Hobbs v. City of Salida: § 25-12-103(11) Noise-Abatement Exemption Applies to Permittees Only When a Government/Nonprofit Uses the Property for the Event

Introduction

In Hobbs v. City of Salida, the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted the exemption in the Colorado Noise Abatement Act (“NAA”), § 25-12-103(11), which removes certain “cultural, entertainment, athletic, or patriotic” events from the NAA’s statewide maximum permissible noise levels. The dispute arose after Giant Hornet LLC d/b/a High Side! Bar and Grill (“High Side”), a for-profit bar and restaurant in the City of Salida (the “City”), hosted outdoor summer concerts and obtained “amplified sound permits” from the City administrator allowing noise above statewide limits.

Matthew K. Hobbs, a nearby resident, sued the City, the City administrator (collectively, “Salida”), and High Side, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the theory that Salida’s permitting practice unlawfully authorized exceedances of statewide noise limits, contrary to the NAA’s “no less restrictive” framework for local regulation. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to Salida and High Side, and a divided court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, narrowing the reach of the NAA exemption.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the legislature intended § 25-12-103(11) to exempt a primary entity’s “lessees, licensees, or permittees” from the NAA’s statewide noise limits only when those subordinate entities are associated with a primary entity’s own use of the property to promote, produce, or hold the qualifying event. Because High Side’s concerts occurred on property not used by the City for a statutorily authorized qualifying event, Salida lacked authority under § 25-12-103(11) to issue amplified sound permits excusing NAA violations. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals and remanded for entry of declaratory judgment in Hobbs’s favor.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Bd. of Governors of Colo. State Univ. v. Alderman, 2025 CO 9, ¶ 33, 563 P.3d 1205, 1212: cited for the standard that statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. This framed the Court’s willingness to reject both lower courts’ readings and independently determine legislative intent.
Burnett v. State Dep't of Nat. Res., 2015 CO 19, ¶ 12, 346 P.3d 1005, 1008 (quoting St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L. ex rel. Loveland, 2014 CO 33, ¶ 10, 325 P.3d 1014, 1019): used to restate the Court’s “primary task” to construe the statute as a whole and give “consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect” to all parts. This canon drove the Court’s concern that an expansive exemption would undermine the NAA’s comprehensive statewide scheme.
People ex rel. Rein v. Meagher, 2020 CO 56, ¶ 22, 465 P.3d 554, 559–60: cited for core textual limits—courts do not add or subtract words, avoid rendering terms superfluous, and apply clear language as written. This became pivotal when the Court rejected interpretations that would make “licensees” redundant with “permittees” or detach the phrase from its “use of property” context.
Godinez v. Williams, 2024 CO 14, ¶ 20, 544 P.3d 1233, 1237 (quoting McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d 379, 389): invoked for the rule that once ambiguity exists, courts may consider consequences, statutory purpose, and legislative history (as reflected in § 2-4-203). This supplied the methodological bridge from grammar-based debate to purpose/history-based resolution.
Kulmann v. Salazar, 2022 CO 58, ¶¶ 32–33, 521 P.3d 649, 655: cited for the common understanding that “or” is generally disjunctive, informing the Court’s breakdown of the exemption’s grammatical structure and why the text plausibly supports more than one reading.
Freed v. Bonfire Ent. LLC, 2024 COA 65, ¶¶ 29 n.2, 38–40, 43, 47, 49, 53, 556 P.3d 817, 824 n.2, 826–28: heavily relied on for (i) decibel-context background, (ii) competing structural readings of § 25-12-103(11), and (iii) the “swallow the rule” concern. Although a court of appeals decision, it supplied analytical scaffolding the Supreme Court endorsed.
People v. Lovato, 2014 COA 113, ¶ 24, 357 P.3d 212, 221: cited for the grammatical principle that an adjective (or modifier) before a series presumptively modifies each noun in the series absent contrary indicators—supporting the Court’s conclusion that “use of property by” modifies more than “this state.”
City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988): used to justify consulting the title of the 1987 bill adding subsection (11) once ambiguity was found. The title’s focus on “Property Used by Not for Profit Entities for Public Events” supported a narrower exemption tied to property use by governmental/nonprofit actors.
Coloradans for a Better Future v. Campaign Integrity Watchdog, 2018 CO 6, ¶ 37, 409 P.3d 350, 356 (quoting Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977)): cited for the interpretive principle that words in a list should be given related meaning. This supported reading “lessees, licensees, or permittees” in a property/land-use sense because the statute addresses “use of property.”

Legal Reasoning

Textual ambiguity identified (not assumed away). The Court first rejected both sides’ insistence that the text was unambiguous. Because the exemption’s structure (two uses of “or,” commas, and the possessive “their”) could reasonably be read either to (a) create multiple independent exempt “entities,” or (b) make “lessees, licensees, or permittees” dependent on a primary entity’s qualifying use of property, the Court found ambiguity and moved to interpretive aids permitted by § 2-4-203.
Statutory purpose and scheme: an expansive reading would “swallow the rule.” The NAA declares “noise” a major source of environmental pollution and makes violations of statewide limits a public nuisance, while preserving only more restrictive local regulation. The Court emphasized the NAA’s comprehensive architecture (measurement rules, multiple targeted exemptions, enforcement mechanisms, and carefully drawn preemption/non-preemption provisions). In that context, reading subsection (11) to allow essentially any for-profit venue to exceed statewide limits on private property by obtaining a city-issued “permit” would dramatically expand the exemption and undercut the NAA’s statewide baseline.
Legislative history: the 1987 amendment targeted open-air public events on governmental/nonprofit property. The Court found the bill title and legislative discussions consistently framed the exemption as protecting open-air concerts and similar events on state, city/county, or nonprofit facilities (e.g., Washington Park, state fairgrounds, Folsom Field). The record did not indicate an intent to create a broad pathway for private, for-profit actors to evade statewide noise standards for events on purely private property.
Contextual meaning of “lessees, licensees, or permittees”: property-law sense, not any “official permission.” Because subsection (11) concerns “use of property,” the Court inferred that “lessees, licensees, or permittees” refer to entities holding a property-based relationship to the primary entity’s use of the premises (i.e., standing in the shoes of, or acting in conjunction with, the primary entity’s use). The Court rejected a reading that would treat “licensee” as anyone holding any license from government (absurd breadth) or treat “licensee” as merely duplicating “permittee” (surplusage).
Application to High Side: no City “use of property” for a qualifying event. High Side’s concerts were not held on property used by the City for a qualifying event. The City’s issuance of amplified sound permits and its zoning preferences did not constitute “use” of the property. Therefore, the statutory exemption did not authorize Salida to excuse exceedances of statewide noise limits through the challenged permits.

Impact

Constrains municipal “noise permit” programs that function as waivers of statewide limits for private venues. Cities cannot rely on § 25-12-103(11) to insulate private, for-profit entities hosting concerts on private property from NAA enforcement merely because the city issued a local permit.
Reinforces statewide baseline noise standards and the NAA’s private enforcement mechanism. Residents retain meaningful ability to challenge exceedances as public nuisances under the NAA when the event is not tied to a governmental/nonprofit entity’s qualifying use of the property.
Clarifies exemption scope for mixed public-private events. The decision strongly suggests the exemption can cover private operators only when their relationship to the event is property-based and connected to the primary entity’s own qualifying use of the premises (e.g., a private promoter operating a concert at a city-owned park or university stadium under a lease, license, or permit integral to that public entity’s event use).
Guidance for future statutory interpretation disputes. The opinion models a disciplined sequence: acknowledge ambiguity; then use statutory purpose, structure, legislative history, and consequence avoidance to select the interpretation that best harmonizes the scheme.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Statewide standards” vs. local ordinances: The NAA sets statewide maximum noise levels. Local governments generally may adopt rules that are more restrictive, but they cannot create local permissions that effectively allow what the statewide statute forbids—unless a statutory exemption applies.
“Public nuisance” and “private right of action”: A “public nuisance” is conduct the legislature deems harmful to the community. The NAA allows residents to sue to enforce the statewide noise limits (not just government prosecutors).
What “ambiguity” means here: The exemption’s grammar permits two reasonable readings: (1) permittees are independently exempt; or (2) permittees are exempt only when tied to a primary entity’s qualifying use of the property. When both readings are reasonable, courts consult purpose and history.
Why “lessees, licensees, or permittees” were read as property-based: Because the statute is about “use of property,” the listed relationships are read as ways someone can be authorized to occupy or use property (lease, license, permit) in connection with the primary entity’s use—rather than any generalized governmental permission to do an activity.
db(A) and why small numeric changes can matter: “db(A)” is a standardized decibel scale used to measure sound. The Court noted that decibel increases are not linear; even a few decibels can represent a significant increase in sound level, underscoring why statutory limits and exemptions matter in practice.

Conclusion

Hobbs v. City of Salida establishes a clear limiting rule: the NAA’s § 25-12-103(11) exemption does not authorize a city to excuse private, for-profit noise exceedances on private property simply by issuing a local permit. Instead, “lessees, licensees, or permittees” are exempt only when their property use is associated with a qualifying event conducted through a primary entity’s own “use of property” (the state, a political subdivision, or a nonprofit). The decision preserves the NAA’s statewide baseline, prevents an exemption from “swallowing the rule,” and meaningfully strengthens residents’ ability to enforce noise protections where local permitting practices conflict with statewide standards.