Historical Fact-Finding on § 924(c) “Crime of Violence” Clauses Under AEDPA Gatekeeping: Commentary on Barnes v. United States (2d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

In Barnes v. United States, No. 24-830 (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a federal prisoner’s successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The decision sits at the intersection of three powerful forces in modern federal criminal law:

the narrowing of “crime of violence” predicates in § 924(c) after United States v. Davis (2019) and United States v. Taylor (2022);
the strict gatekeeping regime for “second or successive” collateral attacks under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA); and
the Second Circuit’s own framework, developed in the Savoca decisions, for determining whether a prior conviction or sentence rested on a now-invalid “residual clause” or on a still-valid “elements clause.”

The petitioner, Calieb Barnes, had been convicted in 2012 of, among other counts, (1) attempted Hobbs Act robbery (Count Four) and (2) brandishing a firearm in furtherance of that attempted robbery, in violation of § 924(c) (Count Five). After Davis struck down § 924(c)’s residual clause and Taylor held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s elements clause, Barnes sought to vacate his § 924(c) Count Five conviction via a successive § 2255 motion.

The core issue before the Second Circuit was not whether Barnes would be guilty if tried today—he plainly would not be under Taylor—but whether his successive § 2255 claim “relie[d] on a new rule of constitutional law” within the meaning of § 2255(h)(2), such that AEDPA would even allow the courts to entertain the claim. That question turned, in turn, on a factual determination: as a historical matter, was Barnes’s 2012 § 924(c) conviction based on the now-invalid residual clause, or on the still-valid elements clause?

The Second Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the Savoca framework to the trial record and did not clearly err in finding that the conviction rested on § 924(c)’s elements clause. Because a Taylor-type error is purely statutory, not constitutional, Barnes’s claim did not meet AEDPA’s threshold requirement for successive motions. The court therefore affirmed the denial of relief.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

Petitioner-Appellant: Calieb Barnes, convicted in 2012 in the Southern District of New York on multiple narcotics, robbery, firearms, and murder-related counts, including two § 924(c) counts (Counts Five and Seven).
Respondent-Appellee: United States of America.
Panel: Circuit Judges Kearse, Leval, and Sullivan (opinion by Sullivan, J.).
Appeal from: Order of Judge Denise Cote (S.D.N.Y.) denying Barnes’s second § 2255 motion.

B. Substantive Background

The convictions relevant to the appeal:

Count Four: Attempted Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, based on a June 2006 incident where Barnes and associates attempted to rob a local drug dealer of kilograms of cocaine, during which Barnes pistol-whipped the dealer.
Count Five: Brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence”—specifically the attempted Hobbs Act robbery in Count Four—in violation of § 924(c).
Count Six: Murder while engaged in a narcotics conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), based on a 2010 shooting of a former associate over drug territory.
Count Seven: Using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, predicated on the Count Six murder, in violation of § 924(c).

Barnes previously filed:

a first § 2255 motion (ineffective assistance claims) denied in 2016; and
a second § 2255 motion, grounded in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (“2015 Johnson”), later supplemented by Davis (2019) and then affected by Taylor (2022).

The Second Circuit had earlier granted Barnes leave to file a successive § 2255 motion on a prima facie showing that his Count Five § 924(c) conviction predicated on attempted Hobbs Act robbery “is no longer valid after [2015] Johnson and Davis.” On remand, after Taylor held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s elements clause, the district court denied the motion, concluding that Barnes had failed to demonstrate that his claim relied on a new rule of constitutional law as required by AEDPA.

C. Holdings

Count Five (§ 924(c) predicated on attempted Hobbs Act robbery): The district court properly applied the Savoca framework and did not clearly err in finding that Barnes’s § 924(c) conviction was based on the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A), not the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B).
- Because Taylor is a statutory interpretation decision, not a constitutional one, a Taylor-based claim alone cannot satisfy § 2255(h)(2).
- Because the conviction did not rest on the residual clause, Barnes was not “sentenced in violation” of the new constitutional rule announced in Davis.
- Consequently, his second § 2255 motion did not rely on a new rule of constitutional law and was barred by AEDPA’s gatekeeping provisions.
Count Seven (§ 924(c) predicated on § 848(e)(1)(A) murder in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy): The court rejected Barnes’s attempt to vacate Count Seven, noting that his argument is foreclosed by Second Circuit precedent holding that intentional killing under § 848(e)(1)(A) is categorically a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s elements clause, see United States v. Pastore, 83 F.4th 113 (2d Cir. 2023), aff’d sub nom. Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. 423 (2025).

The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the order of the district court in full.

III. Precedents and Doctrinal Background

A. Section 924(c): Elements Clause vs. Residual Clause

Section 924(c)(1)(A) imposes mandatory consecutive sentences on anyone who uses or carries a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence” (or drug trafficking crime). It defines “crime of violence” in two ways:

Elements clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A)): a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.”
Residual clause (§ 924(c)(3)(B)): a felony that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”

Under the “categorical approach” (discussed in more detail below), courts ordinarily decide whether an offense qualifies under these clauses by examining the elements of the offense in the abstract, not the defendant’s particular conduct.

B. The Johnson–Davis Line: Constitutional Invalidation of Residual Clauses

2015 Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015)
The Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), which covered offenses involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” was unconstitutionally vague. This was a constitutional ruling under the Due Process Clause.
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019)
Applying similar reasoning, the Court struck down § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Davis thus announced a new, substantive rule of constitutional law, later held to be retroactive on collateral review by lower courts, including the Second Circuit.

C. The Taylor Line: Statutory Narrowing of “Crime of Violence” Under the Elements Clause

In United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), the Supreme Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. The Court reasoned that an attempt conviction can rest on an “incomplete” crime where no actual or threatened use of force occurs, and thus the offense does not “have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” as required by the elements clause.

Crucially, Taylor is a statutory interpretation decision. It clarifies the meaning and reach of § 924(c)(3)(A); it does not rest on any constitutional doctrine such as due process vagueness. Consequently, for AEDPA purposes, it is not a “new rule of constitutional law.”

D. AEDPA and Successive § 2255 Motions

AEDPA severely limits “second or successive” § 2255 motions. A federal prisoner who has already filed one § 2255 motion cannot file another unless, as relevant here, the motion contains a claim that:

“relies on a new rule of constitutional law,”
“made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,” and
“that was previously unavailable.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A).

The process has two levels:

Circuit-level gatekeeping: The court of appeals decides whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the claim meets § 2255(h)’s requirements, and, if so, authorizes filing in the district court.
District court merits gatekeeping: Once authorized, the district court must conduct a “searching inquiry” and must dismiss the claim if, in fact, the petitioner cannot show that the claim satisfies AEDPA’s criteria. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4); Massey v. United States, 895 F.3d 248, 251 (2d Cir. 2018).

A prior grant of authorization by the Second Circuit is not a determination that AEDPA’s requirements are actually satisfied; it only opens the door for the district court to make that final determination.

E. The Savoca Decisions: Historical Fact-Finding About Clauses

The Second Circuit’s analysis in Barnes relies heavily on its earlier decisions in Savoca v. United States:

Savoca I, 21 F.4th 225 (2d Cir. 2021)
The court addressed whether a sentencing enhancement under ACCA rested on its enumerated/force clause or on its residual clause. It emphasized that determining which clause a sentencing court actually used is a “fact-specific” historical inquiry, reviewed for clear error. The court outlined a method for examining the record—including sentencing transcripts, PSRs, and relevant legal context at the time.
Savoca II, No. 20-1502, 2022 WL 17256392 (2d Cir. Nov. 29, 2022) (summary order)
After Taylor, the Second Circuit revisited Savoca I and clarified the framework for § 924(c) cases: a district court must:
- First, conduct a factual inquiry into whether the conviction was based on the elements clause or residual clause; if the record clearly shows this, the analysis ends there.
- Second, if the record is unclear, consider background legal conditions at the time of conviction to infer which clause the district court likely used.
- Third, only if the record remains inconclusive, confront the burden-of-proof and legal consequences issue (on which there is a circuit split, and which the Second Circuit again reserved in Barnes).

F. Massey and Mata: What It Means for a Claim to “Rely On” a New Rule

Two Second Circuit decisions are central to the Barnes court’s view of AEDPA:

Massey v. United States, 895 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 2018)
The petitioner argued that his ACCA-enhanced sentence was wrong under a statutory interpretation decision (Johnson 2010) and tried to invoke the later constitutional decision (Johnson 2015) to satisfy § 2255(h)(2). The Second Circuit held that a claim “relies on” a new constitutional rule only if the petitioner was actually sentenced in violation of that constitutional rule, i.e., under the invalid clause. A purely statutory claim cannot be “bootstrapped” to a constitutional decision to avoid AEDPA’s bar.
Mata v. United States, 969 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2020)
The court held that Rehaif v. United States, which interpreted the felon-in-possession statute, announced a rule of statutory interpretation, not constitutional law, and thus could not support a successive § 2255 motion under § 2255(h)(2).

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Barnes

A. Framing the AEDPA Question

Everyone agreed that, after Taylor, attempted Hobbs Act robbery cannot serve as a § 924(c) predicate under the elements clause. If Barnes were tried today on the same facts, Count Five would be legally invalid.

But AEDPA asks a different question in the successive-motion context: does the prisoner’s claim “rel[y] on a new rule of constitutional law” that is retroactive and previously unavailable? For Barnes, that meant:

Davis is a qualifying constitutional rule (residual clause invalidated as vague);
Taylor is a non-qualifying statutory rule (elements clause interpreted narrowly);
The key is whether Barnes’s § 924(c) conviction actually rested on the residual clause (implicating Davis) or only on the elements clause (implicating only Taylor).

Under Massey, a claim “relies on” a constitutional rule only if the prisoner was actually sentenced in violation of that rule. Thus, if the sentencing court used only the elements clause, Barnes’s claim is a Taylor-based, purely statutory claim, which cannot meet § 2255(h)(2) even if Davis would have been relevant had the residual clause been used.

B. Rejecting Barnes’s “Bootstrapping” Argument

Barnes argued that his claim “relied” at least partly on Davis because:

before Davis, even if the elements clause were misapplied (as Taylor later held), any error would have been harmless, since the conviction could still be upheld under the residual clause;
only after Davis invalidated the residual clause did the elements-clause error become outcome-determinative; thus, Davis was “necessary” to his success.

The Second Circuit—tracking Massey—rejected this reasoning. The relevant inquiry is not whether Davis is logically helpful in undermining the conviction but whether the conviction was actually imposed under the unconstitutional residual clause:

“[A] defendant’s ‘claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law only if he was sentenced in violation of that new constitutional rule.’” (quoting Massey, 895 F.3d at 252).

Since a claim “solely relies” on a statutory decision like Taylor if the conviction was based on the elements clause, it “cannot be bootstrapped” to Davis merely because Davis eliminates a hypothetical alternative basis for the conviction.

C. Applying the Savoca Framework: Historical Fact-Finding

Under Savoca I and Savoca II, the district court had to engage in a three-step framework:

Step One: Examine the “trial court record” to see whether it shows, as a historical fact, that the conviction was based on the elements clause or residual clause.
Step Two: If the record is unclear, consult “background legal conditions” at the time of conviction to infer which clause the sentencing court likely used.
Step Three: If still inconclusive, determine what to do with an unclear record (including which party bears the burden), an issue on which there is a circuit split and which the Second Circuit again reserved.

The Second Circuit emphasized that this inquiry is “manifestly a fact-specific undertaking” and hence reviewed under the deferential “clear error” standard: the appellate court will reverse only if left with the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

D. Why the Record Showed Elements-Clause Reliance

The district court, whose analysis the Second Circuit endorsed, reviewed multiple aspects of the trial record:

1. The Nature of the Offense Conduct

The government’s evidence about the June 2006 attempted robbery showed:

Barnes and associates attempted to rob a drug dealer of kilograms of cocaine.
During the attempt, Barnes repeatedly struck the victim in the head and face with a firearm (pistol-whipping) in an effort to obtain the drugs.
Medical records corroborated the physical injuries.

This was, as the district court put it, within the “heartland” of an offense involving the actual use of violent force. Nothing in the proof suggested a need to rely on the broader, risk-based residual clause.

2. The Jury Instructions on Hobbs Act Robbery and Attempt

The district court highlighted its jury instructions for:

Hobbs Act robbery (for the conspiracy charge, Count Three):

“[T]o take or obtain narcotics or narcotics proceeds from the suspected narcotics dealer or in the presence of that person; and that the ‘taking’ or ‘obtaining’ was to be against the victim’s will, by means of actual or threatened force, violence or fear of injury, whether immediately or in the future, to the victim’s person or property.” (emphasis added)

Attempted Hobbs Act robbery (Count Four):

The court instructed that the government had to prove that the defendant:

intended to commit that robbery (as defined above), and
took a “substantial step” toward its commission—“something more than mere preparation” but less than the last act necessary to complete the crime.

These instructions closely track the language of the elements clause: “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” Importantly, they contain no language resembling the residual clause’s formulation (“by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force … may be used”).

3. The Jury Instructions and Verdict Form for Count Five

For Count Five, the § 924(c) charge predicated on the attempted robbery, the jury was instructed that the predicate “crime of violence” was the “attempted robbery charged in Count Four.” There was no alternative predicate, nor any separate instruction about a risk-based crime-of-violence definition.

The special verdict sheet then asked the jury, if it found Barnes guilty on Count Five, to decide whether he “brandished” a firearm. The court defined “brandish” as:

“to display all or part of [a firearm], or to otherwise make its presence known to another person in order to intimidate or advise that person that violence is imminently or immediately available, regardless of whether the firearm is directly visible.” (emphasis added)

The jury found that Barnes had brandished the firearm. Combined with the instructions on attempted robbery, this indicated that the jury had found Barnes committed the attempt “through the actual or threatened use of force”—the core of the elements clause.

4. Omission of Any Residual-Clause Concept

The district court emphasized what the record did not show: there was no instruction that the “crime of violence” could be any felony that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk” that force might be used. The court found it significant that:

“[I]f the [c]ourt had concluded that Barnes'[s] [Count Five] conviction … hinged on the definition in the residual clause,” it would have instructed the jury that, to convict, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the attempted robbery “involved a substantial risk that the defendant may use force against the person or property of another.” (Sp. App’x 13–14)

The totality of the instructions, the verdict form, and the evidence supported the finding that the conviction rested on the elements clause definition of a crime of violence.

E. Rejection of Barnes’s Challenges to the Historical-Fact Finding

1. Lack of an Express Reference to the Elements Clause

Barnes argued that because neither the trial court nor the parties explicitly referenced “elements clause” or “residual clause,” the record is necessarily “unclear,” forcing the court to proceed to step two or three of the Savoca framework.

The Second Circuit rejected any such express-reference requirement. It reminded that:

In Savoca I, the court upheld a finding that ACCA’s enumerated clause had been used even though no one explicitly invoked it by name at sentencing.
The purpose of the historical inquiry is precisely to reconstruct, from the totality of the record, what the sentencing court must have done—not to require a talismanic formula.

In other words, the absence of a clause label is not dispositive. What matters is whether the record, read as a whole, indicates use of one clause or the other.

2. The Categorical Approach vs. Historical Fact-Finding

Barnes also contended that the district court erred in looking at the underlying offense conduct (e.g., pistol-whipping) because the “crime of violence” inquiry is ordinarily legal and categorical, not factual and conduct-specific.

The Second Circuit replied that this conflated two distinct inquiries:

The categorical approach determines whether, in the abstract, a statutory offense qualifies under the elements or residual clause.
The Savoca historical inquiry asks a different question: which clause did the district court actually apply at the time of conviction?

For the latter task, the court can, and should, “look to a wide range of materials,” including the trial record and the way the evidence and jury instructions were framed. Considering the brutality of the pistol-whipping helps explain why the jury instructions and arguments naturally tracked the elements clause rather than a risk-based residual clause theory.

3. The “Similarly Situated to Taylor” Argument

Barnes argued that, like the defendant in Taylor, his § 924(c) conviction predicated on attempted Hobbs Act robbery was vacated on a successive § 2255 motion, and thus he should receive the same treatment.

The Second Circuit stressed that Taylor did not address AEDPA’s successive-motion gatekeeping at all; it was concerned only with the underlying statutory “crime of violence” issue. There is no basis to read Taylor as silently overriding AEDPA’s textual requirement that the claim rely on a new rule of constitutional law. Barnes and Taylor may be similarly situated on the merits of the § 924(c) issue, but they are not similarly situated procedurally because Barnes is litigating a second collateral attack subject to AEDPA’s special gatekeeping.

F. Count Seven and § 848(e)(1)(A) Murder as a Crime of Violence

Barnes also challenged his § 924(c) conviction on Count Seven, predicated on murder while engaged in a narcotics conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). He conceded that Second Circuit law currently foreclosed his position but sought to preserve the argument for further review.

The Second Circuit summarily rejected the claim, citing United States v. Pastore, 83 F.4th 113 (2d Cir. 2023), which held that intentionally causing the death of another person under § 848(e)(1)(A) involves the use of physical force and therefore qualifies categorically as a “crime of violence” under the § 924(c) elements clause—a holding since affirmed by the Supreme Court in Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. 423 (2025).

V. Impact and Significance

A. Immediate Practical Effect: Narrowing Relief After Taylor

For prisoners seeking to vacate § 924(c) convictions predicated on attempted Hobbs Act robbery, Barnes underscores a crucial distinction:

On direct appeal or first § 2255 motion: A Taylor-based argument can be raised and may succeed in vacating a § 924(c) conviction, because AEDPA’s successive-motion bar does not apply.
On second or successive § 2255 motion: Taylor alone is insufficient. The petitioner must show that the conviction actually rested on the residual clause and thus violates Davis—a constitutional rule. If, as in Barnes’s case, the record shows reliance on the elements clause, AEDPA bars relief even though, in light of Taylor, the conviction would be invalid if imposed today.

The case therefore significantly limits the reach of Taylor for already-final convictions when the prisoner has already had one round of collateral review.

B. Clarifying the Role of Historical Fact-Finding Under AEDPA

Barnes reinforces and operationalizes the Savoca framework:

District courts must undertake a fact-intensive inquiry into the historical record, rather than defaulting to uncertainty whenever the sentencing judge did not explicitly name a clause.
Courts are encouraged to consider jury instructions, verdict forms, trial evidence, and even the logical structure of the charges in determining which clause was actually applied.
Appellate review is highly deferential; absent a clear misreading of the record, the district court’s findings will stand.

This approach gives district courts a detailed roadmap for handling post-Davis and post-Taylor challenges to § 924(c) (and ACCA) convictions.

C. Limits on “Bootstrapping” Statutory Claims into AEDPA’s Constitutional Gateway

By leaning heavily on Massey, the Second Circuit sends a clear signal: prisoners cannot convert a pure statutory claim into a qualifying constitutional claim merely by pointing to the fact that a constitutional decision has eliminated an alternative basis for the conviction or sentence.

This reinforces a conceptual boundary in AEDPA:

Constitutional decisions like Johnson (2015) and Davis can support successive motions if the conviction actually rests on the invalidated provision.
Statutory decisions like Taylor, Rehaif, or Johnson (2010) cannot, even when they would clearly change the outcome if considered.

D. The Unresolved Circuit Split on Unclear Records

The court again flagged, but did not resolve, the circuit split over what happens when the record is genuinely unclear about whether the sentencing court used the elements or residual clause:

Some circuits require only that the conviction “may have been” based on the residual clause (a more lenient standard for petitioners).
Others place the burden on the petitioner to show that it is “more likely than not” that the conviction rested solely on the residual clause.

Because the district court in Barnes found the record clear at step one, the Second Circuit again reserved this issue for “another day.” But the decision illustrates the high practical stakes of this unresolved doctrinal question: if the record had been deemed “unclear,” the outcome could have turned on which standard the Second Circuit eventually adopts.

E. Affirming the Breadth of “Crime of Violence” for Intentional Murder Predicates

Finally, the court’s brisk treatment of the Count Seven argument, citing Pastore and Delligatti, further solidifies the principle that intentional killing offenses, such as § 848(e)(1)(A) murder in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy, are squarely within the elements clause. That aspect of § 924(c) law is now firmly settled in the Second Circuit (and, with Delligatti, nationally).

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Crime of Violence” Under § 924(c)

Elements clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A)): Focuses on the legal elements of the crime: does the statute require the government to prove use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force? If yes, it’s a “crime of violence” under this clause.
Residual clause (§ 924(c)(3)(B)): Focused on the nature of the crime and the risk that force might be used. This clause has been struck down as unconstitutionally vague by Davis.

B. The “Categorical Approach” vs. Historical Clause Inquiry

Categorical approach: A legal test used to decide whether a statutory offense fits a definition like “crime of violence” by looking only at the statutory elements, not the defendant’s actual conduct. This is how courts decided in Taylor that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).
Historical clause inquiry (Savoca/Barnes): A factual question about which clause a sentencing court actually used in a particular case years ago. For this, courts can look at jury instructions, verdict forms, arguments, and the evidence as it shaped the trial.

C. AEDPA’s “New Rule of Constitutional Law” Requirement

For a second or successive § 2255 motion, a claim must:

be based on a constitutional rule (not mere statutory interpretation),
be “new” (previously unavailable), and
have been made retroactive to final convictions by the Supreme Court.

Davis qualifies; Taylor does not. That is why Barnes needed to show that his conviction rested on the residual clause invalidated by Davis, rather than only on the elements clause reinterpreted by Taylor.

D. “Clear Error” Standard of Review

When an appellate court reviews a district court’s factual finding—such as “the conviction was based on the elements clause”—it uses “clear error” review. This means:

The appellate court defers to the district court’s findings unless, after reviewing the whole record, it is firmly convinced that a mistake was made.
Reasonable disagreements about what the record shows are not enough to reverse; the finding must be clearly wrong.

VII. Conclusion

Barnes v. United States is a significant elaboration of the Second Circuit’s post-Davis and post-Taylor jurisprudence on § 924(c) and AEDPA. The decision:

reaffirms that a successive § 2255 motion must truly “rel[y] on a new rule of constitutional law,” not merely on a statutory decision later aided by a constitutional one;
solidifies the Savoca framework for district courts to conduct historical fact-finding on whether convictions rested on elements or residual clauses, and subjects those findings to deferential clear-error review;
demonstrates that even plainly invalid convictions under current law (like a § 924(c) conviction predicated on attempted Hobbs Act robbery) may remain in place when AEDPA’s successive-motion bar is triggered and not satisfied; and
further entrenches the view that intentional killing in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy is categorically a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s elements clause.

In doctrinal terms, Barnes is less about creating new substantive criminal law than about enforcing the procedural rigor of AEDPA’s gatekeeping and clarifying the evidentiary and interpretive tools courts must use when reconstructing the legal basis of older convictions. It is a reminder that, in federal habeas practice, even compelling merits arguments can be foreclosed by the structural limits Congress has imposed on successive collateral review.