Harmless Error Review of Erlinger Violations in ACCA Sentencing: Commentary on United States v. Beasley (7th Cir. 2025)

Harmless Error Review of Erlinger Violations in ACCA Sentencing: Commentary on United States v. Beasley (7th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Alvin Beasley, No. 23‑2489 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), is an important follow‑on to the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). While Erlinger held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a jury to decide, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether prior convictions were committed on “occasions different from one another” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Beasley addresses what happens when a sentencing judge, pre‑Erlinger, made that determination alone.

The core contribution of Beasley is twofold:

  • It holds that an Erlinger-type violation — failing to charge and submit ACCA’s “different occasions” element to a jury — is a trial (constitutional) error subject to harmless‑error review, not a structural error requiring automatic reversal.
  • It provides a concrete template for finding such an error harmless when the temporal separation and nature of the prior offenses make any contrary jury finding effectively impossible, particularly where the defendant has admitted the relevant facts.

The decision thus shapes how lower courts will handle a broad wave of Erlinger-based attacks on ACCA sentences, especially in cases where the underlying convictions are clearly separated in time and character.

II. Case Background

A. Facts of the Offense

On May 23, 2019, police responded to a “shots fired” call at the Danville, Illinois residence of Alvin Beasley’s ex‑girlfriend. Officers observed two bullet holes on the exterior of the home. A witness reported seeing a red Chevrolet Impala leaving immediately after the gunshots.

Police located and tailed the Impala, saw a firearm thrown from the passenger side, stopped the vehicle, and found Beasley in the driver’s seat. Because Beasley was a previously convicted felon, he could not lawfully possess a firearm. He was charged with and convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

B. Prior Convictions and ACCA Exposure

The probation office’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) identified three prior felony convictions as ACCA predicates:

  • Armed robbery committed on March 21, 2004;
  • Aggravated battery on June 11, 2005; and
  • Second‑degree murder (homicide) on December 23, 2011.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), the ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for a § 922(g)(1) offender who has “three previous convictions” for violent felonies “committed on occasions different from one another.” ACCA also raises the maximum sentence from ten years under § 922(g) to life imprisonment.

The Guidelines range based on ACCA and other factors was 262–327 months. The district court concluded that the three prior offenses were committed on different occasions and sentenced Beasley to 300 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release.

C. Beasley’s Objection and Appeal

At sentencing, Beasley:

  • Admitted the existence and dates of the three convictions (2004, 2005, and 2011), including during a colloquy with the court; but
  • Objected that, under Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022), the “different occasions” analysis is fact‑intensive and thus, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, not by a judge.

The district court overruled the objection based on then‑controlling Seventh Circuit precedent, United States v. Hatley, 61 F.4th 536 (7th Cir. 2023), which had held that “separate occasions” need not be charged in the indictment or found by a jury.

While Beasley’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Erlinger, which squarely held that the “different occasions” question under ACCA must indeed go to a jury. That decision rendered the district court’s approach constitutionally erroneous. The question for the Seventh Circuit, therefore, became: what is the consequence of that error here?

III. Summary of the Opinion

Judge St. Eve, writing for a unanimous panel, proceeds in two main steps:

  1. Finding Constitutional Error under Erlinger:
    • The panel accepts that, under Erlinger, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require the “different occasions” determination to be charged in the indictment and decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
    • Beasley’s sentencing violated this rule: the indictment omitted the “different occasions” allegation, the issue was never put to the jury, and the judge alone made findings that increased both the mandatory minimum and the statutory maximum.
    • The government concedes, and the court agrees, that this was constitutional error.
  2. Determining the Standard of Review and Applying Harmless‑Error Doctrine:
    • The court rejects Beasley’s contention that the error is “structural,” i.e., automatically reversible, and instead holds that it is a trial error subject to harmless‑error review.
    • Drawing extensively on Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006), Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), and its own precedent, the court holds that failing to submit a sentencing factor — even one that raises the minimum and maximum sentence — to the jury is subject to Chapman-style harmless‑error analysis.
    • Applying that standard, the panel concludes that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because:
      • Beasley conceded at sentencing that his prior offenses occurred on three widely separated dates (2004, 2005, 2011); and
      • Under Wooden’s framework, crimes separated by over a year and differing in character (armed robbery, aggravated battery, homicide) must be treated as “different occasions.”
    • The court emphasizes that no “colorable argument” could support treating convictions so widely separated in time as a single occasion.
    • Accordingly, the ACCA sentence stands, and the judgment is affirmed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Doctrinal Setting: ACCA, Apprendi, Alleyne, Wooden, and Erlinger

1. ACCA’s “Different Occasions” Requirement

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), ACCA significantly enhances penalties for certain § 922(g) offenders:

  • At least three previous convictions;
  • Each for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense”; and
  • “Committed on occasions different from one another.”

The “different occasions” clause prevents multiple convictions arising from what is functionally a single criminal episode from automatically triggering ACCA’s severe penalties. But this text left unresolved:

  • What counts as “one” occasion vs. “different” occasions?
  • Who decides that (judge or jury), and under what standard?

2. Apprendi and Alleyne

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) and Alleyne v. United States (2013) are the foundational Sixth Amendment sentencing cases:

  • Apprendi: Any fact (other than the mere existence of a prior conviction) that increases the statutory maximum sentence must be charged, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Alleyne: Extends this rule to facts that increase the statutory mandatory minimum.

Together, these decisions establish that ACCA facts that raise the minimum and maximum penalties — beyond the simple fact that the defendant was previously convicted — must be treated as “elements” for jury‑trial purposes.

3. Wooden and the “Intensely Factual” Nature of ACCA’s Occasions Clause

In Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022), the Supreme Court addressed how to interpret “occasions different from one another.” Wooden involved multiple burglaries committed in close succession at separate storage units.

Wooden held that the analysis is “intensely factual,” requiring examination of a “range” of circumstances, including:

  • Timing;
  • Proximity of location; and
  • The character and relationship of the offenses.

The Court noted that:

  • “Often, a single factor — especially of time or place — can decisively differentiate occasions.”
  • “When the crimes are separated by a day or more, they will nearly always be treated as different occasions.”

The Seventh Circuit in Beasley quotes these principles directly, and later applies them as the centerpiece of its harmless‑error analysis.

4. Erlinger: The Jury Right Extends to the Occasions Question

Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), built on Apprendi, Alleyne, and Wooden to resolve a split concerning who decides the “different occasions” issue.

The Court held:

  • The “different occasions” question is not merely encompassed within the “fact of a prior conviction” exception to Apprendi.
  • Because it requires an “intensely factual” examination of multiple circumstances beyond the bare existence of prior convictions, the clause must be treated as an element for purposes of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
  • Thus, a unanimous jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prior offenses were committed on different occasions.

The Beasley panel highlights that the Supreme Court itself characterized Erlinger as being “as nearly on all fours with Apprendi and Alleyne as any [case] we might imagine.” 602 U.S. at 835. This description is crucial: it underpins the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the type of error here is the familiar Apprendi/Alleyne-type trial error that is subject to harmless‑error review.

B. Precedents and Their Influence

1. Structural vs. Harmless Error: Neder, Recuenco, and the Supreme Court’s Framework

The opinion surveys the Supreme Court’s structural‑error jurisprudence:

  • Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006)
  • Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999)
  • Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)
  • Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)
  • Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993)
  • Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997)
  • Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986)
  • Classic structural cases: Gideon, Tumey, Vasquez, McKaskle, Waller.

From these, the Seventh Circuit extracts several key principles:

  • “Most constitutional errors can be harmless.” (Neder quoting Fulminante.)
  • If the defendant had counsel and an impartial adjudicator, there is a “strong presumption” that other constitutional errors are subject to harmless‑error analysis.
  • Structural errors are reserved for a “very limited class of cases” — those that “vitiate all the jury’s findings” or undermine the entire framework of the trial (e.g., total denial of counsel, biased judge, racially discriminatory grand jury, denial of public trial, defective reasonable‑doubt instruction).

Crucially, Recuenco held that the “failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury is not structural error,” and that such errors fall within the standard harmless‑error framework:

“Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury ... is not structural error.” – Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 222.

The Seventh Circuit treats the Erlinger error in Beasley as squarely analogous: both involve judicial fact‑finding of a sentencing factor that should have been found by a jury.

2. Seventh Circuit Apprendi‑Line Precedent

The panel relies on several of its own prior decisions:

  • United States v. Williams, 493 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2007) and United States v. Hollingsworth, 495 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2007): Applied harmless‑error review to Apprendi-type failures to submit sentencing factors to the jury.
  • United States v. Adkins, 274 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2001) and United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2000): Held that Apprendi errors in both charging and instructing the jury are not structural; analogized incomplete indictments to faulty jury instructions, which Neder treated as trial errors subject to harmlessness.
  • United States v. Mansoori, 480 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2007): Applied harmless‑error review even when an uncharged factor ultimately mandated a life sentence.
  • United States v. Johnson, 114 F.4th 913 (7th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Santana, 141 F.4th 847 (7th Cir. 2025): Applied harmless‑error principles to Erlinger violations specifically (Johnson in the context of a guilty plea, Santana under plain‑error review).

These cases establish that, in the Seventh Circuit, Apprendi-related indictment and sentencing errors are uniformly treated as trial errors subject to harmless or plain‑error review — not as structural defects.

3. Constructive Amendment: Distinguishing Stirone and Muresanu

Beasley argued that the failure to charge the ACCA “different occasions” element amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment, which — under longstanding doctrine — is “per se reversible error.” He cited:

  • Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), and
  • United States v. Muresanu, 951 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2020).

Those cases involved the jury convicting the defendant of an offense materially different from the one charged by the grand jury:

  • In Stirone, the jury was allowed to convict for a different Hobbs Act violation not charged in the indictment.
  • In Muresanu, an indictment for attempted crime resulted in a conviction for the completed crime because the jury instruction omitted the word “attempt.”

The Seventh Circuit distinguishes these cases on a key point:

“Both cases... involved the subsequent addition of an entire offense not charged in the indictment... Here, by contrast, the indictment ‘failed to allege... but one element of the ACCA sentencing enhancement to be decided by the jury.’” – Beasley, slip op. at 8–9 (quoting Brown).

The panel emphasizes that it has never applied the Stirone constructive‑amendment doctrine to the omission of a sentencing factor, and that it consistently treats such omissions as Apprendi-type trial errors subject to harmless‑error analysis.

4. Sister‑Circuit Consensus After Erlinger

The opinion notes that “each of our sister circuits to consider an Erlinger error has uniformly reviewed for harmlessness,” citing:

  • United States v. Brown, 136 F.4th 87 (4th Cir. 2025);
  • United States v. Butler, 122 F.4th 584 (5th Cir. 2024);
  • United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th 624 (6th Cir. 2024);
  • United States v. Xavior‑Smith, 136 F.4th 1136 (8th Cir. 2025);
  • United States v. Rivers, 134 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2025);
  • United States v. Saunders, No. 23‑6735‑cr, 2024 WL 4533359 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2024).

In particular, Brown is invoked for two propositions:

  • That “failure to charge” the ACCA enhancement is not structural error; and
  • That sentencing under ACCA without charging the enhancement is not a constructive amendment of the indictment.

The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Beasley thus aligns with an emerging national consensus: Erlinger errors are not categorically reversible; they are subject to harmless‑error scrutiny.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Identifying the Error Under Erlinger

The panel straightforwardly recognizes the constitutional violation:

  • The different‑occasions finding increased Beasley’s statutory maximum (from 10 years under § 922(g) to life under ACCA) and minimum (from 0 to 15 years).
  • Under Apprendi and Alleyne, such a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Under Erlinger, the occasions inquiry is not part of the “fact of a prior conviction” exception but an “intensely factual” question requiring a jury.

The district court’s failure to charge this element in the indictment or submit it to the jury is therefore a conceded constitutional error.

2. Rejecting the “Structural Error” Label

Beasley argued that this Erlinger violation was structural — akin to a total denial of the jury’s role on a critical element — and thus required automatic vacatur of his sentence. The panel rejects this, relying on:

  • Recuenco (failure to submit sentencing factor not structural);
  • Neder (omission of an element from jury instructions can be harmless);
  • Seventh Circuit practice treating Apprendi-type indictment and instruction defects as subject to harmless‑error review.

The court emphasizes that this type of error does not “vitiate the jury’s entire verdict” because:

  • The jury properly decided the underlying substantive offense: felon in possession under § 922(g)(1).
  • The error affected only a discrete sentencing factor (whether ACCA applied), not the validity of the conviction itself.

Accordingly, the error is classified as a trial error, to be reviewed for harmlessness under Chapman.

3. The Sullivan Argument and Its Rejection

Beasley invoked language from Sullivan v. Louisiana suggesting that when there is no valid “verdict of guilty‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt” on the issue in question, harmless‑error analysis is conceptually impossible. The Seventh Circuit observes that this argument has already been considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in:

  • Neder – harmless‑error applied even though the jury never passed on an essential element of the offense; and
  • Recuenco – harmless‑error applied when the jury never decided the aggravating sentencing factor.

The panel describes this line of argument as irreconcilable with settled harmless‑error doctrine and therefore foreclosed.

4. Charging Defects: Indictment and Constructive Amendment

Beasley also argued that failure to allege the ACCA enhancement in the indictment was itself a structural error or a constructive amendment.

The Seventh Circuit responds:

  • It is “well established” in the circuit that Apprendi errors in both indictment and jury charge are subject to harmless‑error analysis (Adkins, Nance).
  • An incomplete indictment (missing a sentencing factor) is analogous to a missing element in jury instructions, which Neder treated as a classic candidate for harmless‑error review.
  • Constructive amendment doctrine (as in Stirone and Muresanu) applies where the jury is allowed to convict the defendant of an offense different from the one charged, not where a sentencing factor is omitted.

The court underscores that, in its own and other circuits’ practice, failure to charge ACCA enhancements is consistently treated as an Apprendi-type defect, not as a constructive amendment or structural error.

5. Evidence Available for Harmless‑Error Review

To conduct harmless‑error analysis, an appellate court asks whether it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” In the ACCA/Erlinger context, this translates to:

Whether it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have found the same facts as the court” regarding the different‑occasions element. – Beasley, slip op. at 10–11 (citing Hollingsworth and Chapman).

Beasley argued that the government could not meet this burden because:

  • The record before the jury lacked evidence about the timing, locations, or relatedness of the prior offenses; and
  • The appellate court should not rely on “Shepard documents” or other sentencing materials not presented to the trial jury.

The Seventh Circuit sidesteps the detailed Shepard‑document question because it does not need those materials. Instead, it relies on:

  • Beasley’s own concessions at sentencing — in his memorandum and in open court — that his prior offenses were:
    • an armed robbery on March 21, 2004;
    • an aggravated battery on June 11, 2005; and
    • a homicide on December 23, 2011.

Drawing on United States v. Robinson, 964 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Warneke, 310 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2002), the court notes that:

“An admission is even better than a jury’s finding.”

Thus, Beasley’s explicit, uncoerced admissions of the dates and nature of his prior offenses are treated as powerful evidence of what a properly instructed jury would have found. The panel also holds that Beasley waived a more sweeping argument — that harmless‑error review must be confined to the trial record alone — by raising it for the first time at oral argument.

6. Applying Wooden’s Factors: Why the Error Was Harmless

Under Wooden, a properly instructed jury deciding the “different occasions” question would consider:

  • Timing of the offenses;
  • Proximity of location; and
  • Character and relationship of the offenses.

The panel focuses primarily on timing, echoing Wooden’s statement that a single factor — especially time or place — can be decisive, and that crimes separated by a day or more will “nearly always” be separate occasions.

Using Beasley’s own admissions:

  • The offenses occurred in 2004, 2005, and 2011 — each separated by at least a year in time, and the final one by roughly six years.
  • The offenses were of distinct character: armed robbery, aggravated battery, and homicide.

The panel compares this to its earlier cases:

  • Johnson – error not harmless when offenses occurred “within minutes” and less than a mile apart.
  • Santana – potential reasonable doubt where crimes were four miles and ten minutes apart.
  • Richardson, 60 F.4th 397 (7th Cir. 2023) – “no colorable argument” that two robberies separated by 36 hours occurred on the same occasion.

Against that backdrop, the court concludes:

  • Beasley’s offenses, separated by years, are even more clearly distinct occasions than those in Richardson.
  • Because time alone “decisively” differentiates the occasions here, and the offenses are different in nature, there is no reasonable possibility that a properly instructed jury would have found them to be a single occasion or fewer than three occasions.

Accordingly, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman.

7. Double Jeopardy and Remand

Beasley raised a final argument that, if the court were to remand for a new ACCA proceeding before a jury, such a retrial on the different‑occasions element might violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The Seventh Circuit deems this argument irrelevant to the harmless‑error inquiry:

  • The harmless‑error question is purely forward‑looking: what would a properly instructed jury have found on the existing record?
  • Whether double jeopardy would bar retrial of the ACCA enhancement is, in this case, moot, because the panel is not remanding at all.

The court therefore does not decide the double jeopardy issue.

V. Impact and Implications

A. For ACCA Litigation After Erlinger

Beasley confirms that:

  • Not every Erlinger violation will result in resentencing. Where the underlying facts make any contrary jury finding effectively impossible, courts can and will deem the error harmless.
  • Defendants challenging ACCA sentences on Erlinger grounds must therefore show realistic, fact‑based grounds on which a reasonable jury could find that three or more prior convictions were not committed on different occasions.

In practice, that means:

  • Cases involving prior offenses separated by minutes or hours, close in space, or part of a single spree will remain fertile ground for relief under Erlinger (as indicated by Johnson and Santana).
  • Cases where the priors are separated by months or years and are obviously separate episodes (as in Beasley, Brown, Butler, Campbell) will often be affirmed under harmless‑error review.

B. Charging Practice and Jury Instructions

From the prosecution’s perspective, Beasley underscores that:

  • Post‑Erlinger, the government must explicitly allege the ACCA different‑occasions element in the indictment if it intends to seek an ACCA enhancement.
  • Trial courts must submit that question to the jury with appropriate instructions following Wooden (e.g., explaining time, place, and relationship factors).

Defense counsel, in turn, will:

  • Ensure that any failure to charge or submit the occasions factor is preserved by timely objection (as Beasley did, by invoking Apprendi, Alleyne, and Wooden).
  • Consider carefully whether to stipulate or concede facts about the prior convictions, knowing those admissions may later be used to support a harmless‑error analysis.

C. Use of Defendants’ Sentencing Admissions

One of the more practically significant aspects of Beasley is its reliance on Beasley’s own admissions at the sentencing hearing to find the Erlinger error harmless. This has several implications:

  • Defendants and defense counsel must recognize that on‑the‑record concessions about prior offenses — particularly dates, locations, and patterns — can effectively settle the ACCA occasions issue, even if they have objected on constitutional grounds.
  • Counsel may need to adjust their sentencing strategies to avoid unnecessary admissions when future legal developments are foreseeable (as Wooden and post‑Apprendi trends might have suggested here).
  • Courts will treat such admissions as at least as powerful as a hypothetical jury finding, consistent with Warneke and Robinson.

D. Boundaries of Harmless Error in the ACCA Context

Beasley helps delineate when Erlinger errors are likely to be harmless vs. harmful:

  • Likely harmless:
    • Long gaps in time between offenses (months or years);
    • Different types of crimes (e.g., robbery, battery, homicide);
    • Well‑documented separate episodes, especially with defendant admissions.
  • Possibly harmful:
    • Multiple offenses close in time and space (minutes or hours, same area);
    • Ambiguous spree‑type conduct where a “single episode” characterization is plausible;
    • Cases where prior convictions are clustered (e.g., multi‑count indictments from the same night).

For appellate practitioners, Beasley offers a structured approach:

  1. Identify the Erlinger error (judge, not jury, decided occasions; not charged in indictment).
  2. Argue whether the record (including admissions and permissible documents) truly forecloses reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed on different occasions.
  3. Address the Wooden factors in detail, emphasizing close timing/location and overlapping conduct where helpful.

E. Open Questions and Future Litigation

Though Beasley resolves much, several issues remain fertile for further development:

  • Scope of Record for Harmless‑Error Review: The panel notes, but does not decide, whether harmless‑error review in this context is limited to the trial record or may consider broader sentencing materials (e.g., Shepard documents). That question was deemed waived here but will likely arise squarely in other appeals.
  • Double Jeopardy on Remand: The court avoids deciding whether retrying the ACCA occasions question before a jury after vacating a sentence would implicate double jeopardy. Future cases in which the error is harmful and reversal is required will have to confront that issue.
  • Interaction with Plea Agreements: Johnson already shows that Erlinger errors can be harmless even after guilty pleas. How plea colloquies must be structured to validly waive or admit ACCA facts will likely be further litigated.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Structural Error vs. Harmless Error

  • Structural error: A rare type of fundamental defect that affects the entire trial process (e.g., having no lawyer at all, a biased judge, a racially discriminatory grand jury, or a defective reasonable‑doubt instruction). These errors require automatic reversal.
  • Trial (or non‑structural) error: An ordinary constitutional error that occurs during the presentation of the case (e.g., wrongly admitted evidence, flawed jury instructions on one element, failure to submit a sentencing factor). Courts ask whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt — i.e., whether the jury would have reached the same result absent the error.

Beasley firmly classifies Erlinger violations (failure to submit ACCA occasions to a jury) as trial errors, not structural errors.

B. ACCA and the “Different Occasions” Element

  • ACCA enhances penalties for certain felons in possession if they have three prior qualifying convictions “committed on occasions different from one another.”
  • Pre‑Wooden, courts often treated each written conviction separately; Wooden clarified that multiple counts can still be a single occasion if they are part of a single criminal episode.
  • Erlinger then held that whether the prior convictions occurred on “different occasions” must be submitted to a jury.

In plain terms: Did the prior crimes happen on three separate days/incidents, or were they all part of one continuous spree? That is now a jury question, but if the answer is obvious from undisputed facts, an Erlinger error can be harmless.

C. Constructive Amendment of an Indictment

  • A constructive amendment occurs when the trial evidence or jury instructions effectively change the charge from what the grand jury approved — for example, allowing conviction for a different crime than the one charged.
  • Because the Fifth Amendment guarantees that a person can be tried only on charges approved by a grand jury, constructive amendments are treated as per se reversible error.
  • Beasley holds that merely failing to charge a sentencing factor (like ACCA occasions) is not a constructive amendment; it is an Apprendi-type defect subject to harmless‑error analysis.

D. Harmless‑Error Standard in This Context

Under Chapman and the Seventh Circuit’s cases, the government bears the burdens:

  • To prove the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and
  • To show that a properly instructed jury would inevitably have reached the same conclusion as the judge.

In ACCA/Erlinger cases, this typically requires:

  • Clear, undisputed evidence of separate offenses (dates, places, victims), and
  • No plausible reading of the facts that would qualify them as a single “occasion” under Wooden.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Beasley is a significant Seventh Circuit decision that operationalizes the Supreme Court’s ruling in Erlinger within the framework of established harmless‑error doctrine. It holds that:

  • Failing to charge and submit ACCA’s “different occasions” element to the jury is a constitutional error, but not a structural one.
  • Such errors are subject to harmless‑error review under Chapman and Recuenco, even when the indictment is incomplete and the jury never considered the issue.
  • Where, as in Beasley’s case, the prior offenses are separated by years and differ in character, and the defendant has admitted the relevant dates and convictions, the error can be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The decision cements a strong, cross‑circuit consensus that Erlinger does not automatically unwind all ACCA sentences imposed under the prior regime. Instead, relief will depend on whether there is a real factual contest over the occasions question. For future litigants, Beasley underscores the importance of:

  • How prior offenses are charged and presented to the jury post‑Erlinger;
  • The strategic handling of admissions at sentencing; and
  • Careful, fact‑focused use of Wooden’s factors to show that prior convictions may — or may not — be part of the same “occasion.”

In the broader legal landscape, Beasley reflects the Supreme Court’s modern sentencing jurisprudence: expanding defendants’ jury‑trial rights (as in Apprendi, Alleyne, Wooden, and Erlinger), while simultaneously preserving the harmless‑error framework to avoid automatic reversal in cases where the outcome is practically inevitable on an undisputed record.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Judge(s)

St.Eve

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