Holistic Sentencing and Upward Variances in Cyberstalking Cases: Commentary on United States v. Marsico (3d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Third Circuit’s nonprecedential decision in United States v. Daniel Marsico, No. 24‑3096 (3d Cir. Nov. 21, 2025), affirms a maximum, above‑Guidelines prison sentence for a defendant who engaged in a multi‑year campaign of cyberstalking and in‑person harassment of a former intimate partner.

Although designated “not precedential” under the Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, the opinion is instructive in at least three respects:

• It illustrates how district courts may justify a substantial upward variance to the statutory maximum in cyberstalking cases when the Sentencing Guidelines do not capture the frequency, duration, sophistication, and digital aspects of the abuse.
• It clarifies that where a district court clearly considers a defendant’s mental‑health history, its decision not to treat that history as significantly mitigating is neither a procedural error nor, without more, a basis for finding a sentence substantively unreasonable.
• It reaffirms the broad deference appellate courts give to sentencing judges, including where:
  • a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is rejected, and
  • a sentence is materially above the advisory Guidelines range but still within the statutory maximum.

This commentary provides an overview of the case, a structured summary of the opinion, a detailed analysis of the precedents and legal reasoning, an assessment of its likely impact on sentencing in cyberstalking and domestic violence–related cases, and an explanation of key concepts for non‑specialists.

II. Case Background

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

• Appellee: United States of America.
• Appellant: Daniel Marsico.
• Originating Court: United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (No. 2:24‑cr‑00012‑001), Judge Cathy Bissoon.
• Appeal: From the sentence imposed after a guilty plea to federal cyberstalking charges.
• Panel: Circuit Judges Restrepo, McKee, and Ambro (opinion by Judge Ambro).

B. Factual Overview

The core facts, as recited by the Court, depict an extreme, sustained pattern of abuse:

• In approximately June 2020, after his girlfriend ended their relationship, Marsico engaged in years‑long stalking and harassment.
• His conduct included:
  • Incessant phone calls and thousands of text messages to the victim and, later, her mother.
  • Repeatedly circumventing communication blocks by using new phone numbers and other means.
  • Surveilling the victim and making sure she knew he was monitoring her.
  • Threats to:
    • publish nonconsensual explicit photos and videos,
    • sabotage her career,
    • invade her home, and
    • assault her and her romantic partners.
  • Carrying out many of these threats, including:
    • Impersonating her online, posting nonconsensual intimate images and providing her contact information so that strangers would harass her.
    • Breaking through her door and physically attacking a former boyfriend who was visiting.
• The opinion emphasizes that “No summary can do justice to the suffocating scope of Marsico’s campaign.”

The victim obtained Protection from Abuse orders (“PFAs”), but they had virtually no deterrent effect:

• Marsico immediately violated the PFAs after each police encounter.
• He sent messages trivializing the orders and law enforcement, such as:

  “The cop on the phone was actually really nice and appreciated that I just straight up admitted to everything I did.”

  “Just got delivered a pfa and the cops were REALLY nice!”

  “I beat up my neighbor and charmed my way out of it with the cops. You think being delivered a pfa phases me in the slightest?”

• He violated a single PFA approximately 1,300 times.
• The victim developed post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and lived in daily fear that he would kill her.

C. Charges, Plea, and Sentencing

• Indictment: In January 2024, a federal grand jury indicted Marsico for:
  • Cyberstalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) and (B).
• Guilty Plea: Marsico pleaded guilty in June 2024.
• Statutory Range: Cyberstalking under the relevant subsections carried a range of 1 to 5 years in prison (18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)(5)–(6)).
• Guidelines Range: The advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines indicated a range of 30 to 37 months.
• Plea Agreement: Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), the parties agreed to a stipulated sentencing range of 20 to 30 months.

At sentencing, the District Court:

• Received victim impact statements and letters of support for the defendant.
• Heard from:
  • Marsico’s mother,
  • his aunt, and
  • Marsico himself.
• Considered a presentence report noting that:
  • Marsico had been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder.
  • He was receiving psychiatric treatment at the time of his arrest.

The District Court:

• Rejected the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, expressly citing:
  • “the severity of the conduct,”
  • the victim impact statements, and
  • “the rest of the record.”
• Gave Marsico the chance to withdraw his guilty plea; he chose to maintain it.
• Imposed a sentence of:
  • 60 months (5 years) in prison — the statutory maximum; and
  • 3 years of supervised release.

The Court described the conduct as “beyond egregious” and stated that:

“There simply is no scenario under which a lesser sentence would be sufficient in this case.”

Marsico appealed, contending that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable, primarily because of his mental‑health history.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

• The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
• The Third Circuit had jurisdiction under:
  • 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (final decisions of district courts), and
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (review of sentences).

The Court articulated two distinct standards of review:

• Procedural reasonableness: Reviewed for plain error because Marsico did not object at the appropriate time in the District Court (citing United States v. Flores‑Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc)).
• Substantive reasonableness: Reviewed for abuse of discretion (citing United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)).

Under Tomko, the Third Circuit will affirm:

“unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”

B. Marsico’s Arguments on Appeal

Marsico advanced two main arguments:

1. Procedural Unreasonableness – He claimed the District Court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factor addressing “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” focusing in particular on his mental‑health conditions.
2. Substantive Unreasonableness – He contended that:
   • the 60‑month sentence (an upward variance from the 30–37 month Guidelines range) was too severe, especially in light of his mental‑health issues;
   • the sentence exceeded the range contemplated by his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement (20–30 months).

C. Holding

The Third Circuit affirmed the sentence in full, holding that:

• The sentence was procedurally reasonable — the District Court clearly considered Marsico’s mental‑health history and other § 3553(a) factors.
• The sentence was substantively reasonable — in light of the severity and persistence of the conduct, and the District Court’s detailed explanation, the upward variance to the statutory maximum was within the broad range of permissible sentences.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. United States v. Flores‑Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc)

Flores‑Mejia established that a defendant must raise objections to the procedural reasonableness of a sentence at the time of sentencing—after the sentence is pronounced but before the hearing concludes—to preserve them for appeal. Otherwise, review is for plain error.

In Marsico:

• Because Marsico “failed to object at the appropriate time,” the Court reviewed his procedural claim under the more demanding plain error standard.
• This raised the bar: he had to show:
  • an error,
  • that was clear or obvious,
  • that affected his substantial rights, and
  • that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Practically, Flores‑Mejia makes it harder for defendants to obtain relief on procedural sentencing challenges when trial counsel does not contemporaneously object.

2. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)

Tomko is the Third Circuit’s foundational en banc decision on substantive reasonableness review of sentences post‑Booker. It sets out:

• the abuse of discretion standard, and
• the key formulation: the appellate court will affirm “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”

It also clarified that:

“we cannot presume that a sentence is unreasonable simply because it falls outside the advisory Guidelines range.”

In Marsico, the Court relies on Tomko to:

• reject any automatic suspicion of an upward variance, and
• emphasize the breadth of discretion afforded to district judges in weighing § 3553(a) factors.

The opinion quotes Tomko repeatedly to reinforce that:

• Marsico bears the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness, and
• the appellate court will not reweigh the sentencing factors de novo.

3. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)

Grier is often cited for multiple propositions concerning sentencing, including the standard of proof for guideline enhancements and the nature of post‑Booker review. Here, the Court quotes Grier for a central definition:

“The touchstone of ‘reasonableness’ is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”

This definition grounds the analysis of both:

• whether the District Court considered the relevant factors at all (procedural reasonableness), and
• whether, in light of those factors, the resulting sentence falls within a range of acceptable outcomes (substantive reasonableness).

4. United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2008)

Wise underscores that if a sentence is procedurally sound, the substantive inquiry is limited:

“As long as [the sentence] falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors, [this Court] must affirm.”

In Marsico, this principle:

• supports deference to the District Court’s choice to impose the statutory maximum; and
• frames the appellate role as confirming that the court acted within a broadly defined band of reasonableness, not choosing the “best” or “ideal” sentence.

5. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370 (3d Cir. 2001)

Walker concerned then‑Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreements (now Rule 11(c)(1)(C)), in which the parties agree that a specific sentence or range is binding on the court if the court accepts the agreement. Walker held that:

“A sentencing court can, of course, reject the results of a plea negotiation if it concludes that the resulting agreement is not in the best interest of justice.”

In Marsico:

• The defendant pointed to the 20–30 month range in his 11(c)(1)(C) agreement as an implicit benchmark of reasonableness.
• The Court invoked Walker to reject that notion, reaffirming:
  • the sentencing judge’s independent responsibility to ensure that the sentence is just in light of the full record; and
  • that a plea bargain cannot bind the court unless the court accepts it—and here it did not.

6. United States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2020)

Seibert is cited for a critical proposition on mitigating factors:

“a district court’s failure to give mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they deserve does not make a sentence substantively unreasonable.”

In other words, disagreement over the weight accorded to a factor—such as mental health, family history, or lack of prior convictions—does not itself amount to an abuse of discretion.

In Marsico, this precedent is central to disposing of the defendant’s main substantive argument: that his mental‑health diagnosis should have substantially reduced his sentence. The Third Circuit:

• Accepts that the District Court was aware of and considered his mental health; but
• Refuses to second‑guess the court’s relative weighting of that factor versus:
  • the gravity and persistence of the offense,
  • the harm to the victim, and
  • the need for deterrence and protection of the public.

7. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)

Rita is a Supreme Court case addressing appellate review of sentences, including the presumption of reasonableness for within‑Guidelines sentences and the sufficiency of a sentencing court’s explanation.

The Third Circuit quotes Rita for the basic articulation of what is required of a sentencing judge:

“The District Court ‘considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decision‑making authority.’”

In Marsico, the Court uses this language to affirm that:

• the record reflects a reasoned, individualized sentencing decision, and
• the explanation, especially given the context and severity of the conduct, is sufficient to support an upward variance to the maximum.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Procedural Reasonableness: Consideration of Mental Health and § 3553(a)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a sentencing court must consider, among other factors:

• § 3553(a)(1): “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”;
• § 3553(a)(2): the need for the sentence to:
  • reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment;
  • afford adequate deterrence;
  • protect the public; and
  • provide the defendant with needed medical care or other correctional treatment.
• and other enumerated factors.

Marsico’s procedural claim is that the District Court failed to consider his mental‑health history as part of his “history and characteristics.”

The Third Circuit rejects this argument based on the record:

• The District Court actively questioned defense counsel and Marsico’s mother about his mental health.
• It expressly stated that it had considered:
  • the presentence report,
  • materials and letters of support, and
  • testimony from one of his mental healthcare providers.
• The opinion also notes that even Marsico’s own brief concedes that:

  “all parties, including the Court[,] were aware of [his] mental health issues”

  and that the Court learned of them through multiple channels (plea agreement, memoranda, letters, live testimony, presentence report).

Taken together, the record decisively refutes any claim that the court ignored his mental health. As Tomko and Grier make clear, procedural error arises from failure to consider relevant factors, not from the ultimate weight attached to them.

Under Flores‑Mejia’s plain‑error standard, and given the rich record of consideration, there is no basis to find procedural unreasonableness.

2. Substantive Reasonableness: The Upward Variance and Maximum Sentence

Substantive reasonableness examines whether the sentence, in light of the § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances, is “greater than necessary” to achieve the purposes of sentencing. The key features here are:

• Guidelines range: 30–37 months.
• Plea agreement range: 20–30 months (Rule 11(c)(1)(C)).
• Imposed sentence: 60 months (statutory maximum).

Marsico argued that:

• the upward variance (to nearly double the top of the Guidelines range) was excessive; and
• his mental health warranted a significantly lower sentence.

The Third Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in several steps.

a. No Presumption of Unreasonableness for Outside‑Guidelines Sentences

Citing Tomko, the Court reiterates:

“we cannot presume that a sentence is unreasonable simply because it falls outside the advisory Guidelines range.”

Thus, the mere fact that the sentence exceeds both the Guidelines and the (rejected) plea range is not itself a ground for reversal. The real inquiry is whether the District Court gave case‑specific, § 3553(a)‑grounded reasons for the variance.

b. The District Court’s “Holistic View” and Identified Shortcomings in the Guidelines

The District Court explained that it took a “holistic view” of:

“all the facts and circumstances of this particular case.”

It specifically found that the Guidelines did not adequately account for:

• “the frequency, duration, and sophistication of the harassment,”
• “the power dynamics between the defendant and his victim,” and
• “the special role of the internet and social media.”

This is significant in two ways:

1. It identifies concrete respects in which the Guidelines understate the true seriousness and complexity of the offense conduct in a modern cyberstalking context.
2. It links the upward variance to recognized § 3553(a) factors:
   • the nature and circumstances of the offense (§ 3553(a)(1)), including its unusually persistent and technologically sophisticated nature;
   • the need for deterrence and protection of the public (§ 3553(a)(2)).

The opinion’s description of the stalking campaign—its “suffocating scope”, repeated violations of PFAs, and escalation to physical violence—reinforces why the Guidelines range might underrepresent the seriousness of the offense.

c. Persistent Defiance of Legal and Social Constraints

The District Court also emphasized Marsico’s apparent immunity to normal deterrents:

• He was not deterred by:
  • the victim’s efforts to block him,
  • police involvement,
  • PFAs (violated ~1,300 times), or
  • the looming possibility of criminal liability.
• He “seemed to be unconcerned with the judicial ramifications of his actions.”

Under § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C), the need to:

• afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; and
• protect the public from further crimes of the defendant

are explicit sentencing goals. The Court clearly weighed these heavily in concluding that a lesser sentence would fail to adequately protect the victim and the community.

d. Rejection of the 11(c)(1)(C) Plea Agreement

Marsico also implicitly argued that the parties’ agreed‑upon range (20–30 months) should influence the assessment of reasonableness. The Third Circuit, citing Walker, flatly rejects this:

• A sentencing court may reject an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement if it concludes it is not in the best interest of justice.
• Once rejected, the agreement’s stipulated range has no binding effect and offers no presumptive cap on reasonableness.

Here, the District Court explicitly grounded its rejection in the “severity of the conduct” and victim impact—classic sentencing considerations that can justify rejecting a too‑lenient bargain.

e. Weight Given to Mental‑Health Mitigation

Marsico’s “only developed argument” on substance, as the opinion puts it, is that his:

• history of depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder
• should mitigate his culpability and reduce his sentence.

The Third Circuit responds in two linked moves:

1. Consideration vs. Weight (Procedural vs. Substantive)
   It had already established that the District Court did consider his mental‑health history. Thus, there is no procedural error. The question is now purely substantive: did the court abuse its discretion by failing to give mental health more weight?
2. Reliance on Seibert
   Citing Seibert, the Court reiterates that:

   “a district court’s failure to give mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they deserve does not make a sentence substantively unreasonable.”

   In other words, as long as the sentencing judge recognizes and considers the mitigating evidence, an appellate court will not reweigh its importance versus aggravating factors.

Given the extraordinary gravity and persistence of the offense conduct, the Third Circuit finds no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to give relatively less mitigating force to mental‑health issues—especially where those issues did not prevent or significantly diminish the defendant’s purposeful, sustained wrongdoing.

f. Conclusion on Substantive Reasonableness

Combining:

• the District Court’s detailed explanation,
• its express finding that the conduct was “beyond egregious,”
• its view that “there simply is no scenario” in which a lesser sentence would be sufficient, and
• the deference mandated by Tomko and Wise,

the Third Circuit holds that the 60‑month sentence falls within the broad range of substantively reasonable sentences for this particular defendant and this particular crime.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Cyberstalking and Digital Domestic Abuse Sentencing

Although nonprecedential, Marsico is significant as an example of how the Third Circuit approves a maximum sentence and substantial upward variance in modern cyberstalking cases where:

• the victim’s life is fundamentally destabilized (e.g., PTSD, constant fear of murder);
• the abuse is:
  • long‑term and relentless,
  • multi‑modal (digital, in‑person, reputational), and
  • involves repeated violations of court orders;
• the defendant uses:
  • nonconsensual intimate imagery,
  • impersonation, and
  • online networks to enlist third‑party harassment.

The opinion underscores that the Sentencing Guidelines may underestimate the seriousness of technologically facilitated abuse and that district courts may justifiably vary upward when:

• the “special role of the internet and social media” exacerbates harms;
• the victim’s exposure and vulnerability are amplified beyond traditional stalking scenarios; and
• traditional deterrents (PFAs, police intervention) fail.

Future sentencing courts in similar cases can rely on the reasoning in Marsico (as persuasive authority) to:

• articulate how digital tools increase both the reach and impact of stalking;
• justify upward variances when the Guidelines lack specific adjustments for:
  • repeated PFA violations,
  • massive message volume,
  • nonconsensual pornography and impersonation, and
  • the psychological devastation inflicted.

2. Mental Health as a Sentencing Factor

The case also has implications for how mental‑health evidence is treated at sentencing:

• It confirms that consideration of mental‑health history is mandatory when properly raised (as part of the defendant’s “history and characteristics”).
• But it strongly reaffirms that:
  • there is no requirement that mental‑health conditions lead to a downward variance or significantly reduce a sentence; and
  • appellate courts will not treat a sentencing judge’s limited reliance on mental health as an abuse of discretion, absent some more concrete indication of irrationality or legal error.

For practitioners, Marsico is a reminder that:

• mental health is a factor to be argued, not a guarantee of leniency;
• when the offense shows planning, persistence, and an ability to navigate legal interventions, courts may find that mental illness does not meaningfully diminish culpability; and
• robust documentation and expert testimony are necessary but not sufficient; the court retains broad discretion in balancing all aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

3. Plea Agreements and Sentencing Autonomy

By explicitly invoking Walker, the Third Circuit reinforces that:

• Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements do not displace the sentencing judge’s obligation to impose a just sentence; and
• if a court finds that the stipulated range does not reflect the seriousness of the offense or the needs of punishment and deterrence, it may reject the agreement and impose a substantially higher sentence, so long as:
  • the defendant is given an opportunity to withdraw the plea; and
  • the sentence itself is otherwise reasonable.

This may influence plea negotiations in serious cyberstalking and domestic violence cases, pushing parties to recognize that courts might be unwilling to accept agreements perceived as unduly lenient given the gravity and modern dynamics of the offense.

4. Deference to District Courts in Extreme Fact Patterns

Finally, Marsico exemplifies the high level of appellate deference in extreme factual scenarios. When the record shows:

• detailed findings,
• a thorough explanation, and
• a clear connection to § 3553(a) factors,

even a statutory‑maximum, above‑Guidelines sentence will typically be upheld. This places a premium on:

• the quality of the District Court’s articulation of its reasoning; and
• trial counsel’s responsibility to create a robust sentencing record, including any objections.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

• Procedural reasonableness asks: Did the judge follow the right steps?
  • Correctly calculate the Guidelines?
  • Allow both sides to argue?
  • Consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors?
  • Avoid relying on clearly incorrect facts?
• Substantive reasonableness asks: Is the sentence, in light of the facts and § 3553(a), within the range of reasonable outcomes?

In Marsico, the Third Circuit held:

• Procedurally: the District Court did consider mental health and other factors, so there was no procedural error.
• Substantively: given the conduct, a 60‑month sentence was within the broad range of outcomes a reasonable judge might choose.

2. Plain Error Review

Because Marsico did not object to the alleged procedural error at sentencing, the Court applied plain error review. Under this demanding standard, he had to show:

1. There was an error.
2. The error was clear or obvious under current law.
3. The error affected his substantial rights (likely changed the outcome).
4. The error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.

Plain error is difficult to meet; it is reserved for truly egregious mistakes. The clear indications that the District Court considered mental health foreclosed such a claim.

3. Upward Variance

An upward variance is a sentence higher than the advisory Guidelines range based on a judge’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. Here:

• Guidelines range: 30–37 months.
• Sentence imposed: 60 months.

The judge may vary upward when the Guidelines do not adequately reflect:

• the seriousness of the offense,
• the need for deterrence,
• the need to protect the public, or
• other statutory factors.

4. Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Plea Agreement

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C):

• The parties may agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition.
• If the court accepts the agreement, it is bound by that agreed‑upon sentence or range.
• But the court may refuse to accept the agreement if it believes the proposed sentence is not just.

In Marsico:

• The parties agreed to a 20–30 month range.
• The District Court rejected the agreement after reviewing the full record.
• Once rejected, the court was free to impose any lawful sentence up to the statutory maximum, subject to reasonableness review.

5. Protection from Abuse Orders (PFAs)

A Protection from Abuse order is a civil protection order, commonly used in domestic violence and stalking situations, directing the respondent to:

• avoid contact with the victim,
• stay away from certain places, or
• refrain from specified conduct.

Repeated PFA violations, as in this case (approximately 1,300 violations of a single PFA), are often treated as strong evidence that:

• the defendant is undeterred by court orders; and
• stronger criminal sanctions may be necessary to protect the victim and the public.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Marsico stands as a powerful illustration of how federal courts may respond to extreme cyberstalking and intimate‑partner harassment. While not precedential, it crystallizes several important points:

• A district court may justifiably impose a statutory‑maximum, above‑Guidelines sentence when:
  • the offense involves prolonged, sophisticated, and digitally‑enabled abuse,
  • the victim suffers severe and ongoing psychological harm, and
  • the defendant repeatedly flouts court orders and appears undeterred by legal interventions.
• So long as the sentencing court clearly considers a defendant’s mental‑health history and other § 3553(a) factors, its decision to give limited mitigating effect to such evidence will ordinarily not constitute either procedural or substantive error.
• Citing established precedents, the Third Circuit reaffirms:
  • the high degree of deference accorded to sentencing judges (Tomko, Wise),
  • the permissibility of rejecting plea bargains deemed too lenient (Walker), and
  • the principle that appellate courts will not reweigh mitigating factors such as mental health (Seibert).

In the broader legal context, Marsico underscores that federal sentencing in the digital age must—and can—adapt to the reality that cyberstalking, when combined with relentless contact, impersonation, nonconsensual intimate imagery, and in‑person violence, can warrant the most severe sentences allowed by statute. The opinion signals that where a district court articulates a careful, “holistic” rationale grounded in § 3553(a), appellate courts will rarely disturb such judgments, even when they involve substantial upward variances and the rejection of negotiated plea ranges.