Harmless Error, Expert Evidence, and Local Rule Enforcement in Civil Rights Trials: Commentary on Paul v. City of New York (2d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s summary order in Paul v. City of New York, No. 24‑2192 (2d Cir. Nov. 24, 2025), affirming a defense verdict in a civil rights and medical malpractice case arising out of the death of Anthony Andre Paul II in 2015.

The plaintiffs, Andre Paul and Alberty Paul, acting as co‑administrators of the decedent’s estate, sued:

The City of New York;
Various NYPD officers and supervisors;
North Central Bronx Hospital; and
The New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation.

They alleged:

Excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, based on NYPD officers’ response to a 911 call that Mr. Paul had barricaded himself in his shared apartment at Narco Freedom House; and
Medical malpractice, based on allegedly deficient emergency care at North Central Bronx Hospital that purportedly contributed to his death on July 2, 2015.

After a multi‑week jury trial (May 7 to June 4, 2024) in the Southern District of New York (Broderick, J.), the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiffs did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or the jury instructions. Instead, they focused narrowly on four evidentiary rulings:

The district court’s decision to deem the medical examiner, Dr. Monica Smiddy, “unavailable” and to present her testimony by deposition instead of live testimony;
The exclusion of two autopsy photographs that plaintiffs claimed would corroborate their theory that a particular puncture wound was caused by a Taser dart;
The admission of expert testimony from the defense’s Taser and use‑of‑force expert, Dr. Mark Kroll, and the denial of a mistrial motion based on that testimony; and
The exclusion of a Quality Assurance report (a “Root Cause Report”) from North Central Bronx Hospital’s Quality Assurance Committee, which the plaintiffs sought to treat as a party admission as to the timing and nature of care upon arrival.

The Second Circuit, applying a deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard to the district court’s evidentiary and mistrial rulings, affirmed the judgment, concluding that either there was no abuse of discretion or, even assuming arguendo error, any such error was harmless.

Although the order is explicitly designated as a summary order without precedential effect under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, it is still citable and provides a useful illustration of:

How rigorously the Second Circuit applies the harmless error doctrine in civil trials;
The limits of challenging expert testimony—especially in use‑of‑force cases—under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 704;
The leeway district courts have in enforcing their local and individual rules on the timing of in limine motions; and
The difficulties plaintiffs face in using internal hospital Quality Assurance materials at trial.

II. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Disposition

The Second Circuit (Livingston, C.J., Nardini, and Menashi, JJ.) affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. The key holdings can be summarized as follows:

Standard of review: Evidentiary rulings and denial of a mistrial are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and errors, if any, must be prejudicial rather than harmless to justify reversal.
Dr. Smiddy and autopsy photos: Even assuming error in (a) deeming Dr. Smiddy unavailable and presenting only deposition testimony, and/or (b) excluding two autopsy photos, any error was harmless. Her deposition testimony and other expert testimony strongly supported the defense theory that the puncture wound at issue was a therapeutic IV attempt, not a Taser prong, and there was no reason to think live testimony or additional photographs would have altered that conclusion.
Dr. Kroll’s testimony and mistrial motion:
- The district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming plaintiffs’ objections to Dr. Kroll’s testimony untimely under Judge Broderick’s individual pretrial rules, which required evidentiary motions to be made with the joint pretrial order.
- Even on the merits, admission of Dr. Kroll’s testimony complied with Rule 702 and did not transgress Rule 704’s limits on legal conclusions. He did not opine that the force used was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment; instead, he critiqued the scientific basis of a 2015 NYPD guideline, a relevant but non‑dispositive fact.
- The denial of a mistrial based on his testimony was likewise not an abuse of discretion.
Quality Assurance Report: Even assuming that excluding the hospital Quality Assurance Report was error, it was harmless because:
- Its timing statement (arrival at 12:45 a.m.) was offset—and indeed undermined the plaintiffs’ theory—by a statement that the emergency department attending and nursing staff “assessed the patient immediately upon arrival and never left his bedside,” contrary to the claimed delay; and
- There was no evidentiary foundation that would cause the jury to give it special weight over other trial evidence.
The Court therefore did not reach the separate question whether the report would be privileged under New York law and Federal Rule of Evidence 501.

Overall, the Second Circuit underscored both the breadth of trial‑court discretion over evidentiary issues and the high threshold appellants must meet to demonstrate prejudicial, as opposed to harmless, error in the conduct of a civil jury trial.

III. Detailed Analysis and Doctrinal Context

A. The Framework: Abuse of Discretion and Harmless Error

1. Abuse of discretion in evidentiary rulings

The Court opened by reiterating its well‑entrenched standard for reviewing evidentiary decisions:

Deferential abuse of discretion standard: “We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, and we will disturb an evidentiary ruling only where the decision to admit or exclude evidence was manifestly erroneous.” (citing United States v. Kandic, 134 F.4th 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2025), quoting United States v. McGinn, 787 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 2015)).
Institutional competence of the trial judge: The Court stressed, once again, that “the trial judge is in the best position to weigh competing interests in deciding whether or not to admit certain evidence,” quoting United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 114 (2d Cir. 1993), which itself drew from United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1992).

In practice, “abuse of discretion” means that an appellate court will not second‑guess a trial judge’s balancing of probative value, prejudice, cumulativeness, and confusion unless no reasonable jurist could have made that decision—or the court clearly applied the wrong legal standard. Merely disagreeing with how the judge weighed competing considerations is not sufficient.

2. The harmless error overlay

Even if a ruling is wrong, reversal is not automatic. A civil judgment will be disturbed only if the error affected the substantial rights of the complaining party:

The Court cited Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1998)), for the proposition that a new trial is not warranted unless the improperly admitted or excluded evidence was “unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question.”
It cited United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 703 (2d Cir. 2012), quoting United States v. Cadet, 664 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 2011), for the standard that an evidentiary error is harmless “if the appellate court can conclude with fair assurance that the evidence did not substantially influence the jury.”
This is reinforced by 28 U.S.C. § 2111 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, which codify the harmless‑error principle in federal practice.

In Paul, the Court employed a common appellate strategy: it frequently assumed arguendo (for the sake of argument) that an evidentiary ruling might have been erroneous, and then resolved the appeal solely on harmless‑error grounds. This approach is efficient and avoids deciding contentious evidentiary questions unnecessarily, particularly in a summary order.

B. Dr. Smiddy’s “Unavailability” and Exclusion of Autopsy Photos

1. The plaintiffs’ theory and evidentiary goals

One battleground at trial concerned the cause and nature of a described “puncture site” in Mr. Paul’s autopsy report. The plaintiffs’ theory was that:

The puncture wound was caused by an embedded Taser dart (suggesting an additional Taser strike); and
This supported their broader contention that Mr. Paul was subjected to excessive force by NYPD officers.

To support that theory, plaintiffs wanted:

Dr. Monica Smiddy, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy, to testify live rather than by deposition; and
Two autopsy photographs admitted into evidence to visually substantiate their Taser‑wound theory.

The district court:

Deemed Dr. Smiddy “unavailable” and allowed her testimony to be presented via deposition; and
Excluded two of the autopsy photographs as unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that live testimony and the excluded photos would have yielded more favorable, or at least more impactful, evidence in support of the Taser‑dart narrative.

2. The appellate court’s response: harmlessness

The Second Circuit declined to resolve whether the district court correctly applied the rules governing witness unavailability and Rule 403, instead holding that any error would be harmless. The reasoning rests on the actual content of the evidence already before the jury:

Dr. Smiddy’s deposition testimony undermined the Taser theory.
- In a portion of her deposition read to the jury, Dr. Smiddy explicitly reaffirmed her autopsy conclusion that the puncture site was a “therapeutic measure”. She also testified that the wound did not resemble a Taser prong wound.
- The panel emphasized that there was “no reason to conclude that Dr. Smiddy would have provided a different opinion at trial” if called live.
Defense experts reinforced the non‑Taser explanation.
- Dr. Mark Kroll, a defense expert, testified that Taser wounds have “distinctive” characteristics and that he did not observe any “potential fourth site of a Taser prong” in the autopsy materials. This testimony was unrebutted on appeal.
- Dr. Joshua Silverberg testified that the puncture wound was consistent with a failed attempt to place an external jugular IV line and that the bleeding pattern in the autopsy record was consistent with a misplaced IV attempt.

Against this backdrop, the Court concluded there was no reasonable possibility that:

Live testimony from Dr. Smiddy would depart from her deposition in a way material to the plaintiffs’ case; or
The excluded autopsy photos would so change the jury’s perception that the verdict would likely be different, especially given the expert testimony already before the jury.

Therefore, even assuming that the unavailability finding or the Rule 403 ruling was mistaken, the evidence (or lack of it) was, in the Court’s words, “unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered” on the excessive‑force claim, satisfying the harmless‑error standard.

3. Doctrinal notes and practical implications

a. Unavailability and deposition use

The order references “deeming” the witness unavailable but does not engage with the details of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(4). Instead, it bypasses the doctrinal question. Still, practitioners should note:

To challenge unavailability successfully on appeal, a party typically must show both that the Rule 804/Rule 32 standards were misapplied and that the mode of testimony (deposition vs. live) materially affected the jury’s assessment of credibility or weight.
Paul illustrates how difficult this is: where a witness has clearly and firmly committed to an unfavorable opinion in a deposition, courts will be skeptical that live testimony would have been meaningfully different.

b. Excluding graphic photos under Rule 403

Autopsy photographs are classic Rule 403 evidence: often probative, but potentially inflammatory. The Court again avoided a detailed Rule 403 analysis and relied on harmless error instead. For future litigants, the message is practical:

To overturn a 403 ruling, an appellant must do more than assert that the evidence was probative—they must show that exclusion likely mattered in light of the rest of the record.
If multiple experts have already testified in a unified way on the point the photos purport to illustrate, appellate courts may conclude that additional visuals would have been cumulative at best.

C. Dr. Kroll’s Testimony: Expert Opinion, Legal Conclusions, and Timeliness

1. Procedural posture: untimely objections under local rules

Plaintiffs challenged the admission of Dr. Kroll’s expert testimony at trial and sought a mistrial based on its alleged impropriety. The district court, however, ruled that:

Under Judge Broderick’s Individual Rules in Civil Cases, parties were required to serve motions in limine concerning evidentiary issues with the joint pretrial order (Rule 6(B)(i)); and
Plaintiffs had not properly moved in limine to exclude Dr. Kroll’s testimony on the specific grounds later asserted at trial.

The Second Circuit endorsed the district court’s reliance on its own procedural rules, citing Commerzbank AG v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 100 F.4th 362, 377 (2d Cir. 2024), for the principle that district courts “generally have broad discretion to determine whether to overlook a party’s failure to comply with local court rules.”

Thus, even before reaching Rule 702/704 issues, the Court affirmed the district court’s authority to treat the objections as waived or forfeited due to untimeliness.

Practical takeaway: In complex civil cases, especially those involving expert testimony, failure to comply with a judge’s specific pretrial scheduling and in limine requirements can be fatal on appeal. Appellants should expect little sympathy if they wait until trial to press objections that should have been raised earlier.

2. Substantive admissibility under Rules 702 and 704

Even assuming the plaintiffs’ objections had been timely, the Court held that Dr. Kroll’s testimony was properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and did not run afoul of Rule 704’s bar on legal conclusions.

a. Rule 702 and the “gatekeeper” function

The Court cited In re Pfizer Inc. Securities Litigation, 819 F.3d 642, 658 (2d Cir. 2016), and United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2007), for the familiar Daubert framework:

An expert may testify if:
- They have “specialized knowledge that will help the trier of fact”;
- The testimony is “based on sufficient facts or data”; and
- The testimony “is the product of reliable principles and methods” that have been “reliably applied” to the facts.
The district court acts as a “gatekeeper” to ensure both reliability and relevance.

Although the panel did not re‑summarize Dr. Kroll’s qualifications in detail, his testimony as described in the order involved:

Evaluating physical features of Taser wounds and their distinctiveness; and
Critiquing the scientific foundation of a 2015 NYPD guideline related to Taser use.

The Court implicitly found that this type of testimony fell comfortably within Rule 702’s domain of “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” and there is no suggestion in the order that his methodology was unreliable.

b. Rule 704 and improper legal conclusions

The more delicate question was whether Dr. Kroll’s testimony impermissibly ventured into legal conclusions about the “reasonableness” of force, an ultimate legal issue in Fourth Amendment excessive force cases.

Two important precedents structure the analysis:

United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2000): Experts may not state legal conclusions, but they can testify about facts, context, and industry practices even when that testimony touches ultimate issues.
Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1992): Reversing a verdict where an expert witness explicitly described police force as unjustified and excessive under standards that essentially mirrored the legal standard, thereby usurping the role of the jury.

The Court in Paul emphasized three points:

Objective reasonableness is a legal question for the jury. Under Sullivan v. Gagnier, 225 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2000), Fourth Amendment excessive‑force claims are analyzed under “an objective test of reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances.” Experts cannot simply tell the jury that force was “reasonable” or “unreasonable” under this constitutional standard.
Not every opinion touching on an ultimate issue is a legal conclusion. Rule 704(a) provides that “an opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” The key is whether the expert is:
- Supplying specialized insight (e.g., how Tasers function, typical wound patterns, physiological effects); or
- Announcing a normative legal standard (e.g., that a use of force was “objectively reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment).
Dr. Kroll stayed on the permissible side of the line. The Court determined that he did not offer a legal conclusion that the officers’ force was reasonable “either in sum or substance,” nor did he communicate “a legal standard—explicit or implicit—to the jury” within the meaning of Hygh.

The order underscores an important doctrinal nuance about the role of police policies and guidelines:

As Brown v. City of New York, 798 F.3d 94, 101 n.11 (2d Cir. 2015), recognizes, police department guidelines are “relevant to a constitutional ruling on excessive force”; they may inform reasonableness but do not constitute the legal standard.
However, per the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993), ultimately “the question is whether the government official violated the Constitution or federal law, not whether he violated the policies of a state agency.”

In this case, Dr. Kroll was critiquing the scientific foundations of an NYPD guideline—essentially telling the jury that the policy itself may be scientifically flawed or overly cautious. That testimony is:

Relevant (because the jury may weigh the policy in assessing reasonableness) but;
Not the same as telling the jury that failure to follow or adherence to that policy definitively makes the force unlawful or lawful under the Constitution.

The Court, therefore, held that admission of this testimony did not invade the jury’s province to decide constitutional reasonableness.

3. Denial of mistrial based on expert testimony

Motions for mistrial are reviewed for abuse of discretion as well, as the Court noted with citation to United States v. Deandrade, 600 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2010). A mistrial is an extraordinary remedy, typically reserved for situations where improper testimony or conduct:

Irretrievably taints the jury;
Cannot be cured by instructions; and
Substantially prejudices a party’s right to a fair trial.

Because the Court found that Dr. Kroll’s testimony was properly admitted under the Rules of Evidence, there was no basis for concluding that its admission warranted a mistrial.

Practical impact: For plaintiffs in police‑force cases, Paul signals that:

Defense experts critiquing departmental policies or guidelines—especially on scientific or technical grounds—will generally be allowed to testify, provided they stop short of declaring the force “constitutionally reasonable.”
Appellate courts are very reluctant to order new trials based on the content of expert testimony where:
- Objections were not timely preserved; or
- The expert’s opinions can be characterized as technical/scientific rather than legal.

D. The Hospital’s Quality Assurance Report (“Root Cause Report”)

1. The evidentiary dispute

Plaintiffs sought to admit a report produced by the hospital’s Quality Assurance Committee—referred to in the opinion as the “Quality Assurance Report” or “Root Cause Report”—under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) as an admission by a party‑opponent (the hospital).

They argued that the report’s statement that Mr. Paul “arrived in the Adult Emergency department” at 12:45 a.m. would corroborate their theory that:

He arrived at 12:45 a.m. but;
Treatment was unjustifiably delayed until 1:00 a.m., thereby supporting a claim of medical malpractice.

The district court excluded the report, and the plaintiffs challenged that exclusion on appeal.

2. The Second Circuit’s harmless‑error analysis

Once again, the Court declined to decide whether the report was properly excluded as hearsay or under any privilege, and instead focused on harmlessness. It found that:

The report was substantively inconsistent with the plaintiffs’ theory. While the arrival time of 12:45 a.m. might seem superficially helpful, the report also stated that: “The ED Attending and nursing staff assessed the patient immediately upon arrival and never left his bedside.” This language directly contradicted the plaintiffs’ theory of a 15‑minute gap in care.
The report lacked foundational indicia that would prompt the jury to give it special weight. The appellate court noted “the lack of any information as to the Quality Assurance Report’s generation or the basis behind its statement regarding Mr. Paul’s arrival time,” making it unlikely that a reasonable jury would elevate it over the live testimony and other records presented at trial.

Given these factors, the Court concluded that, even assuming the exclusion was error, it was “unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question,” echoing Cameron.

3. The unresolved privilege question

In a footnote, the Court observed that, in light of its harmless‑error determination, it did not reach the defendants’ alternative argument that the report was privileged under New York law and Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

New York law recognizes a robust privilege for certain Quality Assurance and peer‑review materials (often codified in state statutes protecting hospital QA committees), which in many circumstances shields such documents from disclosure or use in litigation. Federal courts must determine, under Rule 501, whether state or federal privilege law applies in a given action (or issue) and, if so, whether the documents fall within the privilege.

Practical implications:

For plaintiffs in medical malpractice or § 1983 cases involving municipal hospitals, even if internal QA documents appear favorable on some point (e.g., timing), their overall narrative content may harm the plaintiff’s broader theory of liability.
Litigants should be prepared for defendants to invoke state QA privileges, and appellate courts may avoid those complex questions if harmless‑error analysis suffices.
Strategically, plaintiffs must weigh whether the potential benefit of an internal report outweighs statements in the same document that could be seen as exculpatory or inconsistent with their theory.

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Threads Highlighted

Although Paul is a non‑precedential summary order, it showcases how several strands of Second Circuit and broader federal doctrine operate together in a real trial record.

A. Evidentiary and Harmless‑Error Precedents

United States v. Kandic, 134 F.4th 92 (2d Cir. 2025) and United States v. McGinn, 787 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015):
Reaffirming the deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard for evidentiary rulings.
United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1993) and United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1992):
Emphasizing that trial judges are “in the best position” to evaluate and balance the competing interests involved in admitting or excluding evidence.
Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2010) and United States v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998):
Defining when an evidentiary error warrants a new trial: only when the evidence at issue was important in relation to everything else the jury considered.
United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 2012) and United States v. Cadet, 664 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2011):
Articulating the “fair assurance” standard for harmlessness—whether, with fair assurance, the appellate court concludes that the evidence did not substantially influence the jury.
United States v. Delgado, 971 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2020):
Used in Paul as a template for the Court’s approach: “Even assuming arguendo there was error, it [was] harmless.”

B. Expert Testimony and Local Rule Enforcement

In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 819 F.3d 642 (2d Cir. 2016) and United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2007):
Reaffirming Daubert’s core tenets and the trial judge’s role as gatekeeper under Rule 702.
United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2000):
Clarifying that expert witnesses cannot give legal conclusions, but can offer factual and contextual opinions even when they touch on ultimate issues.
Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1992):
A cautionary example where an expert’s testimony crossed the line into expressing legal conclusions about the justification of police conduct, warranting reversal.
Commerzbank AG v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 100 F.4th 362 (2d Cir. 2024):
Used to affirm that district courts have broad discretion in enforcing compliance with local and individual rules, including rules governing the timing of evidentiary motions.
United States v. Deandrade, 600 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2010):
Providing the standard for reviewing denial of a mistrial (abuse of discretion).

C. Excessive Force and the Role of Police Policies

Sullivan v. Gagnier, 225 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000):
Establishing the objective reasonableness standard under the totality of the circumstances for Fourth Amendment excessive‑force claims.
Brown v. City of New York, 798 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015):
Recognizing that police guidelines are relevant—but not controlling—in assessing constitutional reasonableness.
Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1993):
Emphasizing that the ultimate question in a § 1983 case is whether there was a constitutional violation, not simply a violation of internal policies.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Abuse of Discretion

A court “abuses its discretion” when its decision is based on:

An error of law;
A clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence; or
A decision that no reasonable judge could have made.

In the evidentiary context, this is a highly deferential standard: different reasonable judges could admit or exclude the same evidence, and as long as the decision falls within a reasonable range, the appellate court will not interfere.

B. Harmless Error

Even if a ruling is wrong, a judgment is not reversed unless the error:

Likely affected the outcome of the case; or
Substantially influenced the jury’s verdict.

The appellate court looks at the entire record and asks: “If the ruling had gone the other way, is there a strong probability that the jury would have decided differently?” If the answer is “no,” the error is “harmless,” and the verdict stands.

C. Rule 702 (Expert Testimony) and the Gatekeeper Role

Rule 702 allows a qualified expert to testify if:

Their specialized knowledge will help the jury understand the evidence or decide a fact;
The testimony is based on sufficient facts/data;
The testimony is the product of reliable methods; and
The expert has reliably applied those methods to the facts.

Under Daubert and subsequent cases, the judge must screen out “junk science” and ensure that expert testimony is reliable and relevant. However, once an expert passes this threshold, the jury is allowed to weigh the testimony as it sees fit.

D. Rule 704 (Opinions on Ultimate Issues and Legal Conclusions)

Rule 704(a) says that an opinion is not objectionable “just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” That means an expert can, for example, opine that a patient’s injuries were caused by a particular mechanism, even though causation is an ultimate issue.

However, experts cannot:

State legal conclusions such as “the force was excessive under the Fourth Amendment”; or
Apply legal standards to the facts using legal terminology that mirrors jury instructions.

The line can be subtle, but generally:

Technical/scientific opinions: admissible;
Normative legal judgments: excluded.

E. Party Admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)

Normally, out‑of‑court statements offered for their truth are hearsay and inadmissible. But Rule 801(d)(2) treats certain statements as “not hearsay” when offered against a party, including:

Statements made by the party;
Statements made by the party’s employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship; or
Statements authorized by the party.

Internal reports, such as a hospital’s QA report, may qualify as party admissions, depending on authorship and purpose. However:

They can still be excluded under other rules (e.g., Rule 403, privilege); and
Even if admitted, their impact must be weighed against other evidence.

F. Summary Orders and Precedential Effect

Under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1:

Summary orders do not have precedential effect; they do not bind future panels in the way published opinions do.
They are still citable (especially those issued after January 1, 2007) as persuasive authority, subject to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1.

Paul v. City of New York therefore does not establish new binding law, but it illustrates how existing doctrines are applied in a particular factual setting.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. High Bar for Reversals Based on Evidentiary Rulings

Paul is a strong practical reminder that:

Appellate courts give substantial deference to trial judges’ evidentiary calls;
Even arguable errors often will be deemed harmless if:
- Other evidence strongly supports the verdict; or
- The excluded or admitted evidence would have been cumulative or marginal.

For litigants in civil rights and medical malpractice cases, it underscores the importance of building a record that:

Demonstrates not just that an evidentiary ruling was wrong, but also that it likely changed the outcome; and
Preserves timely and specific objections in accord with local and individual rules.

B. Expert Testimony in Police‑Force Cases

The decision highlights a trajectory in federal courts:

Technical expert evidence about Tasers, use‑of‑force science, and the empirical basis of police guidelines is increasingly central to excessive‑force litigation.
Court scrutiny focuses less on whether juries can hear such testimony at all, and more on whether experts improperly opine on constitutional reasonableness.
So long as experts stay away from explicitly legal terminology and focus on science, medicine, and policy analysis, their testimony is likely to be admitted.

C. The Limited Utility of Internal Quality Assurance Materials

For medical malpractice and custodial care claims:

Internal QA reports may appear attractive as admissions by a hospital or municipal health authority, especially where they admit certain timelines or describe a “root cause.”
However, those same reports often contain narrative statements that defend or rationalize staff conduct and may conflict with the plaintiff’s theory.
Paul illustrates how such documents can be a double‑edged sword, and even if wrongly excluded, they may add little to—or even undermine—plaintiffs’ theories when considered as a whole.

D. Procedural Discipline: The Importance of In Limine Practice

By invoking Commerzbank and upholding the district court’s enforcement of its own pretrial rules, the Second Circuit sends a clear signal:

Trial judges have wide latitude to require that evidentiary challenges be made by specific deadlines;
Parties who delay serious evidentiary challenges to the eve of trial or mid‑trial do so at their peril; and
On appeal, failure to timely raise issues under individual rules will often foreclose any realistic chance of relief.

VII. Conclusion

Paul v. City of New York does not articulate a new legal rule or precedent; as a summary order, it operates instead as a concrete application of entrenched doctrines in an emotionally charged civil rights and medical malpractice setting.

Key takeaways include:

The abuse‑of‑discretion standard for evidentiary and mistrial rulings is highly deferential, and appellate courts frequently avoid reaching close evidentiary questions by invoking the harmless‑error doctrine.
The case illustrates the nuanced boundary between permissible expert testimony on scientific/technical matters (e.g., Taser wound characteristics, the scientific basis for policies) and impermissible legal conclusions about constitutional reasonableness.
It highlights the trial court’s power to enforce compliance with local and individual rules governing in limine practice, and the consequences of untimely objections.
It underscores the complicated strategic calculus surrounding the use of internal Quality Assurance documents, which may contain both potentially helpful admissions and harmful exculpatory narratives, and which may in any event be protected by privilege.

For practitioners, the decision is a reminder that appellate success on evidentiary challenges in complex civil jury trials is rare, especially where the record contains substantial alternative evidence supporting the verdict, and where objections were not raised with the procedural precision and timing required by the trial court’s rules.