Harmless Guidelines Error under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Plea and “Self‑Evident” Justification for Alcohol‑Abstinence Conditions: United States v. Goins (2d Cir. 2025)

Note on precedential status: This is a Second Circuit summary order issued October 23, 2025. Under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, it may be cited but does not have precedential effect.

Introduction

United States v. Goins arises from a violent confrontation and subsequent drug arrest that produced a mixed federal sentence: a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and a heroin-fentanyl distribution conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(C). The case presents two recurring federal sentencing issues:

Whether asserted errors in calculating the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are harmless where the district court accepts a binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea and explicitly states it would impose the same sentence after a thorough 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis; and
Whether a district court’s failure to articulate on the record an individualized assessment for a special condition of supervised release (alcohol abstinence) can be affirmed where its justification is “self-evident” from the record and no objection was preserved (plain-error review).

Before Judges Bianco, Pérez, and Merriam, the Second Circuit affirmed the 57-month sentence imposed within a binding 54–90 month range and upheld a special condition prohibiting alcohol use during supervised release. The panel declined to reach disputed Guidelines issues—an aggravated-assault cross-reference and a serious-bodily-injury enhancement—on harmless-error grounds. It also acknowledged an explanatory lapse regarding the alcohol condition but affirmed because the rationale was apparent from the defendant’s history of substance abuse and impaired driving.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment in full, concluding:

Guidelines challenges: Even assuming arguendo misapplication of (i) the cross-reference from U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1) to § 2A2.2 (aggravated assault) notwithstanding the defendant’s self-defense claim, and (ii) the five-level enhancement for “serious bodily injury” under § 2A2.2(b)(3)(B), any error was harmless. The district court unequivocally stated it would impose the same 57-month sentence regardless of the precise Guidelines calculation, relying on the § 3553(a) factors and the binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea’s stipulated range.
Alcohol-abstinence condition: Although the district court did not expressly conduct the required individualized assessment on the record, its reasoning was self-evident (extensive substance abuse history, DUI history, and impaired driving), and no plain error occurred. The condition is reasonably related to the defendant’s history and rehabilitation needs and imposes no greater deprivation than necessary.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2020): Reiterates that procedural unreasonableness includes failure to calculate or miscalculating the Guidelines range. Sets the frame for reviewing alleged Guidelines errors.
United States v. Solis, 18 F.4th 395 (2d Cir. 2021): Clarifies standard of review: abuse of discretion for procedural reasonableness, with de novo review for Guidelines application. The panel proceeds as if those standards apply but avoids the merits due to harmlessness.
United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2009): Establishes that a Guidelines calculation error can be harmless if the district court would have imposed the same sentence regardless. This anchors the panel’s harmless-error approach.
United States v. Darrah, 132 F.4th 643 (2d Cir. 2025): Warns against insulating sentences from review with a “simple incantation.” Courts must examine the entire record to confirm harmlessness. The panel applies Darrah by surveying the district court’s detailed § 3553(a) analysis, the binding 11(c)(1)(C) range, and explicit same-sentence statements.
United States v. Shuster, 331 F.3d 294 (2d Cir. 2003): Supports declining to adjudicate Guidelines disputes that would not affect the sentence—a policy against “academic exercises” echoed in Borrego.
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016): Recognizes the powerful anchoring effect of the Guidelines but also acknowledges sentences based on factors independent of the Guidelines. The panel uses it to underscore that the district court anchored the sentence in § 3553(a) factors and the accepted plea range.
United States v. Borrego, 388 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2004): Reinforces the futility of resolving issues that would not change the sentence.
United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018): Requires an individualized assessment for special conditions of supervised release and an on-the-record explanation, but allows affirmance if the rationale is self-evident.
United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2005): Articulates standards governing supervised release conditions, including the requirement that they be reasonably related to § 3553(a) purposes and not impose more deprivation than necessary.
United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2008): Applies plain-error review to unpreserved challenges to supervised release conditions. The panel follows that path here.
United States v. Haverkamp, 958 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2020) and United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002): Discuss the contours of plain error and a “relaxed” variant. The panel sidesteps choosing between them because the result is the same under either approach.
United States v. Kyser, 2024 WL 2175963 (2d Cir. May 15, 2024) (summary order): Notes the Guidelines’ recommendation at U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4) for a no-alcohol condition when there is reason to believe the defendant abuses controlled substances or alcohol. Supports the “self-evident” justification for the alcohol condition.

Legal Reasoning

1) Harmlessness of Alleged Guidelines Errors

The disputes. Goins challenged two aspects of the district court’s Guidelines analysis:

Cross-reference under § 2K2.1(c)(1) to § 2A2.2 (aggravated assault): The court used the aggravated-assault guideline to calculate the offense level based on Goins’s firearm use during the apartment-door confrontation. Goins asserted he acted in self-defense, contesting whether an aggravated assault occurred.
Serious-bodily-injury enhancement under § 2A2.2(b)(3)(B): The court applied a five-level increase, which Goins disputed both factually and legally, arguing the injury did not qualify as “serious bodily injury.”

The panel’s approach. Without deciding these contested issues, the panel held any error was harmless. Two pillars supported that conclusion:

Explicit same-sentence statements: The district court unambiguously said it would impose the same 57-month sentence even if the aggravated-assault cross-reference did not apply and even if the serious-bodily-injury enhancement did not apply. These were not perfunctory incantations; each was tethered to the record and the binding plea range.
Record-based § 3553(a) analysis and the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea’s stipulated range: The court emphasized the “extraordinarily reckless” decision to bring a loaded firearm to an “alcohol-infused confrontation,” the admitted intent to use the gun as a bludgeon, the criminal history (albeit some remote), and mitigating considerations (self-surrender overtures, community ties). It also relied on the binding 54–90 month range in the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea, which the court accepted. Defense counsel, for his part, expressly argued for 54 months and acknowledged the court could not go lower under the agreement even if his lower Guidelines view prevailed.

Darrah’s “simple incantation” caution satisfied. The panel hewed to Darrah by inspecting the entire record, not merely the district court’s assurances, and found a concrete § 3553(a) rationale and plea-based anchor supporting the 57-month sentence irrespective of the disputed enhancements. This put the case outside Molina-Martinez’s ordinary prejudice scenario where an erroneous range silently anchors the sentence.

2) Alcohol-Abstinence Condition on Supervised Release

The challenge. Goins attacked the special condition requiring that he “refrain from the use of alcohol and other intoxicants during and after treatment,” arguing the district court provided no on-the-record explanation and that nothing justified alcohol abstinence, despite his drug-history-driven treatment requirement.

The standards. A special condition must be reasonably related to the § 3553(a) purposes (nature/circumstances; history/characteristics; deterrence; protection of the public; rehabilitation), impose no greater deprivation than necessary, and reflect an individualized assessment. While failure to articulate reasons is error, Betts allows affirmance if the rationale is self-evident from the record. Because Goins did not object below, plain-error review applies: he had to show a clear error that affected substantial rights and seriously impugned the fairness or integrity of proceedings (or, under Sofsky’s “relaxed” iteration, at least a clear and obvious error).

The record and result. The panel agreed the district court erred by not explaining the alcohol condition but held the error harmless and not plain because the justification is self-evident:

Goins’s extensive history of substance abuse beginning in adolescence, multiple treatments with relapses, and heavy heroin use (10–15 bags/day) near the time of arrest;
Evidence of alcohol misuse and impaired driving: a 2009 DUI with 0.176 BAC; an alleged 2014 alcohol-related release violation and suspicion of DUI; an April 2022 impaired-driving arrest (drugs detected).

Given U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4), which recommends no-alcohol conditions when a court has reason to believe a defendant abuses controlled substances or alcohol, the condition is reasonably related to rehabilitation and public safety. On this record, it imposes no greater deprivation than necessary.

Impact

Although non-precedential, Goins offers robust guidance for federal sentencing practice in the Second Circuit:

Alternative sentences and harmless-error insulation: District judges who state, with record-specific § 3553(a) reasons, that they would impose the same sentence irrespective of a disputed Guidelines range can often avoid remand even if a later error is found. Darrah’s warning still applies: provide more than a formulaic “same sentence” statement; tie it to the facts and statutory factors.
Rule 11(c)(1)(C) pleas constrain appellate leverage: When parties stipulate to a binding range and the court accepts it, defense challenges to intervening Guidelines steps carry less practical consequence if the sentence falls within the agreed range and the court provides an independent § 3553(a) basis. Counsel should anticipate that appellate courts may deem Guidelines disputes harmless in this posture.
Preservation of supervised-release objections remains critical: Failure to object triggers plain-error review. Even when a district court omits an on-the-record individualized assessment, a strong record of substance abuse and impaired driving can render the justification “self-evident,” dooming a belated challenge.
Record-building for special conditions: District courts should explicitly connect special conditions to the defendant’s history and § 3553(a) purposes. While Betts’s “self-evident” safety valve may save an unexplained condition, best practice is to articulate the rationale to avoid risk on appeal and promote transparency.
Substance abuse and alcohol-abstinence conditions: The Guidelines expressly contemplate alcohol bans where there is reason to believe a defendant abuses controlled substances or alcohol. Practitioners should address both drug and alcohol histories at sentencing when negotiating or contesting conditions.
Serious-bodily-injury disputes may be academic if the sentence is independently grounded: Where a district court provides a fact-specific § 3553(a) rationale and an accepted (C) plea range exists, appellate courts may bypass thorny injury-level disputes as harmless. Counsel should therefore argue both the Guidelines issue and why the § 3553(a) balance should differ even under the court’s alternative analysis.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea: A binding plea agreement in which the parties stipulate a specific sentence or sentencing range. If the court accepts the agreement, it must sentence within that framework. The Guidelines still inform the court’s decision, but the accepted range becomes a powerful anchor for harmless-error analysis.
Sentencing Guidelines vs. § 3553(a): The Guidelines provide an advisory range; § 3553(a) lists factors courts must consider to craft a just sentence (e.g., nature of offense, history of defendant, deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation). A court may vary from the Guidelines if § 3553(a) warrants it.
Cross-reference (§ 2K2.1(c)(1) → § 2A2.2): When a firearm offense is committed in connection with another offense (like aggravated assault), the Guidelines may direct the court to use the more serious offense’s guideline to compute the offense level.
Aggravated assault (§ 2A2.2): Felonious assault involving factors such as a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury or resulting in serious bodily injury. Applying § 2A2.2 typically increases the offense level significantly.
Serious bodily injury enhancement (§ 2A2.2(b)(3)(B)): Adds five levels when the victim sustains serious bodily injury—generally more than transient pain, involving extreme pain, medical intervention, or protracted impairment. It substantially raises the Guidelines range.
Harmless error vs. plain error:
- Harmless error applies when a preserved procedural error likely made no difference to the sentence; appellate courts can affirm if the district court would have imposed the same sentence anyway, based on the record and § 3553(a).
- Plain error governs unpreserved objections. The appellant must show a clear/obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Some cases apply a “relaxed” variant in supervised-release contexts, but the outcome here did not require choosing between standards.
Special conditions of supervised release: Tailored requirements during the supervision period (e.g., treatment, abstinence). They must be reasonably related to § 3553(a) purposes and not impose more deprivation than necessary. Courts should make individualized assessments and explain their reasons; an appellate court may nonetheless affirm where the rationale is apparent from the record.
Summary orders (FRAP 32.1; Local Rule 32.1.1): Non-precedential dispositions that may be cited (with “summary order” designation) and must be served on pro se parties. They signal how a circuit is handling recurring issues without binding future panels.

Conclusion

United States v. Goins provides a clear, practice-focused reaffirmation of two important sentencing principles in the Second Circuit:

Guidelines harmlessness is satisfied when the district court, after a record-specific § 3553(a) analysis and acceptance of a binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) range, explicitly states it would impose the same sentence regardless of disputed enhancements—and the record supports that assertion under Darrah’s “no simple incantation” standard.
Alcohol-abstinence special conditions can be affirmed under plain-error review even if the district court omits an express individualized assessment, provided the justification is self-evident from the defendant’s substance abuse and impaired-driving history and the condition comports with U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b) and (d)(4).

For litigants and judges alike, Goins underscores the value of robust, alternative § 3553(a) explanations that can render Guidelines disputes academic, and the importance of creating a clear record tying special supervised-release conditions to the defendant’s rehabilitative needs and public-safety concerns. Even as a non-precedential summary order, it offers a pragmatic roadmap for insulating sentences from reversible error and for tailoring—and defending—supervision conditions.

Citations: United States v. Goins, No. 24-1572-cr (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2025) (summary order). When citing this order, note it is non-precedential and follow FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1.