Idaho Code § 55-3211 Makes HOA Short-Term Rental Bans Property-Based Unless the Affected Owner Expressly Consents in Writing

Introduction

North Henry's Lake Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Bryan Norton; Henry Virgil LLC; Properties Idaho LLC; and C&N Perspectives LLC presented an issue of first impression in Idaho: whether Idaho Code section 55-3211’s requirement of “express[] agree[ment] in writing” protects only the owner who withholds consent when a short-term rental restriction is adopted, or instead protects the property (so that successors take free of the restriction unless someone later expressly opts in).

The HOA amended its recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs) in 2016 to prohibit rentals under 30 days for “any owner who acquires the property after” the recording date, while exempting then-current owners unless they expressly agreed in writing. The affected parcel’s 2016 owner voted “no” and never gave written consent. The property later changed hands multiple times, with deeds referencing recorded CCRs. When the 2022 owner listed the home as an Airbnb-style rental, the HOA sued for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the 2016 short-term rental ban.

Summary of the Opinion

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the homeowners. It held that Idaho Code section 55-3211 unambiguously prevents an HOA from adding a short-term rental restriction that encumbers a particular property unless the owner of that affected property “expressly agree[s] in writing” at the time the restriction is added or amended. If the affected owner does not consent, the restriction does not validly “apply” to that property and therefore cannot be enforced against later purchasers—even if later purchasers have record notice of the CCR amendment.

The Court also denied attorney fees to both sides. Although the HOA lost, the appeal raised an important first-impression question and was not frivolous. The Court nevertheless cautioned counsel about accurate citation practices under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standards for summary judgment and appellate review

KGF Dev., LLC v. City of Ketchum and Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr.: The Court relied on these cases for the governing summary judgment standard—no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Their role was procedural: the parties agreed on the underlying facts, making statutory interpretation dispositive.
Smith v. Kount, Inc. and Bedke v. Ellsworth: These authorities supported the rule that cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the standard; each motion is evaluated on its own merits. This reinforced that the appellate court’s task was legal, not fact-finding.

2) Statutory interpretation methodology (textualism and “read as a whole”)

Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr.: The Court used Verska as its anchor for Idaho’s plain-language approach: begin with the literal words, give them ordinary meaning, and if unambiguous, apply the statute as written without rewriting it based on purpose or legislative history.
Latah County v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n (quoting Smith v. Excel Fabrication, LLC): These cases supplied the “no surplusage” canon—courts should interpret statutes to give effect to all words and avoid rendering language void, superfluous, or redundant. The Court applied this to harmonize section 55-3211’s two sentences, concluding the second sentence does not silently create a temporal limitation that would undercut the first.
City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc. (quoting Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue): These cases were cited for the proposition that where statutory language is plain, courts do not engage in additional construction. The Court used this to reject the HOA’s policy-based concerns about the recording system and any resort to purpose/legislative history once unambiguity was found.

3) Recording statutes and constructive notice

Miller v. Simonson: The HOA invoked Miller to argue that recording puts later buyers on constructive notice of CCRs (and thus later buyers should be bound). The Court distinguished Miller as addressing whether purchasers had notice of validly created CCRs despite a recording-index error, not whether the disputed restriction was validly imposed on a particular parcel in the first place under section 55-3211. In short, notice cannot substitute for the statute’s consent requirement.

4) Attorney fees standards and “first impression” does not immunize unreasonable arguments

Kelly v. Kelly: Cited for the governing standard under Idaho Code section 12-121: fees may be awarded when an appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
Petersen v. Millennial Dev. Partners, LLC: Cited for the apportionment principle: fees can be awarded for frivolous components even if other issues are legitimate.
Wadsworth Reese, PLLC v. Siddoway & Co., Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., H-K Contractors, Inc., and Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr.: The Court explained these were inaccurately relied on by the homeowners for the specific fees proposition advanced (and, in some instances, did not concern section 12-121 at all). This discussion served as a cautionary note about citation rigor.
Owens v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs and Ada County v. Browning: Although arising under Idaho Code section 12-117 (not 12-121), these cases were used to confirm a general principle: an issue of first impression is not a “free pass” for unreasonable statutory arguments that contradict the statute’s plain language. The Court nonetheless found the HOA’s arguments here were thoughtfully presented and not frivolous.

Legal Reasoning

1) The holding turns on how section 55-3211 allocates “consent”

The Court focused on the first sentence of Idaho Code section 55-3211, which bars an HOA from “add[ing], amend[ing], or enforc[ing]” a restriction limiting rentals “unless expressly agreed to in writing at the time of such addition or amendment by the owner of the affected property.”

The HOA argued the statute protects only the owner at the time of adoption (i.e., once that owner sells, successors should be bound if they had record notice). The Court rejected that reading as adding a temporal limitation not found in the text. If the affected owner does not consent in writing at the time the restriction is adopted, then the HOA cannot validly impose the restriction on that parcel; thus, the restriction never “applied” to that property.

2) The second sentence preserves enforcement of restrictions that already validly “applied”

The HOA relied heavily on the second sentence, which allows enforcement of “valid covenants, conditions, or restrictions” that “applied to the property at the time the homeowner acquired his interest.” The Court treated this as a “run with the land” confirmation for restrictions that were validly in place. It does not cure an invalid attempt to add a short-term rental restriction to a property when the affected owner withheld the required express written consent.

3) Constructive notice cannot validate an invalid encumbrance

Even if later buyers were on notice that the HOA recorded a short-term rental ban in the CCRs, the Court reasoned that notice does not answer the threshold question: did section 55-3211 allow the HOA to make that restriction “apply” to this specific property? Because consent was never obtained from the affected owner at adoption (and no later owner expressly opted in), the restriction never attached to the parcel.

Impact

Property-based exemption: The decision establishes that, for short-term rental restrictions, section 55-3211 operates at the parcel level: absent express written consent by the affected owner at adoption (or later express consent by some owner), the restriction does not encumber that property and cannot be enforced against successors.
HOA governance and amendment strategy: HOAs cannot rely on majority votes plus recording to bind dissenting parcels (and later purchasers of those parcels) to new short-term rental restrictions. Practically, HOAs may need individualized written consents, tailored amendments, or voluntary opt-in mechanisms if they want uniform rental regimes.
Due diligence and transaction counseling: Title review of recorded CCRs may not be sufficient to determine whether a short-term rental ban is enforceable against a specific lot; parties may need additional inquiry into whether the lot’s owner at the time of adoption expressly consented in writing (or whether any later owner did).
Litigation posture: The Court’s denial of fees signals that good-faith arguments on genuine first-impression statutory questions may avoid section 12-121 exposure, while simultaneously warning that inaccurate citations can trigger sanctions under I.A.R. 11.2.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CCRs (covenants, conditions, and restrictions): Private rules recorded against subdivision properties, often enforced by an HOA.
Short-term rental restriction: A covenant limiting rentals (here, rentals for fewer than 30 days).
“Runs with the land” / “applies to the property”: A restriction that attaches to the property itself so later owners are bound. This case holds the short-term rental ban never “applied” to the affected parcel without the statutorily required written consent.
Expressly agreed to in writing: More than notice or implied acceptance; the statute demands an affirmative written agreement by the affected owner at the time of adoption (or later by some owner).
Constructive notice: A legal rule that recording can treat later buyers as “aware” of recorded documents. Here, notice could not substitute for the statute’s consent requirement.
Summary judgment: A ruling made when the material facts are undisputed and the case turns purely on law (here, statutory interpretation).
Issue of first impression: A legal question the court has not previously decided; it may be novel but still must be argued reasonably and with accurate authority.

Conclusion

This opinion creates a clear statewide rule for Idaho HOAs: under Idaho Code section 55-3211, a short-term rental restriction cannot be made to encumber a specific property—nor enforced against that property’s later owners—unless the affected owner at the time of adoption expressly consented in writing (or a later owner expressly consents). Recording and constructive notice do not supply the missing statutory consent. The decision meaningfully limits “majority-rule” amendments in the short-term rental context and will reshape HOA amendment practices, real-estate diligence, and enforcement litigation across Idaho.