I. Introduction

Hulett v. Korb, 2025 NY Slip Op 06563 (3d Dept), is the latest chapter in a long‑running neighbor dispute over a private roadway known as Rodgers Lane in the Town of Saratoga, Saratoga County. The case sits at the intersection of property rights and practical access needs, and it refines New York law on the scope of prescriptive easements for driveways, particularly:

• How to define the width of a prescriptive roadway easement;
• Whether and how the easement can benefit multiple, adjoining parcels under the doctrine of law of the case;
• To what extent an easement holder may lawfully enter and use adjacent areas outside the traveled roadbed for necessary maintenance (snow plowing, mowing, brush removal) and safe passage, without expanding the prescriptive easement itself.

Plaintiffs Monica Hulett and her co‑plaintiff own two contiguous parcels:

• Parcel 1 – acquired and occupied as their residence since 1986;
• Parcel 2 – acquired around 1995 and containing their garage; plaintiffs must cross parcel 2 to reach their home on parcel 1.

Since 1986, plaintiffs accessed their property via Rodgers Lane, including a roughly 250‑foot segment crossing the neighboring property owned by defendant Terri Korb. After defendant installed gates and posts on her segment of the road, plaintiffs brought an action under RPAPL article 15 seeking a declaration of a prescriptive easement over that portion of Rodgers Lane.

The Third Department previously held in 2021 that plaintiffs had, in fact, acquired a prescriptive easement for vehicular access over the defendant’s segment of Rodgers Lane. The present 2025 appeal does not revisit whether an easement exists. Instead, it addresses:

• The precise width of the easement;
• The properties benefited by the easement (parcel 1 alone, or both parcels 1 and 2);
• The lawful scope of use of areas immediately adjacent to the roadbed, particularly for maintenance and safe passage;
• Defendant’s claim for compensatory damages allegedly incurred in responding to plaintiffs’ use and work along the roadway.

The decision provides important guidance for drafting judgments that implement prescriptive easement rulings, balancing the dominant owners’ need for practical access with the servient owner’s right to control their property.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Prior history (2016–2021)

The litigation proceeded in stages:

• 2016 (Nolan, J.) – On motion practice, Supreme Court held that plaintiffs’ use of the disputed segment of Rodgers Lane from 1986–2002 was:
  • Open,
  • Notorious,
  • Continuous for more than 10 years,
  thereby raising a presumption of hostility and satisfying three of the four elements of a prescriptive easement. A jury trial was ordered to determine whether defendant could rebut the presumption of hostility.
• 2019 (Nolan, J.) – Although the jury found for defendant, Supreme Court granted plaintiffs’ CPLR 4404(a) motion, set aside the verdict, and directed judgment declaring that plaintiffs had acquired a prescriptive easement over the relevant portion of Rodgers Lane.
• 2021 (Third Department) – In Hulett v. Korb, 192 AD3d 1424 (3d Dept 2021), the Appellate Division affirmed the 2019 judgment.

After the existence of the easement was finally confirmed, a bench trial was held before a different Supreme Court Justice (Kupferman, J.) solely to determine the width and scope of the easement.

B. Rulings by Supreme Court (Kupferman, J.)

In a 2023 decision and judgment, Supreme Court:

• Fixed the roadway easement width on defendant’s land as between 10 and 11 feet;
• Described the easement as providing access to and from both of plaintiffs’ parcels (1 and 2);
• Created an additional “Gross Easement Area” extending 4–5 feet beyond each side of the roadbed, to be used for:
  • Snow plowing,
  • Mowing,
  • Trimming and other necessary maintenance;
• Granted plaintiffs the right to maintain and replace two culverts under the roadway;
• Authorized uses of the roadway typical of a residential driveway, including:
  • Receiving deliveries,
  • Passage of emergency vehicles,
  • Temporarily pulling aside or parking along the roadway for maintenance or to allow other vehicles to pass.
• Granted defendant an injunction prohibiting plaintiffs from excavating or trenching shoulders of the roadway without defendant’s express permission;
• Denied defendant’s request for more than $10,000 in compensatory damages (survey costs, fence posts, alleged remediation of plaintiffs’ work), finding insufficient documentary support, but awarded only nominal damages for a particular trespass in 2010/2011.^[1]

C. Holdings of the Third Department (2025)

On defendant’s appeal, the Third Department:

1. Width of the Roadway Easement
   • During oral argument, both parties stipulated that the roadway easement is exactly 10 feet wide.
   • The court therefore treated any dispute over a 10–11 foot range as academic and modified the judgment to declare the easement’s width as 10 feet.
2. Benefited Parcels – Law of the Case
   • Defendant argued that the prescriptive easement should benefit only parcel 1 (the residence), not parcel 2 (the garage parcel).
   • The Appellate Division rejected this, holding that:
     • The earlier 2019 decision and 2021 affirmance had already, by necessary implication, determined that the easement serves both parcels.
     • This determination constituted law of the case and could not be re‑litigated during the later “scope” trial before Justice Kupferman.
3. Scope of Prescriptive Area vs. Maintenance Rights
   • The court drew a sharp distinction between:
     • The prescriptive easement area itself, and
     • Additional, ancillary rights necessary to reasonably use and maintain that easement.
   • It declared that:
     • The prescriptive easement “extends solely to the width of the roadbed” — i.e., the 10‑foot‑wide traveled way.
     • The proof did not justify finding a prescriptive easement over land beyond that 10‑foot roadbed.^[2]
   • However, the court affirmed, and slightly clarified, plaintiffs’ maintenance rights:
     • Plaintiffs have the right to perform necessary maintenance activities (brush removal, lawn mowing, snow plowing) on both sides of the roadbed, extending up to 5 feet on either side.
     • They may also pull along the sides of the roadway and temporarily park there to conduct maintenance and to allow vehicles to pass safely.
     • These are implicit rights tied to the easement; they do not convert the shoulders into part of the prescriptive easement itself.
4. Use of Judicial Notice and Parcel Mapping
   • To support its conclusion that both parcels are served by the easement, the court took judicial notice of a parcel map from the Saratoga County Map Viewer Website, under CPLR 4532‑b and cases such as:
     • Matter of Katonah‑Lewisboro Union Free Sch. Dist. v New York State Educ. Dept., ___ AD3d ___, 239 NYS3d 336 (3d Dept 2025);
     • Cordell v City of New York, ___ AD3d ___, 2025 NY Slip Op 05496 (2d Dept 2025).
   • The map showed that parcels 1 and 2:
     • Abut one another,
     • Share the same mailing address, and
     • Require passage through parcel 2 to reach the residence on parcel 1.
5. Damages
   • The Third Department affirmed the denial of substantial compensatory damages, holding that defendant’s claimed expenditures were not supported by adequate evidence, citing:
     • Mastbeth v Shiel, 218 AD3d 987 (3d Dept 2023);
     • and comparing WFE Ventures, Inc. v GBD Lake Placid, LLC, 197 AD3d 824 (3d Dept 2021).
   • Only nominal damages for a 2010/2011 trespass (left intact) were deemed appropriate.

In sum, the judgment and order were modified to:

• Fix the easement’s width at 10 feet;
• Clarify that the prescriptive easement area is limited to the 10‑foot roadbed itself;
• Explicitly authorize maintenance activities within 5 feet of both sides of the roadbed; and
• Leave intact the earlier conclusions, including that the easement benefits both of plaintiffs’ parcels.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Law of the Case and the Benefited Parcels

1. Defendant’s argument

On appeal, defendant argued that the prescriptive easement should be limited to providing access to parcel 1 only, contending there was no evidence that the easement was for the benefit of parcel 2.

2. The court’s reliance on law-of-the-case doctrine

The Third Department held that this issue had already been decided by Justice Nolan’s 2019 decision, as affirmed by the Appellate Division in 2021, and thus was governed by the doctrine of law of the case. The court cited:

• People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 502 (2000);
• Martin v City of Cohoes, 37 NY2d 162, 165 (1975);
• Bennett v Nardone, 298 AD2d 790 (3d Dept 2002), lv dismissed 99 NY2d 579 (2003).

Broadly, these authorities stand for the principle that once an issue is fully litigated and decided in a particular case, and especially once reviewed and affirmed on appeal, that determination should ordinarily be followed in subsequent stages of the same litigation, absent extraordinary circumstances.

3. How law of the case applied here

Several elements led the court to conclude that the scope of the benefited land (both parcels) was already baked into the prior rulings:

• Plaintiffs had owned parcel 2 for nearly 20 years before they commenced this prescriptive easement action.
• The complaint did not distinguish between parcel 1 and parcel 2; it sought access to plaintiffs’ “property” generally.
• Justice Nolan’s 2016 decision explicitly discussed both parcels, noting that after acquiring parcel 2, plaintiffs accessed it by continuing to use Rodgers Lane as it ran through the northeast section of parcel 2.
• In his 2019 decision and order granting the prescriptive easement, Justice Nolan referenced plaintiffs’ “lands” (plural), indicating an understanding that both parcels were being served by the easement.
• The 2021 Appellate Division decision affirming the 2019 order necessarily accepted this underlying configuration.

When Justice Kupferman later described the easement as allowing ingress and egress to both parcels, he was not expanding the original easement; he was implementing what had already been decided. The Third Department therefore characterized defendant’s argument as an impermissible attack on the prior final ruling, not a legitimate issue for the scope‑of‑easement trial.

Practically, this reinforces that parties must raise and preserve any objections to the identity of the dominant estate(s) (i.e., the parcels benefitted by the easement) in the initial easement litigation and appeal. They cannot reserve that challenge for a later “implementation” phase.

B. Judicial Notice of Online Parcel Maps (CPLR 4532‑b)

The Third Department further supported its conclusion about the benefited parcels by taking judicial notice of a parcel map from the Saratoga County Map Viewer Website. It relied on:

• Matter of Katonah‑Lewisboro Union Free Sch. Dist. v New York State Educ. Dept., ___ AD3d ___, 239 NYS3d 336 (3d Dept 2025);
• Cordell v City of New York, ___ AD3d ___, 2025 NY Slip Op 05496 (2d Dept 2025);
• CPLR 4532‑b.

Although the decision does not detail these authorities, their citation indicates that:

• New York appellate courts are comfortable taking judicial notice of officially maintained online maps and GIS data;
• CPLR 4532‑b provides a legal basis for courts to rely on such publicly available, government‑maintained digital records without additional proof of authenticity.

The map showed that:

• Parcels 1 and 2 are contiguous;
• They share a single mailing address;
• Access to the residence on parcel 1 necessarily requires travel over parcel 2 and then along Rodgers Lane.

This spatial context corroborated the court’s conclusion that the easement serves both parcels and illustrates the growing importance of digital mapping evidence in property disputes.

C. Width of the Prescriptive Easement and the Role of Stipulations

Supreme Court had originally described the roadway easement as “between 10 and 11 feet” wide. On appeal, however, counsel for both parties stipulated that the easement should be treated as a 10‑foot‑wide roadway. Because this agreement resolved the controversy, the court found any challenge to the 10–11 foot description academic and modified the judgment accordingly.

This underlines a practical point: appellate courts will often accept and implement parties’ stipulations on factual issues, such as dimensions, when those stipulations eliminate a live controversy and are consistent with the record.

D. Distinguishing the Prescriptive Easement Area from Ancillary Maintenance Rights

1. The core doctrinal move

The most significant substantive development in Hulett is the court’s clear doctrinal line between:

• The prescriptive easement area, which is the strip of land burdened by the right of passage based on historical use; and
• Separate, ancillary privileges that are implied by law as “reasonably necessary” to maintain and enjoy that easement but do not themselves expand the prescriptive area.

The court expressly invoked:

• McMillan v Cronin, 75 NY 474, 477‑78 (1878);
• Restatement (First) of Property § 480; and
• Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.8.

McMillan v Cronin and the Restatements stand for the proposition that when an easement exists, the easement holder has an implicit right to enter the servient estate to make improvements and repairs that are reasonably necessary to the use of the easement, unless the grant (or, in the prescriptive context, the established use) says otherwise.

2. Why there was no prescriptive easement beyond the roadbed

The Third Department made two key points:

• The “proof did not support awarding a prescriptive easement beyond the width of the roadbed itself,” citing:
  • Dias v Town of Ulster, 240 AD3d 1015, 1017 (3d Dept 2025);
  • Dermody v Tilton, 85 AD3d 1682, 1683 (4th Dept 2011).
• Therefore, Supreme Court’s language suggesting it was granting plaintiffs a prescriptive easement “on the sides of the roadway” was error.

Though the specific holdings of Dias and Dermody are not set out in the opinion, they are clearly used to reinforce a settled New York rule: the width and extent of a prescriptive easement are determined by the pattern of actual, adverse use. Occasional or incidental presence (such as mowing or plowing the shoulders) is not enough to create a broader prescriptive property interest.

Hence, the court:

• Defined the prescriptive easement area strictly as the 10‑foot roadbed used for vehicular travel;
• Declined to recognize a prescriptive right over any additional “Gross Easement Area.”

3. The ancillary maintenance and safety rights

At the same time, the court recognized that strictly limiting plaintiffs to the 10‑foot strip of traveled way would be impractical and potentially unsafe, particularly given:

• The location and topography of the roadway;
• The realities of snow plowing, mowing, and brush removal; and
• The need for vehicles to sometimes pull aside or stop briefly to allow others to pass or to perform maintenance.

Relying on the Restatement § 480 and § 4.8, as well as McMillan v Cronin, the court held that:

• Even though the prescriptive easement area ends at the 10‑foot roadbed, plaintiffs may enter land up to 5 feet beyond each side of the roadbed to:
  • Remove brush,
  • Mow vegetation,
  • Plow and manage snow,
  • Perform other necessary roadway maintenance.
• Plaintiffs may also:
  • Pull alongside the roadway, and
  • Temporarily park along the sides of the road for maintenance tasks or to enable safe passing of vehicles.

However, these are characterized as ancillary, use‑limited rights, not as an enlargement of the prescriptive easement’s footprint. This is why the court:

• Corrected Supreme Court’s suggestion of a prescriptive easement in the shoulders;
• Yet still affirmed plaintiffs’ need to be free from trespass liability for reasonable maintenance activity within the specified 5‑foot margin on each side.

4. Limits: excavation and trenching

The injunctive relief granted by Supreme Court – and left in place – prohibited plaintiffs from excavating or trenching in the shoulders of the roadway without defendant’s express permission. The Appellate Division did not disturb this injunction.

Thus, the decision draws a functional line:

• Permitted without trespass liability:
  • Routine, surface‑level maintenance (mowing, brush cutting, snow plowing, minor grading);
  • Temporary pull‑offs and parking necessary for roadway use and maintenance.
• Not permitted without consent:
  • Substantial disturbance of the ground, such as excavation or trenching beyond the roadway itself.

This reinforces the distinction between:

• The easement holder’s inherent right to keep the easement usable, and
• The servient owner’s fundamental right to control significant alterations to their land outside the easement.

E. Damages and Evidentiary Standards

Defendant sought over $10,000 in compensatory damages for:

• Survey costs;
• Materials and installation of fence posts along the roadway;
• Remediation of allegedly unauthorized work by plaintiffs around 2010/2011.

The Third Department upheld Supreme Court’s denial of these damages, emphasizing that defendant’s claim was not supported by a “sufficient evidentiary basis,” citing:

• Mastbeth v Shiel, 218 AD3d 987, 990 (3d Dept 2023);
• and contrasting WFE Ventures, Inc. v GBD Lake Placid, LLC, 197 AD3d 824, 834 (3d Dept 2021).

Though the opinion does not quote these cases, their inclusion signals a familiar rule: a party claiming damages must prove them with competent, non‑speculative evidence – often documentary proof such as receipts, invoices, or expert testimony tying the expenditures to actual harm caused by the opposing party’s wrongful conduct.

At the same time, the court left intact an award of nominal damages for a particular trespass in 2010/2011 (footnote 1). This:

• Recognizes that a legal wrong occurred (an unauthorized encroachment),
• But that defendant failed to prove any quantifiable, compensable loss.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What is a Prescriptive Easement?

A prescriptive easement is a right to use someone else's land that arises from long‑term use, even though there was never a written agreement. In New York, a party must generally prove that its use of the disputed area was:

• Open and notorious – visible and obvious, not hidden;
• Continuous and uninterrupted – for at least 10 years;
• Adverse or hostile – without the owner’s permission.

If those are shown, the law presumes the use was hostile, and the burden shifts to the property owner to show the use was actually permissive (allowed by them).

B. Dominant Estate vs. Servient Estate

• The land that enjoys the benefit of the easement (e.g., the land that gets access over a roadway) is known as the dominant estate.
• The land burdened by the easement (over which the road runs) is the servient estate.

In Hulett:

• Plaintiffs’ parcels 1 and 2 are the dominant estates;
• Defendant’s property, traversed by Rodgers Lane, is the servient estate.

C. Law of the Case

Law of the case is a doctrine that prevents courts from re‑deciding issues that have already been decided earlier in the same lawsuit. Once an appellate court has decided a legal issue and remitted the case, that decision:

• Generally binds the trial court in later phases of the same case, and
• Also binds the appellate court in later appeals in the same matter, unless exceptional circumstances exist.

Here, the 2019 Supreme Court decision (affirmed in 2021) determined that plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement benefiting their “lands,” which the trial and appellate courts understood to mean both parcels. That issue could not be re‑opened in 2025.

D. Judicial Notice and CPLR 4532‑b

Judicial notice allows a court to recognize certain facts as true without requiring formal proof. CPLR 4532‑b specifically facilitates judicial notice of certain kinds of digital records, including maps and images on government websites.

In Hulett, the Appellate Division took judicial notice of:

• A parcel map from the Saratoga County Map Viewer Website,
• To confirm how plaintiffs’ parcels abut and are accessed.

This spared the parties the need to formally introduce the map and authenticate it through witnesses.

E. Prescriptive Easement Area vs. Ancillary Rights

It is crucial to distinguish between:

• Prescriptive easement area – the exact strip of land that long‑term, adverse use has burdened with a legal right (here, the 10‑foot roadbed); and
• Ancillary rights – additional actions on the servient land that are reasonably necessary to enjoy the easement (maintenance, minor repairs, brief pull‑offs), but do not amount to a prescriptive right to occupy or travel over a wider area.

Hulett makes clear that:

• The prescriptive easement for vehicular passage is limited to what was actually used and proven – the 10‑foot roadbed;
• But plaintiffs also have a legal right to enter a narrow band outside the roadbed (here, up to 5 feet on each side) to:
  • Keep the road functional (snow removal, mowing, brush cutting);
  • Momentarily pull off the traveled way when necessary for safety and maintenance.

F. Nominal vs. Compensatory Damages

Compensatory damages are money awarded to reimburse a party for actual, proven losses – for example, repair costs, lost value, or out‑of‑pocket expenses. They require:

• Proof that the defendant’s wrongful act caused harm, and
• Evidence of the amount of that harm (receipts, invoices, expert estimates, etc.).

Nominal damages are a small, symbolic sum (often a dollar or some minimal figure) awarded when a legal right has been violated (e.g., a trespass occurred), but:

• No actual loss can be proven, or
• The plaintiff fails to present adequate proof of the amount of loss.

In Hulett, defendant received nominal damages for an old trespass but no compensatory damages, because she did not substantiate the alleged expenditures with adequate evidence.

V. Impact and Future Significance

A. Guidance for Prescriptive Driveway and Roadway Disputes

For rural and suburban New York properties where access often depends on long‑used private lanes, Hulett offers key guidance:

• Defining the width:
  • Courts should fix the width of a prescriptive roadway easement based on the historically used roadbed, not broader vegetation control areas or theoretical future needs.
• Recognizing practical maintenance needs:
  • At the same time, courts may recognize and spell out ancillary rights to work within a modest shoulder area to maintain the road and ensure safety.
  • This avoids turning every necessary maintenance step beyond the exact wheel tracks into a trespass.
• Drafting judgments carefully:
  • Trial courts should avoid language suggesting that maintenance zones themselves are part of the prescriptive easement unless the evidence truly shows long‑term, adverse use of those zones for travel.
  • Instead, they should distinguish between:
    • The easement area (here, 10 feet); and
    • The maintenance/safety corridor (here, an additional 5 feet on each side, for specified purposes).

B. Reinforcing Law of the Case in Easement Litigation

The decision underscores that once an appellate court has confirmed the existence of an easement and, in effect, identified the benefitted land:

• Parties cannot later narrow or re‑characterize the dominant estate at a subsequent “implementation” trial;
• Any such challenge must be made at the time of the first appeal, or it will be barred by law of the case.

This promotes finality, prevents piecemeal litigation, and gives landowners clearer expectations about the binding effect of early easement rulings.

C. Digital Evidence and Property Law

By taking judicial notice of a county GIS map under CPLR 4532‑b and related cases, the Third Department signals an ongoing trend:

• Court acceptance of digital mapping tools in resolving property configuration and access questions;
• Reduced procedural friction in introducing such evidence, so long as it is sourced from government‑maintained websites.

Counsel in real property disputes should be prepared to:

• Locate and present official online mapping resources;
• Address their accuracy and relevance; and
• Anticipate courts’ willingness to take judicial notice of them.

D. Balancing Neighboring Rights

Hulett reflects a careful balancing:

• Servient owner’s protections:
  • The prescriptive easement is confined to what was actually used – the 10‑foot roadbed.
  • Major alterations (excavation, trenching) remain under the servient owner’s control, absent express agreement.
• Dominant owners’ protections:
  • They have clear legal authority to perform routine maintenance in a narrow corridor beyond the roadbed without fear of trespass suits.
  • The easement is confirmed as serving both of their contiguous parcels, reflecting the reality of their property configuration and long‑term use.

VI. Conclusion

Hulett v. Korb provides a nuanced and practically oriented refinement of New York easement law. While reaffirming that a prescriptive easement’s width is limited to the historically used roadbed, it recognizes an implied right to enter a modest shoulder area for maintenance and safety – a right rooted in longstanding principles and the Restatements, but rarely articulated so clearly with defined dimensions.

The decision also reinforces:

• The binding effect of law of the case on the identity of the dominant estate once a prescriptive easement has been judicially recognized and affirmed;
• The growing role of judicial notice of digital parcel maps under CPLR 4532‑b in clarifying property relationships; and
• The need for solid evidentiary support when seeking compensatory damages in dispute over easement use and alleged trespass.

For litigants, practitioners, and trial courts addressing prescriptive driveway and private road disputes, Hulett functions as a template: define the prescriptive easement area narrowly, specify ancillary maintenance and safety rights expressly, and respect prior appellate determinations on the scope of the dominant estate.