Introduction

This appeal arises from the termination of Daniel Welch, a delivery driver turned production-line worker at Heart Truss & Engineering Corp. After customers received trusses marked with crude graffiti, Heart Truss investigated and fired Welch based on a supervisor’s report that Welch confessed to the defacement. Welch alleged that the stated reason was pretext for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), and for retaliation under Michigan’s Workers’ Disability Compensation Act (WDCA).

The district court granted summary judgment to Heart Truss on the wrongful-termination claims, and Welch appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reinforcing several doctrinal guardrails that frequently determine the outcome of employment discrimination and retaliation cases at the summary judgment stage:

• The “honest belief” rule: employers prevail when decisionmakers reasonably and honestly rely on particularized facts, even if the employee denies the underlying misconduct and even if the investigation was not exhaustive.
• Comparator severity: putative comparators must be truly comparable in the nature and consequences of their conduct, including reputational harm.
• “Shifting reasons” vs. elaboration: adding consistent factual detail later does not create a “shifting rationale.”
• Policy-deviation pretext: minor or disputed deviations generally do not establish pretext without proof of non-uniform enforcement.
• Evidence of animus: workplace conversations that show awareness, frustration, or safety concerns—but not hostility toward a protected trait—do not establish discriminatory or retaliatory motive.
• Temporal proximity: timing alone cannot establish pretext, especially where the employer decided to act before any protected activity occurred.

Summary of the Opinion

The court assumed (as the parties did) that Welch could establish prima facie cases for both disability discrimination (ADA/PWDCRA) and WDCA retaliation, and that Heart Truss offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing him—defacing company property (Shop Rule 28). The appeal turned on the third McDonnell Douglas step: pretext.

Welch advanced three pretext theories. The court rejected each:

1. No factual basis. The “honest belief” rule protected Heart Truss’s decision, because the plant manager reasonably and honestly relied on a particularized set of facts—including a supervisor’s report that Welch confessed and an initial investigation that narrowed the culprit to the first shift.
2. Insufficient basis. Welch’s comparator (an employee who spray-painted a forklift and received a two-day suspension) was not similarly situated in severity: forklift graffiti was internal; the truss graffiti was public-facing, caused customer complaints, and created reputational harm.
3. Not the real reason. The record showed no shifting justification, no material policy deviations applied non-uniformly, no biased comments evidencing animus, and no helpful temporal proximity (the termination decision preceded Welch’s same-day request for medical care).

Because no reasonable jury could conclude that Heart Truss’s explanation was pretext for disability discrimination or WDCA retaliation, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment.

Factual Background and Procedural Posture

• Employment and injuries. Welch, a delivery driver, suffered a left-knee injury in 2017, aggravated it in 2019 (workers’ compensation claim later denied), and had a separate ankle injury in 2020 (medical leave and surgery; returned March 2021).
• Demotion to production line. After returning, Welch walked with a limp. Based on a supervisor’s memorialized conversation referencing knee pain and job limitations, plant manager Tom Gustafson reassigned Welch to the production line (a lower-paying, non-climbing position). Welch recorded two conversations with Gustafson about the demotion.
• Graffiti incident. In April 2021, customers complained about graffiti (smiley faces, devil-horn faces, and images interpreted as breasts) on delivered trusses. Gustafson investigated, concluded the culprit must be from the production facility, eliminated the second shift, and asked first-shift supervisor Tim Oberlin to investigate. Oberlin reported that Welch, within earshot, admitted, “I did it,” asking, “What’s it hurting?” Another employee corroborated. Welch denied confessing.
• Termination decision and timing. Based on Shop Rule 28 (defacing company property, discipline up to discharge), Gustafson decided to fire Welch. Later that day, Welch reported a new right-knee injury and requested medical care; he was evaluated and released to return to work. When he returned that day, Heart Truss terminated him.
• Litigation posture. Welch sued for wrongful demotion and termination (ADA, PWDCRA, and WDCA retaliation). The district court granted summary judgment to Heart Truss on termination claims; demotion claims were later settled. Welch appealed only the termination rulings.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• McDonnell Douglas framework: A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ. (6th Cir. 2013); DiCarlo v. Potter (6th Cir. 2004). The court assumed prima facie and legitimate-reason steps and focused on pretext.
• ADA/PWDCRA alignment: Hrdlicka v. General Motors (6th Cir. 2023) and Whitfield v. Tennessee (6th Cir. 2011) confirm parallel analysis and prima facie elements under ADA and PWDCRA.
• WDCA retaliation: MacDonald-Bass v. J.E. Johnson Contracting (6th Cir. 2012); Chiles v. Machine Shop (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) outline elements and burden shifting.
• Pretext standards: Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals (6th Cir. 1994) describes three ways to prove pretext; later overruled on unrelated grounds by Gross v. FBL Financial (U.S. 2009). Miles v. S. Central Human Resources Agency (6th Cir. 2020) clarifies “shifting rationales” doctrine.
• Honest belief rule: Chen v. Dow Chemical (6th Cir. 2009) and Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard (6th Cir. 2012) hold that reasonably informed decisions based on particularized facts are protected—even without perfect investigations. Welch’s reliance on Yazdian v. ConMed (6th Cir. 2015) was unavailing because that case involved red flags about the reporting supervisor’s credibility and the plaintiff sought to tell his side.
• Comparator severity: Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hospital (6th Cir. 2016) and Clayton v. Meijer (6th Cir. 2002) emphasize that comparators must be similarly situated in all relevant respects, including the severity and consequences of the conduct.
• Evidence of animus: Griffin v. Finkbeiner (6th Cir. 2012) and Brewer v. New Era (6th Cir. 2014) show how inflammatory trait-based comments can support pretext—contrasting with Welch’s recordings, which lacked such hostility.
• Awareness vs. pretext: Witham v. Intown Suites (6th Cir. 2016) distinguishes mere knowledge of protected traits/activity from proof of pretext.
• Temporal proximity: Clark County School District v. Breeden (U.S. 2001) holds that an employer need not halt a contemplated adverse action upon later learning of protected activity; Donald v. Sybra (6th Cir. 2012) holds temporal proximity cannot be the sole pretext basis.
• Nondecisionmaker statements: Roberts v. Principi (6th Cir. 2008) and Bush v. Dictaphone (6th Cir. 1998) discount statements by nondecisionmakers.
• Pleading boundaries: Bridgeport Music v. WB Music (6th Cir. 2007) and Golembiewski v. Logie (6th Cir. 2013) disallow new theories raised for the first time at summary judgment or on appeal.
• Summary judgment standard: Colson v. City of Alcoa (6th Cir. 2022) (de novo review; inferences in nonmovant’s favor; no genuine dispute of material fact).
• Knowledge inferences: Caudle v. Hard Drive Express (6th Cir. 2024) was distinguished: jury issues about knowledge do not equate to pretext without evidence of illegal motive.

Legal Reasoning

The parties narrowed the dispute to pretext. The court methodically examined each of Welch’s three routes to a jury under Manzer and found none viable.

1) Honest Belief: Reasonable Reliance on Particularized Facts

The plant manager, Gustafson, undertook an investigation: he traced the graffiti to the plant, eliminated the second shift, and tasked the first-shift supervisor, Oberlin, to question workers. Oberlin reported Welch confessed; a coworker corroborated. Although Welch denied confessing, the court emphasized that the honest-belief rule looks at the decisionmaker’s perspective: did he reasonably and honestly rely on particularized facts? The answer was yes.

Welch argued the investigation was inadequate because Gustafson did not interview additional witnesses or map graffitied job numbers to Welch’s assignments. But the Sixth Circuit reiterated that an employer’s investigation need not be perfect or exhaustive; it must be “reasonably informed and considered,” not “optimal” or “leave no stone unturned.” Absent evidence giving Gustafson reason to doubt Oberlin’s report, reliance on that report was reasonable. Yazdian did not help Welch because there, the employer ignored red flags about the reporting supervisor’s veracity and refused to hear the employee’s side—conditions not present here.

2) Comparator Severity: “Substantially Identical” Misconduct

Welch’s comparator was an employee who spray-painted the inside of a forklift and received a two-day suspension. That was not “substantially identical” to graffiti on trusses shipped to customers and visible to the public. The latter created customer complaints and reputational harm—a material difference in severity. Welch’s assertion that graffiti was a “common” problem failed because he identified no specific individual who defaced trusses and avoided termination. Without a valid comparator, the “insufficient basis” theory faltered.

3) Not the Real Reason: Shifting Reasons, Policy Deviations, Animus, and Timing

• Shifting rationales. Heart Truss consistently cited Rule 28 (defacing company property). Later filings elaborated the facts but did not contradict the original justification. Added detail is not a “shifting” reason.
• Policy deviations. Welch identified no non-uniform enforcement. The Shop Rules permitted “up to discharge” for a first Rule 28 offense; Gustafson weighed the severity and chose discharge. References in the EEOC position statement to Welch’s prior, forgiven discipline were made by a nondecisionmaker and did not infect the termination decision.
• Recorded conversations. Welch characterized Gustafson’s demotion-era comments as hostile toward disability and compensation claims. The court read them as safety-focused, at times corrective and frustrated, but not trait-based hostility. Unlike Brewer and Griffin, the recordings lacked inflammatory, trait-focused language.
• Temporal proximity. Welch’s disability theory was tied to a long-known left-knee condition (known since 2019), defeating proximity. For WDCA retaliation, the decision to terminate predated Welch’s same-day request for medical care; under Breeden, employers need not suspend a contemplated decision upon later learning of protected activity. Welch’s attempt to premise proximity on his March 2021 return from ankle-leave failed both procedurally (new theory not pled) and substantively (timing alone insufficient, with about one month between return and termination).

Impact and Practical Implications

Key Reinforcements to Sixth Circuit Doctrine

• Honest-Belief Safe Harbor. Employers who document a reasonably informed process and rely on particularized facts—including a supervisor’s report of a confession—are well-positioned to prevail at summary judgment, unless plaintiffs can show the decisionmaker had concrete reasons to doubt the report’s accuracy or impartiality.
• Comparator Analysis Elevated by Consequences. The “severity” of misconduct includes reputational harm and customer impact. Plaintiffs should identify comparators whose conduct produced similar actual and potential consequences.
• “Shifting Reasons” Requires a True Shift. Post hoc factual elaboration consistent with the original rationale does not equate to shifting justifications.
• Policy Deviations Require Non-Uniformity. To infer pretext from process missteps, plaintiffs should show the employer does not apply the policy evenly across the workforce.
• Trait-Based Hostility Must Be Evident. Conversations that show awareness, business-driven safety concerns, or even frustration do not amount to unlawful animus absent explicit or contextual hostility toward a protected trait.
• Timing Alone Rarely Suffices. Temporal proximity cannot be the sole basis for pretext, particularly where a termination decision was already made.

Employer Takeaways

• Document investigative steps and the specific facts relied upon (who reported what; when; corroborating details).
• If relying on a single supervisor account, memorialize why it was deemed reliable and note the absence of red flags or disputes.
• When citing company rules, tie the discipline to severity and consequences; note reputational harm if relevant.
• Avoid including nondecisionmaker opinions in official position statements or, if included, clarify decisionmaker independence.
• Be cautious with commentary in sensitive conversations; stick to safety, performance, and policy—not protected traits.

Employee and Plaintiff Counsel Takeaways

• To pierce the honest-belief rule, develop evidence that the decisionmaker had contemporaneous reasons to doubt the report relied upon (e.g., documented bias, conflicting accounts, refusal to hear the employee, ignored witnesses or documents, or procedural irregularities that matter).
• Identify comparators whose misconduct is truly equivalent in rule violated and real-world consequences.
• Distinguish elaboration from shifting rationales; show contradictions or post hoc new reasons that conflict with earlier stated grounds.
• Connect any policy deviations to non-uniform enforcement, not isolated oversights.
• When invoking temporal proximity, anchor it to the protected activity pled in the complaint and supplement with additional evidence of pretext.

Michigan WDCA Retaliation Context

The opinion underscores the importance of timing: a same-day request for medical care does not create an inference of retaliation if the termination decision was made earlier that day. Plaintiffs should develop evidence that the decision post-dated—or was influenced by—protected activity, or that the employer reopened or escalated discipline in response to it.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting. In the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff first establishes a prima facie case; the employer then offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason; the plaintiff must then show that reason is pretext for unlawful animus.
• Pretext—three common paths (Manzer).
  1. The reason has no basis in fact.
  2. The reason did not actually motivate the decision.
  3. The reason was insufficient to motivate the decision (often via comparators).
• Honest-belief rule. If the employer reasonably and honestly believed its stated reason based on particularized facts at the time, courts generally will not second-guess the decision—even if the reason later proves mistaken.
• Comparator evidence. To show pretext by insufficiency, plaintiffs compare themselves to similarly situated co-workers outside the protected class who engaged in substantially identical misconduct but received more lenient discipline. “Substantially identical” includes the rule violated and the actual/potential consequences.
• Shifting rationales vs. elaboration. A true shift is when the employer offers inconsistent reasons over time. Providing additional details that align with the initial rationale is not a shift.
• Temporal proximity. Close timing between protected activity and adverse action can suggest causation but is rarely enough by itself to prove pretext—especially if the decision preceded the protected activity.
• Nondecisionmaker statements. Remarks by individuals who did not make or influence the decision typically do not prove discriminatory motive for that decision.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Welch v. Heart Truss affirms summary judgment for the employer and clarifies several recurring themes in employment litigation. The court reinforces that the honest-belief doctrine protects employers who reasonably rely on particularized facts—even a single supervisor’s report—absent red flags about credibility. Comparator analysis turns on the real-world severity and consequences of the misconduct. Additional, consistent details are not “shifting reasons,” and minor process imperfections generally do not establish pretext without proof of non-uniform enforcement. Recorded workplace conversations devoid of trait-based hostility do not establish animus, and timing alone is seldom decisive—particularly when the decision predated the protected activity.

Although nonprecedential, the opinion offers a clear, structured roadmap for litigants on both sides of ADA/PWDCRA discrimination and Michigan WDCA retaliation claims: build the record on reasonableness and particularized facts, identify truly comparable misconduct, separate awareness from animus, and connect the dots on causation and timing. On these facts, Welch’s evidence could not allow a reasonable jury to reject Heart Truss’s explanation in favor of an unlawful motive, and the judgment was properly affirmed.

Key Takeaways

• Reasonable reliance on a supervisor’s report of an employee’s confession supports the honest-belief defense, absent contemporaneous reasons to doubt the report.
• Comparator misconduct must be substantially identical in rule and consequences; reputational harm can be a decisive differentiator.
• Consistent elaboration is not a shifting rationale; nondecisionmaker comments do not establish pretext.
• Temporal proximity cannot carry pretext alone, especially where the employer’s decision predated the protected activity.