Holistic Nexus for Drug-Trafficking Warrants: GPS/Surveillance Patterns and Intermediary Controlled Buys Can Establish Probable Cause

Case: United States v. Michael Smith, Jr.

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date: January 7, 2026

1) Introduction

This Sixth Circuit decision addresses a recurring Fourth Amendment problem in narcotics investigations: what it takes to establish a nexus between suspected drug trafficking and specific places to be searched—especially when officers rely heavily on surveillance, GPS tracker data, informants, and controlled buys that may involve intermediaries.

Parties. The United States (appellee) prosecuted Michael Warren Smith, Jr. (appellant), alleged to be a large-scale methamphetamine supplier in Kalamazoo, Michigan.

Search locations. Police obtained warrants for (1) Smith’s alleged residence at 822 Elmwood Avenue (“Elmwood”) and (2) Apartment #33 at 4517 West Main Street, described as a “stash” apartment. Searches produced substantial quantities of methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine, along with firearms and trafficking paraphernalia.

Key issue on appeal. Smith challenged the denial of his suppression motion, arguing the warrants lacked probable cause because the affidavits did not sufficiently connect (i.e., did not establish a nexus between) the places searched and evidence sought, and because informant-driven and off-site observations supposedly could not supply that nexus.

Practical rule reinforced by the court: In the Sixth Circuit, probable cause for drug-trafficking searches does not require an “actual showing” of criminal activity inside the target premises. A nexus may be established through reliable circumstantial evidence—such as repeated GPS-linked travel to and from the locations, short-contact meetings consistent with trafficking, corroborated tips, surveillance technology, and even controlled buys involving intermediaries—evaluated holistically under the totality of the circumstances.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Smith’s motion to suppress. Applying a deferential standard to the issuing judge’s probable-cause determination, the court held the affidavit provided a substantial basis to find a fair probability that drugs, firearms, and trafficking evidence would be found at Elmwood and Apartment #33.

The court emphasized that the affidavit documented:

months of investigation linking Smith (“JR”) to large-scale methamphetamine distribution;
GPS tracker history showing Smith repeatedly stopping at Elmwood and regularly accessing Apartment #33;
surveillance of multiple “short contact” encounters consistent with drug transactions involving suspected/known dealers;
a tip asserting narcotics and guns were stored at Elmwood;
corroboration through phone/rental/property records and surveillance technology placed in common areas.

Having found probable cause, the court declined to address the good-faith exception under United States v. Leon.

3) Analysis

A) Precedents Cited

The opinion is less about announcing a novel doctrinal test than about synthesizing and applying a line of Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court authority that (i) heightens deference to issuing judges and (ii) endorses commonsense, holistic probable-cause assessments in drug cases.

1. Deference and the “second level of review”

United States v. Simmons (129 F.4th 382 (6th Cir. 2025)) and United States v. Taylor (121 F.4th 590 (6th Cir. 2024)): establish the posture for suppression review—viewing evidence in the government’s favor and applying deferential review to probable cause. The Smith panel uses these to frame why it will not reweigh the affidavit de novo.
United States v. Sanders (106 F.4th 455 (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc)): the opinion’s backbone. Smith repeatedly quotes Sanders for three propositions: (i) “front lines” deference to issuing judges, (ii) the low “fair probability” threshold, and (iii) the requirement to read affidavits holistically rather than “hypertechnical[ly] or line-by-line.” Sanders also supports reliance on “more than mere suspicion” via direct or circumstantial evidence, and recognizes that reliable tips can contribute to probable cause.
United States v. Moore (999 F.3d 993 (6th Cir. 2021)) and United States v. Brown (732 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2013)): reinforce “great deference” to the issuing judge and the limited bases for reversal (arbitrary exercise of authority).
United States v. Tagg (886 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018)) and Illinois v. Gates (462 U.S. 213 (1983)): provide the “substantial basis” standard and Gates’s totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Smith uses Tagg/Gates to reject demands for “actual showing” of criminality at the premises.

2. The nexus requirement and what can satisfy it

United States v. Carpenter (360 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc)) and United States v. Van Shutters (163 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 1998)): supply the foundational nexus formulation—probable cause requires a connection between the place and the evidence sought.
United States v. Grubbs (547 U.S. 90 (2006)): quoted via Sanders for the “fair probability” definition of the nexus inquiry.
United States v. Sumlin (956 F.3d 879 (6th Cir. 2020)): anchors the “four corners” limitation—review confined to what is in the affidavit.
United States v. Whitlow (134 F.4th 914 (6th Cir. 2025)): cited for the proposition that probable cause is “not a difficult standard to meet,” consistent with the court’s low-threshold framing.
United States v. Brown (828 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2016)): supplies the key Sixth Circuit drug-nexus articulation used here: probable cause exists with “some reliable evidence connecting the known drug dealer’s ongoing criminal activity to the residence.” Smith treats GPS patterns, surveillance of short meetings, and corroborated tips as the “reliable evidence” satisfying Brown’s requirement.

3. Commonsense inferences, controlled buys, and intermediaries

Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby (583 U.S. 48 (2018)): used (via Tagg and Christian) to legitimize “common-sense conclusions about human behavior” and the idea that the “whole is often greater than the sum of its parts.” This supports treating repeated brief contacts, travel patterns, and access to the apartment as collectively meaningful.
United States v. Higgins (141 F.4th 811 (6th Cir. 2025)): emphasizes that probable cause requires only a “fair shot,” not “ironclad evidence.” The court invokes Higgins to rebut Smith’s insistence on direct proof (e.g., informant inside the unit).
United States v. Hython (443 F.3d 480 (6th Cir. 2006)): Smith relies on Hython to attack controlled buys involving third parties. The panel distinguishes Hython on staleness/temporality: Hython involved an undated controlled buy that left probable cause temporally unmoored; by contrast, the Smith affidavit’s events occurred shortly before execution.
United States v. White (990 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2021)): crucial on two points: (i) one controlled buy can suffice, and (ii) an intermediary “middleman” does not defeat probable cause. The Smith court uses White to treat intermediary purchases and surrounding surveillance as supporting a “common-sense inference” that drugs originated from the searched locations.
United States v. Christian (925 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc)): reinforces holistic review and cautions against atomizing affidavit facts. The panel’s response to Smith’s “incomplete information” argument is essentially Christian’s aggregation principle applied to a multi-source drug investigation.

4. Good-faith avoidance

United States v. Leon (468 U.S. 897 (1984)): raised by Smith to argue reliance was unreasonable because the affidavit was allegedly “so lacking in indicia of probable cause.” The court bypasses Leon because it finds probable cause on the merits.
United States v. Dyer (580 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2009)): cited for the standard move: if probable cause exists, courts need not address good faith.

B) Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three connected steps.

Start with a deferential lens. Relying on United States v. Simmons, United States v. Sanders, and United States v. Tagg, the panel characterizes probable cause as a “low bar” and stresses that reviewing courts must preserve the issuing judge’s determination if there is a “substantial basis.”
Identify “reliable evidence” linking drug activity to each location. Using United States v. Brown (2016) as the operative nexus guide, the panel treats the affidavit’s multi-source corroboration as more than enough: repeated GPS-linked travel to Elmwood and Apartment #33, key access to Apartment #33, surveillance showing brief contacts consistent with transactions, and the anonymous tip about contraband storage at Elmwood. The court rejects the premise that informants must have been inside the locations or observed contraband there; under United States v. Higgins and United States v. Tagg, officers need a “fair shot,” not certainty.
Reject atomized attacks and distinguish staleness concerns. Even acknowledging some vagueness about one controlled buy’s details, the panel applies United States v. Christian (en banc) and Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby to emphasize that probable cause is holistic. It distinguishes United States v. Hython because Smith’s affidavit was temporally anchored and not stale. And it relies on United States v. White to hold that intermediary-controlled-buy mechanics do not defeat probable cause where surrounding facts support an inference connecting supply to the premises.

C) Impact

Although “not recommended for publication,” the opinion is a clear application of the Sixth Circuit’s modern, post-United States v. Sanders approach: nexus questions in drug cases will be resolved by holistic, inference-friendly review, with strong deference to issuing judges.

Likely effects in practice:

GPS + “short-contact” surveillance becomes nexus-sufficient more often. The decision validates warrants where investigators show repeated travel to target locations and brief encounters consistent with trafficking, even without direct observation of hand-to-hand exchanges at the door.
Intermediary controlled buys are not a probable-cause “dealbreaker.” By leaning on United States v. White, the court signals that defendants cannot negate probable cause merely by pointing out middlemen, so long as the affidavit supplies contextual linkage to the premises.
Defense challenges will need to target reliability, staleness, or gaps that prevent commonsense inference. The court was unmoved by arguments focusing on what the affidavit did not contain (e.g., informant inside), rather than on what it affirmatively undermined (e.g., undated buy in United States v. Hython).

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable cause: A practical, common-sense threshold—there must be a reasonable likelihood (“fair probability”) that evidence will be found, not proof beyond doubt.
Nexus: The required link between (a) the place to be searched and (b) the evidence sought. In drug cases, the link can be circumstantial (patterns of access, travel, meetings).
Totality of the circumstances: Courts evaluate all affidavit facts together, not one-by-one in isolation.
Four corners rule: Review is limited to what is written in the affidavit; later-developed facts generally do not matter for probable cause review.
Staleness: Probable cause must be timely; undated or old information can fail to show evidence is still likely present. United States v. Hython is a staleness-centered warning about missing temporal anchors.
Controlled buy / intermediary: A monitored purchase of drugs used to corroborate trafficking. The buyer may sometimes purchase through a middleman; that does not automatically defeat probable cause if other facts connect the supply to the target premises.
Good-faith exception: Even if a warrant lacks probable cause, evidence may still be admitted if officers reasonably relied on it (United States v. Leon). Courts often avoid this question if they find probable cause outright.

5) Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Michael Smith, Jr. reinforces a pragmatic, deferential, and holistic method for evaluating whether drug-trafficking warrants establish a nexus to targeted premises. The court holds that investigators need not show drugs were seen inside the home or apartment; rather, corroborated circumstantial evidence—GPS travel patterns, repeated access, surveillance of brief meetings consistent with trafficking, tips, and controlled buys (even through intermediaries)— can collectively provide the “fair probability” required by the Fourth Amendment. In the wake of United States v. Sanders and related cases, the opinion underscores that probable cause remains a low bar, and that appellate courts will rarely disturb an issuing judge’s commonsense judgment when an affidavit is detailed and corroborated.