Headlong Flight at a Closed Business Converts Reasonable Suspicion into Probable Cause for Alabama Third-Degree Trespass; Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms § 922(g)(1) Post-Bruen/Rahimi

Case: United States v. Joseph Shane Perkins, No. 24-11383 (11th Cir. Oct. 22, 2025) (per curiam) (not for publication)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Panel: Circuit Judges Grant, Lagoa, and Wilson

Introduction

In this unpublished, per curiam decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirms the conviction and sentence of Joseph Perkins for felon-in-possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The appeal presented two issues: (1) whether evidence discovered after a late-night traffic stop—including a firearm—should be suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds because officers allegedly lacked reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and probable cause for the subsequent arrest; and (2) whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi.

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion clarifies two important points. First, applying California v. Hodari D. and Brendlin v. California, it holds that a passenger who immediately flees a traffic stop is not seized until physical force is applied, and that presence at a closed commercial property after hours, coupled with suspicious activity and headlong flight, can supply probable cause for Alabama third-degree criminal trespass. Second, invoking the Circuit’s prior-precedent rule, it reaffirms that § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional post-Bruen and Rahimi under United States v. Rozier as confirmed in Dubois v. United States.

Summary of the Opinion

• Fourth Amendment holding: Perkins was not seized when the traffic stop occurred because he did not submit to the show of authority; he was seized only when tased. Before that moment, officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal trespass based on late-night presence at a closed business in a high-crime area, suspicious vehicle behavior in darker areas, and the attempt to leave upon seeing police. When Perkins fled, that suspicion “ripened” into probable cause for Alabama third-degree criminal trespass, validating the detention and the resulting evidence.
• Second Amendment holding: Challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed in the Eleventh Circuit by United States v. Rozier, which Bruen and Rahimi did not abrogate. The panel relies on the Circuit’s prior-precedent rule and Dubois v. United States (2025), which confirms the continued vitality of Rozier post-Rahimi.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) and Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007): The Court relies on Hodari D. to establish that a seizure requires physical force or submission to authority. Brendlin clarifies that passengers are ordinarily seized during a traffic stop if they remain in the vehicle; here, Perkins fled, so he was not seized until tased. This temporal demarcation defines what facts may be considered to assess reasonable suspicion and probable cause—everything up to the tasing.
• Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000): Provides the baseline for reasonable suspicion (less demanding than probable cause but requiring objective justification) and recognizes headlong flight as strongly suggestive of wrongdoing. Wardlow also supports detaining individuals to resolve ambiguities arising from suspicious, context-dependent conduct.
• D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018): Articulates the probable cause standard—“probability or substantial chance”—and endorses drawing mens rea inferences from “deliberately furtive actions,” including flight.
• United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1991): An Eleventh Circuit analogue: reasonable suspicion arose where a car sat in a commercial lot at 4 a.m. in a high-crime area when businesses were closed and the driver left when police circled. The Court uses Briggman to show that late-night presence at closed commercial premises in a high-crime area, coupled with evasive conduct, justifies a stop.
• United States v. Vasquez, 534 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1976): Adopted in the Eleventh Circuit via Bonner v. City of Prichard, it supports that flight can, in appropriate circumstances, be the “key ingredient” converting suspicion into probable cause.
• Alabama law:
  • Ala. Code § 13A-7-4(a): Third-degree criminal trespass occurs when a person “knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises.” “Premises” include buildings and real property; one “enters or remains unlawfully” if not licensed, invited, or privileged to be there. Importantly, places open to the public confer a privilege while open—implying no privilege after hours. The Court also cites an Alabama Attorney General opinion (persuasive) concluding that people present in a commercial parking lot hours after closing are not privileged or licensed to be there.
  • Ala. Code § 13A-7-4.1: “Criminal trespass by motor vehicle” is distinct, involving marked lots and warnings. The Court rejects the notion that probable cause must be tailored to this more specific offense; the general third-degree trespass requires neither signage nor prior warning. See Howard v. State, 506 So. 2d 351 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
  • Allison v. City of Birmingham, 580 So. 2d 1377 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991): Third-degree trespass requires a knowing mens rea—flight helped supply this mental-state inference.
• Second Amendment line:
  • D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Recognized “longstanding prohibitions” on felon possession as “presumptively lawful.”
  • United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010): Upheld § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment; remains binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.
  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Emphasized text-and-history testing but reaffirmed Heller’s framing of the right for “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”
  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Did not undermine felon-in-possession prohibitions and reiterated the “presumptively lawful” characterization.
  • Dubois v. United States, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025): On remand after Rahimi, held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier; thus, § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional within the Circuit under the prior-precedent rule.

Legal Reasoning

1) Fourth Amendment: Sequencing the Seizure, Building Suspicion, and Ripening to Probable Cause

The Court begins with first principles of seizure. A person is seized only upon physical force or submission to police authority. Although a traffic stop ordinarily seizes passengers who remain in the vehicle, Perkins immediately ran when the vehicle stopped. Under Hodari D. and Brendlin, no seizure occurred until the taser was deployed and physical force was applied. Consequently, all facts up to the tasing were fair game to assess whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed at that moment.

The officers observed Perkins at 1:30 a.m. in a high-crime area, in the parking lot of a closed chiropractor’s office. The SUV moved through illuminated areas to darker regions near the back of the building, where the occupants staged apparent car maintenance (pouring liquid under the hood) and then attempted to leave. Deputy Bates, drawing on training and experience, believed the activity was a ruse commonly used by criminals to avoid police scrutiny. These facts, taken together, supported reasonable suspicion that Perkins was committing Alabama third-degree criminal trespass—being present without license or privilege on premises not open to the public after hours.

The Court bolsters this conclusion by citing the statutory scheme and the Alabama Attorney General’s opinion that after-hours presence in commercial parking lots is unlicensed. It stresses that the time, setting, and conduct created an “ambiguity” justifying a brief detention to clarify whether the individuals had a right to be on the property. Wardlow’s recognition that officers may investigate ambiguous conduct in context underwrites this step.

Critically, the legal threshold moved from reasonable suspicion to probable cause the moment Perkins fled. While flight alone does not always suffice for probable cause, the Court treats it as a powerful “key ingredient” where other suspicious circumstances are already present. Integrating Wesby and Wardlow, the panel reasons that headlong flight is a strong indicator of a guilty mind, filling the mens rea element (“knowingly”) for the Alabama trespass offense. Thus, when tasing occurred, probable cause to arrest Perkins for third-degree trespass existed.

The panel rejects Perkins’s effort to reframe the analysis around the distinct offense of “criminal trespass by motor vehicle,” which requires posted signage or prior warning. That statute is not the basis for the arrest, and third-degree trespass has no such prerequisites. Because probable cause existed for third-degree trespass, the detention was lawful whether characterized as an investigative stop or as an arrest.

A brief footnote addresses “provocation”: the use of blue lights to initiate a traffic stop would not prompt a reasonable innocent person to flee, so the officers did not “provoke” flight in any improper sense. This preserves the probative value of the flight in the probable-cause calculus.

2) Second Amendment: Prior Precedent Forecloses § 922(g)(1) Challenges

On the constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1), the panel applies the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-precedent rule. In United States v. Rozier, the Circuit held that the felon-in-possession ban does not violate the Second Amendment, consistent with Heller’s assurance that such longstanding prohibitions are “presumptively lawful.” After Bruen and Rahimi, the Circuit in Dubois v. United States reaffirmed that Rozier remains intact because those Supreme Court decisions did not “demolish” its fundamental underpinnings. Rahimi did not address § 922(g)(1) and reiterated Heller’s language about presumptively lawful prohibitions. Consequently, the panel is bound to reject Perkins’s Second Amendment challenge.

Impact

• Fourth Amendment practice in the Eleventh Circuit, particularly in Alabama:
  • Officers who encounter vehicles in commercial lots after hours have a clear path to reasonable suspicion of third-degree trespass, especially when the location is closed, the area is high-crime, and the occupants’ behavior is evasive or staged (e.g., feigned car trouble in darker areas).
  • Passengers who flee a traffic stop are not seized until physical force is used or they submit. Their flight can transform reasonable suspicion into probable cause when combined with other suspicious circumstances, especially for offenses requiring knowledge or intent.
  • Prosecutors can ground arrests in Alabama’s general third-degree trespass statute without needing signage or warnings, distinguishing it from “trespass by motor vehicle.”
• Second Amendment litigation in the Eleventh Circuit:
  • Bruen- and Rahimi-based challenges to § 922(g)(1) continue to be foreclosed by Rozier as reaffirmed by Dubois. District courts remain bound to deny such challenges unless and until Rozier is overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.
• Practical defense considerations:
  • Suppression strategies that hinge on the initial traffic stop will face an uphill battle when defendants flee; Hodari D. shifts the seizure moment to the application of force, allowing courts to consider pre-seizure facts and the flight itself in the probable-cause analysis.
  • Arguing “provoked flight” will require more than merely noting activation of blue lights; the inquiry is whether a reasonable, innocent person would have fled under the circumstances.
• Limits and cautions:
  • This opinion is unpublished and thus non-precedential in the Eleventh Circuit; it will be persuasive but not binding. Still, it closely tracks and applies settled Supreme Court and Circuit law.
  • Wardlow cautions that presence in a high-crime area is not itself sufficient; context and cumulative factors are key. Here, after-hours presence, location, conduct, and flight collectively mattered.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Seizure vs. Show of Authority: Police turning on blue lights is a “show of authority.” You are “seized” only if you submit or if officers apply physical force. Running away means you are not yet seized until you are stopped by force or you surrender.
• Reasonable Suspicion vs. Probable Cause: Reasonable suspicion is a modest, objective basis to think crime may be afoot; it justifies brief investigative stops. Probable cause is a higher standard—a fair probability that a specific offense has been or is being committed—justifying arrest.
• Headlong Flight: Sprinting away from police suggests wrongdoing and can elevate reasonable suspicion to probable cause when combined with other suspicious facts.
• Alabama Third-Degree Criminal Trespass: Being knowingly present on property without permission. After hours, a business is not “open to the public,” so presence in its lot may be unlicensed. This differs from “trespass by motor vehicle,” which involves signage or warnings.
• Mens Rea (“Knowingly”): Some crimes require proof of a guilty mind. Courts may infer knowledge or intent from conduct like furtive behavior and flight.
• Prior-Precedent Rule (Eleventh Circuit): A published prior panel decision binds subsequent panels unless overruled by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. Thus, Rozier controls § 922(g)(1) challenges unless superseded.
• Exclusionary Rule: Evidence obtained via unconstitutional searches or seizures is typically suppressed. If the stop/arrest is lawful, the evidence is admissible.
• Non-Precedential (Unpublished) Opinions: “Not for publication” decisions do not create binding Circuit law but can be persuasive and often mirror settled doctrine.

Conclusion

United States v. Perkins offers a clear, doctrinally faithful application of established Fourth and Second Amendment principles. On the Fourth Amendment, it demonstrates how late-night presence at a closed commercial property, combined with evasive conduct and headlong flight, supports first a Terry stop for suspected Alabama third-degree trespass and then probable cause to arrest upon flight. It underscores Hodari D.’s timing rule: a fleeing passenger is not seized until physical force is used, and pre-seizure flight can be legally consequential.

On the Second Amendment, the opinion affirms that in the Eleventh Circuit, § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional post-Bruen and Rahimi under the prior-precedent rule. As Dubois confirms, Rozier still governs. While unpublished and non-precedential, Perkins will likely be a persuasive citation for district courts and practitioners confronting similar late-night trespass-stop scenarios and for litigants preserving, but not expecting to win, Bruen-based challenges to § 922(g)(1) in this Circuit.