Historical Tradition as the Litmus Test: Affirming Firearm Restrictions in Drug Trafficking Cases: 6th Cir.

Introduction

This commentary provides an in-depth analysis of the recent decision in United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymon Doug Risner, Defendant-Appellant, rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on February 21, 2025. The case involves significant constitutional questions regarding the application of firearm-related statutes in the context of drug trafficking offenses. Defendant Risner challenged the constitutionality of two federal statutes—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense)—arguing that these violate his Second Amendment rights, invoking the framework articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. This decision not only reinforces the historical inquiry into Second Amendment challenges but also establishes a clear precedent regarding the limited scope of firearm rights when the conduct in question is statutorily and traditionally regulated.

The key parties include the United States as the Plaintiff-Appellee and Raymon Doug Risner as the Defendant-Appellant. Risner, having pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possessing a firearm related to a drug trafficking offense, sought to contest the constitutional validity of the challenged statutes on a facial (as opposed to as-applied) basis, arguing that no circumstance would ever render them valid.

Summary of the Judgment

In its opinion, Circuit Judge Davis—with concurrences from Judges Thapar and Nalbandian—held that Risner’s facial challenges to both firearm statutes failed. The court reaffirmed that in order for a facial challenge to succeed, it must be demonstrated that no set of circumstances exists in which the challenged statutes could be valid. The court found:

For 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): Risner lacked Article III standing since, with the dismissal of the charge under his plea agreement, no genuine personal stake remained. Consequently, his challenge to this provision was moot.
For 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A): The court observed that this statute, which prohibits employing a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime, was consistent with the Nation’s historical firearm regulations. The court underscored that the regulation is aimed at unlawful conduct, a circumstance historically excluded from Second Amendment protection, and hence affirmed its constitutionality.

Overall, the decision concluded with an affirmation of the district court’s ruling, reinforcing the principle that firearms restrictions targeting unlawful conduct—especially in the milieu of drug-related criminality—are rooted in longstanding historical tradition and thus permissible under the Second Amendment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Judgment draws heavily on several precedents including:

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): This case is foundational for modern Second Amendment jurisprudence, establishing the framework that any firearm regulation must be consistent with the Nation's historical tradition. The court in Risner’s case used Bruen to scrutinize the challenged statutes and decide that the historical understanding of firearm regulation does not extend to armed conduct when used to further unlawful activities.
United States v. Loney, 331 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2003): Cited for the de novo review standard in criminal appeals, this case underpins the appellate methodology used when evaluating constitutional challenges.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Employed to highlight the heavy burden on defendants mounting a facial challenge, where the defendant must show that the statute fails under all possible circumstances.
United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012): Provided a historical analytical framework that was later refined by Bruen. The Greeno decision emphasized that constitutional protection under the Second Amendment does not extend to unlawful use of firearms, especially where historical tradition supports government disarmament of criminals.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s legal reasoning unfolded in two major parts:

Standing and Scope of Plaintiff’s Challenge: The court meticulously addressed the issue of standing, particularly for Risner’s challenge of § 922(g)(1). Based on established precedents such as Bergrin and Pettrey, the court concluded that the dismissal of the charge removed any personal stake that Risner might have had, thereby negating his Article III standing to challenge the statute. This approach underscores the principle that a defendant’s ability to contest a statute is directly related to the collateral consequences that flow from the conviction—consequences which, in this case, were absent.
Historical Analysis under the Second Amendment: In evaluating § 924(c)(1)(A), the court employed the historical inquiry mandated by Bruen. Rather than focusing solely on the recency of the statute’s enactment, the court compared the challenged regulation to historical practices that barred the possession and use of firearms by those engaged in criminal activity. Risner’s contention that the statute's limited historical depth undermined its constitutionality was rejected on the basis that historical regulation, dating back to common law and early statutory practices, has long permitted the disarmament of dangerous individuals. The reasoning integrates comparative historical metrics, analogies with past laws, and an analysis of the government's compelling interest in preventing the misuse of firearms in the commission of violent or drug-related crimes.

Impact on Future Cases and the Legal Landscape

The decision is significant in that it:

Reinforces the application of a historical lens in Second Amendment challenges, thereby limiting scope for defendants seeking to expand firearm rights to cover unlawful behavior.
Establishes that even facial challenges must meet the extremely rigorous standard of showing no circumstance under which the statute could be valid, placing a high burden on appellants.
Clarifies that a defendant’s ability to contest constitutional challenges in the context of plea agreements and dismissed charges is circumscribed by the need to have a personal stake in the outcome—a principle that will likely guide future challenges to firearm regulations.

This precedent is poised to influence future appellate decisions, particularly in cases where constitutional challenges to criminal statutes hinge on historical analyses. It may also impact legislative debates on firearm regulation by underscoring the constitutional deference given to laws that have historical analogs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several complex legal concepts appear in the judgment, including:

Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges: A facial challenge argues that a law is unconstitutional in all of its applications, whereas an as-applied challenge asserts that the law is unconstitutional as it applies to the defendant’s particular circumstances. Risner’s appeal was limited to a facial challenge based on the waiver in his plea agreement.
Historical Tradition in Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Courts now assess whether a firearm regulation is consistent with historical legal traditions, focusing on whether there exists a historical analog that supports the government’s restriction. This method requires a comparative analysis of past laws and traditions to judge contemporary regulations.
Standing: Standing is a constitutional requirement ensuring that a party engaging in litigation has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome. Here, the dismissal of certain charges meant that Risner could not demonstrate such a stake with respect to the challenged provision.

Conclusion

In summary, the decision in United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymon Doug Risner underscores a robust defense of historical tradition as a guiding metric for Second Amendment analysis. The court’s opinion makes clear that when a firearm-related statute targets inherently unlawful conduct—as in the context of drug trafficking—the challenge must overcome stringent hurdles, including demonstrating that no factual scenario would ever render the statute valid.

This judgment reinforces the precedent that historical legal practices and constitutional interpretation remain imperative in evaluating modern firearm restrictions. It highlights the necessity for litigants to have a tangible personal stake in the proceedings and confirms that historical analogs will continue to provide the framework for adjudicating Second Amendment claims. Ultimately, the decision buttresses the authority of the federal government to disarm individuals involved in dangerous criminal activity, aligning modern statutory regulation with the long-standing tradition of public safety.

Historical Tradition as the Litmus Test: Affirming Firearm Restrictions in Drug Trafficking Cases