Hoisted Light Pole Bases as Elevation-Related Hazards:
Kelly v. RBSL Realty, LLC and the Scope of Owner and Subcontractor Liability Under New York Labor Law

1. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Second Department’s decision in Kelly v. RBSL Realty, LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 07291 (Dec. 24, 2025), refines several recurring themes in New York construction accident litigation:

• What counts as an “elevation-related” hazard under Labor Law § 240(1), particularly when a heavy object is being lowered by a crane from a point above a worker into a hole.
• How Labor Law § 241(6) summary judgment motions must be supported when Industrial Code violations are alleged.
• When a subcontractor that supplies a crane and operator can face Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence liability as a supervising “agent,” and conversely, when owners and project managers can be relieved of such claims.
• What a moving party must do to obtain summary judgment on contractual indemnification, common-law indemnification, and contribution cross-claims.

The case arises from a construction-site injury during the installation of a light pole base at a Medford, New York property. The decision both clarifies doctrinal points and offers practical guidance for litigants on how to structure (and defend against) summary judgment motions in Labor Law cases.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Parties and Project Structure

The relationships among the parties follow a common multi-tiered construction pattern:

• RBSL Realty, LLC (RBSL) – the property owner (or landlord).
• Williams Scotsman, Inc. (WS) – the lessee of the property from RBSL.
• Landtek Group, Inc. (Landtek) – the project manager hired by WS.
• Palace Electric Contractors (Palace) – the plaintiff’s employer, retained by Landtek.
• John E. Potente & Sons, Inc. (Potente) – subcontractor that supplied the concrete light pole base and the crane operator.
• John Kelly – the plaintiff, an employee of Palace, working on the project.

RBSL, Landtek, and WS are frequently treated collectively in the opinion as the “RBSL defendants.”

2.2 The Accident

In August 2014, plaintiff John Kelly was working at the Medford construction site, standing in a hole in the ground where a light pole base was to be installed. The base:

• Was a concrete light pole base weighing approximately 800–1000 pounds.
• Was being hoisted by a crane from a point above the plaintiff into the hole where the plaintiff stood.
• Was guided by the plaintiff using his hands as it descended.

According to Kelly’s deposition testimony, the base “jerked” or moved suddenly while being lowered, struck him, and caused injury.

2.3 The Lawsuit and Claims

Kelly commenced an action for personal injuries against:

• RBSL, Landtek, and WS (the “RBSL defendants”), and
• Potente.

The amended complaint asserted:

• Labor Law § 240(1) (the Scaffold Law – elevation-related safety),
• Labor Law § 241(6) (non-delegable duty to comply with specific Industrial Code provisions),
• Labor Law § 200 (codification of common-law safe workplace duty), and
• Common-law negligence.

Cross-claims were also asserted among defendants for:

• Contractual indemnification,
• Common-law indemnification, and
• Contribution.

2.4 Motions in the Supreme Court

In the Supreme Court, Suffolk County:

• The RBSL defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint and all cross‑claims against them.
• Potente moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint against it.

The Supreme Court (Bergmann, J.) denied:

• The RBSL defendants’ motion in its entirety.
• The branch of Potente’s motion seeking dismissal of the complaint.

Both the RBSL defendants and Potente appealed to the Second Department.

3. Summary of the Appellate Division’s Decision

The Second Department modified the Supreme Court’s order and otherwise affirmed. In essence:

3.1 Labor Law § 240(1)

• The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment to both the RBSL defendants and Potente on the § 240(1) cause of action.
• The defendants failed to show, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was not exposed to an elevation-related or gravity-related hazard.

3.2 Labor Law § 241(6)

• The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment to both the RBSL defendants and Potente on the § 241(6) cause of action.
• They failed to demonstrate that the alleged Industrial Code violations were inapplicable or complied with.

3.3 Labor Law § 200 & Common-Law Negligence

• As to Potente: The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment; there were triable issues of fact as to whether Potente supervised or controlled the injury-producing work.
• As to the RBSL defendants: The court reversed the Supreme Court in part and held that these defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the § 200 and common-law negligence claims. Their general right to supervise or enforce safety did not amount to the kind of control that triggers § 200 liability.

3.4 Indemnification and Contribution Cross-Claims Against the RBSL Defendants

• Contractual indemnification: Summary judgment in favor of the RBSL defendants was properly denied; they did not submit the relevant contracts and therefore failed to establish that they had no contractual indemnity obligation.
• Common-law indemnification: Summary judgment dismissing these cross-claims was also properly denied; the RBSL defendants failed to establish that they were not negligent.
• Contribution: The RBSL defendants likewise failed to show that they owed no independent duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff, so dismissal of contribution cross-claims was properly denied.

In sum, the RBSL defendants obtained dismissal of the plaintiff’s § 200 and common-law negligence claims but remain exposed under §§ 240(1), 241(6), and on indemnification and contribution cross-claims. Potente remains in the case on all theories.

4. Detailed Legal Analysis

4.1 Labor Law § 240(1): Hoisted Light Pole Base as an Elevation-Related Hazard

4.1.1 Governing Standard and Precedents

Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a non-delegable duty on owners, contractors, and their agents to provide appropriate safety devices to protect workers from elevation-related risks. The core doctrinal test is framed in the Court of Appeals’ decisions and reiterated in this opinion:

Citing Chuqui v Amna, LLC, 203 AD3d 1018, 1020, the Second Department states:

“In determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1), the single decisive question is whether plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential” (internal quotation marks omitted).

This language is drawn from the Court of Appeals’ modern line of cases:

• Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 604 – Shifted focus away from rigid “falling worker/falling object” categorizations to whether injury was the direct consequence of a gravity-related risk.
• Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 514 – Identified the “special hazards” and “physically significant elevation differentials” that trigger the statute.

The court also relies on its more recent application of this principle in:

• Laliashvili v Kadmia Tenth Ave. SPE, LLC, 221 AD3d 988, 990–991 – A case (as characterized in the opinion) where the court treated injuries arising from a heavy object being hoisted as potentially within § 240(1)’s ambit.

4.1.2 Application to the Facts of Kelly

The key factual description is that:

• The plaintiff was in a hole,
• A concrete light pole base weighing 800–1000 pounds was being hoisted by a crane,
• The base was moving from a point above the plaintiff to a point below (the bottom of the hole), and
• The base “jerked” or moved suddenly and struck him during this lowering process.

The court emphasizes that the plaintiff’s deposition testimony showed he was injured when “a heavy, cement light pole base jerked or suddenly moved and made contact with him while the light pole base was in the process of being hoisted by a crane from a point above the plaintiff to a point below.”

On summary judgment, the moving defendants (RBSL defendants and Potente) bore the burden of showing, prima facie, that the accident did not involve an elevation-related hazard within the scope of § 240(1). They did not:

• Eliminate the possibility that the heavy base’s movement was a gravity-induced hazard, or
• Show that adequate safety devices were provided (e.g., proper rigging, tag lines, bracing, or positioning of workers) to protect the worker from the risk posed by the hoisted load.

The court concludes:

“Thus, the RBSL defendants and Potente failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the plaintiff was not exposed to an elevation-related hazard or gravity-related risk encompassed by Labor Law § 240(1) (see Laliashvili …; see generally Runner …; Rocovich …).”

Because they failed to meet their initial burden, the defendants’ motions had to be denied “regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers,” invoking the familiar rule of Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853.

4.1.3 Doctrinal Significance

The case reinforces and slightly extends several points:

• Descending loads can be elevation-related hazards. Even though the light pole base was being moved to a point below the plaintiff’s position (the bottom of the hole), the court treats the process as a hoisting operation involving a gravity-related risk. This underscores that:
  • The direction (upward or downward) of movement is less important than the presence of a significant elevation differential and a gravity-driven hazard.
  • Injuries from a heavy load that “jerks” or shifts while being lowered by a crane can fall within § 240(1).
• Emphasis on the hoisting operation itself. The object need not fall freely or travel a great distance. A sudden shift or “jerk” of a heavy object in the course of hoisting/lowering can be enough, consistent with Runner.
• Strictness about the defendant’s prima facie burden. Defendants cannot simply assert that there was no elevation differential or that § 240(1) should not apply. They must affirmatively establish either:
  • No covered elevation-related risk existed, or
  • Appropriate enumerated safety devices were furnished and properly placed.

For practitioners, this decision confirms that heavy components like precast light pole bases, manhole rings, vault covers, or similar loads being lowered by cranes or hoists may present § 240(1) exposure whenever a worker is positioned below or adjacent to the descending load.

4.2 Labor Law § 241(6): Defendants’ Prima Facie Burden Regarding Industrial Code Violations

4.2.1 Legal Framework and Precedents

Labor Law § 241(6) requires owners and contractors to comply with specific, sufficiently concrete Industrial Code provisions. To support liability, a plaintiff must:

• Identify a particular Industrial Code section,
• Show that the section is “specific” (not merely a broad general safety standard), and
• Demonstrate that the section was violated and that the violation was a proximate cause of the injury.

On a defense motion for summary judgment, however, the burden is reversed. Citing Lopez v Kamco Servs., LLC, 231 AD3d 1142, 1144, and Gonzalez v City of New York, 227 AD3d 958, 960, the court recites the rule:

“To establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6), a defendant must show that the plaintiff failed to identify a section of the Industrial Code that was allegedly violated, that any such section is insufficiently specific to support liability or is inapplicable to the facts of the case, or that the defendant complied with the requirements of the identified provision” (internal quotation marks omitted).

4.2.2 Application in Kelly

The plaintiff alleged violations of certain Industrial Code provisions (not specified in detail in the slip opinion). The Second Department holds:

“Here, the RBSL defendants and Potente failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the Industrial Code violations alleged by the plaintiff were inapplicable under the circumstances (see Lopez …).”

Because the moving defendants did not adequately show that:

• The identified code sections were not implicated by the hoisting/lowering operation, or
• They had complied with those code provisions,

their motions to dismiss the § 241(6) claims could not be granted. Again, under Winegrad, once the movant fails to make a prima facie showing, the sufficiency of the nonmovant’s papers is irrelevant.

4.2.3 Practical Implications

For defense counsel, this underscores:

• You must identify each Industrial Code section invoked by the plaintiff and address it specifically.
• General arguments that “no Industrial Code violation occurred” are insufficient.
• You must produce evidence (e.g., affidavits, deposition testimony, site photos, or records) showing that:
  • the code provision does not apply to the type of work or condition in question, or
  • the provision was complied with.

For plaintiffs, the case is a reminder that once a viable, specific Industrial Code provision is pleaded, defendants face a meaningful evidentiary burden to eliminate it at the summary judgment stage.

4.3 Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence

4.3.1 General Principles

Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty of owners and contractors to provide workers with a reasonably safe place to work. As the court notes (quoting Fonck v City of New York, 198 AD3d 874, 876, and citing Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877):

“Owners and general contractors, and their agents, have a common-law duty to provide employees with a safe place to work,” and Labor Law § 200 “merely codified that duty.”

The Second Department in Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61, and again here, divides § 200 cases into two broad categories:

1. Dangerous or defective premises conditions – e.g., a hole, debris, uneven flooring.
2. Manner and means of the work – i.e., how the work is performed, including the use of equipment or methods chosen by the contractor or subcontractor.

When the case falls into the “methods or materials” category (as this case does, involving crane and hoisting operations), the rule is:

“When the methods or materials of the work are at issue, recovery against the owner or general contractor [or their agent] cannot be had … unless it is shown that the party to be charged had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work” (Kearney v Dynegy, Inc., 151 AD3d 1037, 1039 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

This supervision-and-control requirement applies not only to owners and general contractors but also to subcontractors when liability is sought against them as “agents”:

“[L]iability against a subcontractor based upon a claimed violation of Labor Law § 200 … requires a showing that authority was conferred on the subcontractor to supervise and control the activity which produced the injury” (Erickson v Cross Ready Mix, Inc., 75 AD3d 519, 523 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Van Nostrand v Race & Rally Constr. Co., Inc., 114 AD3d 664, 666–667).

4.3.2 Application to Potente (Crane Supplier)

Potente supplied both the light pole base and the crane operator. Because the injury stemmed from the actual hoisting operation, the question is whether Potente had sufficient authority to supervise or control that work.

The court holds that Potente “failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether it supervised or controlled the injury-producing work (see Cianciulli v Urban Found./Engg., LLC, 237 AD3d 891).”

This indicates that:

• Potente’s role extended beyond mere equipment rental; it provided the crane operator.
• Evidence in the record (presumably from deposition testimony) suggested that Potente may have directed or controlled the lowering of the base, including how the worker in the hole was to guide it.
• Those factual questions could not be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment.

Consequently, summary judgment dismissing the § 200 and common-law negligence claims against Potente was properly denied, again regardless of the sufficiency of plaintiff’s opposition, under Winegrad.

4.3.3 Application to the RBSL Defendants (Owner, Lessee, and Project Manager)

By contrast, the RBSL defendants obtained a significant appellate victory with respect to § 200 and common-law negligence. The Second Department states:

“The right to generally supervise the work, to stop the work if a safety violation is noted, or to ensure compliance with safety regulations does not amount to the supervision and control of the work necessary to impose liability on an owner or a general contractor pursuant to Labor Law § 200” (Gonzalez v City of New York, 227 AD3d at 959; see Murphy v 80 Pine, LLC, 208 AD3d 492, 495).

Applying that rule, the court finds:

“Here, the RBSL defendants established, prima facie, that the alleged incident arose from work performed over which they did not exercise supervision or control (see Gonzalez …; Murphy …). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.”

The opinion thus makes two key points:

• The accident fell within the “manner and means” category, not a dangerous premises condition. The hazard arose from the conduct of the crane operation.
• The RBSL defendants did not direct the crane work, did not instruct the plaintiff where or how to stand, and at most had a general oversight role. That is insufficient to trigger § 200 liability.

The Appellate Division therefore modified the order by granting that branch of the RBSL defendants’ motion which sought dismissal of the § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action against them.

Importantly, this does not absolve them of potential statutory liability under §§ 240(1) and 241(6), which impose non-delegable duties not dependent on actual supervision or control.

4.4 Indemnification and Contribution Cross-Claims Against the RBSL Defendants

4.4.1 Contractual Indemnification

Contractual indemnification arises where one party agrees by contract to indemnify another for certain losses. The principle is that:

“[T]he right to contractual indemnification depends upon the specific language of the contract,” and “[t]he promise to indemnify should not be found unless it can be clearly implied from the language and purpose of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances” (Shaughnessy v Huntington Hosp. Assn., 147 AD3d 994, 999–1000 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

A party moving to dismiss a cause of action for contractual indemnification must:

“make a prima facie showing that it was not contractually obligated to indemnify the party asserting the indemnification claim” (Crutch v 421 Kent Dev., LLC, 192 AD3d 982, 983).

In Kelly, the RBSL defendants did not submit the relevant contracts with their motion. As a result, they could not demonstrate, as a matter of law, that no indemnity obligation existed.

The court therefore held that the Supreme Court properly denied the branch of the RBSL defendants’ motion seeking dismissal of the contractual indemnification cross-claim. Once again, under Winegrad, failure to make the prima facie showing ends the inquiry.

4.4.2 Common-Law Indemnification

Common-law indemnification is an equitable right allowing a party who is only vicariously liable (without actual fault) to recover from the party actually at fault. In the construction context, a party seeking dismissal of a common-law indemnity claim against it must show:

“A party may establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing a cross-claim for common-law indemnification insofar as asserted against it arising from a workplace injury by establishing that it was not negligent and that it did not have the ability to direct, supervise, or control the work giving rise to the injury” (Keller v Rippowam Cisqua Sch., 208 AD3d 654, 655).

The Second Department found that the RBSL defendants “failed to establish, prima facie, that they were not negligent.” Accordingly, the branches of their motion seeking dismissal of the common-law indemnification cross-claims were properly denied.

There is a procedural nuance here:

• As between plaintiff and the RBSL defendants, the court found no basis for § 200 or common-law negligence direct liability because there was no supervision or control of the injury-producing work.
• However, on the cross-claims, the court held the RBSL defendants had not affirmatively established their freedom from negligence in the manner required by Keller. The difference lies in the specific evidentiary showing demanded in the context of indemnity cross-claims and the strictness of the movant’s burden.

The practical takeaway: defeating the plaintiff’s direct negligence claim does not automatically extinguish common-law indemnity cross-claims unless the moving party expressly and sufficiently demonstrates freedom from all actionable negligence and lack of control in the manner required for indemnity purposes.

4.4.3 Contribution

Contribution allows apportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors based on comparative fault. To obtain summary judgment dismissing a contribution claim:

“A party moving for summary judgment dismissing a cross-claim for contribution insofar as asserted against it must make a prima facie showing that it did not owe a duty of reasonable care independent of its contractual obligations or a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff” (Keller, 208 AD3d at 655).

The RBSL defendants “failed to make this showing,” so the court affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to contribution cross-claims. Again, failure to meet the movant’s initial burden is dispositive under Winegrad.

Practically speaking, the RBSL defendants, although shielded from direct negligence claims by the plaintiff, remain potential contributors or indemnitors for other defendants depending on:

• How the facts and statutory liabilities under §§ 240(1) and 241(6) ultimately play out at trial or in settlement, and
• What the underlying contracts reveal about allocation of risk and indemnity obligations.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 “Elevation-Related Hazard” and Labor Law § 240(1)

In plain terms, § 240(1) applies when:

• A worker is hurt because of the force of gravity, and
• There is a significant difference in height between:
  • the worker and the object, or
  • the worker’s position and the ground/another level.

The object does not have to fall a long distance; sudden movement of a heavy object being lifted or lowered can qualify, as in Kelly.

5.2 Industrial Code and Labor Law § 241(6)

The Industrial Code is a set of detailed safety rules issued by the Department of Labor. Under § 241(6):

• Owners and contractors must follow these rules on construction sites.
• A worker can sue if a specific rule is violated and that violation causes an injury.

On summary judgment, defendants must show that:

• The rule the plaintiff cites does not apply, or
• The rule was followed.

5.3 Labor Law § 200: Two Types of Cases

1. Premises condition cases – something about the property itself is unsafe (a hole, debris, faulty stair).
2. Manner and means cases – something about how work was done or how equipment was used is unsafe (e.g., improper crane operation).
   • Here, liability requires proof that the defendant actually supervised or controlled how the work was done, not merely that it had a general right to oversee the site.

5.4 “Supervision and Control” vs. “General Oversight”

A party “supervises or controls” work if it:

• Gives specific instructions about how the task is to be done,
• Decides what safety measures or equipment are used for that task, or
• Directly oversees and directs the workers’ methods.

Merely:

• Being on site,
• Having the right to stop work for safety reasons, or
• Requiring compliance with general safety regulations

is typically considered only “general oversight” – not enough for § 200 liability, as the RBSL defendants successfully argued.

5.5 Summary Judgment and “Prima Facie” Showing

Summary judgment is a way to win a case (or a part of it) without a trial if there is no genuine dispute about the key facts.

• “Prima facie showing” means the moving party must present enough evidence that, if unopposed, would entitle it to judgment as a matter of law.
• If the moving party fails to do that, the motion is denied even if the other side’s papers are weak (Winegrad rule).

5.6 Indemnification vs. Contribution

• Contractual indemnification – One party agrees in a contract to pay for the other’s losses in certain situations.
• Common-law indemnification – A judge-made rule letting a party who is only vicariously liable (not actually at fault) recover from the party who was actually at fault.
• Contribution – A way to share liability among multiple parties who each bear some fault, in proportion to their responsibility.

In Kelly, the RBSL defendants could not obtain summary judgment dismissing indemnification and contribution cross-claims because they did not adequately show:

• That no contract required them to indemnify anyone (they did not produce the contracts),
• That they were free from negligence, and
• That they owed no independent duty of care to the plaintiff.

6. Broader Impact and Practical Lessons

6.1 Elevation-Related Risks in Hoisting and Lowering Operations

Kelly reinforces for owners, contractors, and subcontractors that:

• Heavy objects being lowered into place by cranes can create § 240(1) exposure, not just traditional “falling object” scenarios where something drops from above unexpectedly.
• Workers guiding heavy loads (like light pole bases) while standing in excavations or holes are in a particularly vulnerable posture that may engage § 240(1) protections.

Practically, this suggests:

• More rigorous planning and supervision of crane and hoisting operations,
• Use of tag lines, exclusion zones, and other means to keep workers out of direct contact with suspended or partially suspended loads,
• Explicit consideration of § 240(1) risks when positioning workers inside excavations while loads are moved above them.

6.2 Subcontractor Exposure Under Labor Law § 200

The decision underscores that subcontractors who supply both equipment and operators (like Potente) can:

• Be treated as “agents” for § 200 purposes, and
• Face direct negligence exposure when they exercise supervision or control over how work is carried out.

For such subcontractors, careful delineation of roles and responsibilities in contracts and in practice is crucial; their field personnel’s conduct may be central in determining liability.

6.3 Owners, Lessees, and Project Managers: Limiting § 200 Exposure

For owners and project managers, Kelly is a reminder that:

• They can often avoid § 200 and common-law negligence liability where the injury arises solely from the methods of work chosen by contractors or subcontractors,
• As long as they do not directly control or supervise the specific injury-producing work.

However, they remain:

• Statutorily liable on a non-delegable basis under §§ 240(1) and 241(6), and
• Potentially subject to indemnification and contribution claims from co-defendants.

6.4 Summary Judgment Strategy in Labor Law Cases

The opinion is a clear cautionary tale on how not to structure a summary judgment motion:

• On § 240(1) – defendants must make a serious evidentiary showing that no elevation-related hazard was involved or that adequate protection was provided.
• On § 241(6) – they must analyze each Industrial Code section invoked; failure to do so will almost invariably doom the motion.
• On § 200 and negligence – they must clearly establish whether the case is about premises condition or means/methods, and then tailor evidence (particularly about supervision and control) accordingly.
• On indemnity and contribution – they must:
  • Produce the actual contracts for any contractual indemnity issues, and
  • Explicitly demonstrate lack of negligence and lack of duty for common-law indemnity and contribution.

Across the opinion, the Second Department repeatedly invokes Winegrad to stress that a defendant’s failure to meet its prima facie burden is fatal, regardless of the plaintiff’s opposition.

7. Conclusion

Kelly v. RBSL Realty, LLC is a detailed and instructive Second Department decision that:

• Confirms that injuries caused by a heavy, crane-lowered object that “jerks” or moves suddenly can fall within Labor Law § 240(1) as elevation-related, gravity-driven hazards, even when the object is being moved from above the worker to a point below.
• Reinforces the stringent prima facie burdens on defendants moving for summary judgment under Labor Law §§ 241(6) and 240(1), particularly regarding Industrial Code applicability and gravity-related risks.
• Clarifies that:
  • Subcontractors who furnish both equipment and operators may face § 200 and common-law negligence liability when they control the injury-producing work,
  • While owners and project managers with only general oversight (and no actual control of methods) can avoid such liability.
• Emphasizes the need for precise contractual and evidentiary support when seeking dismissal of contractual indemnification, common‑law indemnification, and contribution cross-claims.

Going forward, Kelly will likely be cited in cases involving crane and hoisting operations, descending heavy loads, subcontractor control of specific tasks, and the evidentiary sufficiency of defense summary judgment motions in New York Labor Law litigation. It serves as both a doctrinal clarification and a practical roadmap—especially for how carefully defendants must frame and support their motions if they hope to secure pretrial dismissal of Labor Law and related claims.