Hobbs Act Robbery as a § 924(c) Crime of Violence and COA Requirement for § 2255 Resentencing Challenges

Introduction

United States v. Curtis Solomon, No. 22-11488 (11th Cir. May 15, 2025), addresses two discrete but important questions arising after a long collateral litigation over § 924(c) convictions. Curtis Solomon, Jamaur Lewis and Devon Chance were originally convicted in 2008 of Hobbs Act conspiracy and robbery, and of carrying a firearm during those “crimes of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After collateral review in light of Johnson v. United States (2015) and Davis v. United States (2019), each appellant’s § 924(o) count predicated on Hobbs Act conspiracy was vacated. The district court then reentered amended judgments omitting the vacated counts but imposed the very same sentences on all remaining counts without explanation. On appeal the defendants raised two issues: (1) whether the district court erred by declining to conduct a de novo resentencing (and by failing to explain that decision) in the § 2255 collateral proceeding; and (2) whether completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a § 924(c) crime of violence after the Supreme Court’s Taylor v. United States (2022) decision.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit held that:

1. It lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appellants’ challenge to the district court’s failure to explain why it refused a de novo resentencing, because such a challenge is an “aspect” of the § 2255 collateral proceeding and requires a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B).
2. Completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a categorical “crime of violence” under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A), notwithstanding Taylor’s holding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not. The Court relied on its binding precedent—In re Saint Fleur (2016), In re Colon (2016) and United States v. Wiley (2023)—and reaffirmed that Hobbs Act robbery “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force” and thus qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A). Taylor’s abrogation of United States v. St. Hubert (2018) did not disturb the settled rule as to the completed offense.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015): Held that the ACCA residual clause is void for vagueness and announced its retroactive application on collateral review in Welch v. United States (2016).
• Davis v. United States, 588 U.S. 445 (2019): Extended Johnson’s vagueness holding to § 924(c)’s residual clause, invalidating convictions predicated on statutes lacking an elements clause predicate.
• Taylor v. United States, 596 U.S. 845 (2022): Determined that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a crime of violence because its “substantial step” element does not necessarily require proof of force.
• In re Saint Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016): Held that completed Hobbs Act robbery is a § 924(c) crime of violence under the elements clause.
• In re Colon, 826 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2016): Reaffirmed that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery necessarily entails force and qualifies as crime of violence.
• United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th 1355 (11th Cir. 2023): Post-Taylor, reaffirmed that completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a crime of violence and that Taylor did not disturb Saint Fleur.
• United States v. Cody, 998 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2021): Held that an appeal from a § 2255 proceeding requires a certificate of appealability for challenges rooted in the choice of collateral remedies.
• United States v. Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789 (11th Cir. 2015): Refused to create a “lurking argument” exception to the prior‐panel‐precedent rule.

Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdictional Bar to Resentencing Challenge
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B), any appeal “from the final order in a proceeding under section 2255” requires a certificate of appealability as to the specific issue presented. In United States v. Cody (2021), the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court’s selection of a collateral remedy—such as refusing a de novo resentencing under § 2255(b)—is itself an aspect of the § 2255 proceeding and cannot be challenged on direct appeal absent a COA. Because no COA was ever issued as to the appellants’ complaints about the district court’s refusal to resentence them de novo (or its failure to explain that refusal), the Court dismissed that portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

2. Hobbs Act Robbery as a § 924(c) Crime of Violence After Taylor
Section 924(c)(3)(A) defines a “crime of violence” as a felony having “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” The Hobbs Act robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)–(b), punishes the taking of personal property from a person “against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury,” and thus plainly has a force element. In Taylor (2022), the Supreme Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a categorical crime of violence because its “substantial step” prong does not itself require proof of force. Importantly, Taylor did not address the completed robbery offense.

Under the binding prior-panel-precedent rule, this Court cannot overrule its published decisions unless en banc or the Supreme Court has done so “clearly and directly.” See Archer v. Delo, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008). Wiley (2023) reaffirmed that Taylor’s logic is limited to the attempt offense and that completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). Because Wiley was decided after the parties’ briefs in Solomon, and because it controls here, the Court held that Hobbs Act robbery continues to qualify categorically as a crime of violence despite Taylor.

Potential Impact

• Defendants will remain unable to challenge § 924(c) counts predicated on completed Hobbs Act robbery under Taylor’s reasoning—which reaches only attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Practitioners and lower courts must continue to recognize Hobbs Act robbery as a valid § 924(c) predicate unless and until the Supreme Court or this Court en banc says otherwise.

• Appeals of district court decisions denying de novo resentencings on § 2255 motions are subject to the COA requirement as to any challenge rooted in the district court’s choice of statutory remedy. Litigants must secure a COA before raising the absence of an explanation for a denied de novo resentencing on appeal.

• The decision underscores the Eleventh Circuit’s rigorous application of its prior‐panel‐precedent rule and its unwillingness to entertain “lurking arguments” not squarely raised before or decided by prior panels.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Certificate of Appealability (COA): A gatekeeping device in collateral § 2255 proceedings. You need a COA to challenge legal rulings arising within a § 2255 case on appeal—but not to challenge the new criminal judgment itself.
• Categorical Approach: When § 924(c) refers to a “crime of violence,” courts look only to the statutory elements of the offense, not the particular facts of the defendant’s conduct.
• Elements Clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A)): Defines “crime of violence” as requiring as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against another.” This is distinct from the now-void “residual clause.”
• Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule: One panel of a circuit cannot overrule the published decision of another panel unless overruled by the full court (en banc) or the Supreme Court.
• Hobbs Act Robbery vs. Attempt:
  • Robbery: Taking property by force or threat of force is a crime of violence.
  • Attempted Robbery: Requires only an intent plus a substantial step; no categorical force element—thus not a crime of violence after Taylor.

Conclusion

United States v. Solomon reaffirms two foundational principles in Eleventh Circuit practice. First, any direct appeal from a § 2255 collateral proceeding that challenges the district court’s choice of remedy—such as denying de novo resentencing—cannot proceed unless a certificate of appealability is obtained. Second, completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a categorical “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) even after Taylor’s holding on attempted robbery, binding lower courts and litigants under the prior-panel‐precedent rule. Together, these holdings underscore the Eleventh Circuit’s strict jurisdictional rules for collateral appeals and its fidelity to existing precedent on crime‐of‐violence definitions.