Introduction

In United States v. Domingo Francisco‑Juan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a nonprecedential order granting appointed counsel’s Anders motion and dismissing the defendant’s consolidated appeals arising from serious offenses, including kidnapping, forced labor, and illegal reentry. The case presents a useful synthesis of several recurring doctrines in federal criminal practice:

• How appellate courts evaluate Anders submissions and cabin their review to the issues flagged by counsel when the defendant does not respond;
• How an error in describing supervised release at a plea colloquy is assessed under the Rule 11 “plain error/harmless error” framework;
• The enforceability of plea-based appeal waivers absent exceptional circumstances; and
• Sentencing review in an illegal-reentry case involving concurrent life sentences for related conduct.

Although designated “Nonprecedential,” the order clarifies practical points of plea and appellate practice: terms of supervised release run concurrently under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e); an overstatement of the potential supervised-release maximum at a plea hearing will typically be harmless where the defendant faces a life sentence and removal; and valid appeal waivers will be enforced unless the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum or rests on a constitutionally forbidden factor.

Parties: The United States prosecuted Domingo Francisco‑Juan in two separate cases in the Central District of Illinois. He pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, as well as to conspiracy to commit forced labor, forced labor, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and kidnapping. The district court imposed a life sentence on the conspiracy and kidnapping counts and 18 months for illegal reentry, all concurrent, with supervised release terms of five years (conspiracy case) and three years (illegal reentry).

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit, per a panel of Judges Jackson‑Akiwumi, Kolar, and Maldonado, granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California and dismissed the appeals. The court:

• Confined its review to the issues discussed in counsel’s Anders brief because the defendant did not respond, citing United States v. Bey and Circuit Rule 51(b);
• Concluded that any error at the plea colloquy concerning the maximum term of supervised release (the government incorrectly suggested supervised release terms could be stacked to 23 years) did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights, given that supervised release terms run concurrently (§ 3624(e)) and the defendant faced life imprisonment and removal upon release;
• Held that the appeal waiver in the conspiracy case was valid and enforceable, with no applicable exception (no sentence above the statutory maximum and no reliance on impermissible factors);
• Found no nonfrivolous challenge to the guidelines calculation or to the substantive reasonableness of the within-guidelines sentence for the illegal-reentry count.

Result: Motion to withdraw granted; appeals dismissed.

Case Background

The record reflects a scheme beginning in 2015 to bring a minor from Guatemala to the United States under false pretenses (promising education), ultimately coercing her labor for over five years, restricting her communications, and subjecting her to sexual abuse. In December 2020, after eight prior removals, the defendant reentered the United States without authorization. Two separate prosecutions followed:

• No. 22‑20020: One count of illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The defendant pleaded guilty without a plea agreement.
• No. 22‑20057: Counts of forced labor and conspiracy to commit forced labor (18 U.S.C. §§ 1594(a), (b), 1589(a), 2) and kidnapping and conspiracy to commit kidnapping (18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(c), 1201(a)(1), (c), 2). The defendant pleaded guilty under a written plea agreement to four counts; five counts were dismissed. The agreement included a comprehensive appeal waiver except for ineffective assistance claims.

At a consolidated plea hearing, with interpretation into Kanjobal, the district court conducted Rule 11 colloquies, accepted the pleas, and later imposed a life sentence on the conspiracy/kidnapping case and 18 months on the illegal-reentry case, all concurrent, with five-year supervised release terms (conspiracy case) and three years (illegal reentry), also concurrent. The presentence reports (PSRs) set a total offense level of 43 and criminal history category III for the conspiracy case (guidelines life) and a total offense level of 13 for illegal reentry (guidelines 18–24 months). No objections were lodged to the PSR calculations.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
  Establishes the procedure for appointed counsel to withdraw when an appeal is believed to be frivolous. Counsel must file a brief identifying anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. The court then independently reviews the record. Here, counsel fulfilled Anders by identifying plausible issues; the court, satisfied with the thorough analysis and absent a defendant response, proceeded to limited review.
• United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2014).
  In Anders cases, the Seventh Circuit limits its review to the issues counsel discusses when the defendant does not respond. That limitation framed the court’s scope here.
• Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; Seventh Cir. R. 51(b).
  The disposition is designated “Nonprecedential” and may be cited consistent with Rule 32.1. Circuit Rule 51(b) governs defendant responses to Anders motions; none was filed.
• Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(O), (h).
  Rule 11 requires the court to ensure a plea is knowing and voluntary through specified admonishments; Rule 11(h) provides harmless-error treatment. The plea colloquy here complied, save for the government’s misstatement about supervised-release stacking; the court held the misstatement harmless.
• United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020 (7th Cir. 2024).
  Confirming that Anders counsel should address potential challenges to plea validity when the client wishes to do so. Counsel complied.
• United States v. Collins, 986 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2021).
  When a defendant did not move to withdraw a plea in the district court, appellate review of the plea colloquy is for plain error. Applied to the Rule 11 issue here.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e).
  Supervised release terms run concurrently; courts cannot stack supervised-release terms consecutively to increase the total maximum. This statutory rule made the plea-hearing overstatement erroneous but ultimately harmless.
• United States v. Schaul, 962 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2020).
  To show a Rule 11 error affected substantial rights under plain error, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty. The court found that showing implausible here given exposure to life imprisonment and removal.
• United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2020).
  Appeal waivers stand or fall with the plea’s validity and are enforced unless the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum or rests on constitutionally forbidden factors such as race. No such exception applied here.
• Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003); United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 2014).
  Ineffective assistance claims are ordinarily reserved for collateral review where the record can be developed. The panel flagged that route for any IAC claim, as the plea waiver preserved it.
• United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022).
  A defendant who agrees with the guidelines calculation typically waives a challenge to it on appeal. Applied to the illegal-reentry guideline range.
• United States v. Williams, 85 F.4th 844 (7th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1046 (2024).
  A within-guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable. The court relied on that presumption in rejecting substantive reasonableness challenges to the 18-month sentence for § 1326(a).

Legal Reasoning

1) Scope of Anders Review and Defendant’s Nonresponse

Invoking Anders and Bey, the panel limited its review to the issues presented by counsel because the defendant did not respond to the motion to withdraw. This cabining of issues is a regular feature of the Seventh Circuit’s administration of Anders; it incentivizes thorough counsel submissions and recognizes that the court’s independent review focuses on arguably meritorious points.

2) Plea Validity: Rule 11 Compliance and Plain Error

The court confirmed that the district judge conducted proper Rule 11 colloquies, using an interpreter to ensure Kanjobal translation, and reviewed the nature of the charges, maximum penalties, and the rights being waived. The only identified misstep was the government’s statement that supervised-release terms could be consecutive, producing a 23-year maximum. By statute, supervised-release terms run concurrently, and each relevant count carried a five-year supervised-release cap.

Because the defendant did not seek to withdraw his pleas in the district court, review was for plain error. To obtain relief, he would need to show a reasonable probability that he would not have pled but for the misstatement. The panel held that showing untenable in context:

• The defendant faced life imprisonment on multiple counts;
• The district court advised that he faced removal upon release; and
• The PSRs, and ultimately the sentence, reflected the correct supervised-release maxima (3 years for illegal reentry; 5 years per count for the conspiracy/kidnapping case, running concurrently).

In short, the error did not affect substantial rights and was harmless under Rule 11(h).

3) Appeal Waiver Enforcement

The conspiracy case plea agreement included a broad appeal waiver. Because the plea was valid, the waiver stands under Nulf. The panel found no basis to refuse enforcement:

• The sentence did not exceed statutory maxima; and
• No indication existed that the district court relied on a constitutionally impermissible factor.

Any ineffective-assistance claim was preserved by the waiver but relegated to collateral review under Massaro and Flores.

4) Sentencing Issues in the Illegal-Reentry Case

The district court calculated the § 2L1.2 guideline range at 18–24 months based on a total offense level of 13; the defense agreed to that calculation, waiving an appellate challenge under Boyle. The 18-month sentence, being within the range, was presumptively reasonable under Williams and was adequately supported by § 3553(a) factors, including the defendant’s repeated unlawful reentries to facilitate a long-running kidnapping and forced-labor scheme.

Impact and Practical Implications

1) Supervised Release Misstatements at Plea Colloquies

This decision underscores that:

• Overstatements of supervised-release exposure (suggesting stacking) are erroneous because § 3624(e) mandates concurrency. But where other penalties dominate (e.g., life imprisonment) and the record otherwise demonstrates a knowing, voluntary plea, such misstatements are likely harmless.
• Understatements of exposure (telling a defendant the maximum is lower than it is) pose a greater risk of prejudice on appeal, as they can undermine the premise of a knowing and voluntary plea. Practitioners should vigilantly avoid both, but particularly understatements.

2) Appeal Waivers Remain Robust

The Seventh Circuit continues to enforce plea-based appeal waivers, absent limited exceptions. Defendants and counsel should assume that:

• A valid waiver will preclude direct-appeal challenges to conviction and sentence in the covered case;
• Claims of ineffective assistance generally must be brought via § 2255 to allow factual development; and
• Arguments that the court exceeded statutory maxima or relied on impermissible factors remain viable notwithstanding a waiver.

3) Anders Practice: What Makes an Appeal “Frivolous”

This case illustrates an Anders-compliant brief: counsel identified the most plausible issues (plea validity, appeal waiver, guideline calculation, and substantive reasonableness) and explained why none had a reasonable prospect of success. When a defendant does not respond to the Anders motion, the panel will generally confine itself to counsel’s discussion and, if satisfied, dismiss.

4) Language Access and Plea Validity

The court’s express acknowledgment that the Rule 11 admonishments were translated into Kanjobal demonstrates a best practice in ensuring plea validity across language barriers. Accurate interpretation strengthens the presumption that a plea is knowing and voluntary.

5) Concurrent Supervised-Release Terms

The opinion reiterates a recurring but sometimes misunderstood point: supervised-release terms on multiple counts run concurrently. District courts cannot extend the total supervised-release exposure by stacking terms consecutively across counts. Practitioners should ensure that plea colloquies, PSRs, and judgments reflect this concurrency.

6) Sentencing for Illegal Reentry Amid Serious Companion Conduct

Where an illegal-reentry sentence runs concurrently with lengthy or life sentences in companion cases arising from related conduct, appellate challenges to the reentry sentence will often be difficult. A within-guidelines sentence, supported by § 3553(a) factors—especially recidivism and the role of reentry in facilitating other crimes—will typically be sustained.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Anders brief: A filing by appointed counsel who believes an appeal lacks any nonfrivolous issue, explaining why and identifying anything in the record that could arguably support an appeal. The court then independently reviews the record to confirm the assessment.
• Plain error (on plea review): If a defendant did not ask the district court to withdraw a plea, the appellate court asks whether there was a clear error that affected substantial rights (a reasonable probability the defendant would not have pled but for the error) and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
• Rule 11 colloquy: The judge’s in-court conversation with a defendant to ensure the plea is knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis, including an explanation of the nature of the charges, maximum penalties, and rights waived.
• Supervised release concurrency: By statute (18 U.S.C. § 3624(e)), when a defendant has multiple supervised-release terms, they run at the same time, not one after another. Courts cannot “stack” supervised release to lengthen the total period beyond the longest single term.
• Appeal waiver: A defendant’s agreement, usually in a plea deal, not to appeal the conviction or sentence (except for limited issues such as ineffective assistance). Courts enforce these waivers if the plea was valid, the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and the sentence does not exceed statutory limits or rest on unconstitutional grounds.
• Presumption of reasonableness: A sentence within the properly calculated guidelines range is presumed reasonable on appeal; overcoming that presumption requires showing the sentence is too high in view of the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
• Collateral review for ineffective assistance: Claims that counsel performed deficiently are typically raised through a post-conviction motion (28 U.S.C. § 2255), not on direct appeal, because additional evidence outside the trial record is often necessary.

Conclusion

United States v. Domingo Francisco‑Juan is a clear application of well-settled principles in federal criminal appeals. Even though designated nonprecedential, it offers practical guidance:

• Errors in describing supervised release at plea colloquies are assessed under plain error/harmless error; an overstatement of the maximum is rarely prejudicial where life imprisonment or removal renders supervised-release exposure comparatively insignificant and the written PSR and sentence reflect the correct law.
• Appeal waivers remain a formidable barrier to direct appellate review absent sentences that exceed statutory maximums or reliance on impermissible factors.
• Within-guidelines sentences—particularly those corroborated by repeated unlawful conduct and linked to serious companion crimes—are presumptively reasonable.
• Anders practice in the Seventh Circuit emphasizes issue selection and thorough explanation by counsel; absent a defendant’s response, the court will limit its review accordingly.

The decision reinforces fundamental procedural safeguards—accurate interpretation for non-English speakers and proper Rule 11 admonishments—while signaling that minor, non-prejudicial misstatements will not unravel otherwise valid pleas. For practitioners, the opinion is a reminder to ensure plea colloquies accurately reflect supervised-release concurrency and to advise clients carefully about the potency of appeal waivers and the appropriate channel for ineffective assistance claims.

Bottom line: The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeals after concluding that no nonfrivolous issue existed—an outcome shaped by a correct understanding of supervised release, a valid appeal waiver, and standard-of-review constraints in Anders litigation.

Case Metadata

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Date: October 23, 2025
• Docket Nos.: 24‑1594 & 24‑1595
• Originating Court: Central District of Illinois, Nos. 2:22‑CR‑20020 & 2:22‑CR‑20057 (Judge Colin S. Bruce)
• Disposition: Counsel’s Anders motion granted; appeals dismissed
• Designation: Nonprecedential Disposition (FRAP 32.1)