Heightened Evidentiary Requirement for 18 U.S.C. § 666 “Benefits”:
A Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Evans, 92 F.4th ___ (1st Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Evans marks a significant clarification of the government’s burden when prosecuting theft or bribery involving federally funded programs under 18 U.S.C. § 666. Richard Evans, a former Boston Police Department captain, was convicted at trial of wire fraud–based counts and of substantive and conspiracy counts under § 666. On appeal, the court affirmed the wire-fraud convictions but vacated the § 666 convictions, holding that the prosecution failed to prove that the Boston Police Department (BPD) “received, in any one-year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program.” The decision also upholds the propriety of a willful-blindness instruction and rejects multiple other challenges, but its most enduring contribution is the heightened evidentiary standard announced for the § 666 jurisdictional “benefits” element.

Key Issues

• Whether evidence of two federal grants satisfied § 666(b)’s “benefits” requirement.
• Appropriateness of a willful-blindness jury instruction.
• Multiple allegations of instructional and evidentiary error reviewed largely for plain error.

Parties

• Appellee: United States of America
• Appellant: Richard Evans, former BPD Captain

II. Summary of the Judgment

The First Circuit (Judge Lynch, joined by Judges Montecalvo and Kayatta) ruled as follows:

• Wire-Fraud & Conspiracy (affirmed): Ample evidence supported the jury’s verdict; the willful-blindness instruction was proper.
• § 666 Substantive Theft & Conspiracy (vacated): The government’s evidence—limited to the amounts and dates of two grants—did not establish that the monies were “benefits” within the meaning of § 666. The court remanded for further proceedings.
• Other alleged errors: None rose to the level of reversible error under the applicable standards (abuse-of-discretion, de novo, or plain error).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000): Defined “benefits” by reference to funds that “guard, aid, or promote well-being.” Evans applies Fischer to require contextual proof of a grant’s structure, operation, and purpose.
• United States v. Bravo-Fernández, 913 F.3d 244 (1st Cir. 2019): First Circuit precedent on § 666 evidence. Evans distinguishes Bravo-Fernández, noting that even the more robust record in the earlier case was dicta and that the bare figures here fall short.
• United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Epstein, 426 F.3d 431 (1st Cir. 2005): Supply the test for willful-blindness instructions—applied to affirm the instruction given.
• Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) & First Circuit follow-ons (Manso-Cepeda, Fernández-Jorge): Frame the debate over “advance knowledge” in aiding-and-abetting; the court concludes the district court complied.
• Plain-error and instructional-error authorities (Latorre-Cacho, Prieto, etc.) guide rejection of unpreserved claims.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The § 666 “Benefits” Element

Section 666(b) extends federal jurisdiction only where the entity affected “receives, in any one-year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program.” Drawing upon Fischer, the court holds that:

Merely showing the existence and amount of a grant is insufficient; the prosecution must also establish the programmatic character of those funds—i.e., how they promote well-being, their structure, and their operational use.

The government relied on (1) a $2.9 million “Community-based Violence Prevention” grant and (2) a $45,811 “VAWA STOP” grant. Testimony identified only nominal purposes (e.g., “supports domestic-violence advocates”) without explaining duties, beneficiaries, or overall program architecture. The court found the proof “plainly insufficient,” clarifying that Bravo-Fernández did not relax Fischer’s standard.

2. Willful Blindness

Applying the First Circuit’s three-part test, the panel affirmed the decision to instruct on willful blindness:

1. Evans claimed ignorance of wrongdoing (“already the culture”).
2. Numerous “flags of suspicion”—policy memos, discrepant overtime slips, closed-alarm data—supported an inference of deliberate ignorance.
3. The instruction was properly worded and non-mandatory.

3. Other Claims (Plain-Error Rejection)

• Good-faith instruction: Minor inconsistency (“may negate”) did not render charge fundamentally unfair.
• Aiding-and-abetting knowledge: “Consciously shared” language satisfied Rosemond.
• Opinion & state-of-mind testimony: Mostly rooted in personal experience; any borderline statements not “plainly” erroneous or outcome-determinative.
• Leading questions & cumulative error: Within trial-court discretion; no aggregate prejudice.

C. Potential Impact on Future Litigation

1. Elevated Evidentiary Standard for § 666: Prosecutors must now present qualitative evidence—documents, testimony, or expert explanation—linking each federal grant to a welfare-promoting federal program. Mere spreadsheets or conclusory witness statements will not suffice.
2. Grant-by-Grant Analysis: Courts may require proof *per count* as to which grant satisfies which one-year period, preventing the government from lumping multiple grants together.
3. Strategic Charging Decisions: U.S. Attorneys may increasingly opt for wire-fraud or other Title 18 theories where § 666 proof is weak.
4. Compliance & Training: State and local entities receiving grants will face heightened scrutiny; documentation of program purpose and use will become critical.
5. Willful Blindness Guidance: Evans underscores that high-ranking officials with management duties face greater risk of a willful-blindness instruction when systemic wrongdoing occurs under their command.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. 18 U.S.C. § 666

Section 666 targets theft or bribery affecting organizations that substantially benefit from federal funds. Think of it as Congress’s way of protecting federal program money once it reaches state/local hands. But it applies only if, in a given fiscal year, the entity received over $10,000 in qualifying benefits.

2. “Benefits” vs. “Funds”

All benefits are funds, but not all funds are benefits. A “benefit” must advance public welfare (e.g., food assistance, community-violence reduction), not simply cover ordinary operational costs like salaries—unless those salaries are integral to a welfare program. The court demands contextual proof.

3. Willful Blindness

Picture someone who suspects an illegal scheme but deliberately keeps eyes closed to avoid learning details. The law treats that deliberate ignorance the same as actual knowledge if: (a) the person claims ignorance, and (b) red flags would prompt a reasonable person to investigate.

4. Plain-Error Review

When lawyers fail to object properly at trial, appellate courts ask four questions: (1) Was there error? (2) Was it obvious? (3) Did it affect substantial rights (usually meaning it altered the outcome)? (4) Does it seriously harm the integrity of proceedings? Meeting all four is difficult.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Evans cements a stricter, evidence-based approach to the § 666 “benefits” element, requiring prosecutors to do more than point to dollar amounts. They must connect the dots between federal dollars and federally intended benefits. Simultaneously, the court’s endorsement of willful-blindness instructions in supervisory-fraud cases reinforces the accountability of high-level officials who ignore obvious wrongdoing. For practitioners, Evans is a roadmap: prove programmatic purpose or risk dismissal; anticipate willful-blindness where red flags abound; and preserve objections robustly to avoid plain-error hurdles. In the broader landscape, the decision strengthens safeguards around federal grant money and delineates the evidentiary thresholds future § 666 prosecutions must meet.