Harvey v. City of Reno: Abutter Access Is Limited to Easement by Necessity; No Prescriptive Rights Against the State; and Courts May Judicially Notice Recorded Highway Records on a Motion to Dismiss

Introduction

This commentary examines the Nevada Supreme Court’s Order of Affirmance in Harvey v. City of Reno, No. 88962 (Sept. 8, 2025), arising from a long-running dispute over access and ownership issues following a 1987 condemnation for construction of Interstate 580 near Huffaker Place in Washoe County. The appellant, Judith L. Harvey (as trustee and representative of the Harvey Trust and Estate), alleged that more land was taken in 1987 than authorized and that, after a Nevada Department of Transportation (NDOT) access road was sold in 2020 to Green Acres Storage Partners, LLC, her use of that road was restricted, causing economic harm.

The case presented several interlocking legal issues:

Whether the district court could take judicial notice of recorded maps, deeds, and highway plans attached to the defendants’ NRCP 12(b)(5) motions without converting them into motions for summary judgment.
Whether the Trust’s quiet title claims regarding Huffaker Place and the access road were time-barred under NRS 11.080 and when those claims accrued.
Whether the Trust possessed any cognizable access rights—via a “special right of easement” for abutters, by necessity, by prescription, or by implication.
Whether the Trust stated inverse condemnation and due process claims in the absence of a protected property interest in the access road or additional property beyond the 1987 condemnation.

The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluding that the Trust failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal in full, holding that:

Judicial notice was proper as to recorded public documents (subdivision and plat maps, parcel maps, surveys, deeds, judicial orders, highway maps, and highway plans). Considering such materials did not require converting the 12(b)(5) motions to summary judgment.
Quiet title claims were time-barred under NRS 11.080. Accrual occurs upon ejection or when ownership or possession is called into question. Physical alteration for the highway more than 35 years earlier triggered the limitations period. The access road fell within the 1987 Order of Condemnation; the State became the owner then.
No “special right of easement” exists for abutters beyond what an easement by necessity would supply. The Trust failed to establish the required prior common ownership over the access road and necessity at severance.
No prescriptive easement lies against the State absent statutory authorization. No easement by implication was pleaded because unity of title and separation by the dominant tenement were not sufficiently alleged.
Inverse condemnation failed because the Trust did not plead a property interest in the access road and did not adequately allege any uncompensated taking beyond the 1987 condemnation; any such claim would be time-barred.
Procedural due process failed because the Trust did not show a protected property interest that was taken without constitutionally sufficient procedures.
Arguments newly raised on appeal—including the implications of NRS 408.533—were deemed waived.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Judicial Notice and the 12(b)(5)/12(d) Framework

NRS 47.130(2): Courts may take judicial notice of facts generally known within the court’s territorial jurisdiction and facts capable of accurate and ready determination and not subject to reasonable dispute.
Occhiuto v. Occhiuto, 97 Nev. 143, 625 P.2d 568 (1981), and Mack v. Estate of Mack, 125 Nev. 80, 206 P.3d 98 (2009): Courts may judicially notice records of related proceedings when a valid reason exists.
FGA, Inc. v. Giglio, 128 Nev. 271, 278 P.3d 490 (2012): Evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 858 P.2d 1258 (1993): On a motion to dismiss, courts generally cannot consider matters outside the pleadings, but may consider matters of public record, orders, items in the case record, and exhibits attached to the complaint.
United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2003): Courts may consider documents attached to the complaint, incorporated by reference, or subject to judicial notice without converting to summary judgment.

Applying these authorities, the Court approved judicial notice of recorded maps, deeds, and highway plans—public records largely filed with the Washoe County Recorder—finding them capable of accurate and ready determination and not subject to reasonable dispute. Consequently, the district court did not need to convert the motions to dismiss into summary judgment motions under NRCP 12(d).

Standards for Dismissal

Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 181 P.3d 670 (2008): Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would entitle relief; courts accept factual allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Sanchez ex rel. Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 Nev. 818, 221 P.3d 1276 (2009): Allegations must be legally sufficient to establish the elements of the asserted claims.

Quiet Title Accrual and Limitations

NRS 11.080: Five-year limitations period for actions to recover real property or its possession, conditioned on the plaintiff (or predecessor) being seized or possessed within five years before suit.
Berberich v. Bank of America, N.A., 136 Nev. 93, 460 P.3d 440 (2020): Limitations under NRS 11.080 do not run while the plaintiff is still seized or possessed, but the period is triggered upon ejection or when the validity or legality of ownership or possession is called into question.

The Court held that the Trust’s quiet title claims accrued decades ago: for Huffaker Place, the Trust was ejected more than five years prior to suit; for the access road, the 1987 condemnation transferred ownership to the State, and physical alteration into the highway corridor called into question the Trust’s ownership or possession long ago—triggering the limitations period.

Abutter’s Special Right of Easement and Easements Doctrines

State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Linnecke, 86 Nev. 257, 468 P.2d 8 (1970): An abutting owner has a special right of easement in a public road for access purposes that cannot be taken without compensation.
Brooks v. Bonnet, 124 Nev. 372, 185 P.3d 346 (2008): Clarifies Linnecke: an abutter’s access right is cognizable insofar as an easement by necessity exists; necessity analysis governs.
Jackson v. Nash, 109 Nev. 1202, 866 P.2d 262 (1993): Easement by necessity requires (1) prior common ownership of the dominant and servient estates, and (2) necessity at the time of severance; also, present necessity is required (as Brooks explains).
Sloat v. Turner, 93 Nev. 263, 563 P.2d 86 (1977): No prescriptive rights can be acquired against the State absent statutory authorization.

The Trust’s “special right of easement” claim failed because it did not plead prior common ownership or necessity at severance to support an easement by necessity. Prescriptive easement was categorically barred against State property (and the access road was condemned to the State in 1987). An easement by implication was not established because the Trust did not plead unity of title and subsequent separation of the dominant tenement.

Inverse Condemnation and Due Process

Fritz v. Washoe County, 132 Nev. 580, 376 P.3d 794 (2016), and State, Dep’t of Transp. v. Cowan, 120 Nev. 851, 103 P.3d 1 (2004): Inverse condemnation allows recovery when government takes property in fact without formal condemnation; it requires an underlying property interest.
Sloat v. Turner (supra): Without an underlying access right by covenant or prescription, condemnation of property over which an easement allegedly crossed is not a compensable deprivation of access.
Malfitano v. County of Storey, 133 Nev. 276, 396 P.3d 815 (2017): Procedural due process analysis requires (1) a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) constitutionally adequate procedures attendant to the deprivation.
Diamond Enterprises, Inc. v. Lau, 113 Nev. 1376, 951 P.2d 73 (1997): Arguments not raised below are generally waived on appeal.

Because the Trust did not own the access road, lacked an easement over it, and failed to adequately plead any uncompensated taking beyond the 1987 condemnation, the inverse condemnation claim failed for want of a protectable property interest. The due process claim failed for the same reason—no property interest was shown to have been deprived without sufficient process. The late-raised NRS 408.533 argument was deemed waived.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in a straightforward sequence:

Judicial notice as a threshold matter. The Court first resolved an evidentiary issue underlying all claims: could the district court consider recorded maps, deeds, and official plans at the motion to dismiss stage? Citing NRS 47.130(2), Occhiuto, Mack, Breliant, and Ritchie, it held that judicial notice of public records is proper and does not trigger conversion to summary judgment under NRCP 12(d). This unlocked a reliable factual framework from which to assess legal sufficiency without contradicting the rule against considering matters “outside the pleadings.”
Limitations and accrual for quiet title. With the public records noticed, the Court applied Berberich’s accrual rule. The 1987 condemnation and physical highway construction called the Trust’s ownership and possession into question decades ago, and the Trust was ejected from the relevant locations more than five years prior to suit. Under NRS 11.080, the quiet title claims were time-barred.
Constraining abutter access to necessity-based easements. Relying on Brooks’s clarification of Linnecke, the Court held that an abutter’s “special right of easement” derives from, and is no greater than, an easement by necessity. That doctrine requires prior common ownership and necessity at severance (and present necessity). The Trust did not plead these elements, making the access claim untenable.
Blocking prescriptive and implied easements. Sloat’s sovereign-immunity-like rule foreclosed prescriptive easements against State-owned property. The pleaded facts also failed to show the unity of title and separation necessary for an implied easement under Jackson.
No property interest, no takings or due process claims. Inverse condemnation requires an existing protectable property interest. Because the Trust neither owned nor held an easement in the access road—and did not adequately plead any additional property taken beyond the 1987 condemnation—no takings claim was stated. For the same reason, procedural due process failed at step one: no property interest was plausibly alleged to have been deprived.
Waiver. Any appellate arguments not presented to the district court (including those referencing NRS 408.533) were not considered.

Impact

This decision has several practical and doctrinal consequences:

Robust use of judicial notice at the pleading stage. Nevada trial courts may resolve real-property disputes early by judicially noticing recorded maps, deeds, and official highway plans without converting 12(b)(5) motions into summary judgment. This can streamline litigation and foreclose claims that conflict with indisputable public records.
Quiet title timeliness sharpened. Physical alteration of land and public improvements (like highway construction) will often trigger the NRS 11.080 limitations clock. Property owners must act within five years of ejection or when their ownership/possession is called into question; decades-long acquiescence will be fatal.
Abutter access substantially limited. The opinion reaffirms that the “special right” of an abutter is not free-standing; it exists only to the extent an easement by necessity exists. Without prior common ownership and necessity at severance (and present necessity), the claim fails.
No prescriptive rights against the State. Sloat remains decisive: adverse use cannot ripen into prescriptive rights over State property absent statute. Longstanding permissive use of a State roadway or access path will not mature into legal access.
Takings claims must start with a property interest. Inverse condemnation cannot proceed unless the claimant demonstrates a cognizable property interest. Reliance on informal or permissive access to State roads, or speculative claims of extra taking decades earlier, will not suffice.
Appellate waiver enforced. Parties must raise statutory and doctrinal arguments—such as the effects of specific highway statutes like NRS 408.533—in the district court or risk waiver.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Judicial notice: A court’s ability to accept certain facts as true without formal proof because they are publicly recorded or indisputable (e.g., recorded deeds, official maps, court orders). This allows courts to test legal sufficiency without converting a motion to dismiss into a fact-driven summary judgment.
NRCP 12(b)(5) vs. NRCP 56: A 12(b)(5) motion asks whether the complaint states a claim assuming its factual allegations are true. If a court considers outside evidence, it generally must convert to summary judgment (NRCP 56). But judicially noticed public records are an exception and can be considered at the 12(b)(5) stage.
Quiet title and NRS 11.080: Quiet title litigates who owns or has rights to land. Nevada’s five-year limitation starts when the claimant is thrown off the land or the legitimacy of ownership is challenged—often when government physically alters land or records a contradictory interest.
Abutter’s “special right of easement”: Adjacent landowners have a protected interest in access to public roads—but Nevada treats this as coextensive with an easement by necessity. Key ingredients are prior common ownership of both parcels and necessity at the time they were split, plus present necessity.
Easements by prescription vs. implication:
- Prescriptive: Acquired by long, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious use. Not available against the State absent statute.
- Implied: Arise from prior common ownership and circumstances showing the parties intended continued use upon severance of land.
Inverse condemnation: A “reverse” eminent domain claim alleging the government took property in fact without paying just compensation. It requires the plaintiff to first show an existing property interest that was taken or damaged.
Procedural due process: The Constitution requires notice and a hearing before the government can deprive a person of a protected property or liberty interest. Without a protected interest, there is no due process violation.
Waiver on appeal: Appellate courts usually will not consider arguments not presented to the trial court.

Conclusion

Harvey v. City of Reno consolidates and clarifies several Nevada doctrines at the intersection of public infrastructure, real property rights, and civil procedure. The Court confirmed that trial courts may take judicial notice of recorded property and highway documents at the motion-to-dismiss stage, thereby avoiding premature conversion to summary judgment. On the merits, the Court reaffirmed that quiet title claims accrue when ownership or possession is first called into question—here, decades earlier when the highway project altered the land—and are therefore subject to NRS 11.080’s five-year limit.

Substantively, the decision narrows abutter access claims to the contours of easements by necessity and underscores that prescriptive rights cannot be acquired against the State. Without a valid easement or ownership interest, claims for inverse condemnation and due process cannot proceed. Finally, the decision reinforces the importance of preserving issues below; new appellate theories—such as those invoking highway statutes—will not be entertained if not raised in the district court.

Key takeaway: Property owners adjacent to public highways must timely assert claims and cannot assume that long-term, informal use of State access roads will crystalize into legal rights. Public records will be judicially noticed to test these claims early, and the absence of a cognizable property interest is dispositive for both takings and due process theories.