Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC: “Marital Status” Under NYCHRL Limited to Legal Condition, Not Specific Spousal Relationship

Introduction

Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC is a interlocutory appeal decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on April 8, 2025. The case arose when Kelvin Hunter, the long-time Executive Producer of The Wendy Williams Show, was terminated shortly after his then-wife Wendy Williams filed for divorce. Hunter sued Debmar-Mercury LLC and its principals under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), alleging that he was fired “solely because of his marital status” to Williams. Debmar-Mercury moved to dismiss, arguing that “marital status” under the NYCHRL does not extend to the identity of one’s spouse or partner. The district court denied the motion and certified the question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Second Circuit—relying on the New York Court of Appeals’ subsequent ruling in McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp.—vacated the denial and held that “marital status” under the NYCHRL refers only to the legal condition of being single, married, separated, divorced, or widowed, and not to one’s relationship with a specific person.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit considered whether the term “marital status” in the NYCHRL encompasses discrimination based on an individual’s marriage or divorce with respect to a particular person (here, Wendy Williams) rather than the individual’s general status as married, single, divorced, etc. Applying a de novo standard on a motion to dismiss, the Court first reviewed longstanding New York Court of Appeals precedent (Manhattan Pizza Hut; Hudson View Properties; Levin v. Yeshiva University) which uniformly construes “marital status” as referring to one’s condition as married or not, and not to the specific identity of one’s spouse. The district court had felt bound by the intermediate appellate decision in Morse v. Fidessa Corp., which took a broader view after NYCHRL amendments, but the Second Circuit found its reasoning inconsistent with the New York Court of Appeals’ clear post-certification holding in McCabe. In McCabe, the Court of Appeals rejected a housing discrimination claim predicated on the surviving partner’s marital status relative to a decedent owner, defining “marital status” narrowly as a legal condition and expressly distinguishing it from discrimination based on a particular relationship. The Second Circuit concluded that McCabe resolves the issue: Hunter’s claim is not cognizable because he alleges discrimination based on his marital relationship to Wendy Williams, not his status as married or divorced per se. The district court’s denial of Debmar-Mercury’s motion to dismiss was therefore vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd. (51 N.Y.2d 506, 1980) Established that under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), “marital status” refers to one’s condition of being married or unmarried and does not encompass discrimination because of whom one has married.
Hudson View Properties v. Weiss (59 N.Y.2d 733, 1983) Applied the Manhattan Pizza Hut interpretation to the NYCHRL in the housing context, holding that “marital status” has the same limited meaning.
Levin v. Yeshiva University (96 N.Y.2d 484, 2001) Reaffirmed the distinction between an individual’s marital condition and the existence or nature of a relationship with a particular person, across both NYSHRL and NYCHRL housing claims.
Morse v. Fidessa Corp. (165 A.D.3d 61, 1st Dep’t 2018) An intermediate appellate decision interpreting post-2005/2016 amendments to the NYCHRL to reach discrimination claims based on the identity of the spouse or partner; the district court felt bound by Morse but expressed reservations about its soundness.
McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. (–– N.Y.3d ––––, 2024 WL 5126078, Dec. 17, 2024) The New York Court of Appeals held that “marital status” under the NYCHRL denotes the legal condition of being married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed, and does not extend to discrimination predicated on one’s relationship with a specific person. McCabe expressly reaffirmed the Manhattan Pizza Hut line and rejected Morse’s broader view.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit’s analysis began with the well-settled principle that statutory terms should be construed consistently across contexts unless the legislature clearly indicates otherwise. The Court observed that the NYCHRL’s 2005 and 2016 amendments emphasized liberal construction but did not expressly alter the statutory definitions of protected categories. Under New York law, the City Council’s directive to interpret the NYCHRL “independently” and “broadly” does not authorize courts to rewrite unambiguous terms. Here, “marital status” had long been defined by the Court of Appeals as one’s participation in marriage itself, not the character or identity of the spouse.

The Court found Morse’s reasoning unpersuasive and inconsistent with McCabe. In McCabe, the Court of Appeals confronted the identical definitional issue in a housing context and concluded, after reviewing the same legislative history, that “marital status” refers exclusively to the status categories (married, single, divorced, widowed, legally separated). The Second Circuit treated McCabe as controlling on the issue, noting that it reaffirmed the Manhattan Pizza Hut/Hudson View/Levin trilogy and explicitly rejected a dual-meaning approach that would vary by context. Because Hunter alleged discrimination based on his divorce from—or marriage to—a particular person, rather than on the universal categories of marital status, his claim fell outside the statute’s coverage. Applying de novo review on the pleadings, the Court held that Hunter’s complaint did not plausibly allege discrimination on the basis of his marital condition and therefore could not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Impact

The Second Circuit’s decision provides clarity and uniformity in the interpretation of “marital status” under the NYCHRL. Employers and litigants now have definitive guidance that claims of discrimination premised on the identity of an employee’s spouse or partner—rather than the employee’s condition of marriage or divorce—do not fall within the statutory protection. The ruling curtails a potential expansion of the NYCHRL that might have exposed employers to novel liability whenever an adverse employment action coincided with marital changes involving prominent individuals.

For future litigation, plaintiffs seeking to challenge conduct tied to personal relationships will need to invoke other NYCHRL categories—such as sex, gender, or association-based discrimination—or rely on common-law tort or contract claims. The decision also reinforces the role of the New York Court of Appeals in defining the scope of city human-rights protections, illustrating how lower federal and state courts must adhere to the state’s highest authority even when faced with expansive remedial mandates.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Interlocutory Appeal (28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)): A limited procedure allowing immediate review of a non-final order when controlling questions of law could materially advance the case; here used to decide whether Hunter’s claim was legally viable before full discovery.
NYCHRL vs. NYSHRL: The NYCHRL is New York City’s local human-rights law, which often tracks but can exceed the protections of New York State’s Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). Both have historically defined “marital status” similarly.
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss: A defendant’s request to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court assumes all factual allegations are true and asks whether they plausibly entitle the plaintiff to relief.
Liberal Construction: The NYCHRL requires courts to interpret its provisions broadly in favor of human-rights protection; however, this does not permit rewriting clear statutory language.

Conclusion

Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC crystallizes the meaning of “marital status” under the NYCHRL as the individual’s legal condition—married, single, divorced, separated, or widowed—and not the identity or status of a specific spouse or partner. By aligning with the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in McCabe, the Second Circuit preserved the uniform interpretation long established in Manhattan Pizza Hut, Hudson View, and Levin, and rejected a broader reading that might have swept in disparate claims of relationship-based discrimination. This ruling restores predictability for employers and employees alike, confines the reach of marital-status protections to their intended scope, and underscores the primacy of state appellate authority in shaping New York human-rights jurisprudence.