HRCP Rule 60(b) Reconsideration Motions Toll the HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) Appeal Deadline When Filed Within the 30-Day Appeal Period

HRCP Rule 60(b) Reconsideration Motions Toll the HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) Appeal Deadline When Filed Within the 30-Day Appeal Period

I. Introduction

Case: Mālama Kakanilua v. Director of the Department of Public Works, County of Maui; and Maui Lani Partners, SCWC-19-0000107 (Haw. Sept. 30, 2025).
Parties: Petitioners (Mālama Kakanilua, Clare H. Apana, Kaniloa Lani Kamaunu) challenged Maui County’s extension of a grading and grubbing permit held by Maui Lani Partners (MLP) for excavation at a residential development with ancestral burial sites.
Procedural posture: After the circuit court dismissed the complaint (without prejudice) and entered final judgment, Petitioners filed an HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion styled as a motion for reconsideration. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) concluded the subsequent notice of appeal was untimely because the HRCP Rule 60(b) motion did not “toll” the appeal deadline unless filed within ten days (by treating it as an HRCP Rule 59(e) motion). The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether HRCP Rule 60(b) reconsideration motions are “tolling motions” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3).

Key issue (dispositive): Whether an HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration is a “tolling motion” that extends the time to file a notice of appeal under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3), and if so, under what temporal limits consistent with the finality language in HRCP Rule 60(b).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court held that an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion seeking reconsideration qualifies as a “tolling motion” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) because HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) tolls the appeal period for a timely motion “to reconsider,” and HRCP Rule 60(b) specifies the time to file such a motion as “within a reasonable time.”

To reconcile HRCP Rule 60(b)’s statement that such motions “do[] not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation,” the Court limited tolling: an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion tolls the appeal deadline only if filed before the HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) appeal deadline expires (i.e., within 30 days after entry of judgment).

The Court further held the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) reconsideration motion because Petitioners relied on Bank of America v. Reyes-Toledo (Reyes-Toledo II) as “new law,” but the Court viewed that decision as reaffirming long-standing notice pleading principles rather than supplying new law that could not have been raised earlier.

Disposition: The ICA’s judgment was vacated in relevant part and remanded because the ICA should have reached the merits of the appeal from the dismissal orders, given the notice of appeal was timely under the Court’s tolling analysis.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Appellate timeliness, “tolling motions,” and access-to-merits policy

  • Alexander & Baldwin, LLC v. Armitage — cited for the Court’s policy preference to decide cases on the merits when possible, including on appeal. This policy underpins the Court’s reluctance to read HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) narrowly in a way that would create avoidable jurisdictional forfeitures.
  • Simbajon v. Gentry and Simpson v. Department of Land & Natural Resources — represent the ICA’s historical workaround: because earlier HRAP Rule 4(a)(4) listed specific rule numbers and omitted HRCP Rule 60(b), the ICA treated HRCP Rule 60(b) motions filed within 10 days as HRCP Rule 59(e) motions to obtain tolling and avoid harsh outcomes.
  • Lambert v. Lua, Citicorp Mortg., Inc. v. Bartolome, Dubois v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, and Mendez v. Mendez — illustrate the ICA’s continued reliance on the “10-day” conversion approach (Rule 60(b) treated as Rule 59(e)) even after HRAP Rule 4 was amended to describe tolling motions by substance rather than enumerated rule numbers.
  • Association of Condominium Homeowners of Tropics at Waikele v. Sakuma and Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Amasol — discussed to clarify that the Supreme Court had not previously resolved whether HRCP Rule 60(b) itself is a tolling motion; the relevant statements were either addressing other issues or dicta.
  • Cole v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu (In re Cole) — invoked for concerns about finality and the desirability of “an easy-to-understand notice of appeal deadline,” supporting the Court’s decision to impose a limiting principle (tolling only if the Rule 60(b) motion is filed within the original appeal period).

2. Interpreting court rules (textual approach and in pari materia)

  • State v. Choy Foo, Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., and Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture — supply the interpretive framework: de novo review, applying statutory-construction principles to court rules, and reading related rules together (in pari materia).

3. Rule 60(b)(6) standards and “reasonable time” / finality concerns

  • James B. Nutter & Company v. Namahoe, Hawaiʻi Hous. Auth. v. Uyehara, and Aiona v. Wing Sing Wo Co. — address the “reasonable time” and extraordinary-circumstances landscape in HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) practice, emphasizing case-specific evaluation and finality (“There must be an end to litigation someday”).
  • In re Hana Ranch Co. — referenced in the opinion to underscore the ICA’s misapplication of “extraordinary circumstances” where a Rule 60(b) motion is filed before the appeal time has run.
  • Saplan v. U.S. Bank N.A. and James W. Glover, Ltd. v. Fong — cited to tie finality to the expiration of appeal time (or exhaustion of appeals), supporting the Court’s reconciliation of Rule 60(b) with appeal deadlines.

4. Motions for reconsideration and pleading standards

  • Cho v. State, Soderlund v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, and Bank of Hawaii v. Kunimoto — collectively support the proposition that, even if the HRCP do not expressly create a “motion for reconsideration” by name, Hawaiʻi courts have long recognized reconsideration practice under HRCP Rule 60 (and related frameworks).
  • Ass'n of Apt. Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea Resort Co. — used for the foundational principle that reconsideration exists to present new evidence or arguments that could not have been raised earlier; it is not for relitigation.
  • Pennymac Corp. v. Godinez — supports the “strong showing” burden on appellants claiming abuse of discretion in denial of HRCP Rule 60(b) relief.
  • Bank of America v. Reyes-Toledo (Reyes-Toledo II) and Pavsek v. Sandvold — central to Petitioners’ reconsideration theory: Petitioners claimed Reyes-Toledo II abrogated Pavsek and rejected “plausibility” pleading, but the Court characterized Reyes-Toledo II as reaffirming Hawaiʻi’s longstanding liberal notice pleading, undermining the “new law” premise.
  • Kaniakapupu v. Land Use Comm'n — appears as a note that Simpson was overruled on other grounds, showing doctrinal evolution while leaving the tolling question unresolved until now.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The text of HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) now turns on substance, not enumerated rule numbers

The Court explained that the ICA’s older “conversion” doctrine (treating Rule 60(b) motions filed within 10 days as Rule 59(e) motions) was historically driven by then-existing HRAP Rule 4(a)(4), which enumerated specific tolling motions by rule number and omitted HRCP Rule 60(b). After amendments, HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) describes tolling motions by what they seek (including a motion “to reconsider”) and adds a condition: “court or agency rules specify the time by which the motion shall be filed.”

Because HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) no longer depends on enumerated rule numbers, the Court concluded the “conversion” workaround is unnecessary and can distort the rules’ text. Accordingly, to the extent the Supreme Court had previously “affirmed” the ICA’s conversion approach, those affirmations were overruled insofar as they conflict with this opinion.

2. HRCP Rule 60(b) “specifies” a filing time: “within a reasonable time”

The Court rejected the notion that a rule must specify a fixed number of days to satisfy HRAP Rule 4(a)(3). It held that “within a reasonable time” is still a “time” specified by rule, and therefore HRCP Rule 60(b) meets HRAP Rule 4(a)(3)’s requirement.

The Court also emphasized longstanding Hawaiʻi practice recognizing that motions under HRCP Rule 60 can function as motions “for reconsideration,” citing Cho v. State, Soderlund v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, and Bank of Hawaii v. Kunimoto.

3. Reconciling tolling with HRCP Rule 60(b)’s finality clause: the “filed before appeal deadline” limitation

The opinion confronted a serious structural tension: HRCP Rule 60(b) says the motion “does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation,” yet HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) tolling affects appellate timing, and HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motions can be filed long after judgment if still “reasonable.”

To harmonize the rules, the Court held that HRCP Rule 60(b) tolls the appeal deadline only when filed “within a reasonable time” and before the original HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) time to appeal has expired (30 days after entry of judgment). This preserves finality by preventing “revival” of long-final judgments via a later Rule 60(b) motion, while still enabling litigants to seek reconsideration promptly without forfeiting appeal rights.

4. Denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief affirmed (result only): no “new law” warranting reconsideration

On the merits of the reconsideration denial, the Court treated Petitioners’ motion as resting on the claim that Bank of America v. Reyes-Toledo (Reyes-Toledo II) was “new law” affecting pleading standards. The Court disagreed, characterizing Reyes-Toledo II as reaffirming (not newly creating) Hawaiʻi’s long-established notice pleading regime. Given the rule that reconsideration is not for relitigating old matters or raising arguments that could have been raised earlier (Ass'n of Apt. Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea Resort Co.), and the “strong showing” required to overturn a denial (Pennymac Corp. v. Godinez), the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.

C. Impact

1. A significant clarification of appellate jurisdiction and timing practice

The decision changes Hawaiʻi appellate timing in a practical way: litigants who file a post-judgment HRCP Rule 60(b) motion seeking reconsideration (including Rule 60(b)(6)) within the 30-day appeal period preserve appellate jurisdiction under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3), even if the motion is filed after ten days. This repudiates the prior ICA-centered “10-day conversion” approach as the governing rule.

2. A clearer “bright-line” safeguard for finality

By tying tolling eligibility to the HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) deadline, the Court creates an administrable line that avoids the risk that a later-filed Rule 60(b)(6) motion could “restart” appeal rights months or years later. The rule is designed to serve both (a) access to merits review and (b) finality interests emphasized in Cole v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu (In re Cole).

3. Likely downstream effects: more post-judgment motion practice, fewer jurisdictional dismissals

Expect fewer appeals dismissed as untimely when parties file prompt HRCP Rule 60(b) reconsideration motions. At the same time, counsel will need to evaluate strategically whether to file HRCP Rule 59(e) versus HRCP Rule 60(b), but the jurisdictional penalty for choosing Rule 60(b) (when filed within 30 days) is significantly reduced.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Tolling motion”: A post-judgment motion that pauses (or extends) the deadline to file a notice of appeal. Here, a timely motion “to reconsider” extends the appeal deadline until 30 days after the court enters an order disposing of the motion (HRAP Rule 4(a)(3)).
  • HRCP Rule 60(b)(6): A “catch-all” provision allowing relief from judgment for “any other reason” justifying relief. It must be filed “within a reasonable time,” and courts treat it as extraordinary relief, not a routine second chance.
  • “Within a reasonable time”: Not a fixed number of days; it depends on the circumstances. But for tolling the appeal deadline, this case adds an outer boundary: the motion must be filed before the 30-day appeal deadline expires.
  • Notice pleading vs. plausibility pleading: Under notice pleading, a complaint need only give fair notice of the claim and grounds. “Plausibility” pleading is a stricter federal-style screening approach. Petitioners argued Bank of America v. Reyes-Toledo (Reyes-Toledo II) rejected plausibility and abrogated Pavsek v. Sandvold; the Court said Reyes-Toledo II reaffirmed Hawaiʻi’s long-standing notice pleading tradition.
  • In pari materia: A rule-interpretation principle meaning related rules should be read together to make a coherent system. The Court used this to harmonize HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) and (3) with HRCP Rule 60(b)’s finality language.

V. Conclusion

This opinion establishes a clear procedural rule with substantial jurisdictional consequences: an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion seeking reconsideration is a “tolling motion” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) when filed within a reasonable time and before the HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) 30-day appeal deadline expires. The Court simultaneously protects finality by rejecting any notion that later Rule 60(b) motions can revive long-expired appeal periods.

On the merits of reconsideration, the Court reaffirmed that HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) is not a vehicle for relitigation and that Bank of America v. Reyes-Toledo (Reyes-Toledo II) did not supply “new law” warranting post-judgment relief here. The practical result is a remand directing the ICA to finally address the dismissal’s merits—precisely the kind of merits-based appellate review the Court’s procedural holding is designed to facilitate.

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