Introduction

In United States v. Fednert Orisnord, No. 24-12776 (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 2025) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a pro se prisoner’s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The case presents two practical and recurring issues in compassionate release litigation:

• Whether a district court’s denial of a motion before the movant could file a reply, as permitted by local rules, requires reversal; and
• Whether a district court may deny compassionate release based solely on its weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, even when a defendant invokes serious medical conditions.

The court assumed, without deciding, that the Southern District of Florida’s local rules afforded Orisnord an opportunity to reply to the government’s opposition. It nevertheless held any error harmless because the defendant did not show prejudice and can file a new compassionate release motion. On the merits, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that a district court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) factors alone can justify denial of compassionate release, and it found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s emphasis on the seriousness of the offenses and the defendant’s prison disciplinary record.

The decision thus clarifies two important practice points: harmless-error review applies to premature rulings that cut off reply rights in § 3582(c)(1)(A) litigation, and courts retain broad discretion to deny relief based on § 3553(a) considerations alone, consistent with Eleventh Circuit precedent.

Case Background

In 2005, after trial, Fednert Orisnord was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, drug-trafficking offenses involving five or more kilograms of cocaine, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received a total sentence of 420 months, which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in 2007.

Since then, Orisnord has repeatedly sought sentence reductions and collateral relief, including a prior unsuccessful compassionate release motion in 2020 and a 2024 motion for a § 3582(c)(2) reduction that the Eleventh Circuit also rejected. In June 2024, he filed the present pro se compassionate release motion, invoking U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1) and (5) and asserting multiple medical conditions (colon cancer, hypertension, heart disease, migraines, long-COVID symptoms, latent tuberculosis) as “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” along with rehabilitation, age, and educational efforts. He also raised fairness concerns about his underlying conviction as stemming from a “reverse sting.”

The government opposed, citing medical records indicating adequate treatment and cancer remission, and it emphasized the seriousness of the offenses, criminal history, and numerous prison disciplinary infractions. Two days after the opposition, and before the seven-day reply window under S.D. Fla. Local Rule 7.1(c)(1) expired, the district court denied the motion, adopting the government’s position and concluding that the § 3553(a) factors did not support release. On appeal, Orisnord argued (1) procedural error in refusing him the opportunity to reply and (2) substantive error in the denial.

Summary of the Judgment

• Procedural issue: The Eleventh Circuit assumed the district court should have allowed a reply under the local rule but held any error harmless under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) because the defendant did not identify what his reply would have added, replies are limited in scope, and he remains free to file a new compassionate release motion.
• Substantive issue: The court affirmed the denial based on the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors. It held that focusing on the defendant’s prison disciplinary history and the need to promote respect for the law and deterrence fell within the court’s discretion.
• Key principle reaffirmed: Under United States v. Tinker, a district court may deny compassionate release if any one of the three prerequisites—(i) § 3553(a) support, (ii) extraordinary and compelling reasons, and (iii) consistency with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (including dangerousness)—is absent. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed solely on § 3553(a), without needing to decide the other prongs.
• Disposition: Affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

• Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009): Confirms deference to a district court’s interpretation and application of its local rules, reviewed for abuse of discretion. This frames the procedural lens for evaluating the reply-right claim.
• United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2021): Establishes standards of review for § 3582(c)(1)(A): eligibility is reviewed de novo; the ultimate denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. This bifurcation underlies the panel’s approach.
• In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159 (11th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989): Describe the breadth of the abuse-of-discretion standard—district courts have a “range of choice” so long as they do not make a clear error of judgment.
• United States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2009): Emphasize that abuse-of-discretion review is not a rubber stamp; errors of law can warrant reversal.
• Gonzalez v. United States, 981 F.3d 845 (11th Cir. 2020): An error of law is an abuse of discretion. The panel signals that even under deferential review, legal missteps are correctable.
• United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): The district court may attach great weight to one § 3553(a) factor over others; failure to consider relevant factors or giving weight to irrelevant ones can be an abuse, but weighing is generally discretionary.
• United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789 (11th Cir. 2009), and Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1986): Courts liberally construe pro se filings, an important principle here given Orisnord’s pro se status.
• S.D. Fla. Local Rule 7.1(c)(1): Permits a reply within seven days after service of an opposing memorandum. The panel assumed a reply opportunity should have been afforded.
• Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a): Harmless error rule—errors not affecting substantial rights must be disregarded. Central to the court’s disposition of the procedural challenge.
• United States v. Paslay, 971 F.2d 667 (11th Cir. 1992), and EEOC v. STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2019): Confirm harmless-error analysis in criminal and civil contexts, respectively.
• United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1266 n.20 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc): Explains prejudice in harmless-error review—error must have a substantial influence on the outcome or leave grave doubt.
• United States v. Henricy, 859 F. App’x 462 (11th Cir. 2021) (unpublished): A closely analogous case holding a similar reply-cutoff error harmless. This case provides direct, albeit nonbinding, support for the panel’s approach.
• United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234 (11th Cir. 2021): Core Eleventh Circuit framework for § 3582(c)(1)(A). A court may deny relief if any of three conditions is missing: support under § 3553(a); extraordinary and compelling reasons; and consistency with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (including non-dangerousness).
• United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2021), superseded in part by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023): Earlier binding holding that § 1B1.13 constrained defendant-filed motions; cited to explain doctrinal history post-2023 Guidelines amendments.
• United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2021): District courts must show they considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors but need not analyze each exhaustively; acknowledgement suffices.
• Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022), and Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011): Support that courts may consider current information and post-sentencing conduct; used by the panel to underscore that a new motion could be assessed with updated facts.
• Statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (compassionate release), § 3553(a) (sentencing factors), and 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (dangerousness factors, incorporated via U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13).

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural challenge: Early denial without allowing a reply

The panel assumed the local rule entitled Orisnord to file a reply within seven days. Still, reversal requires prejudice under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). Applying Frazier’s formulation, the court found no indication that the error had a substantial influence on the outcome or left grave doubt. Three considerations proved decisive:

• No proffer of prejudice: Orisnord did not identify what arguments or evidence he would have offered in reply or how those would have changed the calculus. Without a proffer, showing substantial influence is difficult.
• Limited scope of replies: By local rule, replies cannot raise new arguments; they are confined to rebutting points raised in opposition. Even if allowed, the reply’s function would be constrained.
• Ability to refile: § 3582(c)(1)(A) permits successive compassionate release motions. And under Concepcion and Pepper, a court can account for new, current information when it adjudicates such motions. Thus, any procedural shortfall does not foreclose future merits consideration.

Against this backdrop, any failure to await a reply was deemed harmless. Importantly, the court did not decide whether the local rule confers an absolute right to reply in every case; it held only that any assumed error was not reversible here.

2) Substantive challenge: Denial based on § 3553(a) alone

The court reaffirmed the Tinker framework: a compassionate release motion can be denied if any one of the three conditions is not met. The panel focused exclusively on the § 3553(a) factors and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s emphasis on:

• Seriousness of the offenses: Robbery conspiracy, large-quantity cocaine trafficking, and firearms offenses are serious and weigh against early release.
• Prison disciplinary record: Infractions involving violence, threats, weapons, intoxicants, insubordination, and refusal to work suggested lack of rehabilitation and underscored the need for deterrence and respect for law.
• Deterrence and respect for the law: The district court reasonably concluded that early release would not promote these goals. Under Butler, courts may assign great weight to such factors.

While Orisnord highlighted mitigating considerations—time served, age, and medical conditions—the panel reiterated that district courts need not give equal weight to each factor or analyze each in detail. An acknowledgement of consideration generally suffices (Cook; Tinker), and the choice to give greater weight to certain factors is within the court’s discretion (Butler). On this record, there was no clear error of judgment.

Practical Impact and Implications

A. Procedural practice: Replies and harmless error

• Eleventh Circuit panels will treat premature denials that cut off local-rule reply periods as subject to harmless-error review. To obtain reversal, appellants must concretely identify the arguments or evidence a reply would have supplied and explain how those would likely have altered the outcome.
• Because replies are limited to issues raised in the opposition, litigants should fully develop their factual and legal arguments in the opening motion, anticipating likely government objections.
• If a ruling issues before a reply is filed, consider immediate motions for reconsideration with a detailed proffer, or submit a renewed compassionate release motion with updated evidentiary support.

B. Substantive practice: § 3553(a) remains decisive

• Tinker’s triad endures after the 2023 amendments to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13: courts may deny on § 3553(a) alone without resolving whether “extraordinary and compelling” reasons exist or whether the defendant is non-dangerous.
• Prison disciplinary history can be outcome determinative. Applicants should proactively contextualize and, where possible, rebut disciplinary entries; show sustained periods without incidents; document participation in programming; and present robust release plans to mitigate perceived risks.
• Medical conditions—even serious ones—must be linked to the § 3553(a) analysis. Where conditions are controlled, in remission, or being adequately treated, courts may view them as insufficient to outweigh aggravating factors.
• Arguments challenging the fairness of the original conviction (such as “reverse sting” concerns) rarely carry weight in compassionate release, which focuses on current circumstances and sentencing factors rather than relitigating guilt or trial issues.

C. Institutional implications

• District courts are reminded to at least acknowledge consideration of § 3553(a) and the parties’ arguments. A succinct order can suffice when it identifies the decisive factors.
• The decision encourages efficient resolution of § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions, but courts should be mindful of local-rule reply periods to avoid avoidable harmless-error disputes.
• For incarcerated pro se litigants, mail delays can impede timely replies. Courts may consider granting reasonable reply extensions upon request; litigants should ask promptly and specify expected content.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Compassionate release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A)): A mechanism allowing courts to reduce a sentence if three conditions are met: (1) the § 3553(a) factors support reduction; (2) “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist; and (3) release is consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, including a finding that the defendant is not a danger.
• § 3553(a) factors: Statutory sentencing considerations, including seriousness of the offense, respect for law, just punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, the defendant’s history and characteristics, and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities. Courts may weigh these factors as they see fit within reason.
• U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023 amendments): The Sentencing Commission updated the policy statement to apply to defendant-filed motions and to enumerate various “extraordinary and compelling” categories, including certain medical conditions, vulnerability to infectious disease, family circumstances, and some legal-change disparities. But even if those are met, § 3553(a) can still defeat a motion.
• Harmless error (Rule 52(a)): Appellate courts disregard trial-level errors that do not affect “substantial rights.” The appellant must show the error probably changed the outcome or casts serious doubt on the result.
• Abuse of discretion: A deferential standard of appellate review. A decision stands if the court considered the right factors and made a reasonable judgment call, even if the appellate court might have decided differently.
• “Reverse sting” operations: Law enforcement operations in which agents propose a fictitious crime (often a robbery or drug deal) to ensnare suspects. While controversial in some contexts, they typically cannot be relitigated via compassionate release, which is not a vehicle to attack the validity of the conviction.

What the Case Does Not Do

• It does not hold that a movant has an absolute right to a reply in every case; the court assumed error without deciding that point.
• It does not determine whether Orisnord’s medical conditions qualify as “extraordinary and compelling.” The panel affirmed solely on § 3553(a) grounds, consistent with Tinker.
• It does not change the law on the binding effect of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 post-2023; it describes Bryant as “superseded in part” by the amendments but relies on Tinker’s triad and Cook’s articulation of the § 3553(a) framework.
• As an unpublished, non-argument decision, it is not binding precedent, though it offers persuasive guidance on harmless error and § 3553(a)-only denials.

Conclusion

United States v. Orisnord delivers two clear messages for compassionate release practice in the Eleventh Circuit. First, even if local rules permit a reply, a district court’s premature denial is subject to harmless-error review on appeal. Without a concrete showing of prejudice—what the reply would have said and why it likely matters—reversal is unlikely, particularly given the availability of renewed motions and the court’s ability to consider updated information.

Second, the court reaffirmed that § 3553(a) can independently defeat a compassionate release request. District courts may assign significant weight to public safety, deterrence, respect for the law, and a defendant’s disciplinary history. Medical conditions, if adequately treated and controlled, will not necessarily outweigh aggravating factors, especially for serious offenses with adverse prison conduct.

For practitioners and pro se litigants, the decision underscores the importance of fully developing the opening motion, anticipating the government’s opposition, and, if necessary, promptly seeking reconsideration or filing a renewed motion with targeted, concrete showings—particularly on how the § 3553(a) factors now favor release. In the broader legal landscape, Orisnord fits squarely within Eleventh Circuit doctrine: harmless-error principles temper procedural missteps, and district courts retain broad discretion to deny compassionate release on § 3553(a) grounds alone.