Attorney Michael B. Padden in August 2024 based on serious misconduct, including fee misappropriation, forgery, failure to refund unearned fees, repeated failures to appear, and noncooperation with the disciplinary investigation. The Wisconsin Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) initiated reciprocal proceedings under SCR 22.22.

Attorney Padden resisted identical discipline by invoking two exceptions under SCR 22.22(3): that Minnesota’s process deprived him of due process, and that the misconduct warranted “substantially different discipline” in Wisconsin. In a notable turn, while the OLR initially sought revocation in Wisconsin as equivalent to Minnesota disbarment, its later briefing asserted that a six‑month suspension would be the “more equivalent” sanction. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected Padden’s exceptions and OLR’s revised equivalency analysis, holding that revocation is the functional equivalent of Minnesota disbarment and is the appropriate reciprocal sanction.

This commentary analyzes the Court’s reasoning, its treatment of the exceptions under SCR 22.22(3), its reaffirmation of the narrow scope of reciprocal proceedings, and its clarification of “identical discipline” across jurisdictions with differing reinstatement regimes.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Court imposed revocation of Attorney Padden’s Wisconsin license as reciprocal discipline for his Minnesota disbarment.
• It rejected Attorney Padden’s claims that Minnesota’s process violated due process and that his misconduct would justify substantially different discipline in Wisconsin. No referee hearing was warranted because there were no genuine disputes of material fact.
• It reaffirmed that in reciprocal discipline, the foreign jurisdiction’s judgment is conclusive as to the misconduct and that the Wisconsin Supreme Court will impose identical discipline absent the narrow exceptions in SCR 22.22(3).
• It clarified that Minnesota disbarment is functionally equivalent to Wisconsin revocation. Differences in reinstatement procedures, including waiting periods, do not defeat identity of discipline for SCR 22.22 purposes. A six‑month suspension is not equivalent to Minnesota disbarment.
• No costs were imposed because the matter was resolved without a referee and OLR did not seek costs.

Detailed Analysis

Factual and Procedural Context

Attorney Padden was admitted in Wisconsin in 2002 and in Minnesota in 1986. His Minnesota disciplinary record included a 1996 private admonition, a 2017 public reprimand, and a 2019 private admonition. In 2023, Minnesota’s Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed a petition and a supplementary petition. Padden answered the first but not the second. Under Minnesota’s rules, his failure to answer the supplementary petition resulted in the allegations being deemed admitted. After an evidentiary hearing, the referee recommended disbarment; the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed, basing its decision solely on the deemed‑admitted supplementary petition allegations and finding them independently sufficient for disbarment.

The deemed‑admitted misconduct included: forging a client’s signature on an “amended” fee agreement to retain $25,000 he was contractually obliged to return; misrepresentations to the client’s wife and to the disciplinary authority; failure to deposit and refund unearned fees (including an $8,500 advance fee and a $5,000 flat fee); repeated failures to appear at key court hearings; and failure to cooperate with the investigation.

The OLR filed for reciprocal discipline in Wisconsin under SCR 22.22. After directing Padden to specify any SCR 22.22(3) exceptions, the Court concluded there were no material factual disputes requiring a referee and ordered briefing on two asserted exceptions: due process (22.22(3)(a)) and substantially different discipline (22.22(3)(c)). Despite that directive, Padden (eventually through counsel) continued to press for a referee hearing to relitigate facts, which the Court declined as inconsistent with the nature of reciprocal discipline.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Selmer, 227 Wis. 2d 85, 595 N.W.2d 373 (1999): establishes that in reciprocal discipline, the foreign judgment is conclusive as to misconduct; Wisconsin does not relitigate facts or review the validity of the foreign process except through the narrow exceptions in SCR 22.22(3). The Court relies on Selmer to reject Padden’s effort to re-open factual issues and his collateral attacks on Minnesota’s process.
• SCR 22.22(3) and (4): requires the Court to impose identical discipline unless (a) due process was lacking; (b) there was an infirmity of proof; or (c) the misconduct justifies substantially different discipline in Wisconsin. Subsection (4) treats the foreign finding as “conclusive evidence” of misconduct. The Court invokes these provisions to cabin the proceeding and to analyze the asserted exceptions.
• In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jones, 2016 WI 86, 372 Wis. 2d 23, 886 N.W.2d 92; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Rothstein, 2010 WI 30, 324 Wis. 2d 37, 781 N.W.2d 490: both recognize Wisconsin revocation as the equivalent of Minnesota disbarment for reciprocal discipline. These cases anchor the Court’s equivalency holding.
• In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moree, 2004 WI 118, 275 Wis. 2d 279, 684 N.W.2d 667: emphasizes that “identical discipline” focuses on replicating the practical effect of the foreign sanction, not formal labels, guiding the Court’s equivalency analysis.
• In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Laumann, 2019 WI 3, 385 Wis. 2d 152, 922 N.W.2d 520: a reciprocal case where a six‑month suspension in Wisconsin was deemed equivalent to a Maryland indefinite suspension (with a fitness component). The Court distinguishes Laumann because an indefinite suspension is a step below disbarment in Maryland; thus, Laumann does not justify mapping Minnesota disbarment to a six‑month suspension in Wisconsin.
• In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kleinsmith, 2018 WI 50, 381 Wis. 2d 486, 912 N.W.2d 114 (n.2): notes that revocation in Wisconsin is “nearly identical” to disbarment in Colorado despite different reinstatement waiting periods, supporting the Court’s conclusion that reinstatement mechanics do not defeat identical discipline.
• In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss, 2011 WI 2, 331 Wis. 2d 1, 795 N.W.2d 415: demonstrates that Wisconsin suspensions can be lengthy (here 4 years, 8 months), underscoring that a six‑month suspension is far from the harshest non‑revocation sanction.
• Wisconsin cases on revocation for similar misconduct: In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schatz, 2005 WI 10, 278 Wis. 2d 18, 693 N.W.2d 299; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lamb, 2015 WI 52, 362 Wis. 2d 345, 864 N.W.2d 794. Both support that revocation is within the Wisconsin range for forgery, conversion/misappropriation, nonrefund of unearned fees, client neglect, and noncooperation.
• ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standards 2.2 and 2.3: disbarment terminates lawyer status and is “the most severe sanction,” while suspension is an “intermediate level of discipline.” The Court cites these to reinforce the categorical difference between disbarment and suspension.
• Minnesota authorities on reinstatement after disbarment: In re Smith, 19 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1945); In re Reinstatement of Ramirez, 719 N.W.2d 920 (Minn. 2006); In re Reinstatement of Anderley, 696 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. 2005); In re Reinstatement of Sand, 951 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 2020); In re Lieber, 834 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 2013); In re Trygstad, 472 N.W.2d 137 (Minn. 1991); In re Wegner, 417 N.W.2d 97 (Minn. 1987). These establish that reinstatement after disbarment is rare, slow, and demanding in Minnesota, countering the OLR’s reliance on the lack of a formal waiting period.
• Rules cited: MRLPR 13(b) (default admission upon failure to answer); MRLPR 15(a)(1)–(2) (sanction hierarchy with disbarment at the top); MRLPR 18(e) (reinstatement requisites, including bar exam, unless waived); SCR 21.16(1m) (Wisconsin discipline hierarchy—revocation is the top sanction); SCR 22.29(2) (five‑year wait for reinstatement after revocation); SCR 22.26 (post‑revocation duties); SCR 22.16(1) and Wis. Stat. § 802.02 (pleading standards).

Legal Reasoning

1. Scope of reciprocal discipline is narrow. The Court emphasized that reciprocal proceedings are not a forum to re‑try the underlying misconduct or to sit in appellate review of the foreign process. The foreign judgment is conclusive as to misconduct, and the Court’s role is limited to applying SCR 22.22(3)’s exceptions. Padden’s “offer of proof” and claims of selective prosecution or referee bias in Minnesota are collateral attacks barred by Selmer.
2. No due process violation (SCR 22.22(3)(a)). Due process is satisfied if the respondent had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Padden had notice, a multi‑day hearing before a referee, and appellate review through briefing and oral argument to the Minnesota Supreme Court. His default on the supplementary petition—resulting in deemed admissions—flowed from Minnesota’s rules (MRLPR 13(b)), not a deprivation of process. His fairness complaints do not transmute into cognizable due process defects within SCR 22.22(3)(a).
3. “Identical discipline” means functional equivalence, not label matching. The Court reaffirmed that identical discipline under SCR 22.22(3) is assessed by the practical effect and relative severity within each jurisdiction’s sanction hierarchy. Disbarment is Minnesota’s most severe sanction; revocation is Wisconsin’s. Suspension is a step below in both states.
4. Revocation is the Wisconsin equivalent of Minnesota disbarment. Consistent with Jones and Rothstein, the Court held that revocation is the functional peer of Minnesota disbarment. The OLR’s assertion that reinstatement differences (no fixed waiting period in Minnesota versus a five‑year wait after revocation in Wisconsin) defeat equivalence was rejected. As Kleinsmith observed, differing reinstatement timelines do not destroy practical equivalence; what matters is that both sanctions are the systems’ most serious, long‑lasting forms of discipline.
5. Six‑month suspension is not equivalent to Minnesota disbarment. The Court rejected the OLR’s reliance on Laumann. In Laumann, a six‑month suspension was mapped to an indefinite suspension in Maryland—a sanction categorically below disbarment in that jurisdiction. By contrast, Minnesota disbarment sits at the apex of sanction severity. A six‑month suspension in Wisconsin is neither the most severe suspension nor the most severe sanction; it is a commonly imposed term and comparatively modest to the practical severity of disbarment.
6. No “substantially different discipline” (SCR 22.22(3)(c)). The exception requires showing that the foreign sanction is not merely outside, but substantially outside, the range Wisconsin would impose for similar misconduct. The Court surveyed Wisconsin precedent, particularly Schatz and Lamb, and concluded that revocation comfortably falls within Wisconsin’s disciplinary range for conduct involving misappropriation, forgery, nonrefunding unearned fees, neglect, and noncooperation—especially given Padden’s Minnesota disciplinary history and the absence of mitigating evidence. Thus, the exception does not apply.
7. No referee hearing was warranted. Having found no genuine disputes of material fact as to any SCR 22.22(3) exception, the Court declined to appoint a referee and decided the matter on the briefs, as allowed by SCR 22.22(5).

Why the Reinstatement-Difference Argument Failed

The OLR’s briefing shifted from its complaint’s request for revocation to advocating a six‑month suspension, arguing that because Minnesota lacks a codified waiting period for reinstatement after disbarment, a short suspension better captures equivalence. The Court rejected this for three reasons:

• Sanction hierarchies in both states place disbarment/revocation at the top; a six‑month suspension is plainly lower in severity.
• In practice, reinstatement from disbarment in Minnesota is rare, slow, and demanding (often many years, with bar exam and other requisites), making its practical severity far stronger than a short suspension in Wisconsin.
• Wisconsin precedent (Kleinsmith) has already recognized that differing reinstatement waiting periods do not negate functional equivalence for reciprocal purposes.

The Court also observed that if Minnesota had imposed a fixed-term suspension, Wisconsin would likely mirror the same term. The OLR’s request for only six months when the foreign jurisdiction imposed its maximum sanction lacked a convincing rationale.

Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

• Clarified equivalency for Minnesota disbarments. This decision cements that, for reciprocal discipline, Minnesota disbarment maps to Wisconsin revocation. Practitioners and the OLR should treat revocation as the default “identical discipline” in such cases.
• Reinstatement mechanics won’t erode identical discipline. Differences in reinstatement frameworks, including waiting periods and bar-exam requirements, do not upend functional equivalence under SCR 22.22. The focus remains on sanction hierarchy and practical severity.
• Narrowing attempts to relitigate under SCR 22.22. The Court underscored that default admissions in the foreign jurisdiction are binding; litigants cannot use the “infirmity of proof” or due process exceptions to redo facts or mount collateral attacks on the foreign tribunal.
• Guidance for OLR charging posture. The decision implicitly admonishes against downgrading equivalency where the foreign jurisdiction imposed its apex sanction. Where the foreign court disbars, OLR should seek revocation absent a compelling exception under SCR 22.22(3).
• Sanction calibration in Wisconsin. The Court reaffirmed that revocation is within the Wisconsin range for misconduct involving forgery, misappropriation or failure to refund, client neglect, and noncooperation, especially for an attorney with prior discipline and without mitigation.
• Process efficiency. The Court’s refusal to appoint a referee absent factual disputes encourages efficient resolution of reciprocal cases on briefs, consistent with Selmer and SCR 22.22(5).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Reciprocal discipline (SCR 22.22): When another jurisdiction disciplines a Wisconsin lawyer, Wisconsin typically imposes the same sanction unless the lawyer proves one of three narrow exceptions: (a) lack of due process; (b) infirmity of proof; or (c) the misconduct warrants substantially different discipline here.
• Conclusive effect of foreign judgment: The findings of misconduct by the foreign jurisdiction are binding in Wisconsin reciprocal proceedings. The Wisconsin Supreme Court does not re‑try the facts or review the foreign tribunal’s merits.
• Disbarment vs. revocation vs. suspension: Disbarment (Minnesota) and revocation (Wisconsin) are the most severe sanctions. Suspension is lower in severity, can vary in length, and is considered an intermediate sanction under ABA Standards.
• “Identical discipline” means functional equivalence: Wisconsin looks to the practical effect and severity in each jurisdiction’s hierarchy, not the exact labels or the minutiae of reinstatement processes.
• Default admissions: If a lawyer fails to answer a disciplinary petition (as with Minnesota’s supplementary petition under MRLPR 13(b)), the allegations can be deemed admitted; those admissions bind the lawyer in reciprocal proceedings.
• “Substantially different discipline” exception: It’s not enough to show Wisconsin might have imposed something different; the difference must be substantial. Revocation is not substantially different for misconduct involving forgery, misappropriation, failure to refund, neglect, and noncooperation in the absence of mitigation.
• Why reinstatement differences don’t control equivalence: Even if states have different waiting periods or prerequisites, what matters is that both sanctions occupy the top tier and are long‑lasting in practice; thus, they are treated as identical for reciprocal purposes.

Conclusion

The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in 2025 WI 47 provides clear and practical guidance for reciprocal discipline. First, the Court reaffirmed the narrow scope of SCR 22.22 proceedings: foreign findings of misconduct are conclusive, and collateral attacks on the foreign process are not cognizable except within the tight confines of the due process and infirmity‑of‑proof exceptions. Second, it clarified the equivalency question that often vexes cross‑jurisdictional cases: Minnesota disbarment is identical to Wisconsin revocation for reciprocal discipline, and differences in reinstatement mechanics do not defeat that identity. Third, it confirmed that revocation is well within Wisconsin’s sanction range for misconduct involving forgery, misappropriation or nonrefund of client funds, repeated neglect, and noncooperation—especially in the absence of mitigation and with prior discipline.

By imposing revocation and rejecting a six‑month suspension as “equivalent,” the Court emphasized the primacy of sanction hierarchies and practical severity. The ruling strengthens the predictability and integrity of reciprocal discipline in Wisconsin: when another jurisdiction imposes its harshest sanction, Wisconsin will do the same—unless the respondent can carry the heavy burden of proving a statutorily enumerated exception. Here, no such exception applied, and revocation was both identical and appropriate.