Historical‐Tradition Standard Upholds Felon-in-Possession Prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

Introduction

United States v. Betancourt, 24-20070 (5th Cir. June 4, 2025), presents an appeal by Joseph Lee Betancourt from his conviction under the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After deputies responded to a domestic disturbance at Betancourt’s Texas home—where he allegedly brandished a firearm at a family member holding a one-year-old—and discovered two interstate-manufactured guns, ammunition, and body armor in his safe, a grand jury charged him with two counts of felon-in-possession. Betancourt moved to dismiss, asserting that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. The district court denied relief; Betancourt pleaded guilty (reserving this issue) and appealed. The Fifth Circuit, applying the Supreme Court’s Bruen framework, affirmed the conviction.

Summary of the Judgment

The court reaffirmed that Section 922(g)(1) does not offend the Second Amendment when applied to a felon who has committed a violent predicate offense.
Betancourt’s facial challenge to the statute was foreclosed by prior Fifth Circuit precedent (United States v. Diaz).
His as-applied challenge failed under Bruen’s two-step test:
1. The plain text of the Second Amendment covers firearm possession.
2. The historical tradition of disarming felons is sufficiently analogous to § 922(g)(1).
The panel concluded that aggravated assault by reckless high-speed driving placed public safety at risk, fitting within the Founding-era tradition of disarming violent wrongdoers.
Judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms and identified felon-disarmament laws as “presumptively lawful.”
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Established the two-step framework for Second Amendment challenges:
1. Determine if the conduct falls within the Amendment’s plain text.
2. If so, the government must show the regulation aligns with the nation’s historical tradition.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Applied Bruen and reaffirmed that prohibitions on felons possessing firearms are “presumptively lawful.” Introduced the principle that exact historical “twins” are not required—reasonable analogy to founding-era practices suffices.
United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024): Held that § 922(g)(1) survives facial and as-applied challenges; established that Founding-era analogues for disarming felons exist.
United States v. Schnur, 132 F.4th 863 (5th Cir. 2025): Rejected an as-applied challenge under § 922(g)(1) where the predicate offense did not involve a firearm but nonetheless endangered public safety.
United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024): Similar application of Bruen to uphold § 922(g)(1) against as-applied challenges.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied Bruen’s framework de novo:

Plain Text Inquiry: The Second Amendment’s text protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.” Betancourt’s challenge conceded this step, as he admitted the Amendment covers firearm possession generally.
Historical Tradition Inquiry: The government must demonstrate that disarming felons is consistent with the nation’s longstanding tradition of firearm regulation. The court found:
- Founding-era statutes imposed severe punishments (forfeiture of property, death, or permanent disarmament) for violent crimes or affrays (“going armed”).
- These laws targeted individuals deemed dangerous or “quarrelsome,” akin to modern felon-in-possession prohibitions.
- In Betancourt’s case, his aggravated assaults stemming from reckless high-speed driving created a credible threat to public safety.
- Following Rahimi, the court emphasized that perfect historical analogues are not required—reasonably analogous traditions sufficed to uphold § 922(g)(1).

Because these historical precedents were “relevantly similar” to the modern statute, Betancourt’s as-applied challenge failed.

Impact

United States v. Betancourt reinforces the Fifth Circuit’s post-Bruen jurisprudence by:

Confirming that § 922(g)(1) continues to withstand both facial and as-applied Second Amendment attacks.
Clarifying that a defendant’s non-firearm violent predicate offense can support disarmament under historical-tradition analysis.
Emphasizing that modern courts need not identify “dead ringer” laws at the founding—analogous traditions suffice.
Providing guidance for future challenges to other § 922(g) categories by illustrating the interaction between Bruen, Rahimi, and circuit precedent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): A federal law making it unlawful for anyone convicted of a felony to possess a firearm or ammunition that has moved in interstate commerce.
Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge:
- Facial Challenge: Argues the law is unconstitutional in all its applications (e.g., Diaz foreclosed § 922(g)(1) facial attacks).
- As-Applied Challenge: Contends the law is unconstitutional as applied to a particular person with specific facts (Betancourt’s approach here).
Bruen Two-Step Test:
1. Does the Second Amendment’s plain text cover the conduct?
2. If yes, is the regulation consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation?
Historical Analogues: Laws from the Founding Era that disarmed or punished violent individuals—e.g., statutes confiscating weapons from those involved in affrays or outlawing “going armed.” Perfect matches are unnecessary if the modern regulation aligns with the same underlying principles.

Conclusion

United States v. Betancourt reaffirms that the federal prohibition on firearm possession by felons under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is consistent with the Second Amendment. By applying Bruen’s text-and-history test, the Fifth Circuit held that disarming individuals convicted of violent crimes aligns with a long-standing tradition of protecting public safety. This decision solidifies the principle that modern disarmament of dangerous felons draws its legitimacy from analogous Founding-era regulations, ensuring that § 922(g)(1) remains a “presumptively lawful” exercise of Congress’s power to regulate firearms.