ICWA “Active Efforts,” Reasonable Time To Remedy, And Permanency For Young Indian Children: Commentary On Jada M. v. State of Alaska (Memorandum Opinion)

ICWA “Active Efforts,” Reasonable Time To Remedy, And Permanency For Young Indian Children: Commentary On Jada M. v. State of Alaska

Note: This is a commentary on an Alaska Supreme Court memorandum opinion and judgment (No. 2121, Dec. 3, 2025). Under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d), memorandum opinions do not create binding precedent, although they may be cited under limited circumstances. The discussion below treats the decision as persuasive authority and as an illustration of how existing law is being applied.

I. Introduction

The case of Jada M. v. State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children’s Services concerns termination of a mother’s parental rights to her very young Indian child, “Tye,” under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and Alaska’s Child in Need of Aid (CINA) statutes and rules.

The decision arises from a tragic but familiar pattern in child protection litigation: severe parental substance abuse, homelessness, unstable caregiving arrangements, and an extended period of foster care for a young child during which the parent does not complete treatment or achieve stability.

The core legal issues on appeal were whether the superior court correctly found that:

  1. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made “active efforts” under ICWA to prevent the breakup of the Indian family;
  2. Jada failed to remedy, within a reasonable time, the conduct and conditions that placed Tye at substantial risk of harm;
  3. There was proof beyond a reasonable doubt, including qualified expert testimony, that Tye would likely suffer serious emotional or physical damage if returned to Jada’s custody;
  4. Termination of Jada’s parental rights was in Tye’s best interests.

The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the termination order on all four grounds. Along the way, the Court:

  • Reiterated the distinction between ICWA’s “active efforts” requirement and the more general “reasonable efforts” standard in non-ICWA CINA cases;
  • Clarified that mislabeling efforts as “reasonable” rather than “active” in a written order is not necessarily reversible error where the underlying efforts, reviewed de novo, satisfy ICWA’s higher standard;
  • Emphasized the role of placement with extended family or a tribal-preferred caregiver (here, a long-term caregiver, Lionel) as part of active efforts, especially when the parent is effectively unavailable because of severe addiction;
  • Reaffirmed that for very young children, “reasonable time” to remedy parental deficiencies is inherently short, given their need for permanency and capacity to form lasting attachments.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

  • Tye was born in February 2020. His father is unknown.
  • OCS became involved in May 2021 after an incident in which Jada, under the influence of drugs and alcohol, tried to take Tye from a frequent caregiver, Lionel. Police intervened, and OCS took temporary custody.
  • OCS alleged neglect, parental substance abuse, and risk of harm. The superior court found Tye to be a child in need of aid based on neglect and substance abuse under AS 47.10.011(9) and (10).
  • Tye is an “Indian child” under ICWA, and his Tribe intervened in the proceedings.
  • Tye was officially placed with his maternal grandmother, but in practice spent most of his time with Lionel, who had been substantially caregiving for Tye since August 2020.
  • Jada struggled with severe methamphetamine and alcohol abuse and homelessness; she entered treatment multiple times with OCS support but never completed a program.
  • OCS provided case planning, referrals for substance abuse assessment and treatment, drug testing, transportation assistance, parenting and domestic violence class referrals, and housing assistance. Jada attended about half of her scheduled visits with Tye.
  • OCS sought kin placements: it pursued an ICPC placement with Jada’s sister in North Dakota (denied by that state), contacted Tye’s adult sister (who would only accept emergency placement), and eventually coordinated with the Tribe, which in September 2024 passed resolutions supporting placement of Tye with Lionel under ICWA preferences.

B. Procedural Posture

  • OCS filed a petition to terminate Jada’s parental rights in January 2024.
  • A four-day termination trial was held in August 2024.
  • OCS presented two expert witnesses:
    • A cultural expert from Tye’s Tribe, who testified about tribal norms, Jada’s parenting in light of those norms, and the risks her conduct posed to Tye.
    • An expert (Karen Morrison) on substance abuse and child safety, who explained the specific dangers of Jada’s drug use and the importance of stability and permanency for young children.
  • Jada presented two witnesses, largely focused on placement issues.
  • In December 2024, the superior court terminated Jada’s parental rights.

C. Superior Court’s Key Findings

  1. Child in Need of Aid: Tye was a CINA due to Jada’s substance abuse and neglect (AS 47.10.011(9), (10)).
  2. Failure to Remedy Within a Reasonable Time (AS 47.10.088(a)(2)(B)):
    • Jada continued to actively abuse substances;
    • She had unstable housing;
    • She could not meet Tye’s basic needs;
    • Over more than three and a half years since removal, she did not achieve sufficient stability to safely parent.
  3. Active Efforts (25 U.S.C. § 1912(d); CINA Rule 18(c)(2)(B)):
    • OCS made a case plan with Jada’s input;
    • OCS offered substance abuse assessment, treatment, and drug testing;
    • OCS assisted with housing (lists, funding resources, applications) and visitation (transportation vouchers, supervised visits);
    • OCS worked to find family/tribal-preferred placements and ultimately aligned placement with the Tribe’s resolution approving Lionel.

    The court stated OCS had proven “reasonable efforts” but also acknowledged the clear-and-convincing “active efforts” standard.

  4. Risk of Serious Emotional or Physical Damage (25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)):
    • Based on expert testimony (including the tribal cultural expert and Morrison), the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that returning Tye to Jada would likely cause serious emotional or physical damage.
  5. Best Interests (AS 47.10.088(c); CINA Rule 18(c)(3)):
    • Tye had been in state custody for most of his young life;
    • Jada had never meaningfully engaged in her case plans;
    • Tye could not be safely returned to Jada within a reasonable time;
    • Given his age, permanency was especially important;
    • Jada’s substance abuse and homelessness were likely to continue.

D. Supreme Court’s Holding

The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed on all points:

  • OCS’s efforts satisfied ICWA’s active efforts requirement, despite the superior court’s occasional use of “reasonable efforts” language.
  • The court did not clearly err in finding Jada failed to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time given Tye’s age and need for permanency.
  • The finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Tye would likely suffer serious harm if returned was supported by detailed expert and lay evidence.
  • The determination that termination was in Tye’s best interests was supported by the record, notwithstanding some typographical errors in the written findings.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. ICWA’s Active-Efforts Requirement

ICWA’s core provision on remedial efforts, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d), states that before parental rights to an Indian child are terminated, the court must be satisfied that:

active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.

The Court draws on several bodies of authority to flesh out this standard:

  • BIA Regulations and Commentary:
    • 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 defines “active efforts” as:
      affirmative, active, thorough, and timely efforts intended primarily to maintain or reunite an Indian child with his or her family.
    • The 2016 BIA commentary (81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,790) explains that the active efforts requirement is “one of the primary tools” to remedy state agencies’ historical failures to recognize straightforward means to reduce neglect or separation in Indian families.
  • Alaska CINA Rule 23.2 mirrors the federal definition.
  • Alaska case law distinguishing “active” vs. “reasonable” efforts:
    • Clark J. v. State, OCS, 483 P.3d 896, 901 n.13 (Alaska 2021): reiterates that in ICWA cases, courts must apply the more stringent “active efforts” standard; “reasonable efforts” is insufficient.
    • Winston J. v. State, OCS, 134 P.3d 343, 347 n.18 (Alaska 2006): explicitly holds that ICWA’s active efforts requirement is “more demanding” than AS 47.10.086’s reasonable-efforts requirement.
    • Casey K. v. State, OCS, 311 P.3d 637, 646-47 (Alaska 2013): underscores that active efforts impose a higher burden than reasonable efforts and require a more engaged, hands-on approach.
  • Standard of review in active-efforts analysis:
    • Ben M. v. State, OCS, 204 P.3d 1013 (Alaska 2009): characterizes active-efforts analysis as a mixed question of law and fact:
      • Factual findings on “what OCS did” reviewed for clear error;
      • Legal question whether those efforts are “active” reviewed de novo.
    • E.A. v. State, DFYS, 46 P.3d 986, 989, 991 (Alaska 2002): exemplifies de novo review of whether active efforts were legally sufficient, while deferring to factual findings.

2. Legislative and Historical Context of ICWA

The Court recites the well-known legislative history:

  • Congress found that the “wholesale separation of Indian children from their families [is] perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life today.” (H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386 at 9 (1978)).
  • This history underlies why “active efforts” are demanded: the higher standard is a deliberate corrective to past removal practices that often failed to support Indian families or to respect tribal child-rearing norms.

3. Failure to Remedy Within a Reasonable Time

Several Alaska cases inform how the Court views “reasonable time” to remedy parental deficiencies:

  • Ralph H. v. State, OCS, 255 P.3d 1003, 1007-08 (Alaska 2011): reiterates that whether a parent has failed to remedy within a reasonable time is a factual question reviewed for clear error.
  • AS 47.10.990(30): defines “reasonable time” as a period that serves the child’s best interests, taking into account age, emotional and developmental needs, and ability to form and maintain lasting attachments.
  • Christina J. v. State, OCS, 254 P.3d 1095, 1107 (Alaska 2011): for very young children, “reasonable time” tends to be shorter because prolonged instability can cause lasting emotional harm and attachment disruptions.
  • Trevor M. v. State, OCS, 368 P.3d 607, 612 (Alaska 2016): reasonable time is determined case by case.
  • Amy M. v. State, OCS, 320 P.3d 253, 260-61 (Alaska 2013): confirms that in evaluating failure to remedy, the court may consider any factor bearing on the child’s best interests, not just parental conduct in isolation.

4. Serious Emotional or Physical Damage to the Child

ICWA requires a special, heightened finding under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f):

No termination of parental rights may be ordered … in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody … is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.

The Court relies heavily on prior explanations of this requirement:

  • Diana P. v. State, OCS, 355 P.3d 541, 546 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Chloe W.):
    • Serious harm requires evidence that:
      1. The parent’s conduct is likely to harm the child; and
      2. The conduct is unlikely to change.
    • This element can be proved via one expert, multiple experts, or a combination of expert and lay testimony.
  • Christina J. and Sherman B. v. State, OCS, 290 P.3d 421, 428 (Alaska 2012): identify the “serious damage” finding as a factual determination reviewed for clear error.
  • State, OCS v. Cissy A., 513 P.3d 999, 1009 (Alaska 2022): in most ICWA cases, the court may not terminate parental rights without hearing from a tribal cultural expert knowledgeable about the Tribe’s prevailing social and cultural norms regarding parenting.

5. Best Interests of the Child

Best interests are guided by statute and case law:

  • AS 47.10.088(c): mandates that in termination cases the court must consider the best interests of the child.
  • CINA Rule 18(c)(3): requires a preponderance-of-the-evidence finding that termination is in the child’s best interests.
  • Chloe W. v. State, OCS, 336 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Alaska 2014):
    • The superior court need not give specific weight to any single factor, such as a parent’s stated desire to parent or love for the child.
    • The court may consider:
      • Bonding with the foster parent;
      • The child’s need for permanency;
      • The parent’s lack of progress.
  • Sherry R. v. State, DFYS, 74 P.3d 896, 903 (Alaska 2003): the court may rely on a parent’s documented history as a predictor of future behavior.
  • Annette H. v. State, OCS, 450 P.3d 259, 266 n.30 (Alaska 2019) (quoting In re Adoption of Hannah L., 390 P.3d 1153, 1157 n.16 (Alaska 2017)): findings must be sufficiently detailed to give a “clear understanding” of the grounds for the decision.
  • In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 279 (Alaska 1991): underscores the “highest magnitude” of a parent’s interest in termination cases, reinforcing the need for careful judicial attention.

6. Placement Efforts and Extended Family

The Court analogizes Jada’s situation to incarceration cases in evaluating active efforts:

  • Anton K. v. State, DFCS, OCS, 554 P.3d 456, 467 (Alaska 2024):
    • OCS’s efforts to place a child with an extended family member who supports reunification are taken as strong evidence of active efforts when the parent is incarcerated and unavailable.

In Jada M., the Court treats Jada’s severe, ongoing drug addiction as functionally similar to incarceration in terms of practical unavailability, thus crediting OCS’s placement work with family and with Lionel (a long-term caregiver endorsed by the Tribe) as significant components of active efforts.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Active Efforts Under ICWA

a. Mislabeling “Reasonable” vs. “Active” Efforts

The superior court correctly identified that ICWA requires “active efforts,” cited the correct regulations, and referred to the clear-and-convincing burden. However, in its written analysis it concluded only that OCS “met its burden of proving reasonable efforts.”

The Supreme Court responds on two levels:

  1. Doctrinal clarification:
    • In ICWA cases, the general obligation to provide “reasonable efforts” (AS 47.10.086) is subsumed within the higher “active efforts” requirement; asking whether OCS made “reasonable efforts” is “functionally irrelevant.”
    • Active efforts are “more demanding” and must be the focus.
    • The Court takes the opportunity to explicitly “urge courts to pay close attention to this distinction.”
  2. Harmlessness of mislabeling:
    • Whether efforts are “active” is ultimately a legal question reviewed de novo.
    • The factual findings regarding what OCS actually did were unchallenged and supported by the record.
    • On independent review of those facts, the Court concludes that OCS indeed satisfied the active-efforts requirement by clear and convincing evidence.

So although the superior court’s language was imperfect, the error was purely semantic and did not affect the outcome given the Court’s independent legal analysis.

b. Tailoring and Individualization of Services

Jada argued OCS’s efforts were “inflexible” and limited to “standard” services, not customized to her needs. The Court disagrees, emphasizing that:

  • Active efforts must be tailored to the specific facts and circumstances (25 C.F.R. § 23.2; Mona J. v. State, OCS, 511 P.3d 553, 561 (Alaska 2022)), but this does not mean services cannot be standard if they are appropriate to the parent’s needs.
  • In light of Jada’s daily meth and alcohol use and homelessness, OCS’s services were appropriately tailored:
    • Repeated referrals and assistance entering residential treatment;
    • Follow-up with treatment providers after she left programs early, confirming she could return;
    • Presentation of multiple treatment options, including attempts to engage Jada in programs that would accept her insurance;
    • Housing-assistance resources, including a specific list of available apartments once funding resources were secured;
    • Transportation support (cab and bus vouchers);
    • Visitation scheduling and supervision.

The Court highlights a particular example: after Jada left a residential program two days into treatment in late 2022, the OCS worker proactively contacted the facility to explore re-admission and then reached out to Jada to encourage her return. Jada did not follow through. This kind of follow-up goes beyond mere “referral” and is emblematic of hands-on, active efforts.

c. Placement Efforts as Part of Active Efforts

Jada also challenged OCS’s placement work—especially the unsuccessful ICPC attempt with her sister—as evidence of inadequate efforts. The Court rejects this challenge and reframes those efforts as part of a broader strategy to maintain family and tribal connections despite Jada’s unavailability.

Key points:

  • OCS:
    • Initially placed Tye with his maternal grandmother;
    • Attempted to place him with his adult sister (who agreed only to emergency care and supported placement with Lionel or grandmother);
    • Exerted substantial effort to identify Tye’s father (testing several potential fathers);
    • Submitted an ICPC application for placement with Jada’s sister in North Dakota; the request was denied by North Dakota authorities for reasons not attributed to OCS’s shortcomings;
    • Ultimately worked with the Tribe to align legal placement with the de facto reality that Lionel had been Tye’s primary caregiver and attachment figure, and the Tribe formally supported this by resolution.
  • Drawing on Anton K., the Court observes that placement with extended family who support reunification can be a core component of active efforts, especially when the parent—due to incarceration or, here, severe addiction—is not realistically able to serve as a day-to-day caregiver.
  • Because Lionel supported Tye’s connection to his biological family and expressed willingness to keep Jada involved if he could adopt Tye, this placement advanced both stability and maintenance of family ties.

The Court goes so far as to call OCS’s efforts in this case “commendable,” which is notable praise in a termination decision.

2. Failure to Remedy Within a Reasonable Time

Jada argued she had made progress—attending about half of her visits, intermittently pursuing treatment, seeking housing, and communicating with OCS—and that given the severity of her addiction and homelessness, she should have been allowed more time to remediate.

The Court focuses on two interrelated points:

  1. Persistent inability to parent safely:
    • Jada did not challenge the core factual findings: she was still actively abusing substances, had no stable housing, and could not meet Tye’s basic needs at the time of trial.
    • The Court acknowledges she took some steps, but agrees with the superior court that these fell far short of what was necessary for safe parenting.
  2. Time elapsed and Tye’s developmental needs:
    • More than three and a half years had passed since Tye’s removal; he was not yet five years old at termination.
    • Consistent with Christina J. and the statutory definition of “reasonable time,” the Court emphasizes that young children have an acute need for permanency and stable attachments.
    • Jada’s chronic, unresolved addiction and instability could not be reconciled with Tye’s timeline for healthy development.

On this record, it was not clearly erroneous to conclude that Jada had failed to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time.

3. Serious Emotional or Physical Damage Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Jada’s principal complaint here was that the superior court’s findings were sparse and did not explicitly articulate a detailed nexus between her conduct and the specific risk of harm to Tye.

The Supreme Court first determines that the findings, though brief, are legally sufficient because they:

  • State the required conclusion (likelihood of serious harm if Tye returned to Jada); and
  • Expressly rely on the opinions of qualified expert witnesses (the tribal cultural expert and Morrison), which the court found consistent with the other evidence.

Turning to the evidence, the Court summarizes why the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was met:

  • Cultural expert testimony:
    • From the Tribe’s perspective, Jada’s pattern of using substances while caring for Tye was profoundly inconsistent with tribal parenting norms;
    • This conduct was likely to traumatize Tye and result in serious emotional or physical harm.
  • Morrison’s expert testimony:
    • Jada’s substance abuse was “uncontrolled,” and she could not safely prioritize or care for Tye while using;
    • Specific risks included:
      • Exposure to needles;
      • Accidental ingestion of drugs by the child;
      • Heightened risk of accidents because of parental inattention and impaired judgment;
      • Psychological harm from witnessing bizarre drug-induced behavior.
    • Morrison explained that Jada suffered from persistent drug-induced hallucinations: she believed worms were eating her face, contemplated cutting parts of her face off, and thought Tye’s food was “slithering” with parasites. A medical provider noted that Jada would likely die of her meth addiction.

This combination of extreme, ongoing addiction, psychotic symptoms, and concrete risk scenarios—not improved over a lengthy period—supported the superior court’s conclusion that returning Tye to Jada would likely cause serious harm and that Jada’s conduct was unlikely to change in the relevant time frame.

4. Best Interests of the Child

Jada challenged the best-interests finding on three main grounds:

  1. The court underweighted the emotional harm of severing the parent-child bond;
  2. Tye’s history of multiple caregivers undermined the conclusion that he urgently needed permanency;
  3. The court did not adequately credit her new stated intention (through counsel) to re-engage in treatment.

The Supreme Court rejects all three arguments:

  • No requirement to prioritize any one factor:
    • Citing Chloe W., the Court reiterates that the superior court need not assign particular weight to parental desire or emotional bonds, and may instead focus on permanency, stability, and the child’s long-term needs.
    • Moreover, Tye’s proposed adoptive caregiver, Lionel, testified he intended to keep Jada involved in Tye’s life if he adopted Tye, softening the impact of termination on the ongoing relationship.
  • Permanency despite multiple caregivers:
    • The fact that Tye had multiple caregivers does not lessen his need for permanency; if anything, the resulting instability increases the urgency of achieving a permanent, stable home.
    • Evidence showed that, despite official placement with the grandmother, Tye spent most of his time with Lionel and showed distress when separated from him—supporting the finding that Tye was bonded to Lionel and needed that stability codified.
  • History over last-minute promises:
    • In line with Sherry R., the court is entitled to rely on Jada’s documented history—severe addiction, repeated failure to complete treatment—as a predictor of her future conduct.
    • The superior court was not required to give significant weight to a late-stage representation by counsel that Jada desired to try treatment again.

The Court does, however, express concern about the quality of the written best-interests findings. The paragraph contains a duplicated sentence and ends with an incomplete fragment (“While [Tye] is bonded to her, she has missed [sic]”), which “risk diminishing the parties’ confidence” in the care taken by the court.

Nonetheless, because the record “amply supports” the superior court’s conclusion, and the substantive reasoning can be discerned from the broader context, the typographical and drafting errors do not amount to reversible error.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is ICWA and Why Does It Matter Here?

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1923, is a federal law passed in 1978 to address the widespread and often unjust removal of Native children from their families and tribes by state systems. ICWA applies when:

  • The child is an “Indian child” (a tribal member or eligible for membership and the biological child of a member); and
  • The case involves foster care placement, termination of parental rights, or similar child-custody actions.

ICWA imposes heightened safeguards compared to ordinary child protection cases, including:

  • Higher standards of proof;
  • A requirement of “active efforts” to prevent family breakup;
  • Specific placement preferences favoring family and tribal connections;
  • Use of qualified experts familiar with tribal social and cultural standards.

2. “Active Efforts” vs. “Reasonable Efforts”

  • Reasonable efforts (general CINA standard):
    • OCS must take steps that are reasonable under the circumstances to help reunify the family—often satisfied by offering standard services like referrals to treatment, visitation, etc.
  • Active efforts (ICWA standard):
    • OCS must go further: its actions must be “affirmative, active, thorough, and timely,” with a primary purpose of maintaining or reunifying the Indian family.
    • This can include:
      • Helping the parent make appointments and follow through;
      • Working to overcome practical barriers (homelessness, lack of transportation, insurance issues);
      • Providing culturally appropriate services and involving the Tribe;
      • Using family or tribal-supported placements to preserve connections while the parent works on problems.

In Jada M., the Supreme Court explicitly notes that in ICWA cases, asking whether OCS made “reasonable efforts” is not enough; courts must analyze, and explicitly find, that “active efforts” were made and unsuccessful.

3. Standards of Proof: Preponderance, Clear and Convincing, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Different issues in a termination case require different levels of certainty:

  • Preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not, >50%):
    • Used for the best interests finding (CINA Rule 18(c)(3)).
  • Clear and convincing evidence (highly probable, well above 50%):
    • Required for:
      • CINA grounds (child in need of aid);
      • Failure to remedy within a reasonable time; and
      • Active efforts under ICWA (§ 1912(d)).
  • Beyond a reasonable doubt (highest standard, used in criminal cases):
    • Required by ICWA for the “serious emotional or physical damage” determination under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f);
    • Must be supported by qualified expert(s), usually including a tribal cultural expert.

4. “Reasonable Time” to Remedy

“Reasonable time” is child-focused, not parent-focused. The law asks: within a time-frame compatible with this child’s age, needs, and ability to form secure attachments, is the parent likely to be able to safely care for the child?

  • For a toddler or preschooler, years of instability may already be too long.
  • “Trying” is not enough if there is no sustained change in sobriety, housing, or parenting capacity.

5. ICWA Placement Preferences and Tribal Resolutions

ICWA’s placement preferences (25 U.S.C. § 1915(b)) prioritize, in foster/termination contexts:

  1. Extended family members;
  2. Foster homes approved by the child’s tribe;
  3. Indian foster homes licensed by a non-Indian authority;
  4. Institutions for children approved by a tribe or operated by an Indian organization.

Under § 1915(c), a Tribe may reorder or modify these preferences by resolution. In Jada M., Tye’s Tribe passed resolutions in 2024 explicitly designating Lionel—a non-parent but primary caregiver and long-time close figure—as a preferred placement consistent with ICWA. That tribal action gave additional legal and cultural support to placing Tye with Lionel.

6. Memorandum Opinions and Precedent

The Court begins with a notice that this is a memorandum opinion governed by Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d), which specifies that such opinions:

  • Do not establish binding precedent; but
  • May still be cited in limited circumstances, and can be persuasive authority or guidance on how existing law is being applied.

Thus, while Jada M. cannot be invoked as binding authority in future cases, it provides insight into how the Court is likely to analyze similar ICWA and termination issues.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

1. Reinforcing the Primacy of “Active Efforts” in ICWA Cases

Even as a memorandum decision, Jada M. is clear guidance to the trial bench and bar: in ICWA cases, courts must:

  • Frame the analysis explicitly in terms of “active efforts,” not just “reasonable efforts”;
  • Recognize that active efforts require more than routine referrals—they demand sustained, proactive assistance tailored to the particular family;
  • Understand that the appellate court will independently review whether the factual record meets the active-efforts standard, regardless of the trial court’s wording.

It also signals that if the factual record is strong and efforts are clearly “affirmative, active, thorough, and timely,” minor terminological slippage in the written findings will not automatically result in reversal. However, the Court’s admonition implies that consistent use of correct terminology is expected going forward.

2. Addiction and Incarceration: Functional Unavailability and Placement-Based Efforts

By analogizing Jada’s severe addiction to incarceration in Anton K., the Court underscores a broader doctrinal point: when a parent is effectively unavailable as a caregiver for a prolonged period—whether due to prison, chronic homelessness, or destructive addiction—OCS’s duty to make active efforts reasonably includes:

  • Identifying and supporting extended family or tribal-preferred caregivers who:
    • Can provide day-to-day stability; and
    • Support ongoing connections between the child and parent, where safe.

This recognizes that “active efforts” can be directed not only to changing the parent’s behavior but also to constructing a stable, culturally appropriate surrogate caregiving environment that preserves family and tribal ties.

3. Continued Emphasis on Permanency for Very Young Children

The decision reinforces a pattern in Alaska child-protection jurisprudence: for very young children, the law will not tolerate extended, indefinite uncertainty while a parent struggles with entrenched issues.

In practice, this means:

  • Years in care with minimal progress will very often lead to termination, even where the parent is bonded to the child and expresses love and a desire to do better;
  • The child’s need for a stable, permanent home will outweigh late-stage promises of change that are not supported by a track record of sustained improvement.

4. Procedural Rigor and Written Findings

The Court’s mention of typographical and drafting errors in the superior court’s best-interests analysis—citing K.L.J.—is more than a passing comment. It serves as a reminder that:

  • Termination of parental rights is among the gravest actions a court can take;
  • Findings must be carefully written, complete, and free of obvious cut-and-paste errors, to inspire confidence in the process.

While the Court did not reverse here, the warning suggests that more serious or substantive deficiencies in written orders could result in remand or reversal in future cases.

5. Tribal Participation and Cultural Expertise

Jada M. illustrates best practices in involving the Tribe and cultural experts:

  • The Tribe intervened in the litigation and later used its authority to pass resolutions identifying a preferred placement under ICWA;
  • A tribal cultural expert testified about the Tribe’s parenting standards and how Jada’s conduct departed from those standards, thereby grounding the “serious damage” finding in culturally specific evidence.

This model of tribal engagement strengthens ICWA compliance and affirms tribal sovereignty over key aspects of child welfare affecting tribal children.

VI. Conclusion

Jada M. v. State of Alaska is a detailed application of ICWA and Alaska’s CINA statutes to a difficult and heartbreaking set of facts. Although issued as a memorandum opinion without precedential force, it offers several important takeaways:

  • ICWA’s active-efforts standard is distinct from, and more demanding than, ordinary “reasonable efforts”—and must be treated as such in both analysis and written orders.
  • OCS can satisfy active efforts not only by repeatedly offering treatment and services, but also by:
    • Actively helping a struggling parent access those services; and
    • Securing extended-family or tribal-preferred placements that protect the child while preserving family and tribal connections.
  • For very young children, the concept of “reasonable time” to remedy parental deficiencies is short; years of instability and unresolved severe addiction will typically justify termination if other statutory and ICWA elements are met.
  • The “serious emotional or physical damage” requirement demands robust expert and lay evidence, especially regarding the likelihood that parental conduct will persist; here, the combination of uncontrolled methamphetamine addiction and psychotic symptoms provided that proof.
  • Best-interests determinations properly emphasize permanency, stability, and the child’s long-term developmental needs, even in the face of a real bond between parent and child.
  • Finally, meticulous, error-free written findings are critical in such high-stakes cases; while minor drafting errors were excused in this instance, the Court’s cautionary language underscores the need for care and precision.

In sum, Jada M. demonstrates how Alaska’s Supreme Court continues to interpret and enforce ICWA’s protections in a manner that balances the historical imperative to prevent unjust separation of Indian families with the immediate, concrete need to safeguard the well-being and permanency of very young Indian children.

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