Hair Follicle Drug Testing, Improvement Period Compliance, and Termination of Parental Rights in West Virginia: Commentary on In re S.D.-1 and S.D.-2

Hair Follicle Drug Testing, Improvement Period Compliance, and Termination of Parental Rights in West Virginia: Commentary on In re S.D.-1 and S.D.-2

I. Introduction

The memorandum decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in In re S.D.-1 and S.D.-2, No. 24-635 (Nov. 4, 2025), affirms the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two children, one of whom is a severely disabled, nonverbal child requiring around-the-clock medical care.

Although issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, the opinion is doctrinally significant in at least three respects:

  • It reinforces the stringent statutory standard for extending a post‑adjudicatory improvement period, emphasizing that substantial compliance with its terms is a prerequisite.
  • It confirms that circuit courts may rely on hair follicle drug testing, in combination with other evidence (including missed drug screens), to find ongoing substance abuse, and that appellate courts will not reweigh such evidence.
  • It reiterates that failure to participate in and complete an improvement period, especially where accompanied by ongoing drug abuse and neglect of a medically fragile child, can justify termination without resort to less restrictive dispositional alternatives.

This commentary provides a structured examination of the case, explains the court’s reasoning, explores the precedents applied, and considers the broader impact on abuse and neglect jurisprudence in West Virginia.

II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The petitioner mother, A.S., appealed the Lewis County Circuit Court’s October 8, 2024 order terminating her parental rights to S.D.-1 and S.D.-2. She challenged:

  • The denial of an extension of her post‑adjudicatory improvement period;
  • The circuit court’s reliance on hair follicle drug screens and certain testimony (including statements attributed to the older child, S.D.-1); and
  • The termination of her parental rights itself.

The Supreme Court:

  • Applied the established standard of review from In re Cecil T.—clear error for factual findings and de novo review for legal conclusions.
  • Held that the mother did not “substantially comply” with the terms of her improvement period, pointing to:
    • Numerous missed drug screens in a deliberate pattern;
    • Positive tests for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl during the improvement period;
    • Buprenorphine and naloxone levels inconsistent with her prescribed Suboxone regime; and
    • Failure to attend most of the disabled child’s medical appointments despite being notified and directed to participate.
  • Rejected her challenge to the use of hair follicle tests, deferring to the circuit court’s assessment of weight and credibility and noting the lack of any cited authority prohibiting such reliance.
  • Found that evidentiary objections to hearsay‑like testimony about statements by S.D.-1 were not preserved below and therefore could not be raised on appeal.
  • Affirmed termination of parental rights under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6) and (d)(1), (3), citing the mother’s continued substance abuse and failure to follow through with the reasonable family case plan, and held termination necessary for the children’s welfare.

The Court therefore affirmed the circuit court’s order in full.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. DHS Petition and Initial Allegations

In November 2023, the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that both parents:

  • Abused and neglected the children by using drugs to the detriment of their parenting abilities; and
  • Failed to provide for the children’s medical and educational needs.

Key allegations included:

  • Then‑15‑year‑old S.D.-1 reported seeing drugs and drug paraphernalia in his parents’ possession.
  • The mother had a history of substance abuse, talked openly about using drugs, and admitted to a CPS worker that she had relapsed.
  • Neither child had seen a doctor or dentist for approximately five years.
  • Then‑8‑year‑old S.D.-2, described as developmentally and physically disabled, was not enrolled in school.

B. Adjudication and Improvement Period

At a January 2024 adjudicatory hearing, the mother stipulated that:

  • She abused and neglected the children by abusing drugs to the detriment of her parenting ability; and
  • She neglected S.D.-2’s educational and medical needs.

Based on this stipulation, the circuit court adjudicated her as an abusive and neglectful parent.

In March 2024, the court granted her a post‑adjudicatory improvement period. The core terms required her to:

  • Engage in drug rehabilitation and therapy;
  • Complete parenting classes;
  • Attend multidisciplinary team (MDT) meetings;
  • Submit to regular drug screening;
  • Obtain employment;
  • Maintain suitable housing; and
  • Participate in supervised visitation with the children.

C. Dispositional Proceedings

At the September 2024 dispositional hearing, evidence focused heavily on:

  • The mother’s conduct during the improvement period; and
  • The specialized needs and care of S.D.-2.

The foster parent of S.D.-2 testified that:

  • The child has “many disabilities,” is nonverbal, and requires complex, around‑the‑clock care.
  • After an MDT directed the mother to attend S.D.-2’s medical appointments, the foster parent notified the mother of each appointment.
  • The mother nevertheless attended only two of five subsequent appointments.

The mother:

  • Testified that she did not successfully complete all improvement period terms; and
  • Requested a three‑month extension of the improvement period.

The circuit court made extensive factual findings about:

  • A pattern of missed drug screens (particularly on Fridays, Mondays, back‑to‑back days, and around holidays) by the mother and father, without explanation;
  • Positive tests for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl during the improvement period;
  • Inconsistent buprenorphine and naloxone levels relative to prescribed Suboxone, suggesting she was not using the medication as prescribed; and
  • A pattern in hair follicle testing, including:
    • Negative for methamphetamine in June 2024; but
    • Positive for methamphetamine in July and August 2024, which, combined with missed screens, indicated recent use.

The court rejected the mother’s argument that her slow hair growth caused misleading hair follicle results. It also credited evidence that:

  • S.D.-1 persistently expressed that he did not want reunification with his parents;
  • He did not believe they were sober; and
  • He believed his parents were incapable of properly caring for S.D.-2.

Ultimately, the circuit court:

  • Found the mother failed to successfully complete the improvement period and was unwilling or unable to meet her children’s needs;
  • Denied an extension of the improvement period;
  • Found no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future; and
  • Terminated her parental rights, finding termination necessary for the children’s welfare and adoption in the current placement to be the preferred permanency plan.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standard of Review and Appellate Deference

The Court restated the standard from syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011):

  • Findings of fact by the circuit court are reviewed under a “clearly erroneous” standard.
  • Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

In practice, the opinion repeatedly underscores a deeper principle: appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility. That function is “the exclusive function and task of the trier of fact.” This is drawn from State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995), which the Court cites multiple times.

This deference framework is crucial to understanding why the Supreme Court declined to disturb the circuit court’s findings concerning:

  • The mother’s claimed compliance with the improvement period;
  • The weight of hair follicle versus urine tests;
  • The familiarity of the CPS worker with the case; and
  • The reliability of testimony recounting statements made by S.D.-1.

B. Denial of Extension of the Post‑Adjudicatory Improvement Period

1. Statutory Framework: West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑610(6)

Under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑610(6), a court may extend an improvement period if certain conditions are met, including that the parent has:

  • Substantially complied with the terms of the improvement period; and
  • Shows that further improvement is likely through continued participation.

The statute sets a threshold: a parent who is not substantially compliant is not entitled to an extension. That statutory requirement became dispositive here.

2. Application to the Mother’s Conduct

The Supreme Court endorsed the circuit court’s findings that the mother did not substantially comply. The critical facts included:

  • Numerous missed drug screens, in an “intentional and deliberate pattern”:
    • Missed on Fridays and Mondays;
    • Missed on back‑to‑back days; and
    • Missed immediately before or after holidays.
  • Positive test results for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl during the improvement period.
  • Inconsistent levels of buprenorphine and naloxone relative to prescribed Suboxone, suggesting the medication was not being used as prescribed (raising concerns of misuse or diversion).
  • Failure to attend S.D.-2’s medical appointments:
    • Of five appointments notified to her after the MDT directive, she attended only two.
    • This was especially significant given that S.D.-2 is nonverbal, had many disabilities, and required complex care.

On appeal, the mother argued:

  • She had “substantially complied” with the improvement period aside from obtaining employment;
  • She was not permitted to attend S.D.-2’s medical appointments; and
  • DHS failed to provide reunification therapy.

The Court refused to second‑guess the circuit court’s credibility determinations:

“[A]n appellate court may not decide the credibility of witnesses or weigh evidence as that is the exclusive function and task of the trier of fact.” State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995).

After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court described the evidentiary basis for the circuit court’s findings as “extensive” and held that the mother’s contrary testimony was insufficient to show clear error.

Citing In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996), the Court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying an extension where the parent failed to comply with the terms of the improvement period.

Key takeaway: Substantial compliance means more than sporadic participation or partial effort. Continued drug use, missed testing, and failure to meet critical care obligations—particularly to a medically fragile child—defeat any claim to an extension of an improvement period.

C. Use and Weight of Hair Follicle Drug Testing

1. The Mother’s Challenge

The mother argued that:

  • The court improperly relied on hair follicle tests instead of urine screens; and
  • Her hair grew slower than the commonly assumed rate (about half an inch per month), such that the standard 90‑day window for hair testing did not apply and led to “false positives.”

She claimed this slower hair growth was “unrefuted” in the dispositional record.

2. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s response is multi‑layered:

  1. No bar to hair follicle testing absent authority. The Court notes that, to the extent the mother argued that reliance on hair follicle tests is “generally inappropriate,” she cited no authority disallowing a circuit court from considering such testing. This signals that, absent controlling authority to the contrary, hair testing is a permissible evidentiary tool in abuse and neglect proceedings.
  2. Hair tests were considered with other evidence. The Court emphasizes that the circuit court did not rely on hair follicle tests in isolation. Rather, it weighed them in conjunction with:
    • The mother’s numerous missed drug screens; and
    • The overall pattern of her test results.
  3. Pattern of results indicates new use. Importantly, the circuit court observed—and the Supreme Court agreed—that:
    • In June 2024, the mother’s hair follicle test was negative for methamphetamine; but
    • In July and August 2024, her hair follicle tests were positive for methamphetamine.
    This fluctuation, when paired with repeated missed screens, was deemed “indicative of continued drug use” and undercut her theory that the positives merely reflected old usage trapped in slow-growing hair.
  4. Appellate deference to weight of evidence. The Court again invoked Guthrie to stress that assessing the weight and credibility of competing scientific or factual explanations is for the circuit court:

    “[T]he circuit court exercised its legitimate authority to assign weight and credibility to the evidence presented, and we decline to disturb its determinations on appeal.”

  5. Record did not support her factual premise. The Court observed that the specific transcript citation she offered for the “unrefuted” hair‑growth evidence did not mention hair growth at all, further undermining her argument.

Key takeaway: Hair follicle drug testing is an acceptable evidentiary basis for findings of ongoing drug use in West Virginia abuse and neglect cases, especially when:

  • Considered together with missed urine screens or other evidence; and
  • Supported by a pattern in results (e.g., becoming negative, then positive again) that suggests new use.

Appellate courts will not reweigh how such scientific evidence is interpreted, absent clear error or an established legal bar to its use.

D. Evidentiary Issues and Preservation

1. CPS Worker’s Familiarity with the Case

The mother argued that the circuit court erred in relying on the testimony of a Child Protective Services worker who, she claimed, was “unfamiliar” with the case.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument for the same reason it rejected the hair test challenge: it goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence, which is the circuit court’s domain (Guthrie). There was no showing that admission of the testimony itself was unlawful; only a disagreement about its persuasive value.

2. Statements Attributed to S.D.-1 and the Waiver Doctrine

The mother also contended that the circuit court improperly relied on witness testimony recounting out‑of‑court statements by S.D.-1 (for example, his expressed desire not to be reunified, and his belief that his parents were not sober and could not care for his sibling), given that:

  • He was not called as a witness; and
  • No Child Advocacy Center (CAC) interview was conducted.

However, the Supreme Court noted:

  • The mother did not identify anywhere in the record where she objected to that line of questioning at the dispositional hearing.
  • Under State v. Asbury, 187 W. Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d 891 (1992), failure to object generally constitutes a waiver of the right to raise the matter on appeal.
  • Under Noble v. W. Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 223 W. Va. 818, 679 S.E.2d 650 (2009), the Court does not consider nonjurisdictional questions raised for the first time on appeal.

As a result, the issue was not preserved for appellate review, and the mother was “entitled to no relief in this regard.”

Key takeaway: Parents and their counsel must timely object to contested testimony at the circuit court level—particularly to hearsay‑like evidence—if they intend to raise such issues on appeal. Failure to object ordinarily forfeits the argument.

E. Termination of Parental Rights

1. Statutory Framework: West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6) and (d)

The Court reaffirmed the well‑established standard from In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (relying on In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)):

Termination of parental rights may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when:

  • There is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6); and
  • Termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

Under § 49‑4‑604(d), there is no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction when, among other things:

  • The parent has habitually abused or is addicted to controlled substances or drugs (§ 49‑4‑604(d)(1)); or
  • The parent has not responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts (§ 49‑4‑604(d)(3)).

2. Failure to Follow Through with the Improvement Period (In re K.L.)

The Court found that the mother’s case fit squarely within these statutory grounds:

  • She continued to abuse controlled substances—as evidenced by positive tests for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and fentanyl, and numerous missed screenings.
  • She failed to follow through with the terms of her improvement period and reasonable case plan, including drug treatment, testing, and participation in critical medical appointments for her disabled child.

Citing In re K.L., 247 W. Va. 657, 885 S.E.2d 595 (2022), the Court emphasized that:

A parent’s failure to participate in their improvement period is “a statutorily‑recognized basis upon which this Court regularly affirms termination of parental rights.”

In other words, it is not necessary for DHS to show that no service whatsoever was offered or that every possible rehabilitative tool was exhausted. When a reasonable case plan and improvement period are provided and the parent fails to meaningfully participate, that failure itself is a recognized ground for termination.

3. Best Interests of the Children

Beyond statutory unfitness, the court must also find that termination is necessary for the welfare—or “best interests”—of the children.

Here, the Court noted that:

  • Then‑9‑year‑old S.D.-2 was nonverbal, had many disabilities, and required complex, round‑the‑clock care, yet the mother:
    • Had historically neglected his medical and educational needs (no doctors or dentists for approximately five years, no school enrollment); and
    • Failed to take advantage of the opportunity, and direction by the MDT, to attend his appointments during the case.
  • Then‑15‑year‑old S.D.-1:
    • Repeatedly expressed a desire not to be reunified with his parents;
    • Did not believe his parents were sober; and
    • Believed they could not care properly for his disabled sibling.
  • Adoption in the current placement would provide the children with the most stability.

The Court agreed with the circuit court that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare and that adoption was the preferred permanency plan.

Key takeaway: Where a parent combines ongoing, unremedied substance abuse with prolonged medical and educational neglect—particularly of a severely disabled child—the best‑interests analysis will weigh heavily toward permanency through termination and adoption, even if the parent shows some limited engagement with services.

F. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. In re Cecil T. – Standard of Review in Abuse and Neglect Appeals

Cecil T. sets out the familiar two‑tier standard:

  • Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.
  • Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review.

In In re S.D.-1 and S.D.-2, that standard underpins the Court’s refusal to re‑evaluate:

  • Whether the mother “really” complied with her improvement period;
  • The comparative merits of hair versus urine testing; and
  • The reliability of testimony from the CPS worker and other witnesses.

2. State v. Guthrie – Deference to Credibility and Weight of Evidence

Though a criminal case, Guthrie is repeatedly cited in civil abuse and neglect appeals for the rule that:

“An appellate court may not decide the credibility of witnesses or weigh evidence as that is the exclusive function and task of the trier of fact.”

In this case, Guthrie serves as the backbone for rejecting:

  • The mother’s attempt to re‑characterize the evidence of her improvement period performance;
  • Her contention that hair follicle results were scientifically misleading; and
  • Her challenge to the CPS worker’s familiarity with the case.

3. In re Katie S. – Denial of Improvement Period Extensions

Katie S. supports the proposition that a circuit court does not abuse its discretion in denying an extension of an improvement period when the parent has not complied with its terms.

The Court in In re S.D.-1 and S.D.-2 uses Katie S. to anchor its conclusion that the mother’s:

  • Continued drug abuse;
  • Missed drug screens; and
  • Failure to attend the disabled child’s medical appointments;

justified refusal to extend her improvement period.

4. State v. Asbury and Noble v. W. Va. DMV – Preservation and Waiver

Asbury establishes that failure to object at trial generally waives the right to complain on appeal. Noble articulates that nonjurisdictional issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.

These cases directly support the Court’s refusal to consider:

  • The mother’s belated challenge to testimony recounting S.D.-1’s statements.

5. In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M. – Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

These cases affirm that termination of parental rights is permissible without trying less restrictive alternatives when:

  • There is no reasonable likelihood that conditions of abuse/neglect can be corrected in the near future; and
  • Termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

In re S.D.-1 and S.D.-2 falls squarely within this framework. Once the court found:

  • Ongoing, unremedied substance abuse; and
  • Failure to participate in services and meet the children’s basic needs;

it was neither obligated nor inclined to order lesser measures such as an additional improvement period or guardianship while preserving parental rights.

6. In re K.L. – Improvement Period Noncompliance as a Basis for Termination

K.L. confirms that a parent’s failure to participate in an improvement period is a “statutorily‑recognized” basis for terminating parental rights.

In re S.D.-1 and S.D.-2 relies on this principle, applying it to:

  • Repeated missed drug screens;
  • Positive drug test results; and
  • Failure to attend crucial medical appointments for a medically fragile child.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

For clarity, the following are brief explanations of key legal concepts used in the opinion:

  • Abuse and neglect proceeding: A civil court case brought (usually by DHS) alleging that a child is abused or neglected. The court can order services, remove children from the home, and ultimately terminate parental rights if statutory thresholds are met.
  • Adjudicatory hearing: The phase where the court decides whether the allegations of abuse/neglect are proven. A parent may stipulate (admit) or the court may hold a contested hearing. Once adjudicated, the case moves to dispositional planning.
  • Post‑adjudicatory improvement period: A court‑ordered period in which a parent is given structured services, obligations, and time to correct the conditions of abuse or neglect. Conditions commonly include drug treatment, parenting classes, mental health treatment, and regular drug screens.
  • Substantial compliance: Not a rigid percentage test but a qualitative standard: the parent must meaningfully engage in, and progress in, the services and conditions required. Repeated missed drug screens, ongoing use of illegal drugs, or failure to meet critical obligations (such as attending medical appointments) generally indicate a lack of substantial compliance.
  • Hair follicle drug testing: A method that examines hair samples for drug metabolites. Typically, about half an inch of hair is said to represent around 30 days of use, but actual detection windows can vary. In this case, the courts treated changes in hair test results over time (negative to positive) as evidence of new drug use, especially combined with missed urine tests.
  • No reasonable likelihood that conditions can be substantially corrected: A statutory finding under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(d) that future improvement is unlikely, often due to habitual drug abuse, failure to respond to case plans, or other entrenched problems.
  • Best interests of the child: The overarching standard guiding dispositional decisions, including termination. It considers safety, stability, permanency, and the child’s physical and emotional needs. In this case, the extensive medical needs of S.D.-2 and the older child’s stated wishes were central to the best‑interests determination.
  • Multidisciplinary team (MDT): A team of professionals (social workers, therapists, lawyers, foster parents, etc.) who meet periodically to coordinate services, monitor progress, and recommend case plans and permanency options to the court.
  • Termination of parental rights: A permanent severance of the legal relationship between parent and child. Once terminated, the parent generally has no legal right to custody, visitation, or decision‑making, and the child becomes legally free for adoption.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Parents and Counsel in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings

  • High bar for improvement period extensions. This case reinforces that an extension is not automatic. Parents must demonstrate sustained, meaningful engagement and tangible progress. Continued drug use and neglected obligations—especially medical care for special‑needs children—will almost certainly bar extensions.
  • Importance of complete participation in services. Partial compliance (e.g., attending some classes but missing drug tests, or sporadically attending appointments) will not satisfy the “substantial compliance” standard.
  • Need to create a clear evidentiary record. If a parent believes they were:
    • Prevented from attending appointments;
    • Denied services such as reunification therapy; or
    • Subjected to unreliable testing;
    those issues must be clearly raised and documented in the circuit court, ideally with corroborating evidence or expert testimony. Unsupported assertions on appeal will not suffice.
  • Timely objections are essential. To challenge hearsay or questionable testimony (such as second‑hand accounts of a child’s statements), counsel must object in the trial court. Failure to do so will almost always waive the issue for appeal.
  • Medication‑assisted treatment (Suboxone) will be scrutinized. The opinion shows the Court’s willingness to consider not just whether a parent is prescribed Suboxone, but whether they are using it as prescribed, based on drug level data. Inconsistent levels may be treated as evidence of misuse.

B. For DHS and Circuit Courts

  • Document patterns of noncompliance. The circuit court’s detailed findings about the timing and pattern of missed drug screens (Fridays, Mondays, holidays) were influential. Thorough documentation strengthens the evidentiary basis for findings of continued substance abuse and lack of compliance.
  • Use of hair follicle testing. While no case law disallows hair testing, In re S.D.-1 and S.D.-2 effectively endorses its use where:
    • It is interpreted in context (with urine screens and other behavior); and
    • The results demonstrate meaningful changes over time (such as reverting to positive after a negative result).
  • Medical neglect of special‑needs children is heavily weighted. Where a child has significant disabilities and complex care needs, failure by a parent to engage in medical care—especially after being specifically directed to attend appointments—will strongly support findings of unfitness and justify termination.
  • Children’s expressed wishes matter, especially older children. The Court explicitly noted S.D.-1’s consistent desire not to reunify and his view of his parents’ sobriety and caregiving ability. While not dispositive, such statements are a relevant factor in the best‑interests analysis, particularly for older adolescents.

C. Doctrinal Clarification

Although the decision primarily applies existing law, it clarifies and reinforces several points:

  • Improvement periods are conditional, not guaranteed. A parent’s failure to perform during the original improvement period can and will foreclose any extension, even if the parent expresses a desire to continue working on reunification.
  • Hair follicle testing is a valid component of the evidentiary mix. Absent authoritative scientific or legal grounds to the contrary, courts may rely on hair testing as part of the overall picture of substance use.
  • Non‑participation in an improvement period is itself a recognized ground for termination. This follows In re K.L. and is strongly restated here.

VII. Conclusion

In re S.D.-1 and S.D.-2 stands as a significant reaffirmation of West Virginia’s abuse and neglect framework, especially in cases involving parental substance abuse and medically fragile children. The Supreme Court:

  • Strictly applied statutory requirements for improvement period extensions, emphasizing that substantial compliance is indispensable;
  • Confirmed that hair follicle testing, used alongside other evidence such as missed urine screens, is a permissible and reliable basis for finding continued drug use;
  • Reiterated that failure to participate in and complete an improvement period is a statutorily recognized basis for terminating parental rights; and
  • Affirmed that when entrenched substance abuse and medical neglect persist, termination without lesser alternatives is appropriate and often necessary to serve the children’s best interests.

For practitioners, the decision highlights the importance of:

  • Full and documented engagement with case plans and services;
  • Timely and precise evidentiary objections in the trial court; and
  • Careful attention to the needs and expressed wishes of older and medically complex children.

In the broader legal context, the case does not revolutionize West Virginia law, but it sharpens its application: parents must act promptly and consistently to remedy the conditions that brought their children into care, or risk the finality of termination based on clear, well‑documented noncompliance.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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