Heck, De Novo Appeals, and “Outstanding Convictions”: Commentary on Kleinman v. City of Cedar Park

I. Introduction

In Kleinman v. City of Cedar Park, No. 25‑50260 (5th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed a recurring but often misunderstood threshold problem in § 1983 litigation: when does Heck v. Humphrey bar a federal civil-rights suit that collaterally touches on state criminal proceedings?

The case arises from Cedar Park, Texas’s zoning ordinance banning “head shops” and the City’s enforcement efforts against a Planet K retail store selling smoking paraphernalia and related products. After municipal-court fines and an appeal for a trial de novo in state court, the store’s owners and operators filed a federal suit challenging the ordinance’s validity under federal and state law, seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed their claims as barred by Heck.

The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that under Texas law a de novo appeal from a non-record municipal court annuls the municipal judgment and leaves no “outstanding conviction” capable of triggering the Heck bar. The panel also clarified that Heck cannot bar the claims of a plaintiff who has never been charged, and it affirmed only the dismissal of a separate, now‑forfeited equal protection claim about utility termination.

The opinion thus squarely addresses the interplay between:

The federal Heck “favorable termination” doctrine;
Texas’s unique de novo appeal structure for municipal courts that are not courts of record; and
The proper procedural handling of § 1983 challenges to ordinances while related criminal proceedings are still pending.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. The Parties and the Cedar Park “Head Shop” Ordinance

The plaintiffs–appellants are:

Michael Kleinman – an individual and limited partner in the business entities;
AusPro Enterprises, L.P. (“AusPro”) – the owner of the commercial property; and
MMK Holdings, L.P. (“MMK”) – the lessee operating the Planet K store.

In late 2021, these parties opened a Planet K store within the City of Cedar Park, Texas. The store sells:

Rolling papers, hand and water pipes, vape pens and cartridges, and CBD-related products;
Other general merchandise, such as hula hoops and toiletries.

Pipes used for smoking or inhalation constitute roughly 20%–25% of Planet K’s revenue, making the alleged paraphernalia business a significant, but not exclusive, part of its operation.

Several years before the store opened, the City enacted a zoning ordinance banning “head shops” in the city’s zoning districts. The ordinance defines “head shops” in relevant part as:

Retail stores that sell products commonly used to ingest or inhale illegal substances. (City of Cedar Park, Tex., Code of Ordinances § 11.09.001.)

On December 3, 2021, a City Code Compliance Officer notified Kleinman and AusPro—identified as the property owners—that Planet K’s operation violated the head-shop ban. The notice warned that if the store continued operating as a head shop, a citation could be issued, resulting in misdemeanor charges. A second notice followed on December 17, 2021. Shortly thereafter, criminal complaints were filed in municipal court against Kleinman and AusPro for using a building in violation of zoning ordinances. MMK was not charged.

B. Municipal Court Convictions and De Novo Appeal

On January 27, 2023, the Cedar Park municipal court entered judgments against Kleinman and AusPro, imposing criminal fines for violation of the head-shop ordinance.

Kleinman and AusPro then exercised their statutory right under Texas law to appeal to the county court for a trial de novo. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.17. They also filed a pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of the criminal complaint.

The Texas state-court sequence is:

County court at law – denied the habeas petition.
Texas Court of Appeals (Austin) – affirmed without reaching the merits, holding that neither Kleinman nor AusPro was under sufficient “restraint” to invoke habeas relief. Kleinman v. State, 706 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024).
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals – reversed and remanded, holding that Kleinman and AusPro “have yet to be finally convicted of their fine-only offenses.” Ex parte Kleinman, 721 S.W.3d 400, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025).

That state litigation remains ongoing, and no final judgment of conviction has yet been entered in the county court de novo proceedings.

C. The Federal Civil Rights Action

While the state criminal matters were unfolding, Kleinman, AusPro, and MMK filed a federal suit on May 31, 2022, in the Western District of Texas. Their complaint:

Challenges the head-shop ordinance on multiple grounds:
- Preemption by Texas state law;
- Overbreadth and vagueness in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Texas Constitution’s Due Course of Law provision;
- Equal Protection violations under the U.S. and Texas Constitutions.
Seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief – no damages or relief directed at the criminal fines themselves.

Presented with cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court:

Held that all claims challenging the ordinance were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994);
Dismissed these claims without prejudice on that basis; and
Separately addressed what it understood to be a standalone equal protection claim based on the City’s termination of Planet K’s utility services (water), granting summary judgment to the City on that claim as well.

The plaintiffs appealed, arguing primarily that Heck did not apply because they had no outstanding convictions and that, in any event, they sought only prospective relief.

D. The Fifth Circuit Appeal

On appeal, the City initially contested appellate jurisdiction, contending that a Heck-based dismissal without prejudice is not a final, appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Fifth Circuit rejected that argument, relying on circuit precedent that allows appeals where the plaintiff challenges the threshold applicability of Heck. See Cook v. City of Tyler, 974 F.3d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).

The key merits question became: do Kleinman and AusPro have “outstanding convictions” under Texas law such that their federal suit is barred by Heck?

III. Summary of the Fifth Circuit’s Opinion

The Fifth Circuit’s main holdings can be summarized as follows:

Appellate jurisdiction exists. A dismissal under Heck is “final” for § 1291 purposes when the appeal contests whether Heck applies at all. (Cook v. City of Tyler.)
No “outstanding conviction” exists after a de novo appeal from a non-record Texas municipal court. Under Texas law, such an appeal “sets aside and annuls” the municipal judgment and deprives it of “any finality.” (State ex rel. State Bd. of Morticians v. Cortez, State v. Campbell, Ex parte Jones.)
Heck does not apply to pending criminal matters or to plaintiffs without convictions. Because de novo proceedings are ongoing and there is no final conviction, Heck is inapplicable for Kleinman and AusPro. And since MMK was never charged at all, Heck cannot bar MMK’s claims either.
The district court’s Heck-based dismissals are reversed and the case is remanded. The Fifth Circuit reverses on the Heck issue and remands for the district court to consider the City’s alternative grounds for dismissal.
Standalone water-termination equal protection claim is affirmed as dismissed. Plaintiffs disclaim any intent to assert a separate equal protection claim based on utility termination; to the extent such a claim existed, it is forfeited on appeal, so the district court’s dismissal stands.
The panel expressly declines to decide whether Heck applies to purely prospective relief. That question is pending before the U.S. Supreme Court in Olivier v. City of Brandon, No. 24‑993, and the Fifth Circuit finds it unnecessary to resolve here because there is no qualifying conviction.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Heck Doctrine and Its Evolution

1. The core rule of Heck v. Humphrey

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), holds that a state prisoner may not use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to seek damages if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an existing conviction or sentence that has not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. The Court analogized to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution, which historically required a favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding before suit.

The Fifth Circuit in Kleinman quotes its own formulation from Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2021):

“In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner seeking monetary damages cannot proceed under [section] 1983 if success on those claims would ‘necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.’” (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87, 490)

Over time, courts have extended Heck beyond its original factual setting:

To § 1983 claims for other relief (not just damages) when success would necessarily undermine the conviction or sentence;
To non-prisoners, provided there is still an “outstanding criminal judgment” against the plaintiff.

Yet the Supreme Court has cautioned against further extensions, especially where the criminal process is still unfolding.

2. Pending prosecutions and the Wallace v. Kato framework

The Supreme Court in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), clarified that Heck does not apply to plaintiffs who have not yet been convicted. Instead, if a federal civil suit threatens to impugn an ongoing or likely criminal prosecution, the proper course is generally to stay the civil proceedings until the criminal matter ends:

“[I]t is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. Then, if [the plaintiff] is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.” (Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393–94.)

The Fifth Circuit in DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 2007), interpreted this as the Supreme Court’s refusal to extend Heck to pending criminal matters. Kleinman quotes DeLeon on this point, emphasizing that Heck presupposes an existing conviction, rather than a merely potential or in-process one.

3. Who counts as having an “outstanding conviction”?

Two elements are crucial:

The plaintiff must be subject to a criminal, not merely civil or administrative, judgment (see Hoog-Watson v. Guadalupe County, 591 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2009)); and
The conviction or sentence must be both outstanding and final enough under state law to be treated as a conviction for Heck purposes (see DeLeon on Texas deferred adjudication).

Against this background, the Kleinman court had to assess whether the municipal fines—after a de novo appeal—still qualified as “outstanding” convictions within the meaning of Heck.

B. Texas De Novo Appeals and the Status of Municipal Convictions

1. Article 44.17: Appeals from non-record municipal courts

Article 44.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that appeals from municipal courts that are not courts of record “shall be de novo in the trial in the county court, the same as if the prosecution had been originally commenced in that court.”

Texas courts have long held that such an appeal does more than simply transfer the case:

In State ex rel. State Bd. of Morticians v. Cortez, 333 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. 1960), the Texas Supreme Court explained that an appeal for a trial de novo “sets aside and annuls the order of the court or body from which the appeal is taken,” absent a statutory saving clause.
In State v. Campbell, 820 S.W.2d 44, 45 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref’d), the court held that such an appeal deprives the municipal court’s “judgment of any finality.”
Earlier, in Ex parte Jones, 81 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1935), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals described the de novo appeal as beginning a new trial “as if no former trial had been had.”
McIntosh v. Watts, 5 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. App.—Waco 1928, no writ), is in the same vein.

These cases collectively support a strong proposition: once a defendant perfects an appeal for a de novo trial from a non-record municipal court, the original judgment is treated as legally void for purposes of finality and enforcement, and the case proceeds entirely anew in county court.

2. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ statement in Ex parte Kleinman

The Fifth Circuit’s understanding is reinforced by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ explicit statement in Ex parte Kleinman that the petitioners “have yet to be finally convicted of their fine-only offenses.” 721 S.W.3d at 411. That authoritative statement of Texas criminal law confirms that:

The municipal fines imposed on Kleinman and AusPro do not amount to final convictions once the de novo appeal is taken; and
Their prosecutions are properly characterized as ongoing criminal matters.

In other words, Texas law treats these defendants not as persons with final convictions, but as criminal defendants whose cases are midstream in the county court.

C. How Precedents Shaped the Court’s Reasoning

1. Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court cases on Heck and pending cases

Hoog-Watson v. Guadalupe County, 591 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2009).
The Fifth Circuit there looked to Texas law to determine whether juvenile proceedings were “criminal” for Heck purposes, illustrating the principle that state criminal law defines whether a proceeding can trigger Heck. Kleinman borrows this analytic method: it asks Texas law whether Kleinman and AusPro are subject to a final criminal judgment.
DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 2007).
The question in DeLeon was whether a Texas deferred adjudication counts as a “sentence or conviction” under Heck. The Fifth Circuit answered yes, but with a significant caveat, which Kleinman emphasizes:
“[T]he … argument[] that Heck applies to deferred adjudication orders issued in ongoing state criminal proceedings[] lacks merit.” (DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 655.)
That caveat aligns with Wallace v. Kato and underscores that ongoing proceedings—whatever their form—do not yet give rise to Heck bars.
Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2021).
Used in Kleinman mainly to restate the general Heck rule and the idea that the exclusive remedy for attacks on the “fact or duration of confinement” is habeas corpus, not § 1983.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).
As noted, Wallace is the Supreme Court’s instruction that for pre-conviction plaintiffs, the standard response is a stay, not a Heck-based dismissal.
Cook v. City of Tyler, 974 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2020).
Cook establishes that a dismissal under Heck can be a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 when the appellant asks whether Heck should apply at all. Kleinman cites Cook to dispose of the City’s jurisdictional objection.

2. Texas precedents interpreting de novo appeals

The City argued that existing Texas authority showed that a criminal judgment is not annulled by a de novo appeal. The panel found that the cases the City relied on—especially Cortez—actually say the opposite:

State ex rel. State Bd. of Morticians v. Cortez, 333 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1960).
The Texas Supreme Court held that invoking the right to a trial de novo “sets aside and annuls the order of the court … from which the appeal is taken,” absent some statutory saving clause. The Fifth Circuit in Kleinman notes that this rule is “well settled.”
State v. Campbell, 820 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref’d).
Reiterated that a de novo appeal deprives the underlying judgment “of any finality.”
Ex parte Jones, 81 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1935); McIntosh v. Watts, 5 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. App.—Waco 1928, no writ).
Described the de novo proceeding as beginning “as if no former trial had been had.”

Far from assisting the City, these state authorities compelled the conclusion that there is no longer a final municipal conviction at all once the appeal is perfected.

D. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Kleinman

1. Jurisdiction: When is a Heck dismissal “final”?

The City argued that a Heck-based dismissal without prejudice is non-final and thus unappealable. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, relying on Cook v. City of Tyler. Under Cook, a Heck dismissal is final and appealable where:

The plaintiff is not merely seeking to refile later; and
The appeal directly contests whether Heck applies in the first place.

Because the appellants here challenged the threshold application of Heck, the panel held it had jurisdiction under § 1291.

2. Framing the key question: Are these “pending criminal matters” under Texas law?

The panel recognized that Heck does not apply “where there is no underlying conviction” (citing Hoog-Watson and a Fifth Circuit unpublished case, Chisolm v. Complainant Unknown). It further noted the Supreme Court’s refusal to extend Heck to pending criminal matters (Wallace, as read in DeLeon).

Thus, the threshold inquiry became:

Whether Kleinman’s and AusPro’s prosecutions are “pending criminal matters” under Texas law.

Because criminal procedure is a matter of state law, the Fifth Circuit properly looked to Texas law to determine:

Whether the municipal fines remained legally operative convictions; and
What effect the de novo appeal had on those municipal judgments.

3. Effect of the de novo appeal: No final conviction

Applying Texas authorities (Cortez, Campbell, Ex parte Jones), the panel concluded:

The de novo appeal “sets aside and annuls” the municipal court judgment; and
That judgment is deprived of “any finality.”

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ statement in Ex parte Kleinman—that Kleinman and AusPro “have yet to be finally convicted”—bolsters this interpretation. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the prosecutions against Kleinman and AusPro are pending criminal matters and that no final conviction currently exists.

Thus, the most fundamental prerequisite for applying Heck—an outstanding conviction—was absent. That ends the Heck inquiry.

4. “Favorable termination” is irrelevant if there is no conviction

The City might have argued that even if the municipal convictions were vacated, they were not “favorably terminated,” which would still trigger a Heck bar. The Fifth Circuit rejected this framing:

Because there is no outstanding conviction at all after a de novo appeal, the question of “favorable termination” is irrelevant at this stage. Heck presupposes:

An existing conviction or sentence; and
The fact that the civil suit, if successful, would necessarily imply its invalidity.

Here, neither condition is satisfied: there is no conviction to invalidate.

5. Heck cannot bar claims by a plaintiff who was never charged: MMK

The panel also emphasized that MMK was never charged in any criminal proceeding. As Heck itself states, the doctrine applies when there is an “outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff.” 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added).

Because there is no criminal judgment—indeed, no prosecution at all—against MMK, the district court’s application of Heck to MMK’s claims was doubly erroneous:

MMK never had a conviction; and
Even if Kleinman and AusPro had convictions, those could not trigger a Heck bar as to MMK, who is a distinct plaintiff.

6. Prospective relief and the pending Supreme Court case Olivier v. City of Brandon

A potentially important nuance is that the plaintiffs here sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, not damages. Some courts and commentators question whether Heck should apply at all to purely prospective relief; the Supreme Court has agreed to consider that question in Olivier v. City of Brandon, No. 24‑993, argued December 3, 2025.

The Fifth Circuit flagged that the Supreme Court will be deciding:

“whether Heck bars [section] 1983 claims seeking purely prospective relief where the plaintiff has been punished before under the law challenged as unconstitutional.”

However, the panel explicitly declined to reach this question in Kleinman. Because it found there was no outstanding conviction, Heck was inapplicable regardless of the type of relief sought. The opinion therefore remains neutral on the broader prospective-relief question and avoids any conflict with the forthcoming Supreme Court decision.

7. Remedy: Reversal and remand, not an automatic stay

Having concluded that Heck does not presently apply, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s Heck-based dismissal. It acknowledged that “ordinarily” the proper approach under Wallace v. Kato would be to stay the civil case while the criminal proceedings continue. But here, the panel noted:

The district court had not reached the City’s alternative grounds for dismissal; and
Those grounds “may warrant further consideration upon remand.”

Thus, rather than directing a stay, the Fifth Circuit left it to the district court on remand to decide:

Whether the suit is otherwise barred (e.g., by abstention or other doctrines, if raised); and/or
Whether a stay is appropriate while the state criminal proceedings run their course.

8. The separate water-termination equal protection claim

Finally, the panel addressed a discrete issue: the district court had treated part of the complaint as asserting a standalone equal protection claim based on the City’s termination of Planet K’s water service. On appeal:

Kleinman, AusPro, and MMK explicitly disclaimed any intent to pursue such a standalone claim; and
Under Fifth Circuit precedent (United States v. Hernandez, 279 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2002)), issues not briefed on appeal are forfeited.

Therefore, the court:

AFFIRMED the judgment as to the water-termination equal protection claim; and
REVERSED and REMANDED in all other respects.

E. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What is the Heck doctrine?

In simple terms, the Heck doctrine prevents a person from using a civil rights lawsuit under § 1983 to indirectly attack a criminal conviction that has not yet been overturned. If you have an existing conviction, you cannot sue for damages (and in many courts, certain forms of injunctive relief) in a way that would necessarily show that conviction is invalid—unless and until you first get the conviction reversed, vacated, or otherwise invalidated through direct appeal, post-conviction relief, or habeas corpus.

2. What is a “trial de novo” in Texas municipal appeals?

A trial de novo is not just a review of what happened below; it is a completely new trial. For appeals from non-record municipal courts in Texas:

The case starts over in the county court “as if the prosecution had been originally commenced in that court.”
The municipal court’s judgment is legally wiped out; it no longer has any final or binding effect.

Thus, once you perfect your appeal, you are no longer someone with a final municipal conviction—you are a criminal defendant awaiting trial in county court.

3. What does “outstanding conviction” mean?

An “outstanding conviction” is a criminal judgment that:

Has been entered by a criminal court;
Is in effect (not vacated, annulled, or superseded); and
Has not been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Under the reasoning in Kleinman, once a Texas defendant appeals a municipal conviction for a de novo trial in a non-record municipal case, that conviction is no longer “outstanding” for Heck purposes.

4. What is “forfeiture” of a claim on appeal?

A party “forfeits” a claim on appeal when it fails to properly raise, brief, or argue that claim to the appellate court. Here, the plaintiffs stated they had not intended to bring a standalone equal protection claim based on water termination, effectively abandoning any challenge to the district court’s ruling on that issue. The Fifth Circuit therefore treated the claim as forfeited and left the district court’s dismissal intact.

F. Impact and Future Significance

1. Clarifying Heck’s reach in Texas de novo municipal appeals

The central doctrinal contribution of Kleinman is the clear holding that:

A municipal conviction from a non-record Texas municipal court that has been appealed for a trial de novo does not qualify as an “outstanding conviction” capable of triggering Heck.

For practitioners, this has practical consequences:

Defendants who promptly appeal municipal convictions de novo may still be able to file § 1983 suits challenging the underlying ordinance or enforcement practices, without facing an automatic Heck dismissal—though other doctrines, such as abstention, might still apply.
Municipalities cannot rely on municipal court fines that have been annulled by de novo appeals as a shield under Heck to avoid federal constitutional scrutiny.

2. Separate treatment of non-charged entities

The court’s insistence that Heck applies only where there is a criminal judgment “against the plaintiff” has implications for:

Business entities related to criminal defendants (e.g., landlords, corporate affiliates, franchisors); and
Third parties affected by enforcement but not actually prosecuted.

Kleinman makes clear that such plaintiffs are not swept into Heck merely because their affiliates or principals face criminal charges. Each plaintiff’s exposure to Heck must be assessed individually.

3. Relationship with Wallace v. Kato and the use of stays

By recognizing that Kleinman and AusPro’s cases are pending criminal matters rather than completed convictions, the Fifth Circuit implicitly directs lower courts back toward the Wallace framework:

If the federal suit threatens to interfere with or undermine an ongoing criminal case, the appropriate step is usually to stay, not dismiss, the civil case.
After the criminal case ends, the district court can then evaluate whether Heck applies based on the actual outcome and the relief sought.

The panel in Kleinman did not instruct the district court to stay the case on remand, but it signaled that a stay would be the ordinary course if the claims are otherwise justiciable.

4. Intersection with Olivier v. City of Brandon and prospective relief

The Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in Olivier v. City of Brandon will likely resolve whether, and to what extent, Heck applies to § 1983 plaintiffs who seek purely prospective relief (e.g., injunctive or declaratory relief) where they have previously been punished under the challenged law.

Kleinman deliberately leaves this question open. This maintains flexibility for lower courts in the Fifth Circuit after Olivier is decided:

If the Supreme Court narrows Heck’s reach to damages actions, plaintiffs like Kleinman and MMK may have even clearer paths to prospective relief in future cases.
If the Court extends Heck more fully to prospective relief, then future litigants in the Fifth Circuit will need to consider the finality and status of their convictions carefully before filing § 1983 suits.

Either way, Kleinman will remain significant because it addresses a logically earlier question: when, under state law, is there a conviction at all?

5. Broader implications for zoning and business regulation litigation

On the substantive side, Kleinman does not resolve the underlying constitutional questions about Cedar Park’s head-shop ordinance. However, by removing the Heck obstacle, the decision:

Clears the way for federal judicial review of zoning ordinances that target certain businesses (e.g., “head shops,” sexually oriented businesses, vape or CBD retailers) in Texas when the enforcement has led to municipal fines and de novo appeals;
Signals that municipalities cannot rely solely on municipal-court convictions—in cases subject to de novo review—to insulate potentially unconstitutional ordinances from federal scrutiny.

On remand, the district court will now need to grapple with the plaintiffs’ substantive claims: preemption, overbreadth, vagueness, and equal protection under both federal and state law, unless some alternative procedural bar applies.

V. Conclusion

Kleinman v. City of Cedar Park is a focused but important decision at the intersection of federal § 1983 doctrine and Texas criminal procedure. The Fifth Circuit holds that:

A de novo appeal from a non-record Texas municipal court nullifies the underlying municipal conviction and leaves no “outstanding conviction” for Heck v. Humphrey to attach to;
Heck does not apply to pending Texas criminal matters initiated in such municipal courts; and
Heck cannot bar claims brought by a plaintiff who has never been charged, such as MMK in this case.

While the court expressly declines to weigh in on the broader issue of whether Heck applies to purely prospective relief—a question now before the Supreme Court in Olivier v. City of Brandon—its opinion squarely resolves the antecedent question of when a Texas municipal conviction counts as “outstanding” for Heck purposes.

The decision strengthens the principle that Heck is a narrow, conviction-focused doctrine. It cannot be used by municipalities to block constitutional challenges grounded in state court proceedings that, under state law, do not yet (or no longer) constitute final convictions. As such, Kleinman will guide both civil-rights plaintiffs and municipal defendants in structuring and defending § 1983 claims that arise amid ongoing Texas criminal enforcement of local ordinances.