Huynh v. Blanchard: Limits on Shutdown Injunctions and the Duty to Align Nuisance Relief with Texas Environmental Regulation

I. Introduction

This commentary addresses Justice Huddle’s concurring opinion in Steve Huynh, et al. v. Frank Blanchard, et al., No. 21‑0676, a Texas Supreme Court nuisance case arising from large-scale chicken-growing operations and the severe odors affecting neighboring landowners. The underlying dispute pits poultry growers (and integrator Sanderson Farms) against nearby residents alleging a private nuisance caused by persistent, noxious odors from chicken-growing facilities.

A jury found that the growers negligently and intentionally caused a private nuisance. Based on that verdict, the trial court issued a sweeping permanent injunction that effectively shut down the entire chicken-growing operation. The growers appealed, arguing, among other things, that:

• A permanent injunction cannot issue to abate a nuisance the jury characterized as “temporary.”
• A “temporary nuisance” necessarily means there is no “imminent harm,” defeating injunctive relief.
• The neighbors had an adequate remedy at law in the form of money damages.

The Texas Supreme Court rejected those arguments and held that an injunction was available in principle, but concluded that the particular “shutdown injunction” the trial court entered was an abuse of discretion. The Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to narrow the injunction.

Justice Huddle concurred in the judgment. She agreed that an injunction was proper and that the trial court overreached, but parted ways with aspects of the majority’s reasoning. Her opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Bland (and by Justice Young as to Part I), emphasizes two critical themes:

1. Substantive availability of injunctive relief: A permanent injunction can issue to abate a nuisance even when the jury finds the nuisance to be “temporary” in character, and such a finding does not defeat the elements of “imminent harm” or “absence of an adequate remedy at law.”
2. Scope and design of injunctions: A trial court cannot use a permanent injunction as a first‑strike tool to shut down a lawful business. The injunction must be narrowly tailored to abate the unlawful nuisance while allowing lawful activity, and—where a comprehensive regulatory scheme exists (here, the Texas Clean Air Act and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) regulations)—the injunction must be crafted in harmony with that scheme.

Although this is a concurring opinion, it powerfully frames the case as one about the proper limits of equitable power in the face of both a jury’s findings and a Legislature-created regulatory framework for poultry facility odors.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background (as Reflected in the Concurrence)

The petitioners are a group of poultry growers and related business entities, including Sanderson Farms. They operate a “chicken-growing operation” near the respondents’ properties. The neighbors alleged that the industrial-scale poultry operations emitted extremely offensive odors that substantially interfered with their use and enjoyment of their land—classic private nuisance allegations.

The dispute did not arise in a regulatory vacuum. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality had been involved; it had received complaints about poultry odors, conducted investigations, and issued Notices of Violation (NOVs). As required by Texas Health and Safety Code § 382.068—Poultry Facility Odor; Response to Complaints—TCEQ and the growers developed a “Strategic Odor Control Plan” intended to bring the facilities into compliance.

At trial, the jury found:

• Each grower negligently and intentionally caused a private nuisance to each neighbor (Questions 1 and 3).
• In response to Question 4 (framing the nuisance as either of two “types” of injury), the jury selected
  the option that the injury was “of such a character that any anticipated recurrence would be only occasional, irregular, intermittent, and not reasonably predictable” for each neighbor.

No party challenged these findings as unsupported by the evidence. Nonetheless, the trial court entered a permanent injunction that, in effect, shut down the entire chicken-growing operation as its very first equitable remedy.

The growers petitioned for review. While they raised multiple challenges to both the availability and scope of injunctive relief, the Supreme Court ultimately held that—although an injunction was available—the shutdown order was overbroad and an abuse of discretion, requiring remand to craft a narrower remedy.

B. Main Conclusions in Justice Huddle’s Concurrence

Justice Huddle’s opinion can be distilled into several core propositions:

1. Injunction was proper in principle.
   The growers’ three threshold arguments against any injunction failed:
   • A permanent injunction can issue even when the nuisance is factually “temporary.”
   • The jury’s “temporary nuisance” finding does not negate “imminent harm,” which is a legal question for the court.
   • Damages are not an adequate remedy at law where future harm is uncertain and would require multiple suits.
2. The injunction’s scope was an abuse of discretion.
   The trial court’s very first equitable step—a permanent, total shutdown of a lawful business—ignored the rule that injunctions must be narrowly tailored and may not prohibit lawful conduct alongside unlawful nuisance-causing conduct.
3. Judicial respect for the jury’s role.
   Courts cannot disregard jury findings that are supported by evidence. The jury’s answer to Question 4 (that the nuisance-level odors were “occasional, irregular, intermittent, and not reasonably predictable”) must be accepted as a factual determination.
4. Injunctions must be aligned with existing regulatory schemes.
   In an area comprehensively regulated by statute and TCEQ—especially Texas Health and Safety Code § 382.068—courts must craft injunctions that dovetail with legislative and regulatory determinations about acceptable odor levels and required control measures.
5. Shutdown may be appropriate—but only as a last resort.
   A complete shutdown could be justified only if narrower, regulation-consistent injunctions prove ineffective and if there are continued, willful violations.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Jury Findings and Appellate Deference

• Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2016)
  Cited for two propositions:
  • The circumstances in which courts may set aside jury findings (legal and factual sufficiency review). Here, no such challenge was made, so the findings stand.
  • Nuisance law definitions and the idea that characterization as “temporary” or “permanent” does not control the availability of injunctive relief.
• Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2003)
  Reinforces that a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury on factual disputes; the jury is the sole judge of weight and credibility.
• Benoit v. Wilson, 239 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. 1951)
  Emphasizes the same core principle: the jury, not the court, is the fact-finder; courts cannot replace jury findings with their own view of the facts.
• Livingston v. Livingston, 537 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.)
  After a jury resolves ultimate fact issues, it is for the trial court to decide the expediency, necessity, and propriety of injunctive relief based on those factual determinations.
• Bostow v. Bank of Am., 2006 WL 89446 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.)
  Distinguishes fact findings (for the jury) from the application of equitable principles and the fashioning of equitable relief (for the court).

These authorities underpin Justice Huddle’s criticism of any suggestion that the trial court—or the Supreme Court— could simply ignore or relabel the jury’s “temporary” nuisance finding (Question 4).

2. Temporary vs. Permanent Nuisance

• Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines (East Texas), L.P., 449 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. 2014)
  Held that the ultimate characterization of an injury to real property as “temporary” or “permanent” is a question of law for the court, but underlying factual issues must be decided by the jury upon proper request. Justice Huddle stresses that this does not allow a court to disregard jury findings relevant to that determination.
• Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004)
  Important for several reasons:
  • Explains “temporary” nuisance as one where the interference is intermittent or sporadic and can be abated.
  • States that whether a nuisance is temporary or permanent should not determine whether an injunction can be used to abate it.
  • Warns against leaving parties in a “state of perpetual litigation” and recognizes that multiplicity of suits can render damages an inadequate remedy.
• Crosstex, supra
  Quoted for the proposition that a court may decide to abate a nuisance whether it is temporary or permanent, and may decline to abate either even if that is the only remedy requested.

3. Elements of Permanent Injunctive Relief

• Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2020)
  Recites the traditional elements for a permanent injunction:
  1. Wrongful act
  2. Imminent harm
  3. Irreparable injury
  4. Absence of an adequate remedy at law
  Justice Huddle uses this framework to analyze whether the “temporary” nuisance finding negates imminence or adequacy.
• Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998)
  Clarifies that whether there is “imminent harm” warranting injunctive relief is a legal question for the court, not a factual question for the jury—though it must be based on the jury’s underlying factual findings.
• W & T Offshore, Inc. v. Fredieu, 610 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. 2020)
  Confirms the general principle that legal questions are decided by courts, subject to the jury’s factual determinations.

4. Adequate Remedy at Law and Multiplicity of Suits

• Bank of Sw. N.A., Brownsville v. Harlingen Nat’l Bank, 662 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1983, no writ)
  Illustrates that an adequate legal remedy is one where the wrongs are in the past and the damages are reasonably calculable—and the defendant can pay them.
• Sharma v. Vinmar Int’l, Ltd., 231 S.W.3d 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)
  Notes that when potential future damages “cannot be easily calculated,” legal remedies are inadequate, justifying injunctive relief.
• Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. 2016) and Repka v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 186 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. 1945)
  These cases stand for the principle that if a legal remedy will lead to a multiplicity of suits, that very fact makes it incomplete and inadequate—supporting equitable relief.
• United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953)
  Cited for the basic idea that the purpose of an injunction is to prevent future violations, not merely to compensate for past harms.

5. The Nature and Scope of Injunctions

• Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002)
  Restates the “general rule at equity” that injunctive relief is only available when there is no adequate remedy at law—injunctions are not a first resort.
• Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2003) and Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1992)
  Together, they stand for the rule that injunctions must be narrowly drawn and precise.
• Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo, 276 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.)
  Example of a nuisance case in which the court balanced equities with a sharp focus on abating the nuisance.
• eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
  Quoted for the idea that discretion is not whim; equitable discretion must be guided by consistent legal standards so similar cases are decided alike.
• Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1958)
  Establishes that injunctions are not punitive—they are designed to correct or prevent wrongful conduct, not punish misconduct.
• TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance Techs., LLC, 540 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.)
  States that an injunction must be narrowly tailored to the offending conduct and cannot prohibit a defendant from acting within its lawful rights.
• Fairfield Estates L.P. v. Griffin, 986 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.)
  An injunction that grants more relief than the plaintiff is entitled to—by enjoining lawful activities—is an abuse of discretion.
• Wiese v. Heathlake Cmty. Ass’n, 384 S.W.3d 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.)
  An injunction must be specific, clear, and precise in describing the enjoined acts; it should prevent further violations but not prohibit lawful conduct.
• Holubec v. Brandenburger, 214 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.)
  Injunctions may restrain existing nuisances but should not prohibit intended acts merely because they might become a nuisance.
• Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979)
  The scope of injunctive relief must be dictated by the extent of the violation proven.
• Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc., 937 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), aff’d as modified, 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998)
  Cited to show that a broader injunction—including potentially shutdown-type remedies—can be justified where a narrower injunction has already failed to stop violations.

6. Industrialization, Lawful Businesses, and Nuisance

• Sherman Gas & Elec. Co. v. Belden, 123 S.W. 119 (Tex. 1909)
  Recognizes that lawful and ordinary use of new businesses can change nearby property values, and some degree of interference or discomfort is inevitable in an industrial society.

7. Environmental Regulation and Deference to TCEQ

• Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975)
  Under the federal Clean Air Act, states are required to regulate air quality, but the specific mechanisms are largely left to them.
• BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc. v. City of Houston, 496 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016)
  Explains the Texas Clean Air Act, which created TCEQ and empowered it to administer and enforce air-quality regulation.
• Brazoria County v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 128 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.)
  Notes that TCEQ is the primary state agency charged with protecting air quality.
• Slay v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 351 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. denied)
  Illustrates TCEQ’s enforcement actions in air-quality matters.
• In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 476 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
  Emphasizes that injunctive or equitable relief issued by courts should account for consistency and coordination with the actions of state environmental agencies.

These environmental cases, combined with Texas Health and Safety Code § 382.068, frame Justice Huddle’s insistence that the injunction must be harmonized with TCEQ’s odor-control framework rather than ignore it.

B. Legal Reasoning in the Concurrence

1. Respecting the Jury’s Finding of a “Temporary” Nuisance

The jury found that each grower negligently and intentionally created a private nuisance (Questions 1 and 3). Question 4 then asked the jury to choose between two types of injury:

1. Injury “of such a character as to recur repeatedly, continually, and regularly”; or
2. Injury “of such a character that any anticipated recurrence would be only occasional, irregular, intermittent, and not reasonably predictable.”

For each neighbor, the jury chose the second option—effectively classifying the nuisance as “temporary” in the sense that nuisance-level odors are intermittent and unpredictable rather than constant and regular.

Justice Huddle emphasizes:

• The evidence on the permanence of the odors was conflicting.
• The jury resolved that conflict, and no party challenged the sufficiency of the evidence.
• Therefore, under cases like Golden Eagle and Benoit, the courts are bound by the jury’s factual determination; they may not reweigh or ignore it.

She criticizes any suggestion that the trial court (or Supreme Court) could simply disregard the jury’s answer to Question 4 or relabel the nuisance as “permanent” for purposes of granting injunctive relief. The proper approach is to accept the “temporary” factual character of the nuisance and then ask whether, in light of that factual pattern, injunctive relief is still permissible under Texas law.

2. Why a “Temporary” Nuisance Can Still Support a Permanent Injunction

Justice Huddle agrees with the Court that the “temporary” nature of the nuisance does not preclude a permanent injunction. She explains:

• A nuisance can be “temporary” in the sense that its symptoms—here, extreme odors—wax and wane or occur sporadically, yet be “permanent” in the more fundamental sense that the underlying source (the chicken-growing operation) will continue indefinitely and will keep producing nuisance-level odors from time to time.
• She analogizes to disease: a chronic disease may be permanent even if symptoms are not constant. Treatment is warranted even if the symptoms are intermittent. Similarly, injunctive “treatment” may be warranted even when the nuisance-level odors are not continuous.
• Cases like Schneider and Crosstex make clear that whether a nuisance is temporary or permanent should not control whether a court may enjoin it.

In other words, labeling the nuisance “temporary” may affect measures like the statute of limitations or the damages framework, but it does not remove the court’s power to issue a permanent injunction aimed at preventing future intermittent but recurring invasions.

3. The Jury’s “Temporary” Finding Does Not Negate “Imminent Harm”

The growers argued that if a nuisance is “temporary” and recurs only occasionally and unpredictably, there can be no “imminent harm,” a required element of a permanent injunction under Pike.

Justice Huddle—and the Court—reject this argument by:

• Pointing to Operation Rescue, which states that the question of “imminent harm” is a legal one for the court, not a factual question for the jury, though it is grounded in the jury’s factual findings.
• Clarifying that “imminent” does not mean “continuous” or “currently occurring,” but something more like “sufficiently likely and sufficiently near in time to justify an injunction.”
• Explaining that even if the timing and intensity of odors are unpredictable, the fact that they will recur is clear from the operation’s nature and past pattern. That can constitute imminent harm.

Thus, the jury’s classification of the nuisance as intermittent does not, as a matter of law, defeat the “imminent harm” element for injunctive relief.

4. Why Damages Are an Inadequate Remedy at Law in This Context

The growers also claimed that the neighbors had an adequate remedy at law—money damages—making an injunction improper. Justice Huddle disagrees, highlighting:

• If the harm were solely a matter of past intrusions with reasonably calculable damages, a damages remedy might suffice (Bank of Southwest).
• Here, the neighbors seek to prevent future harm. Future nuisance-level odors are uncertain in both timing and magnitude, and future damages are difficult to quantify (Sharma).
• Because the jury found that the recurrence would be “not reasonably predictable,” the neighbors could not sue in advance; they would need to wait for each new episode and “rush to court,” resulting in a “state of perpetual litigation” (Schneider).
• Under Campbell and Repka, a remedy that requires a multiplicity of suits is not complete and adequate in equity.

Therefore, the legal remedy of successive damages suits is inadequate, and equity can step in with a properly tailored injunction to address ongoing and uncertain future injury.

5. The Central Error: A Total Shutdown as the First Equitable Step

Justice Huddle’s sharpest criticism is directed at the scope of the trial court’s injunction. She characterizes the shutdown order as “crack[ing] a nut with a sledgehammer”:

• Under Butnaru and related cases, injunctions are remedies of last resort—available only after the court is satisfied that no adequate legal remedy exists, not as the court’s first and broadest intervention.
• Holubec, Brown v. Petrolite, TMRJ, and Fairfield Estates all stress that injunctions must be narrowly drawn to address the offending conduct only, without prohibiting lawful activities.
• There is nothing inherently unlawful about operating a chicken farm; some level of odor is inevitable in an industrialized society (Sherman Gas & Elec.).
• The injunction should have been crafted to reduce odors from “unreasonably” offensive levels (as to a person of ordinary sensibilities) down to a lawful, tolerable level, not to eradicate all odors entirely.
• Injunctions are corrective, not punitive (Hyde Corp.). The court’s apparent focus on the growers’ “sins” (such as alleged misuse of subsidies) strayed from the core question: what relief is necessary and sufficient to abate the nuisance?

Justice Huddle concludes that it will “almost never” be appropriate for a trial court to issue a shutdown order at the outset in a nuisance case involving a lawful business, especially where a regulatory scheme already exists to handle the type of harm at issue.

6. The Requirement to Align Injunctions with Texas Health and Safety Code § 382.068 and TCEQ Regulations

A distinctive contribution of the concurrence is its insistence that the injunction be crafted in harmony with the existing statutory and regulatory framework for poultry facility odors:

• Under the Texas Clean Air Act (Health & Safety Code ch. 382), the Legislature created TCEQ and charged it with regulating air quality and abating air-related nuisances (BCCA, Brazoria County).
• Section 382.068 specifically addresses poultry facility odors. It provides that:
  • TCEQ is to respond to complaints about poultry odors and, upon finding violations, issue Notices of Violation.
  • If three NOVs are issued in a year, TCEQ and the operator must enter a “comprehensive compliance agreement” that includes an odor control plan “sufficient to control odors.”
• In this case, TCEQ did issue NOVs and entered into a Strategic Odor Control Plan with the growers. There was evidence the growers did not fully implement it and TCEQ may not have enforced it robustly. But that does not mean the plan itself was incapable of abating nuisance-level odors if properly implemented.
• The trial court does not control TCEQ’s enforcement actions. However, it must not ignore TCEQ’s determinations about what level of operation and what odor-control measures are consistent with Texas law. Courts should strive for consistency and coordination with state agencies (MTBE).

Justice Huddle’s prescription for remand is concrete:

• The trial court must ascertain, using § 382.068 and TCEQ’s plan, the point at which odor emissions cross from lawful to unlawful.
• It should identify operational factors—number of chickens, grow cycles, ventilation, facility maintenance, and other technical measures—necessary to keep odors within lawful bounds.
• The injunction should be tailored to prohibit only activity that creates unlawful, nuisance-level odors while permitting the growers to continue lawful operations.
• The Strategic Odor Control Plan is a natural reference point and could be incorporated or mirrored in the injunction (though the trial court need not copy it verbatim).

In short, where the Legislature has struck a balance between industrial activity and environmental impacts, courts must honor that balance rather than supplant it with their own policy choices via shutdown orders.

7. When a Shutdown Might Be Justified

Justice Huddle does not rule out shutdowns entirely. She acknowledges that:

• A shutdown injunction might be appropriate if:
  • A narrower, regulation-consistent injunction has already been tried and failed; and
  • The growers willfully and repeatedly violate the narrower injunction, demonstrating that no lesser measures can abate the nuisance.
• This approach mirrors the logic in Operation Rescue, where the failure of an earlier, narrow injunction justified a broader remedy.

The key point is sequencing: a total shutdown is not the starting point; it is a potential end point after lesser measures prove insufficient.

C. Impact and Broader Significance

1. Refining Texas Nuisance and Injunction Law

The case, as illuminated by the concurrence, has several important doctrinal consequences:

• Temporary vs. permanent nuisance no longer seen as controlling for injunctive relief.
  Building on Schneider and Crosstex, the Court confirms that a nuisance’s classification as “temporary” (intermittent, episodic) does not bar permanent injunctive relief. That classification principally affects damage measurement and limitations, not whether equity can intervene.
• Clarification of “imminent harm” in recurring-harm contexts.
  The opinion underscores that harm can be “imminent” even if it is sporadic and unpredictable, so long as recurrence is reasonably certain.
• Reaffirmation of the “multiplicity of suits” doctrine.
  Repeated, unpredictable nuisance events that would require constant new lawsuits render damages inadequate, strengthening the case for injunctions in environmental and land-use contexts.
• Stronger limits on the scope of equitable remedies.
  The case reinforces that injunctions must:
  • Be the least restrictive means of abating the wrong;
  • Be specific and precise in describing the enjoined conduct; and
  • Not operate as punishment or shut down lawful business activity absent compelling, incremental justification.

2. Interaction Between Common-Law Nuisance and Environmental Regulation

Perhaps the most forward-looking aspect of Justice Huddle’s concurrence is its insistence on harmonizing court-ordered relief with TCEQ’s regulatory framework:

• It effectively instructs trial courts: when you have a detailed statutory scheme and an agency (like TCEQ) making expert determinations about acceptable emission levels and control measures, your injunction should calibrate to those standards rather than reinventing the policy balance.
• This has significant implications for:
  • Poultry and livestock operations
  • Other odor-generating facilities (waste treatment, rendering plants, landfills)
  • Air and water pollution cases where agencies have prescribed compliance plans
• Courts remain free to protect private-property interests against nuisances, but they are cautioned not to undermine legislative judgments about how much interference is acceptable in a regulated industry.

3. Practical Litigation and Trial-Court Management Effects

For litigants and trial courts, the case offers several practical takeaways:

• Jury charge design:
  Temporary/permanent characterization and nuisance elements should be carefully separated from injunctive standards, with the understanding that “temporary” does not preclude equitable relief.
• Evidentiary focus at trial and post-verdict hearings:
  Parties will need to introduce:
  • TCEQ records, NOVs, and compliance plans;
  • Evidence on how proposed operational changes (stocking density, ventilation, manure management, etc.) affect odor levels; and
  • Expert testimony tying those measures to TCEQ’s standards and to nuisance abatement.
• Incremental remedy design:
  Trial courts must think in stages:
  • First, impose a targeted injunction closely tracking TCEQ plans and nuisance-causing conduct.
  • Then, if violations persist, consider progressively stronger sanctions, potentially culminating in a shutdown.
• Business planning and compliance:
  Regulated entities now have clearer notice that:
  • Compliance with TCEQ plans is central not only to regulatory enforcement but also to how courts will shape injunctive relief.
  • Noncompliance may not immediately justify a shutdown but will significantly weaken their position in nuisance litigation.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is a “Private Nuisance”?

In Texas, a private nuisance is a condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. It does not require trespass or physical invasion; severe odors, noise, smoke, or vibration can all qualify.

2. Temporary vs. Permanent Nuisance

• Temporary nuisance: The interference comes and goes, is intermittent or sporadic, and can generally be abated. Each episode may give rise to a new cause of action.
• Permanent nuisance: The interference is constant or substantially certain to continue, and is practically irremediable by the plaintiff. Damages may be measured once for all time.

This case underscores that these labels, while important for damages and limitations, do not decide whether a court may issue an injunction.

3. Permanent Injunction

A permanent injunction is a final court order requiring a party to do or stop doing certain acts indefinitely (unless modified). To obtain one, the moving party must show:

1. A wrongful act (here, creation of a nuisance).
2. Imminent harm (future injury is sufficiently likely and near in time).
3. Irreparable injury (harm not adequately compensable by money alone).
4. No adequate remedy at law (damages are inadequate, often because of multiplicity of suits or difficulty of quantification).

4. “Imminent Harm”

“Imminent” does not mean “happening at this precise moment” or “constant.” In the injunction context, it means that the threatened harm is sufficiently likely and sufficiently close at hand that waiting for it to occur first would unjustifiably expose the plaintiff to serious risk.

5. “Adequate Remedy at Law”

A legal remedy (usually money damages) is “adequate” if it can fully compensate the injured party and is reasonably certain and efficient. It is often inadequate when:

• Future harm is hard to predict or quantify.
• New lawsuits would be needed every time the wrong recurs (multiplicity of suits).
• The defendant is unable or unlikely to pay damages.

6. Notices of Violation (NOVs) and Compliance Plans

Under Texas Health and Safety Code § 382.068:

• When TCEQ finds a poultry facility violating air-quality standards (including odor-related issues), it issues a Notice of Violation.
• If three NOVs are issued in one year, the operator and TCEQ must enter a “comprehensive compliance agreement,” which includes an odor control plan sufficient to control odors–often specifying management practices, operational limits, and monitoring.

7. Balancing Equities and Narrow Tailoring

In deciding whether and how to issue an injunction, courts “balance the equities”—weighing:

• The severity of harm to the plaintiff if no injunction issues.
• The burden on the defendant and the public if an injunction does issue.
• Availability of less restrictive remedies.

“Narrow tailoring” means designing the injunction so that it:

• Addresses only the proven unlawful conduct (here, nuisance-level odors).
• Goes no further than necessary to prevent future harm.
• Does not unnecessarily prohibit lawful, non-nuisance-generating activities.

V. Conclusion

Justice Huddle’s concurring opinion in Huynh v. Blanchard reframes the case not as a referendum on the offensiveness of chicken-farm odors, but as a test of the judiciary’s fidelity to established guardrails for equitable relief and to the Legislature’s environmental policy choices.

Key takeaways include:

• A permanent injunction can be used to abate a nuisance even when the jury finds the nuisance is intermittent and “temporary” in character.
• “Temporary nuisance” findings do not defeat the elements of imminent harm or irreparable injury; nor do they supply an adequate remedy at law where future harms are uncertain and would require repeated litigation.
• Trial courts abuse their discretion when they immediately resort to shutdown injunctions that prohibit lawful business activities alongside unlawful nuisance-causing conduct.
• In fields comprehensively regulated by statute and agency rules—such as poultry facility odors under Texas Health and Safety Code § 382.068—injunctions must be harmonized with those regulatory frameworks rather than supplant them.
• Shutdowns may be justified only after narrower, carefully tailored injunctions have been tried and failed, particularly where the defendant willfully disregards both regulatory and judicial directives.

In this way, Huynh v. Blanchard becomes a significant waypoint in Texas nuisance and injunction law, clarifying both the availability of equitable relief in recurring-harm cases and the outer bounds of judicial power when dealing with lawful but regulated industries. It reinforces that injunctions are surgical tools, not sledgehammers—and that courts must wield them in concert with, not in opposition to, the Legislature’s regulatory design.