IDEA Exhaustion for ABA Therapy Framed as ADA/§504 Claims: Commentary on Derek S. v. Ballston Spa Central School District

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s summary order in Derek S. and Ashley T.S. v. Ballston Spa Central School District, et al., No. 25-668 (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2025). Although issued as a nonprecedential summary order, the decision is important because it:

Applies the Supreme Court’s decisions in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools and Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools to a request for Applied Behavior Analysis (“ABA”) therapy.
Clarifies how courts in the Second Circuit should characterize claims for intensive autism-related services framed as ADA/§504 “accommodations.”
Reinforces the distinction between:
- the type of wrong alleged (denial of a FAPE vs. disability discrimination), and
- the type of remedy sought (injunctive educational relief vs. compensatory damages).

The plaintiffs—parents of an autistic child, J.S.—sued under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“§ 504”), and later sought a preliminary injunction compelling the school district to provide J.S. with a structured ABA program with a one-to-one aide during the school day. The district court denied the injunction on the ground that the parents had not exhausted administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The Second Circuit affirmed.

The central legal issue is whether a demand for school-provided ABA therapy, packaged as an ADA/§ 504 “reasonable accommodation,” is substantively a claim for educational services available under the IDEA—thus triggering IDEA exhaustion under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)—or whether it can proceed directly in federal court as a standalone disability discrimination claim.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, holding that:

Plaintiffs’ request for ABA therapy is, in substance, a claim about the adequacy of J.S.’s educational program—that is, a FAPE claim under the IDEA—even though it is formally pleaded under the ADA and § 504.
Because the plaintiffs sought relief “also available” under the IDEA (the inclusion of ABA in J.S.’s school-day program), they were required by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) to exhaust IDEA administrative procedures before seeking such injunctive relief in federal court.
The fact that the complaint primarily demanded compensatory damages (a remedy not available under the IDEA) allows the damages claims to continue; however, the preliminary injunctive relief requesting ABA services is barred without exhaustion.
Under the Supreme Court’s framework in Fry, the “gravamen” of the complaint is educational: no adult visitor could demand a one-to-one ABA aide, and no public library or theater would plausibly be required to provide ABA in the same way. That characterization makes the claim subject to IDEA procedures.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lartigue v. Northside Independent School District, 100 F.4th 510 (5th Cir. 2024), does not help the plaintiffs, because there—as here—the gravamen was denial of a FAPE, and exhaustion was excused only as to compensatory damages, not injunctive educational relief.

The Second Circuit therefore concluded that the district court did not commit a legal error in imposing the exhaustion requirement and did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction.

III. Background and Procedural Context

A. Parties and Claims

The plaintiffs, Derek S. and Ashley T.S., are the parents and guardians ad litem of J.S., a minor child with autism. They sued the Ballston Spa Central School District and its Board of Education (collectively, the “School”) alleging:

Violations of Title II of the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132), and
Violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794).

Their theory is that J.S. is a child with a disability who requires ABA therapy—a highly structured, evidence-based behavioral intervention frequently used with autistic children—to access and benefit from education. They claimed the School’s refusal to provide a structured ABA program and a one-to-one aide constitutes disability discrimination.

B. Procedural Posture

Two key procedural features frame the Second Circuit’s analysis:

The plaintiffs initially sought compensatory damages under the ADA and § 504. Compensatory damages are not available under the IDEA.
Seven months later, they moved for a preliminary injunction compelling the School to implement ABA therapy as part of J.S.’s school program—relief that is squarely educational and falls within the scope of services contemplated by the IDEA.

The district court:

Held that the request for an injunction seeking ABA therapy was subject to IDEA exhaustion and that plaintiffs had not exhausted, and thus denied the preliminary injunction.
Allowed the damages claims to remain live, in light of Luna Perez.

The parents appealed only the denial of the preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which authorizes interlocutory appeals from orders refusing injunctions.

IV. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

A. The Interlocking Statutes: IDEA, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act

The opinion carefully “sketches the relationship” among three relevant federal statutes:

IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act)
The IDEA is a specialized education statute designed to ensure that “all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education [FAPE].” A FAPE includes:
- Special education instruction tailored to the child’s “unique needs,” and
- “Supportive services” that allow the child to benefit from that instruction.
School districts deliver FAPE through Individualized Education Programs (IEPs), which set goals, services, and progress measures.
ADA Title II
Title II prohibits public entities (including public schools) from discriminating “by reason of” disability and from denying the benefits of their services, programs, or activities to qualified individuals with disabilities.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 imposes substantially the same duties on “programs or activities” receiving federal financial assistance, including public schools. The Second Circuit notes that courts “consider [ADA Title II and § 504] together” because their substantive standards are “nearly identical.”

Without the IDEA overlay, a child with a disability could sue a school under Title II/§ 504 by showing that the school denied meaningful access to its programs or discriminated because of disability. But where the alleged wrong is the denial of an appropriate education, the IDEA’s administrative regime may come into play.

B. IDEA Exhaustion and § 1415(l)

The linchpin of this case is § 1415(l) of the IDEA. That provision:

Explicitly preserves the right to bring suits under other federal statutes (like the ADA and § 504), but
Requires plaintiffs to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures when they are “seeking relief that is also available under” the IDEA.

Administrative remedies under the IDEA (and New York’s parallel Education Law § 4404) generally require parents to:

Challenge an IEP before an impartial hearing officer,
Appeal to a state review officer, and
Only then seek judicial review in state or federal court.

This exhaustion requirement serves multiple purposes:

Promoting expert resolution of educational disputes by specialized officers.
Creating a factual record regarding the child’s needs and appropriate services.
Giving school districts the first opportunity to correct errors or adjust services.

C. Supreme Court Framework: Fry and Luna Perez

1. Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools

In Fry, the Supreme Court addressed when a plaintiff bringing ADA or § 504 claims about a child in school must exhaust under the IDEA. The Court held:

The key is the nature of the grievance, not the statute cited or labels used in the complaint.
Courts should look to the “gravamen” of the complaint: is the core allegation the denial of a FAPE?
If a plaintiff seeks relief for denial of a FAPE, exhaustion is required, even if the complaint is styled as an ADA claim.

To aid this inquiry, Fry offers two “clue” questions:

Could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim at a public facility that is not a school (e.g., a library or theater)?
Could an adult visitor or employee at the school have brought essentially the same claim?

If the answer to both is “no,” that suggests the complaint is fundamentally about the provision of an appropriate education—i.e., a FAPE claim.

2. Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools

Luna Perez addresses a different but related question: exhaustion when the plaintiff seeks a type of remedy the IDEA cannot provide. The Court held:

Section 1415(l) requires exhaustion only when the plaintiff seeks “relief that is also available” under the IDEA.
If the plaintiff seeks a remedy the IDEA does not offer—such as compensatory damages—then exhaustion is not required, even if the alleged wrong involves the denial of a FAPE.

Luna Perez thus separates:

The substantive theory of the case (denial of FAPE vs. discrimination), from
The remedy sought (educational program changes vs. money damages).

D. Second Circuit Precedents and Standards

The Second Circuit draws on a number of its own decisions:

Zervos v. Verizon New York, Inc., 252 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2001) and JTH Tax, LLC v. Agnant, 62 F.4th 658 (2d Cir. 2023) – These cases set the standard for reviewing preliminary injunctions: abuse of discretion, including legal error such as using an incorrect legal standard.
Ventura de Paulino v. New York City Department of Education, 959 F.3d 519 (2d Cir. 2020) – This case reaffirms the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement and the primacy of administrative procedures before judicial relief.
A.R. v. Connecticut State Board of Education, 5 F.4th 155 (2d Cir. 2021) – Quoted for the basic definition and purpose of the IDEA and FAPE.
McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2012) – Cited for the elements of ADA and § 504 claims and the near-identity of their standards.
Doe v. Franklin Square Union Free School District, 100 F.4th 86 (2d Cir. 2024) – Used to confirm, in a post–Luna Perez environment, that damages-only claims may avoid exhaustion, even when the substantive allegations involve denial of a FAPE.
Frutiger v. Hamilton Central School District, 928 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1991) – Cited on appellate jurisdiction over preliminary injunction appeals under § 1292(a)(1).

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Standard of Review

The Second Circuit reviews the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs if:

The district court applies the wrong legal standard, or
Its decision rests on an error of law.

Accordingly, the appellate court’s primary task is to determine whether the district court was correct to apply the IDEA exhaustion requirement to this request for ABA therapy.

B. Characterization of the Relief: Is ABA Therapy “Relief Available Under the IDEA”?

The Second Circuit treats the requested injunctive relief—“implementing ABA therapy as part of J.S.’s educational routine”—as:

An educational service or “supportive service” used to deliver or enhance a FAPE, and therefore
Relief that the IDEA is designed to provide through the IEP process.

ABA therapy, in this context, is not a generic accessibility feature (such as a wheelchair ramp or captioning) that could easily be conceptualized across different types of public services. It is instead a method of instruction and behavioral support tailored to J.S.’s learning needs while in school.

C. The “Gravamen” Inquiry Under Fry

Plaintiffs argued that they were not challenging the denial of a FAPE but rather the School’s refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation under the ADA and § 504. They characterized ABA as “not an educational service,” but an accommodation necessary to access education.

The Court rejects this framing by applying Fry’s gravamen analysis and emphasising that courts must look past “artful pleading” and “magic words”:

The plaintiffs sued under the ADA and § 504, not the IDEA—but § 1415(l) presupposes exactly that: plaintiffs are suing under a non-IDEA statute.
Simply invoking disability discrimination statutes does not avoid exhaustion if the essence of the complaint is about whether the school is providing appropriate educational services.

1. Applying the First Fry Question

Could the plaintiffs have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct occurred at a public library or theater?

The answer is clearly no. The claim is that:

J.S. needs a “structured ABA program” with a 1:1 aide,
To “help J.S. make progress” at school.

No one realistically expects a public library or theater to provide intensive, individualized ABA programming with one-to-one aides for patrons. That demand is uniquely bound up with the school’s duty to educate and provide FAPE.

2. Applying the Second Fry Question

Could an adult visitor or employee at the school have brought essentially the same grievance?

Again, the answer is no. An adult employee or visitor could not plausibly claim a right to a “structured ABA program” with a 1:1 aide to “help them make progress” in the educational sense. This kind of program is inherently tied to child development and education under a school IEP.

As the Court notes, “the only reason that Plaintiffs could plausibly expect such services from the School is that their complaint clearly concerns J.S.’s educational needs.” Under Fry, this strongly signals that the gravamen of the complaint is the adequacy of the child’s educational program—a FAPE issue.

D. The Role of Remedies Under Luna Perez

Having concluded that the gravamen of the complaint is denial of FAPE-like educational services, the Court next turns, implicitly, to the Luna Perez dimension: what type of relief is the plaintiff seeking?

The Court distinguishes between:

The damages claims under the ADA and § 504, which seek compensatory damages unavailable under the IDEA. For those claims, § 1415(l) does not require exhaustion, in line with Luna Perez. The district court correctly “separated Plaintiffs’ damages claim—which remains live—from [the] motion for injunctive relief.”
The injunctive claim seeking implementation of ABA as part of J.S.’s educational routine. That is relief squarely “available” under the IDEA. As such, § 1415(l) requires exhaustion for this portion of the case.

Thus, even though the overall complaint includes ADA and § 504 claims and seeks damages, the specific request for immediate ABA programming—a change in the educational program—is barred until IDEA procedures are completed.

E. Distinguishing the Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Lartigue

Plaintiffs invoked Lartigue v. Northside Independent School District, 100 F.4th 510 (5th Cir. 2024), arguing that it distinguishes between:

IDEA claims for denial of FAPE, and
ADA claims for failure to provide reasonable accommodations necessary to access education.

The Second Circuit rejects this as a misreading of Lartigue:

In Lartigue, everyone agreed that the gravamen of the complaint was denial of a FAPE.
The Fifth Circuit excused exhaustion only because the plaintiff sought compensatory damages, a remedy that the IDEA does not provide, mirroring the Supreme Court’s rationale in Luna Perez.
Here, the Second Circuit follows essentially the same approach: damages claims proceed; injunctive education-related relief is subject to exhaustion.

In other words, Lartigue actually reinforces, rather than undermines, the district court’s result:

Where plaintiffs seek educational programming changes (e.g., ABA services in school), IDEA exhaustion applies.
Where plaintiffs seek only damages unavailable under the IDEA, exhaustion does not apply.

F. Policy Overtones: The “Well-Worn Path” of the IDEA

The opinion closes with a policy-inflected reminder: even if J.S. “might urgently need ABA therapy,” the proper way to secure that relief is to “follow the well-worn path of the IDEA.”

The Court emphasizes:

The IDEA enlists specialized officials “experienced in addressing exactly the issues [J.S.] raises” rather than placing federal district courts in the role of front-line educational decision-makers.
Plaintiffs waited seven months after filing a damages suit before attempting to graft an educational injunction onto the litigation, a move that would bypass the administrative mechanisms designed to handle these disputes.

This underscores a central message: federal civil rights claims cannot be used as a shortcut to bypass the educational expertise and procedural structure of the IDEA when the true subject is the content of a child’s education.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. FAPE (Free Appropriate Public Education)

A FAPE is the core promise of the IDEA. In simple terms:

The school must provide an educational program reasonably calculated to allow a child with a disability to make meaningful progress, given the child’s unique circumstances.
This includes both the teaching itself (special education) and related services (like therapy, aides, assistive technology).

B. IEP (Individualized Education Program)

An IEP is a legally binding written plan for a child with a disability that:

Describes the child’s current performance levels.
Sets out measurable educational goals.
Specifies the special education and related services the school will provide.

ABA services, if required educationally, would typically be written into the IEP as a methodology or related service.

C. IDEA Exhaustion

Exhaustion under the IDEA means:

You must first use the IDEA’s dispute-resolution system (hearings, appeals) to challenge the school’s decisions about your child’s education.
Only after that process is complete can you sue in federal court for educational relief.

Section 1415(l) extends this rule even to ADA or § 504 suits, if the plaintiff is seeking relief that the IDEA can provide (like changes to the IEP, additional services, or compensatory education).

D. “Gravamen” of the Complaint

“Gravamen” simply means the core or essence of the complaint. Courts look past:

The specific statute cited (IDEA vs. ADA vs. § 504), and
How the plaintiffs describe their claims (e.g., “accommodation” vs. “service”).

Instead, they ask: is the heart of the complaint about:

Whether the child received an appropriate education (FAPE issue, triggering IDEA exhaustion), or
Different, broader forms of disability discrimination (e.g., exclusion from programs available to others, physical barriers, harassment), which may proceed directly under the ADA/§ 504.

E. Compensatory Damages vs. Injunctive Relief

The type of remedy matters:

Injunctive relief – Court orders requiring the school to change a child’s educational program (e.g., add ABA therapy, change placement, provide certain services). This is the kind of relief the IDEA can provide; exhaustion is generally required.
Compensatory damages – Money to compensate for past harm (e.g., emotional distress, lost opportunities). These are not available under the IDEA. Under Luna Perez, ADA/§ 504 claims seeking only this type of relief do not require exhaustion.

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Parents and Advocates

The decision reinforces several practical lessons:

If parents want specific educational services (like ABA, a particular methodology, or a change in placement), they should expect to litigate through the IDEA’s administrative process first, even if they also want to bring ADA or § 504 claims.
Attempting to re-label educational services as “reasonable accommodations” under the ADA/§ 504 will not circumvent exhaustion if the core issue is the appropriateness of the IEP.
Parents may still bring damages claims under ADA/§ 504 without exhaustion, but they should understand that:
- Courts may not order immediate changes in services without IDEA exhaustion.
- Damages cases may require proof of intentional discrimination, deliberate indifference, or similar mental states—not simply a disagreement over educational methodology.

B. For School Districts

School districts gain further support for the position that:

Disputes over what services constitute an appropriate education—including the need for ABA—belong in the IDEA process (IEPs, due process hearings) rather than being litigated immediately as ADA/§ 504 actions in federal court.
Where plaintiffs seek educational program changes, they can insist on exhaustion, even if the lawsuit is framed purely in civil rights terms.
They must nevertheless be prepared to face damages suits under ADA/§ 504 without exhaustion, as recognized by Luna Perez and reaffirmed here.

C. For Courts in the Second Circuit

Although this is a summary order and thus nonprecedential under Second Circuit rules, it provides a concrete application of:

Fry’s gravamen and “two questions” test, and
Luna Perez’s emphasis on the nature of the relief sought.

In particular, it signals that:

Requests for ABA therapy during the school day will typically be treated as FAPE-related, not as free-standing access accommodations.
Creative pleading under ADA/§ 504 cannot convert a quintessential educational-services dispute into a pure discrimination case for purposes of bypassing IDEA exhaustion.

D. Substantive vs. Procedural Rights in Special Education

Substantively, this decision emphasizes that the IDEA remains the central mechanism for determining what services (including specific therapies like ABA) a disabled student should receive in school. Procedurally, it underscores that:

Parents have robust rights under the IDEA, but those rights are channeled through structured processes before they reach federal court.
ADA and § 504 function as complementary civil rights protections, not as broad overrides of the IDEA’s procedural regime.

VIII. Conclusion

Derek S. v. Ballston Spa Central School District exemplifies the post–Fry, post–Luna Perez landscape in which courts must continuously distinguish:

What kind of wrong is being alleged (denial of a FAPE vs. general disability discrimination), and
What kind of relief is being sought (educational services vs. money damages).

The Second Circuit holds that a demand for a structured ABA program with a one-to-one aide, provided during school hours to enable an autistic child to “make progress,” is paradigmatically a request for FAPE-related educational services. As such, under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), it cannot be pursued in federal court—whether framed as an ADA or § 504 claim—without first exhausting IDEA administrative remedies.

At the same time, consistent with Luna Perez and Lartigue, the Court affirms that ADA/§ 504 damages claims are not subject to exhaustion, because monetary relief is not “available” under the IDEA. The result is a bifurcated regime:

Educational program changes, including demands for specific therapies like ABA, must proceed through the IDEA’s “well-worn path.”
Retroactive monetary compensation may be sought directly under ADA/§ 504 when legal standards for discrimination or denial of meaningful access are met.

In sum, this decision reinforces that the IDEA is not merely one option among many for parents unhappy with their child’s educational services; it is often the necessary starting point whenever the heart of the dispute is what it means to provide a free appropriate public education.