Harmless Error and Coworker “Me Too” Testimony in Retaliation Trials: Commentary on McKnight v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in Keith N. McKnight v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 24-12308 (11th Cir. Dec. 9, 2025) (non-argument calendar), which arises from a jury verdict rejecting a former UPS driver’s retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA).

The appeal centers on a narrow but practically important issue: whether the district court’s decision to exclude a coworker’s testimony—offered as circumstantial “me too” evidence of a retaliatory corporate culture—required a new trial. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that even assuming the exclusion was erroneous, the appellant failed to show the kind of substantial prejudice required to overturn a jury verdict on the basis of an evidentiary ruling.

The case is doctrinally significant for several reasons:

• It illustrates the stringent harmless error / substantial rights requirement for reversing evidentiary rulings.
• It clarifies how coworker testimony about generalized retaliation fits (or does not fit) into a retaliation plaintiff’s proof of pretext and causation.
• It reinforces the Title VII and § 1981 retaliation framework—and by extension the FCRA framework—particularly the “materially adverse action” and but-for causation standards.
• It underscores the significance of an employer’s documented, good-faith reliance on mental health evaluations and Employee Assistance Program (EAP) compliance in defending against retaliation claims.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Plaintiff-appellant Keith McKnight, a UPS delivery driver and union member, filed approximately 2,100 grievances over 18 months, largely accusing his managers of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, and also making dire assertions about threats to his life. In response to safety and mental health concerns raised by coworkers and management, UPS:

1. Referred McKnight to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP).
2. Required him to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation with a neuropsychologist.
3. Ultimately terminated his employment for failure to comply with the EAP treatment plan, after repeated warnings and after he declined to apply for short-term disability needed to maintain insurance coverage.

At trial, only McKnight’s retaliation claims remained. By stipulation, the alleged retaliatory “adverse actions” were limited to:

• His referral for a fitness-for-duty evaluation; and
• His termination.

The jury, through special interrogatories, found:

1. McKnight did not prove that the referral for a fitness-for-duty evaluation constituted an adverse employment action; and
2. McKnight did not prove that UPS would not have terminated him but for his protected activity.

Before trial, the district court had granted UPS’s motion in limine to exclude testimony from coworker and fellow driver Kyle Longest. Longest would have testified that managers, including McKnight’s manager, were “tyrants,” that UPS retaliated against anyone who complained about unfair treatment (not limited to protected categories), and that managers repeatedly told him to “get in line,” which he interpreted as a threat of increased scrutiny for complaining.

On appeal, McKnight argued that the exclusion of Longest’s testimony was an abuse of discretion that warranted a new trial, because the testimony allegedly went to the “central dispute” of pretext and retaliatory intent.

The Eleventh Circuit:

• Applied abuse-of-discretion review to the in limine ruling.
• Emphasized that evidentiary errors justify reversal only if they affect a party’s substantial rights, i.e., if the error “probably had a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict.”
• Concluded that McKnight failed to show substantial prejudice from the exclusion.
• Affirmed the judgment, making McKnight’s challenge to the directed verdict on punitive damages moot.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

McKnight began working for UPS in 2014 and became a package delivery driver in 2017. His work record, according to his testimony, was initially positive, including safety awards. The turning point was the arrival of a new center manager, Nicole Strickland, around late 2020. McKnight perceived her interactions with him as hostile: challenging his speeding, seatbelt usage, and even his makeshift seat cushion (a stuffed alligator), and confronting him when he unilaterally switched trucks.

UPS and the Teamsters union operated under a collective bargaining agreement with a multi-step grievance process. McKnight used that process heavily—filing roughly 2,100 grievances between December 2020 and June 2022 (about 15 per workday). Many grievances alleged harassment, discrimination (including race discrimination), retaliation, and safety issues, such as being assigned allegedly unsafe vehicles.

McKnight also:

• Called UPS’s anonymous HR hotline multiple times, alleging that district manager Mike Alberni was “out to kill” him, that his phone was tapped, and that he faced execution with his own stolen firearm (later found in his garage).
• Began writing “sabotage” on misloaded packages.
• Claimed to use (or intended to use) a drone to gather evidence against management.
• Used UPS’s DIAD device—intended for package scanning and routing—to send unprofessional messages about management’s incompetence.

Concerned about safety and mental health, coworkers, supervisors, and union representatives reported their worries. UPS responded by:

• Conducting “observations” (supervisors following his route for safety compliance).
• On February 12, 2021, removing him from duty and referring him to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for an evaluation.

Through the EAP’s third-party vendor, Resources for Living, McKnight met with a licensed clinical social worker, who diagnosed him with adjustment disorder with anxiety but returned him to work in March 2021.

In May 2021, an anonymous employee again reported that McKnight was mentally unstable and might hurt someone. Then, at a June 2021 grievance panel hearing, McKnight appeared wearing a bulletproof vest and carrying a heavy rucksack full of grievance documents, alarming attendees until a union delegate searched him for weapons.

Following that hearing, Strickland reported to Resources for Living continued concerns, including customer complaints, “sabotage” markings, drone references, and the bulletproof vest incident. Resources for Living recommended a fitness-for-duty evaluation. UPS accepted that recommendation, placed McKnight on paid leave, and referred him to Dr. David Maroof, a board-certified clinical neuropsychologist.

Dr. Maroof’s report concluded that McKnight had a psychiatric condition rendering him unable to perform the essential functions of his job, with “prominent persecutory ideation” rising to the level of paranoid delusions, distrust, and serious interpersonal difficulties. He recommended McKnight take three months off to establish psychiatric care.

However, due to a “communication breakdown,” local management and McKnight did not promptly receive the report. UPS continued to pay McKnight while he was off duty from June 2021 until January 7, 2022. On that date, labor relations manager Roy French, Strickland, and union delegate Dave Concannon informed McKnight:

• He was no longer going to be paid while out of work;
• He needed to apply for short-term disability to maintain income and health insurance.

McKnight, believing he was not disabled, refused to apply. When his insurance lapsed, he ceased participating in treatment, and Resources for Living discharged him as noncompliant. UPS’s Occupational Health Department, which relied on Resources for Living for compliance status, relayed that noncompliance to French and local management.

After written warnings that failure to comply with the EAP requirements could result in termination, UPS terminated McKnight on March 17, 2022, characterizing him as out on unauthorized leave due to EAP noncompliance.

McKnight filed suit alleging race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, § 1981, and the FCRA. The district court granted summary judgment to UPS on all but the retaliation claims. A jury found for UPS on those claims. After trial, McKnight appealed, arguing that:

• The exclusion of coworker Longest’s testimony was an abuse of discretion affecting his substantial rights; and
• The directed verdict on punitive damages was erroneous (later deemed moot).

B. The Excluded Coworker Testimony

Coworker Kyle Longest, a fellow UPS driver, testified in deposition that:

• He viewed Manager Strickland as a “tyrant” who went “straight after” employees.
• He believed UPS retaliated against any employee who “spoke up for themselves,” regardless of whether the complaint involved protected categories like race.
• Various managers told him to “get in line,” which he interpreted as a threat of oversupervision and harassment.
• He had no firsthand knowledge of McKnight’s specific interactions, and was speculating when he suggested similar statements might have been made to McKnight.
• His personal definitions of “discriminate” and “harass” did not track the legal meaning, but instead included any oversupervision or perceived overdiscipline.

The district court excluded Longest’s testimony about statements and conduct by UPS management, reasoning that:

• The testimony was inherently unreliable—e.g., the suggestion that every manager used the same wording was implausible and likely paraphrase.
• The alleged comments lacked a sufficient nexus to statutorily protected activity (such as complaints of race discrimination) as opposed to any complaint “on any matter.”
• The probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403.

C. Standard of Review and Harmless Error Doctrine

1. Abuse of Discretion

The Eleventh Circuit applied the familiar abuse of discretion standard to the motion in limine ruling, citing Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1161 (11th Cir. 2005) and Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 769 F.3d 1063, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014). A district court abuses its discretion when it:

• Applies an incorrect legal standard;
• Applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner;
• Follows improper procedures; or
• Makes clearly erroneous factual findings.

2. Substantial Rights and Harmless Error

Even where an abuse of discretion is shown, a new trial is warranted only if the evidentiary error affects a party’s substantial rights. This requirement arises from:

• Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a): an error in excluding evidence is grounds for relief only if it affects a substantial right.
• Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61: courts must disregard errors that do not affect substantial rights (harmless error rule).

Relying on Proctor v. Fluor Enterprises, Inc., 494 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2007), the court reiterated that to reverse on an evidentiary ruling, the appellant must show:

1. The claim of error was preserved;
2. The district court abused its discretion; and
3. The error likely had a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict.

The third element—the “substantial influence” test—is the fulcrum of the decision. The court drew on:

• Burchfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 636 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2011) (reversal where mischaracterized video evidence directly misled the jury on the pivotal issue), and
• Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2011) (reversal where exclusion of expert testimony deprived the jury of the only evidence directly addressing the alleged negligent choice of slippery flooring).

Those cases demonstrate the kind of error that goes to the heart of the case, where the excluded or misused evidence “speaks directly to the ultimate disputed issue.”

By contrast, in McKnight’s case, the Eleventh Circuit determined that Longest’s proposed testimony did not directly address the two dispositive issues the jury decided:

1. Whether the fitness-for-duty referral was a materially adverse action; and
2. Whether UPS would not have terminated McKnight but for his protected activity.

Thus, the court found no substantial prejudice and affirmed without needing to decide whether the exclusion was actually erroneous—explicitly invoking Proctor to bypass the abuse-of-discretion inquiry once lack of prejudice was clear.

D. Retaliation Framework: Elements, Adverse Action, and Causation

1. Elements of Retaliation under Title VII and § 1981

Citing Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008), the court reaffirmed that to prevail on a retaliation claim under Title VII or § 1981, a plaintiff must show:

1. He engaged in statutorily protected activity (e.g., filing grievances alleging race discrimination).
2. He suffered a materially adverse action.
3. A causal relationship between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.

UPS did not dispute that McKnight engaged in protected activity. The dispute centered on the second and third elements, focused through two specific, stipulated “adverse actions”:

• The referral for a fitness-for-duty evaluation; and
• The termination.

2. “Adverse Employment Action” vs. “Materially Adverse Action”

The court’s jury instructions used the older phrase “adverse employment action.” However, citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67–68 (2006), the panel noted in a footnote that the proper retaliation standard is broader:

Actionable retaliation is any employer conduct that is materially adverse, i.e., that “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,” and is not limited to “ultimate employment decisions” or actions inside the workplace.

The opinion observes that no one challenged the jury instruction’s phrasing on appeal, and thus the panel accepted the instruction as given. It nonetheless clarified that “materially adverse action” is the correct term under Burlington and the Eleventh Circuit’s pattern instructions.

3. But-For Causation in Retaliation

For the termination claim, the jury was instructed to apply a but-for causation standard, consistent with Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013), which held that:

“Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”

This is more demanding than merely showing that retaliation was a motivating factor. The Eleventh Circuit further extended this standard to the FCRA, relying on:

• Palm Beach County School Board v. Wright, 217 So. 3d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (en banc), which aligned FCRA retaliation causation with Nassar;
• Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010), and
• State v. Jackson, 650 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1995), which instructs that Florida statutes patterned on federal law should be construed consistently with federal interpretations.

Thus, McKnight had to show that UPS would not have terminated him but for his protected activity, not merely that the protected activity and termination were temporally related or that protected activity played some role.

E. Application to the Two Alleged Retaliatory Actions

1. Fitness-for-Duty Referral

McKnight’s first retaliation theory was that the referral for a fitness-for-duty evaluation was itself retaliatory. He argued that UPS portrayed his safety complaints and discrimination grievances as paranoid delusions to justify a retaliatory psychiatric evaluation.

The special interrogatory asked the jury whether McKnight had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the referral constituted an adverse employment action. The court explained “adverse employment action” to the jury in terms paralleling Burlington’s standard: an action that would deter a reasonable employee from complaining of discrimination.

The jury answered no on this question. That finding was foundational: without a materially adverse action, there can be no retaliation claim as to the referral, regardless of motive or pretext analysis. Citing Alvarez and Goldsmith, the panel underscored that proof of adversity is an essential element of retaliation.

Critically, the court observed that McKnight pointed to nothing in Longest’s proposed testimony that would have:

• Explained why the fitness referral itself was materially adverse to a reasonable employee; or
• Undermined the jury’s conclusion on that specific interrogatory.

Longest’s deposition focused on generalized complaints of oversupervision and “get in line” comments, not on psychiatric referrals or safety-based evaluations. Consequently, even if Longest had testified, the jury’s finding that the referral did not rise to the level of a materially adverse action would not likely have changed. That alone precluded a finding of substantial prejudice on this branch of the case.

2. Termination for EAP Noncompliance

McKnight’s second—and more substantial—retaliation theory concerned his termination. Termination is plainly a materially adverse action under Eleventh Circuit precedent. See Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2006).

The dispositive issue on this theory was causation: did UPS terminate McKnight because of his protected activity, or for the stated reason—noncompliance with the EAP treatment requirements and loss of authorized leave status?

The district court instructed the jury that UPS claimed a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for termination—EAP noncompliance. The jury was further instructed on pretext:

“If you do not believe the reasons [UPS] gave for the decisions, you may consider whether the reasons were so unbelievable that they were a cover-up to hide the true retaliatory reasons for the decision. That is a pretext.”

The record supporting UPS’s non-retaliatory explanation included:

• Third-party EAP provider (Resources for Living) reporting McKnight as noncompliant.
• Testimony from Occupational Health Manager Jill Cutaiar that UPS relies in good faith on Resources for Living’s compliance determinations.
• McKnight’s refusal to apply for short-term disability despite being told—by both UPS and union delegate Concannon—that failure to do so would cause loss of insurance, impede treatment, and jeopardize his job.
• Written warnings from French indicating that continued EAP noncompliance could result in termination.
• The final termination letter characterizing McKnight as on unauthorized leave due to noncompliance.

Against this backdrop, the Eleventh Circuit applied its “good-faith belief” doctrine, citing Gogel v. Kia Motors Manufacturing of Georgia, Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1148 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), and Jefferson v. Sewon America, Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir. 2018). Under that doctrine:

• The relevant question is not whether the employee actually engaged in the conduct alleged, but whether the employer honestly believed he did.
• An employer may fire an employee “for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all,” so long as the action is not for an unlawful reason (e.g., retaliation).

The court found abundant evidence that UPS believed in good faith that McKnight was noncompliant with the EAP and that its actions followed from that belief, rather than from a retaliatory desire rooted in his grievances.

McKnight argued that Longest’s testimony would have:

• Corroborated his narrative that UPS systematically retaliates against “complainers” by oversupervising and harassing them; and
• Bolstered his credibility in the face of UPS’s portrayal of him as mentally unstable.

The panel was unpersuaded for several reasons:

1. Remoteness from the termination decision: Longest admitted that he did not know the details of McKnight’s treatment history, the fitness-for-duty evaluation, the EAP requirements, or the specific circumstances leading to termination. His testimony would not directly address the central causation question: whether UPS acted as it did because of protected activity rather than EAP noncompliance.
2. General culture vs. specific decision-making: Longest described a generalized culture of oversight and “retaliation” toward any employee who “spoke up,” not retaliation tied to statutorily protected activity such as race complaints. That distinction is critical under Title VII and § 1981. His broad assertions did not specifically implicate McKnight’s termination or the managers involved in that decision in a way likely to overturn the jury’s but-for causation finding.
3. Idiosyncratic definitions of “discrimination” and “harassment”: Longest’s notion of “discrimination”—over-supervision, extra attention, “trying to find something against you”—does not align with the legal standards for unlawful discrimination or retaliation. That diminished the probative weight of his observations for purposes of statutory retaliation.
4. Weight of documentary and testimonial evidence: The trial record contained extensive, detailed evidence of UPS’s EAP referral, mental health concerns, noncompliance reports, and repeated warnings. Against that record, the general and speculative nature of Longest’s testimony was unlikely to “have a substantial influence” on the jury’s verdict.

For these reasons, the panel found this case unlike Rosenfeld, where the excluded expert testimony was the only evidence on the pivotal negligence theory, and more like a typical harmless error situation where the excluded evidence is cumulative, collateral, or too attenuated from the dispositive issues.

F. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

The opinion weaves together a cluster of precedents to construct a coherent doctrinal framework:

• Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005), and Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 769 F.3d 1063 (11th Cir. 2014)
  These cases provide the general abuse-of-discretion standard and its application to evidentiary rulings.
• Proctor v. Fluor Enterprises, Inc., 494 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2007)
  Supplies the three-part test for reversal and, crucially, the “substantial influence on the jury’s verdict” requirement for showing prejudice.
• Burchfield v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 636 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2011)
  Shows when evidentiary error warrants reversal—where defense counsel repeatedly mischaracterized video evidence as depicting the actual incident, affecting the core liability issue.
• Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2011)
  Demonstrates that exclusion of foundational expert testimony bearing directly on the plaintiff’s theory (slippery flooring) can have a “substantial prejudicial effect” justifying a new trial.
• Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2008)
  Provides the basic elements of a retaliation claim under Title VII and § 1981, framing the analysis of adverse action and causation.
• Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
  Clarifies that retaliation covers all materially adverse actions, not just ultimate employment decisions, and that the standard is an objective “reasonable worker” test.
• Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010)
  Reiterates that an adverse (or materially adverse) action is indispensable to a retaliation claim and that the FCRA tracks Title VII’s framework.
• Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006)
  Recognizes termination as an adverse employment action.
• Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013)
  Supplies the but-for causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims, which the Eleventh Circuit also extends to FCRA retaliation.
• Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), and Jefferson v. Sewon America, Inc., 891 F.3d 911 (11th Cir. 2018)
  Articulate the “good-faith belief” rule and the principle that employers may act for any reason, including mistaken or poor reasons, so long as the reason is not unlawful.
• Palm Beach County School Board v. Wright, 217 So. 3d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (en banc), Alvarez, and State v. Jackson, 650 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1995)
  Together establish that FCRA retaliation claims mirror Title VII claims in structure and causation, reinforcing that Nassar’s but-for standard applies under Florida law.

G. Impact and Implications

1. The High Bar for Reversing Evidentiary Rulings

The primary doctrinal message from McKnight is the reaffirmation of how difficult it is to reverse a civil jury verdict based on an evidentiary ruling. Even where a plaintiff can plausibly argue that excluded evidence supported his theory of pretext or intent, appellate courts will require a concrete showing that:

• The evidence directly addresses one or more dispositive issues (e.g., causation or the existence of a materially adverse action); and
• The exclusion, in context, probably changed the outcome.

Generalized “me too” or workplace culture evidence is unlikely to meet that standard unless it is closely tied to:

• The same decision-makers;
• Similar temporal and factual circumstances; and
• The same type of challenged adverse action.

2. Use of Coworker Testimony in Retaliation Cases

The opinion offers a cautionary illustration for plaintiffs relying heavily on coworker testimony:

• Testimony that management is “harsh” or “retaliatory” in a lay sense does not automatically translate into evidence of statutory retaliation.
• Vague, paraphrased statements and personal glosses on what “discrimination” or “harassment” mean may carry limited probative value—and substantial prejudice—under Rules 401, 403, and 602 (personal knowledge).
• Absent a clear factual nexus to the adverse action and protected activity at issue, such testimony may be excluded without creating reversible error.

3. Employer Reliance on Mental Health Evaluations and EAP Compliance

Although the case does not involve ADA disability discrimination claims (those claims did not reach the jury), the opinion is significant for employers managing employees who raise both:

• Frequent discrimination grievances and safety complaints; and
• Manifest signs of possible mental health problems that raise workplace safety issues.

McKnight signals that:

• Employers may legitimately rely on third-party mental health providers (such as Resources for Living) for fitness and compliance determinations.
• Removing an employee from duty, placing them on paid leave, and conditioning return to work on EAP compliance can be non-retaliatory when grounded in documented safety concerns and external professional advice.
• Even when an employer makes mistakes (e.g., the communication delay about the fitness report), those mistakes do not equate to retaliation absent evidence of unlawful motive.

4. Clarifying FCRA Retaliation and But-For Causation

By explicitly aligning FCRA retaliation standards with Title VII after Nassar, the opinion:

• Confirms that FCRA retaliation plaintiffs must also prove but-for causation—that the adverse action would not have occurred absent a retaliatory motive.
• Reinforces Florida’s interpretive practice of following federal law where state statutes are patterned on federal civil rights laws.

5. Jury Instructions and the “Materially Adverse” Standard

The panel’s observation that “materially adverse action” is the proper formulation under Burlington Northern, even though the instructions here used “adverse employment action,” serves as a reminder that:

• Trial courts should update retaliation instructions to reflect the broader, Burlington-compliant standard.
• Practitioners should be attentive to preserving objections to outdated phrasing.
• Where no objection is lodged and the case is tried on a narrower formulation, appellate courts may still affirm so long as the jury’s findings resolve the dispositive elements (as here with the special interrogatory on adversity).

IV. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Protected Activity

In retaliation law, “protected activity” generally means:

• Opposing discrimination (e.g., complaining about race discrimination internally or to external agencies); or
• Participating in proceedings under anti-discrimination laws (e.g., filing a charge, testifying, or assisting in an investigation).

In McKnight, UPS did not dispute that his repeated grievances alleging discrimination constituted protected activity.

2. Materially Adverse Action

Under Burlington Northern, a materially adverse action is any employer action that “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Examples include:

• Firing, demotion, or loss of pay;
• Significant negative changes in job duties;
• Suspension or formal disciplinary actions; and
• Certain transfers, investigations, or evaluations, if they would deter a reasonable employee from complaining.

The jury here found that a fitness-for-duty referral, on these facts, was not materially adverse, but that termination was.

3. Causation: “But For” Standard

“But-for” causation means the adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the unlawful motive. This does not mean the unlawful motive is the only factor, but it must be determinative:

If the employer would have taken the same action for other, lawful reasons even if the protected activity had never occurred, the but-for standard is not met.

4. Motion in Limine

A motion in limine is a pretrial request asking the court to rule on the admissibility of certain evidence before it is presented to the jury. Such rulings:

• Shape what evidence the jury hears; and
• Can be revisited at trial if the context changes, although here the exclusion of Longest’s testimony stood.

5. Abuse of Discretion

An appellate court defers heavily to a trial judge’s discretion on evidentiary matters. It will not reverse unless the judge applied the law incorrectly or made clearly unreasonable or clearly erroneous decisions.

6. Harmless Error and “Substantial Rights”

Not every mistake justifies a new trial. An error is harmless if it likely did not affect the outcome. A substantial right is affected only when the error:

• Probably changed the verdict; or
• Deprived a party of a meaningful opportunity to present its case on a decisive issue.

7. Pretext

“Pretext” refers to a false reason offered by an employer to hide the real, unlawful motive (e.g., retaliation). To show pretext, a plaintiff must do more than show that the employer’s decision was mistaken or unfair; he must show that the stated reason is not the true reason and that the true reason was retaliatory.

8. Good-Faith Belief Doctrine

Under the good-faith belief rule, what matters is what the employer honestly believed at the time of the decision, not whether its belief was correct. If the employer honestly believed an employee was noncompliant or unsafe, and acted on that belief, the action is not unlawful retaliation even if the belief later proves mistaken—absent evidence that the belief was a sham to cover retaliation.

9. Special Interrogatories

Special interrogatories are specific written questions the jury must answer, in addition to or in lieu of a general verdict. They help:

• Clarify which elements the jury found or did not find; and
• Facilitate appellate review, as in this case where the answers to adversity and but-for causation were key to the affirmance.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in McKnight v. UPS underscores a core principle of civil appellate practice: evidentiary errors—especially in the admission or exclusion of circumstantial, “me too”-type testimony—will lead to reversal only when they likely changed the jury’s answer to a dispositive question.

In this case, the jury:

• Found that the fitness-for-duty referral was not a materially adverse action; and
• Determined that McKnight’s termination would have occurred regardless of his protected activity, because of his failure to comply with EAP requirements.

Because coworker Longest’s excluded testimony did not directly bear on these determinations—and was remote from the specific facts of the referral and termination decisions—the court held that its exclusion did not affect McKnight’s substantial rights. The verdict for UPS was affirmed, and the challenge to the directed verdict on punitive damages became moot.

More broadly, the opinion:

• Reaffirms the materially adverse action and but-for causation requirements for retaliation under Title VII, § 1981, and the FCRA.
• Reinforces the harmless error threshold for overturning evidentiary rulings on appeal.
• Highlights the importance of concrete, decision-specific evidence over generalized workplace culture testimony in proving retaliation and pretext.
• Confirms that Florida courts will continue to interpret FCRA retaliation provisions in lockstep with Title VII precedent.

Even as an unpublished decision, McKnight offers a clear, practical reminder: in retaliation litigation, both sides must focus their evidence—and their appellate arguments—squarely on the elements the jury must actually decide, and on whether any alleged error could plausibly have changed the outcome on those elements.