Harmless-Error Controls § 1324 “Reckless Disregard” Instruction Disputes: United States v. Adames-Ramos (2d Cir. 2025)

Note: This is a Second Circuit Summary Order. Under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, it may be cited but has no precedential effect.

Introduction

In United States v. Adames-Ramos, No. 24-2714-cr (2d Cir. Oct. 10, 2025), a panel of the Second Circuit (Judges Calabresi, Sack, and Lee) affirmed a jury conviction for transporting noncitizens for private financial gain under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B)(i). The appeal challenged the district court’s jury instruction defining “reckless disregard” for the immigration-status element. The defendant urged that “reckless disregard” under § 1324 requires a subjective awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the transported persons were noncitizens unlawfully in the United States, citing Farmer v. Brennan and the Ninth Circuit’s United States v. Rodriguez. The district court, however, instructed the jury using a formulation akin to “deliberate indifference” to facts indicating a very high objective probability of unlawful presence.

The Second Circuit did not resolve this mens rea debate. Instead, assuming arguendo that the defendant’s stricter, subjective-awareness instruction was correct, the court held that any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the trial record. The decision underscores that, where the evidence compellingly demonstrates the defendant’s subjective consciousness of risk, disputes over the precise phrasing of “reckless disregard” are unlikely to alter the verdict.

Case snapshot

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Panel: Calabresi, Sack, Lee, Circuit Judges
Date: October 10, 2025
Disposition: Affirmed
Key issue: Whether the jury needed to find subjective awareness of a risk that passengers were unlawfully present to satisfy § 1324 “reckless disregard,” and, if not instructed that way, whether any error was harmless

Background

In March 2023, Ydenis Adames-Ramos left Brooklyn at 3:00 a.m., drove hundreds of miles through a snowstorm to a remote, dead-end road near the Canadian border, and picked up three individuals who were cold, wet, and shaking. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) stopped his vehicle shortly thereafter and determined the passengers lacked lawful status.

During a CBP interview, Adames-Ramos stated his brother had connected him with someone paying $2,000 to drive three people to New York City. He acknowledged thinking the offer was “maybe” “not right,” but said he had been told it was not “anything illegal.” Later in the interview, he admitted he had been untruthful: two months earlier, his brother attempted a similar trip but was “caught” by CBP. Because of that failed attempt, the brother declined to try again, telling Adames-Ramos, “I’m not going to risk it.” Adames-Ramos replied that he decided to “take a risk” and undertook the trip himself. Trial evidence also indicated he lied initially about aspects of his communications with the arranger.

A federal grand jury charged him with transporting noncitizens for private financial gain. After trial, the jury convicted him; he received time served and one year of supervised release. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s “reckless disregard” instruction and, in post-verdict motion practice, the sufficiency of evidence of the requisite mental state.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit reviewed the challenged jury instruction de novo. The district court had instructed the jury that “reckless disregard” means “deliberate indifference to facts that if considered and weighed in a reasonable manner indicate the highest probability that the alleged aliens were in fact aliens and were in the United States unlawfully.” The defense proposed an instruction requiring that the defendant “subjectively knew” of a “substantial and unjustifiable risk” that the passengers were noncitizens unlawfully present.

Without deciding which instruction correctly states the law, the court held that any error was harmless. Applying the Neder/Moran-Toala standard, it concluded it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted even if it had been told it must find subjective awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. The court emphasized: the remote border pickup in the middle of the night; a large, no-advance fee from an unknown person; knowledge of the brother’s prior, identical attempt being thwarted by CBP; the brother’s statement that he would not “risk it”; the defendant’s admission that he “decided to take a risk”; his recognition that something might be “not right”; the passengers’ evident condition upon pickup; and the defendant’s lies to investigators. The panel thus affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents cited and their influence

United States v. Kopstein, 759 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2014): Establishes de novo review for challenges to jury instructions. This frames the court’s threshold posture: it assesses correctness and potential misdirection independently rather than for abuse of discretion.
United States v. George, 779 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 2015): An instruction is erroneous if it fails to inform the jury of the law or misleads as to the legal standard; instructions must be considered as a whole. This guides the court’s holistic evaluation of the charge.
United States v. Rutigliano, 790 F.3d 389, 401 (2d Cir. 2015): The defendant must show the requested instruction accurately stated the law and that the actual charge was prejudicial. Rutigliano places a dual burden on appellants seeking a tailored instruction.
LNC Invs., Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. N.J., 173 F.3d 454, 462 (2d Cir. 1999): Sets forth the harmless-error principle: an error is harmless if it did not influence the verdict. This frames the remedy inquiry.
United States v. Moran-Toala, 726 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)): For instructional error, the question is whether it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” The panel’s analysis turns on this exact standard.
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734–35 (1993): The government bears the burden of showing harmlessness. The panel expressly invokes this allocation of burden.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825: Cited by the defense for the proposition that “recklessness” in criminal law often entails subjective awareness of a risk (Farmer defined “deliberate indifference” in the Eighth Amendment context as a subjective recklessness). The panel references Farmer as an anchor for the defense’s proposed mental-state requirement, but resolves the case without adopting or rejecting that standard.
United States v. Rodriguez, 880 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2018): The Ninth Circuit interprets § 1324’s “reckless disregard” to require subjective awareness of a substantial risk that the person transported is unlawfully present. The defense seeks similar treatment in the Second Circuit; the panel sidesteps the issue.

Legal reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in two steps:

Assuming, without deciding, a subjective standard. The panel treats the defense’s preferred definition—that “reckless disregard” under § 1324 requires subjective awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk—as the governing standard for purposes of analysis. This approach avoids resolving a potentially consequential question of statutory mens rea while ensuring that, even on the defendant’s strongest legal theory, the conviction stands.
Harmless-error analysis under Neder/Moran-Toala. Applying the “clear beyond a reasonable doubt” test, the panel concludes that the trial record compelled a guilty verdict even if the jury had been instructed to find subjective awareness. The court catalogues circumstances that, collectively, demonstrate consciousness of risk:
- Travel to a remote, dead-end road near the Canadian border in the early morning during a snowstorm;
- A large promised payment ($2,000) from an unknown contact, with no advance;
- Knowledge that the arranger previously hired the defendant’s brother to make the same trip, which CBP intercepted;
- The brother’s explicit refusal to “risk it,” and the defendant’s admission, “I decided to take a risk”;
- The suspicious condition of the passengers—cold, wet, shaking—upon pickup; and
- False statements to CBP about his role and communications, indicating consciousness of wrongdoing.
The panel reads these facts as establishing either actual knowledge or, at a minimum, subjective awareness of a substantial risk that the passengers had “come to, entered or remained” unlawfully—satisfying the defense’s own articulation of reckless disregard.

What the court did not decide

The panel did not decide whether § 1324’s “reckless disregard” requires subjective awareness (as in the Ninth Circuit) or may be satisfied by an objective “deliberate indifference to facts indicating a high probability” standard.
The panel did not address broader contours of “in furtherance” or other elements of § 1324, as those were not contested on appeal.
Because the case resolves on harmless error, it sets no binding precedent on the correct instruction in the Second Circuit.

Impact and practical implications

Limited precedential effect, but clear signals: Although nonprecedential, the decision signals how the Second Circuit may dispose of similar challenges—by assuming a stricter subjective standard and affirming where the facts reflect obvious risk-taking coupled with incriminating admissions or concealment.

Mens rea standard remains an open question in the Second Circuit: The court left unresolved whether § 1324 requires subjective awareness for “reckless disregard.” Litigants should continue to brief the issue fully and preserve objections to instructions.

Harmless-error posture dominates instruction challenges: Prosecutors should build a record demonstrating the defendant’s subjective awareness (statements such as “I decided to take a risk,” evidence of prior enforcement encounters, unusual pickup circumstances, and concealment). Defense counsel should focus on excluding or countering such evidence or showing that any inference of subjective awareness is speculative, to avoid a harmlessness finding.

Trial-craft on jury instructions: Defense proposals should track a subjective awareness formulation—e.g., “knew of facts that indicated a substantial and unjustifiable risk and subjectively knew of that risk”—and emphasize the difference between that and an objective, reasonable-person standard. Even then, counsel should be prepared to argue prejudice specifically.

Evidence themes likely to matter: Time/place of pickup (remote border locations), payment terms (large sums, unknown payors, no advance), knowledge of prior interceptions, passenger condition, and post-stop deception will be treated as powerful indicators of subjective awareness.

Complex concepts simplified

Mens rea: The mental state required to commit a crime. Here, the question is what mental state “reckless disregard” requires under § 1324: does it mean the defendant actually appreciated the risk (subjective) or merely that the facts would have alerted a reasonable person (objective)?
Reckless disregard (subjective vs. objective):
- Subjective recklessness: The defendant was actually aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk and consciously disregarded it.
- Objective recklessness/deliberate indifference: The defendant ignored clear facts that, if reasonably considered, indicate a high probability of the prohibited circumstance, even if the defendant did not admit awareness.
Harmless error (instructional): Even if the trial court misstated the law to the jury, an appellate court will not reverse if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted under the correct instruction.
De novo review of instructions: The appellate court independently evaluates whether the instruction accurately stated the law, without deference to the trial court’s view.
In furtherance (element in § 1324): The transportation must help the person’s continued unlawful presence or evasion of detection; not at issue on appeal here.
Commercial advantage or private financial gain: An aggravating factor under § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i), triggered by transportation conducted for money or similar benefit.

Contextualizing Farmer and Rodriguez

The defense’s reliance on Farmer v. Brennan reflects a broader criminal-law trend of requiring subjective awareness for “recklessness” in serious offenses. Farmer defined “deliberate indifference” as subjective recklessness (the official must actually know of and disregard an excessive risk). In United States v. Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit carried that logic into § 1324, holding that “reckless disregard” requires proof that the defendant was aware of a substantial risk that the person transported was unlawfully present and consciously disregarded that risk.

The Second Circuit, in this Summary Order, neither endorsed nor rejected Rodriguez’s approach. Instead, it applied a pragmatic adjudicatory technique: assume the stricter standard and affirm if the trial evidence clears that bar, thereby postponing resolution of an important statutory-interpretation question until a case in which the choice of standard is outcome-determinative.

Key takeaways

Second Circuit affirms § 1324 conviction on harmless-error grounds, assuming—without deciding—that “reckless disregard” requires subjective awareness of risk.
Instructional error is harmless if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted under the correct standard; the government bears this burden.
The panel highlights facts strongly probative of subjective awareness: remote border pickup, odd timing and conditions, large no-advance fee from an unknown arranger, knowledge of a prior CBP interception, admissions about “risk,” passengers’ condition, and post-stop deception.
The decision is nonprecedential, leaving open the precise mental-state definition for “reckless disregard” in the Second Circuit under § 1324.
Trial and appellate strategy should anticipate a harmless-error analysis: prosecutors should elicit direct and circumstantial evidence of subjective awareness; defendants should attack the inference of awareness and show concrete prejudice from any instructional misstatement.

Conclusion

United States v. Adames-Ramos exemplifies the Second Circuit’s reliance on harmless-error analysis to affirm convictions where the factual record overwhelmingly demonstrates the defendant’s subjective consciousness of risk. While the court did not decide whether § 1324’s “reckless disregard” requires subjective awareness, the message for future litigants is clear: in alien-transport cases, evidence of suspicious logistics, knowledge of prior enforcement encounters, admissions about risk-taking, and post-stop deception will likely suffice to sustain a conviction even under a subjective recklessness standard. The precise mens rea formulation remains open in the Second Circuit, but this Summary Order cautions that, in many cases, that doctrinal debate may not change the outcome.