Introduction

In Amy Hadley v. City of South Bend, Indiana, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed—without qualification for the facts presented—that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause does not require compensation for property damage caused by law enforcement officers executing a valid search warrant. The case arises from a highly destructive search of Hadley’s home in South Bend, Indiana, during which officers, acting on a lawfully issued warrant to find a murder suspect, broke windows, deployed approximately thirty tear gas canisters, and caused extensive interior damage. After the City of South Bend and St. Joseph County declined to pay Hadley’s approximately $16,000 in losses, she sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a federal Takings Clause claim (as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment).

The district court dismissed at the pleading stage, relying on the Seventh Circuit’s own precedent, Johnson v. Manitowoc County (2011). On appeal, a panel consisting of Judges Rovner, Scudder, and Kolar (opinion by Judge Kolar) affirmed. The panel held that Johnson squarely controls and bars a Takings Clause claim where damage occurs as a result of law enforcement executing a valid search warrant. The opinion also addresses, and rejects for present purposes, the plaintiff’s invitation to overrule Johnson in light of modern takings doctrine, while acknowledging open questions percolating in other circuits and at the Supreme Court’s doorstep.

The core issue: whether the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause entitles an innocent homeowner to “just compensation” when police cause significant damage to her home while executing a valid warrant in search of a fugitive believed to be inside. The Seventh Circuit’s answer remains no—at least where the search is lawful and the claim is framed under the Takings Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment.

Summary of the Opinion

• Holding: Damage caused by law enforcement in the execution of a valid search warrant is not a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. Johnson v. Manitowoc County controls, and the court declines to overrule it.
• Reason for affirmance: The police activity here—entry and damage pursuant to a valid warrant—falls within the government’s exercise of law-enforcement authority (police power) and longstanding common-law privileges to enter to effect arrests or enforce criminal law. Under Johnson and Supreme Court guidance (including Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid), such authorized searches do not “take” a property right from landowners.
• Doctrinal clarification: While the court leaves open that takings may occur when the state exercises police power outside the classic law-enforcement context, it emphasizes that Johnson controls in this precise setting and that the appropriate constitutional lens for challenging destructive searches is the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, not the Takings Clause.
• Procedural posture: The decision affirms a Rule 12(b)(6)-type dismissal at the pleadings stage (accepting well-pled facts as true) because the complaint, on its face, cannot state a Takings Clause claim under binding Seventh Circuit law.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Johnson v. Manitowoc County, 635 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2011).

  The lynchpin. In Johnson, police caused extensive damage to a landlord’s trailer and garage while executing a valid warrant; the Seventh Circuit rejected a Fifth Amendment takings claim, characterizing the conduct as an exercise of the police power rather than eminent domain. The panel here treats Johnson as controlling for “law enforcement damaging property while executing a valid search warrant,” rendering the Takings Clause claim a “non-starter.”

• Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139 (2021).

  Although Cedar Point broadened the protections for property owners against government-mandated access by defining many physical invasions as per se takings, it expressly recognized “traditional common law privileges,” including the privilege to enter property to effect an arrest or enforce criminal law. The Hadley panel leverages Cedar Point’s observation that “government searches that are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and state law cannot be said to take any property right from landowners.” This aligns Johnson’s rule with modern Supreme Court takings doctrine by locating law-enforcement entries within pre-existing limitations on title.

• Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996).

  The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture of an automobile used in criminal activity—even where a co-owner is innocent—is not a taking, because the government acquires the property through an exercise of authority other than eminent domain. Hadley relies on Bennis to reinforce that where the government proceeds under law-enforcement powers, the Takings Clause does not require compensation.

• AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (and Acadia Technology, Inc. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

  Cited in Johnson and invoked here, these cases treat seizure or retention of property for law-enforcement purposes as exercises of the police power, not takings. The Seventh Circuit uses these authorities to confirm that when police act pursuant to valid warrants, the Takings Clause simply does not apply.

• Regulatory takings lineage (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Penn Central, Pennsylvania Coal; Arkansas Game & Fish; Yee).

  The panel canvasses modern takings jurisprudence to acknowledge that rigid police power/eminent domain distinctions have eroded in the regulatory context. Even so, the court emphasizes that in this specific law-enforcement search setting, longstanding common-law privileges and Fourth Amendment-consistent entries foreclose treating the damage as a “taking.”

• Fourth Amendment cases (United States v. Banks; Cybernet, LLC v. David; San Jose Charter of Hells Angels; Rainsberger; Lange).

  The panel underscores that the Fourth Amendment—not the Fifth—is the constitutional safeguard governing searches and the destructive force used to execute them. Excessive or unnecessary destruction during a search can be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and qualified immunity is not always a barrier (as Hells Angels illustrates). Hadley did not assert a Fourth Amendment claim, and the court expressly notes that this was her more natural avenue for relief.

• Sister-circuit decisions and Supreme Court “percolation.”

  The Fifth Circuit in Baker v. City of McKinney and the Sixth Circuit in Slaybaugh v. Rutherford County have likewise declined to award compensation for similar law-enforcement-caused damage. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pena v. City of Los Angeles was pending at the time of the opinion. Two Justices (Sotomayor, joined by Gorsuch) have flagged this as an “open question” warranting further development in the courts of appeals.

• Principles of precedential reading (Vinning-El; Lewis; Skoien).

  The panel stresses that opinions are to be read for their holdings in context, not as broad statutes. Johnson’s binding force is thus framed as specific to damage arising from execution of valid search warrants.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

1. Johnson controls. The facts align closely with Johnson: property damage occurred during the execution of a valid search warrant, and the plaintiff seeks just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Johnson holds such damage is not a compensable taking because the conduct arises from the state’s police power in criminal enforcement, not from the power of eminent domain. On that basis alone, dismissal is required.
2. No grounds to overrule Johnson in this context. Hadley argued Johnson is inconsistent with modern takings doctrine, which recognizes that takings can occur through exercises of the police power (e.g., certain regulations). The panel acknowledges that takings analysis resists rigid labels and that the police power/eminent domain dichotomy is not dispositive in all contexts. Even so, the court distinguishes the specific, “classic” law-enforcement context: entries consistent with the Fourth Amendment are embedded within pre-existing limitations on title, so no property right is taken. Cedar Point’s recognition of traditional law-enforcement entry privileges reinforces this outcome. Moreover, sister circuits and Supreme Court precedent (such as Bennis) point the same way.
3. Concerns with the plaintiff’s proposed rule and proper constitutional fit. The court expresses skepticism about an “innocent homeowner” compensation rule—its administrability is fraught (how to define innocence? what degree of connection suffices?). The opinion emphasizes constitutional fit: destructive or unreasonable execution of warrants is policed by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, not by after-the-fact compensation through the Takings Clause. Hadley did not pursue a Fourth Amendment claim, and the court notes such a claim was available and sometimes viable despite qualified immunity.

A noteworthy clarification emerges: while the court refuses to overread Johnson as a categorical bar to all police-power takings claims, it insists that Johnson’s holding is clear and controlling in the specific law-enforcement search setting. The panel thus both reaffirms Johnson and narrows any temptation to treat it as an across-the-board rule cutting off takings theories in other, non-search police-power contexts.

Impact

• Immediate effect in the Seventh Circuit: Plaintiffs cannot use the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause to recover for property damage inflicted by police during the execution of a valid warrant. Complaints framed exclusively as takings claims will be vulnerable to early dismissal. Litigants must instead evaluate and, where supported, pursue Fourth Amendment claims alleging unreasonable execution or excessive destruction.
• Pleading strategy and remedy selection: The decision underscores the importance of choosing the proper constitutional vehicle. Where police damage property during a search:
  • Allege a Fourth Amendment unreasonable execution claim, supported by specific facts about the necessity and proportionality of the force used (e.g., number of canisters, alternatives available, risks on scene).
  • Anticipate a qualified immunity defense; develop clearly established law and analogous fact patterns (e.g., Cybernet; Hells Angels).
  • Recognize that purely Fifth Amendment theories will likely fail unless the facts fall outside the law-enforcement search context identified by Johnson and Cedar Point (or unless the Supreme Court later charts a different course).
• Doctrinal signal: Johnson is reaffirmed and cabined. The Seventh Circuit reaffirms the Johnson rule for valid searches while cautioning against reading Johnson as categorically foreclosing takings claims in all police-power settings. This calibrated approach may shape future litigation over non-search exercises of governmental authority that physically affect property.
• National landscape and Supreme Court interest: The Fifth and Sixth Circuits align with the Seventh. The Ninth Circuit’s forthcoming decision (as of the opinion date) may either maintain consensus or tee up a circuit split. Two Justices have identified this as an “open question,” signaling a realistic prospect of Supreme Court review if divergent approaches emerge.
• Policy implications: By channeling disputes into the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness framework, the court favors ex ante regulation of police conduct and case-specific balancing over after-the-fact compensation. Municipalities may consider administrative or legislative compensation schemes for innocent owners to mitigate hardship, but such remedies are not constitutionally compelled under the Takings Clause given this precedent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Takings Clause (Fifth Amendment): The government must pay “just compensation” when it takes private property for public use. Classic example: eminent domain to build a road. Courts also recognize “regulatory takings,” where a regulation goes so far that it is equivalent to a taking. But not all government-inflicted property loss is a “taking.”
• Police Power vs. Eminent Domain: Police power concerns public safety, health, and morals (e.g., enforcing criminal laws). Eminent domain is the power to condemn and physically appropriate property for public use. Modern doctrine recognizes takings can occur even under the “police power” in some regulatory contexts, but law-enforcement entries and seizures consistent with the Fourth Amendment are treated as pre-existing limits on property rights and thus not takings.
• Pre-existing limitations on title: Some limits are baked into property ownership under common law—like the privilege of officials to enter to effect an arrest. When government acts within such traditional privileges, courts say no property right has been “taken” because the owner never had the right to exclude the government in those circumstances.
• Per se vs. Regulatory Takings:
  • Per se takings: physical appropriation or destruction by the government (usually triggers automatic compensation).
  • Regulatory takings: laws that go “too far” in restricting use; courts use multifactor tests (e.g., Penn Central).
  Cedar Point refined the per se category, but it preserved traditional law-enforcement entry privileges, which means not all physical entries are takings.
• Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard: Searches and seizures must be reasonable. Even when officers have a valid warrant, the manner of execution must be reasonable. Excessive or unnecessary destruction during a search can violate the Fourth Amendment and lead to damages under § 1983—subject to qualified immunity defenses.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A federal statute providing a cause of action for damages against state actors who violate federal rights. Plaintiffs must identify a specific constitutional or federal right that was violated. Here, the court holds the Takings Clause is not the right implicated by valid warrant execution damage; the Fourth Amendment would have been the correct vehicle.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hadley v. City of South Bend fortifies a clear, administrable rule in this Circuit: where law enforcement causes property damage while executing a valid search warrant, the Takings Clause does not require compensation. Johnson v. Manitowoc County remains controlling for this specific law-enforcement context, and modern Supreme Court takings decisions such as Cedar Point are harmonized with that outcome by recognizing longstanding law-enforcement entry privileges as pre-existing limitations on title.

The court is careful not to transform Johnson into a categorical prohibition of all takings claims that involve exercises of the police power writ large. Yet, for destructive warrant execution, the constitutional analysis belongs under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, not the Fifth Amendment’s compensation regime. Plaintiffs seeking redress for excessive destruction should plead Fourth Amendment claims and be prepared to meet qualified immunity.

Nationally, appellate courts are converging on this approach, though the Supreme Court has flagged the question as open and deserving of continued percolation. Unless and until the Supreme Court says otherwise, Hadley confirms that in the Seventh Circuit, destruction incident to the lawful execution of a warrant is not a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.

Key takeaways:

• The Takings Clause does not apply to property damage caused by police executing a valid search warrant.
• Johnson v. Manitowoc County is reaffirmed as controlling in this context.
• The proper constitutional vehicle to challenge destructive searches is the Fourth Amendment.
• The Seventh Circuit leaves room for future takings theories outside the law-enforcement search context, but not here.

Case Snapshot

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Date: October 7, 2025
• Panel: Judges Rovner, Scudder, and Kolar (opinion by Judge Kolar)
• Parties: Amy Hadley (Plaintiff-Appellant) v. City of South Bend, Indiana, et al. (Defendants-Appellees)
• Procedural posture: Appeal from dismissal at the pleadings stage
• Disposition: Affirmed
• New/Confirmed Rule: No Fifth Amendment takings liability for property damage inflicted during execution of a valid search warrant; challenges must sound, if at all, in the Fourth Amendment.