Habeas in Transit: Second Circuit Affirms District Courts’ Power to Order ICE Transfers and Rejects Broad INA Jurisdiction-Stripping for Constitutional Detention Claims

Introduction

In Öztürk v. Hyde, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the federal government’s emergency bid to stay a district court order requiring Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to transfer a detained graduate student, Rümeysa Öztürk, from a Louisiana correctional facility to ICE custody within the District of Vermont so she could participate meaningfully and expeditiously in scheduled habeas proceedings. The case presents an unusually stark factual backdrop: Öztürk was lawfully present in the United States on an F‑1 visa, arrested by six plainclothes officers near her Massachusetts home, and transported across multiple states while her location and immediate custodian were withheld from counsel. The government says the arrest and ongoing detention were premised on an agency assessment tied to an opinion piece Öztürk co-authored a year earlier; Öztürk alleges unconstitutional retaliation and chilling of protected speech, and a deprivation of due process.

The government appealed an order from Judge William K. Sessions III (D. Vt.) directing her transfer to Vermont “to support the Court’s resolution” of her bail and habeas hearings and sought an emergency stay pending appeal. The Second Circuit (Parker, Carney, Nathan, JJ.) denied the stay and a parallel mandamus request, vacated its administrative stay, and ordered compliance with the transfer order by a date certain.

Beyond the immediate result, the opinion sets out several consequential propositions about habeas jurisdiction in immigration detention, the “district of confinement” and “immediate custodian” rules when the government conceals a detainee’s location, the limited reach of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) jurisdiction-stripping provisions over constitutional detention challenges, and the district courts’ power—grounded in habeas and the All Writs Act—to order the government to transport a detainee to facilitate adjudication.

Summary of the Opinion

Appellate jurisdiction exists: Citing Shoop v. Twyford, the court held it had collateral-order jurisdiction to review a transportation order issued under the All Writs Act.
Stay denied for failure on all Nken factors:
- Likelihood of success: The government is unlikely to prevail on its challenges to district court jurisdiction or its INA-based jurisdiction-stripping arguments.
- Irreparable injury: The transfer order does not enjoin enforcement of any statute; removal proceedings may continue, and any logistical burden is insufficient.
- Balance of equities/public interest: Öztürk’s ability to participate in habeas proceedings and the equitable interest in enforcing Article III orders outweigh administrative concerns.
Habeas jurisdiction lies in Vermont and was properly preserved:
- At filing, Öztürk was physically in Vermont; the District of Massachusetts properly transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which relates back to the time of the original filing.
- The “unknown custodian” exception applies when the government withholds a detainee’s location; § 2242 requires naming the immediate custodian “if known.”
INA jurisdiction-stripping does not bar this habeas petition:
- 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii): No bar because 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g) does not “specify” discretion over detention location/transfer decisions.
- 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g): Narrow; does not cover independent challenges to unlawful detention, which are collateral to commencing, adjudicating, or executing removal.
- 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5), 1252(b)(9): No “channeling” because there is no order of removal and the detention claims do not seek review of removal proceedings.
- 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e): Does not bar constitutional or legal claims challenging detention.
Mandamus denied: No “judicial usurpation of power” or exceptional circumstance; appellate courts avoid deciding jurisdictional issues by mandamus where regular appeal suffices.
Operative direction: Compliance with the District of Vermont’s transfer order required within one week; deadline set to May 14, 2025.

Background and Procedural Posture

Öztürk, a Turkish national and third-year Ph.D. candidate at Tufts University, lived in Somerville, Massachusetts on an F‑1 visa. Following a DHS/ICE assessment that her associations and a March 2024 op-ed “may undermine U.S. foreign policy,” the State Department approved silent revocation of her visa without notice to her. On March 25, 2025, six plainclothes officers arrested her near her home, transported her through New Hampshire to Vermont, and by the following day flew her to a Louisiana facility. She was barred from contacting counsel during transport; the government intentionally withheld her location “for security” while in transit.

Counsel filed a habeas petition in the District of Massachusetts at approximately 10:01 p.m. that day—her last known location—obtained an order to preserve the status quo, and, after it emerged she was in Vermont at filing, the case was transferred under § 1631 to the District of Vermont. Judge Sessions denied the government’s motion to dismiss, scheduled a bail hearing and a habeas hearing, and ordered ICE to transfer Öztürk to ICE custody in Vermont to aid resolution. The government appealed and sought an emergency stay; the Second Circuit denied the stay and later mandamus, and ordered immediate compliance.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

The panel’s reasoning is densely interwoven with precedent clarifying habeas practice and jurisdiction-stripping:

Shoop v. Twyford (596 U.S. 811 (2022)): Establishes appellate jurisdiction, via the collateral order doctrine, to review transportation orders under the All Writs Act. The Second Circuit relies on Shoop’s threshold holding to reach the stay question.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla (542 U.S. 426 (2004)): Anchors the “district of confinement” and “immediate custodian” rules in habeas; the panel applies Padilla while recognizing its footnote carve-out for unknown locations (footnote 18) and distinguishing habeas “jurisdiction” from Article III subject-matter jurisdiction (footnote 7).
Ex parte Endo (323 U.S. 283 (1944)): A habeas court retains jurisdiction over a properly filed petition despite the government transferring the petitioner after filing; this principle supports Vermont’s continuing jurisdiction after Öztürk’s move to Louisiana.
Kucana v. Holder (558 U.S. 233 (2010)); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr. (498 U.S. 479 (1991)); Bowen v. Michigan Academy (476 U.S. 667 (1986)): These cases supply the clear-statement presumption for restricting judicial review; the court uses them to construe INA jurisdiction-stripping narrowly.
Nethagani v. Mukasey (532 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2008)): For § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), discretion must be “specified” by statute; mere implication is not enough. The panel uses Nethagani to reject the government’s reliance on § 1231(g) as a source of specified discretion.
Aguilar v. ICE (510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007)); Reyna ex rel. J.F.G. v. Hott (921 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2019)): Persuasive authorities concluding § 1231(g) does not “specify” discretion regarding transfer decisions and speaks principally to facilities—the “brick and mortar” problem—not individualized transport decisions.
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC) (525 U.S. 471 (1999)); Department of Homeland Security v. Regents (591 U.S. 1 (2020)); Jennings v. Rodriguez (583 U.S. 281 (2018) (plurality)): Establish that § 1252(g) is narrow and does not bar claims collateral to commencement, adjudication, or execution of removal; the Second Circuit applies these decisions to hold that independent detention claims are not barred.
Kong v. United States (62 F.4th 608 (1st Cir. 2023)); Parra v. Perryman (172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999)): Detention challenges are independent/collateral to removal and are not funneled into § 1252(g) or § 1252(b)(9).
Barahona-Gomez v. Reno (236 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2001)); Michalski v. Decker (279 F. Supp. 3d 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)); Madu v. U.S. Att’y Gen. (470 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 2006)): Distinguishing detention decisions from commencement/adjudication/execution actions for § 1252(g) purposes.
Demore v. Kim (538 U.S. 510 (2003)): While detention can be “necessary for removal proceedings,” § 1226(e) does not explicitly bar constitutional claims; thus habeas jurisdiction persists over constitutional detention challenges.
Nken v. Holder (556 U.S. 418 (2009)) and Winter v. NRDC (555 U.S. 7 (2008)): Supply the four-factor stay standard and the need to show likely irreparable injury; the court applies them to deny a stay.
Degen v. United States (517 U.S. 820 (1996)); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. (322 U.S. 238 (1944)): Recognize inherent equitable powers and the All Writs Act authority to protect proceedings and afford necessary relief—here, to order transfer to facilitate habeas adjudication.
Johnson v. Eisentrager (339 U.S. 763 (1950)); 28 U.S.C. § 2243: Habeas tradition requires production of the body; the panel emphasizes this core feature to justify transfer to aid fact-finding and live participation.
Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger (604 U.S. 22 (2025)): Distinguished; it concerns Article III subject-matter jurisdiction after amendment. Habeas “jurisdiction” is governed by § 2241’s venue/custodian rules, and amendments can relate back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
Kerr v. U.S. District Court (426 U.S. 394 (1976)); Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (542 U.S. 367 (2004)); Roche v. Evaporated Milk (319 U.S. 21 (1943)); In re Ivy (901 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1990)): Articulate the stringent mandamus standard and the norm against resolving jurisdictional merits by mandamus where direct appeal suffices.

Legal Reasoning

1) Appellate Jurisdiction Over the Transfer Order

Although the district court’s order is interlocutory, Shoop v. Twyford resolves that transportation orders under the All Writs Act are reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. The court therefore reached the merits of the stay request.

2) Likelihood of Success on the Merits: Habeas Jurisdiction

a) District of confinement: Habeas petitions seeking to challenge present physical custody must ordinarily be filed in the district of confinement. At the time counsel filed the original petition (10:01 p.m. on March 25, 2025), Öztürk was physically in Vermont in transit to an ICE facility; thus Vermont was the proper district. The case was correctly transferred from Massachusetts to Vermont under § 1631, which “relates back” so that the Vermont court treats the petition as filed at that time in that court.

b) Retention of jurisdiction after transfer to Louisiana: Under Ex parte Endo, once a district court has jurisdiction over a properly filed habeas petition, the petitioner’s subsequent relocation does not strip that jurisdiction. The § 1631 transfer’s relation-back effect means the Vermont court “obtained” jurisdiction at the original filing time and retains it despite the later move.

c) Immediate custodian: While the default rule requires naming the warden of the facility of confinement, § 2242 requires naming the custodian “if known.” When the government intentionally withholds a detainee’s location and custodian, the “unknown custodian” exception permits naming a higher official (e.g., the Secretary of Homeland Security). The government’s argument that the exception applies only to prolonged secrecy lacks textual or precedential support and, if accepted, would effectively bar habeas filing whenever the government transports detainees under a veil of secrecy.

d) Amended petition: Habeas “jurisdiction” here is not Article III subject-matter jurisdiction. Under Rule 15(c), an amended pleading relates back to the original filing. The government’s reliance on Royal Canin is inapposite.

3) Likelihood of Success on the Merits: INA Jurisdiction-Stripping

a) Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii): The government argued the district court could not order a transfer because detention and transfer decisions lie within the Secretary’s unreviewable discretion. The panel rejects this: § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) only strips jurisdiction where Congress has “specified” discretion in the statute. Section 1231(g)(1) uses “shall” and concerns arranging “appropriate places of detention” and, in a next sentence, authorizes expenditures to acquire or operate facilities; it does not explicitly grant discretion over transfer decisions. At most, such discretion is implied, which is insufficient to trigger § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The clear-statement rule (Kucana) confirms that ambiguity is resolved in favor of judicial review.

b) Section 1252(g): This is a “narrow” provision covering three discrete prosecutorial decisions—commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, executing removal orders. Öztürk’s claims challenge unlawful detention and alleged retaliation, not any of the three. Detention challenges are collateral to removal and thus fall outside § 1252(g) (AADC, Regents, Jennings; see also Kong and Parra).

c) Sections 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9): There is no “order of removal,” so § 1252(a)(5) does not apply. Further, § 1252(b)(9)’s “channeling” does not reach independent constitutional detention claims that do not seek review of removal or its process (Regents; Jennings). Reading § 1252(b)(9) to delay First Amendment and due process challenges until after removal would render such claims “effectively unreviewable” and produce the “absurd” results Jennings warned against.

d) Section 1226(e): While the statute bars review of certain discretionary judgments, it contains no explicit ban on habeas review of constitutional claims. Demore and Second Circuit precedent (Velasco Lopez) preserve jurisdiction over constitutional and legal challenges to detention.

4) Irreparable Injury and Balance of Equities

The government’s claim of irreparable injury from being “enjoined” from executing statutes was unpersuasive; the order does not halt removal proceedings, which may proceed (including by remote means). If the government ultimately prevails, Öztürk could be returned to Louisiana. By contrast, Öztürk’s interests—participating in a prompt bail hearing and habeas hearing, accessing medical and legal services, and avoiding ongoing alleged constitutional harms—are weighty. Habeas’s core requirement to “produce the body” supports the transfer to facilitate fact-finding and meaningful participation. The court also weighed the Massachusetts court’s earlier status quo order and expressed concern for respect among Article III courts.

5) Mandamus

Mandamus is extraordinary and inappropriate here. The government’s arguments turn on debatable jurisdictional issues better addressed through the normal appellate process; courts are reluctant to resolve such issues by mandamus absent clear usurpation or abuse.

Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

Habeas venue and rapid filing: When the government moves a detainee and withholds location, the district of physical presence at filing governs. Section 1631 transfer can cure an initial misfiling and relates back to preserve timing and interim relief.
Immediate custodian flexibility: The opinion operationalizes the “unknown custodian” exception—vital in fast-moving, multi-jurisdictional transports—underscoring that § 2242’s “if known” language has teeth. Government-imposed secrecy cannot functionally extinguish the right to seek habeas relief.
Limits of INA jurisdiction-stripping: Constitutional and legal challenges to detention—especially First Amendment retaliation and due process claims—remain reviewable in district court and are not channeled into the petition-for-review process. Attempts to recharacterize detention claims as “arising from” removal are disfavored.
District court authority to order transport: The decision affirms district courts’ equitable and All Writs Act power to order that a detainee be physically produced within the forum when necessary to adjudicate habeas, notwithstanding generalized claims of logistical burden.
Practical constraints on transfer tactics: Rapid, opaque multi-state transfers intended to frustrate access to counsel and courts may backfire; courts can restore the status quo ante and insist on physical presence for prompt adjudication.
Procedural posture matters, but guidance is robust: Although arising in the stay context, the court’s merits assessment is comprehensive and will likely guide district courts within the Circuit (and beyond) confronting similar habeas questions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Habeas corpus: A legal mechanism allowing a detainee to ask a court to examine the legality of their detention. Traditionally requires that the custodian produce the detainee (“the body”) for the court’s review.
District of confinement rule: A habeas petition challenging present physical custody must be filed in the district where the detainee is confined at the time of filing.
Immediate custodian rule and the exception: Ordinarily, the respondent is the warden or official with immediate control over the detainee. If the government conceals the detainee’s location, a higher official can be named because § 2242 requires naming the custodian only “if known.”
Section 1631 transfer: When a case is filed in the wrong court, a court may transfer it to the proper court “in the interest of justice.” The case proceeds as if originally filed in the transferee court on the original date, preserving timing and interim orders.
All Writs Act: Authorizes federal courts to issue orders necessary to protect their jurisdiction and ensure effective adjudication, including ordering transport of detainees for hearings.
Collateral order doctrine: A narrow exception allowing immediate appeal of certain interlocutory orders that conclusively resolve important questions separate from the merits and would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment (e.g., some transport orders).
INA jurisdiction-stripping provisions:
- § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii): Removes jurisdiction to review decisions “specified” by statute to be in the discretion of the Attorney General/Secretary. “Specified” means expressly stated; implied discretion is not enough.
- § 1252(g): Narrowly bars review of decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders, but not independent detention challenges.
- § 1252(a)(5), § 1252(b)(9): Channel review of removal orders and claims arising from removal proceedings into a petition for review; do not apply to independent constitutional detention claims or where no removal order exists.
- § 1226(e): Precludes review of some discretionary judgments under § 1226 but does not bar constitutional or legal challenges to detention.
Stay factors (Nken/Winter): To obtain a stay pending appeal, the movant must show (1) likely success on the merits, (2) likely irreparable injury absent a stay, (3) that the balance of hardships favors a stay, and (4) that the public interest favors a stay. The first two are most critical; when the government is a party, the last two factors merge.
Mandamus: An extraordinary writ used only in exceptional circumstances to correct a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power; not a vehicle to short-circuit ordinary appellate review of jurisdictional issues.

Practical Takeaways for Litigants and Courts

File fast; venue is where the body is: When a detainee’s location is obscured during transport, counsel should file in the last known district and be prepared to invoke § 1631. Courts should assess physical presence at filing, even if the detainee is in transit within the district.
Name a higher official if location is withheld: If the immediate custodian is unknown due to government secrecy, name the DHS Secretary or appropriate high-level official and explain the “unknown custodian” basis.
Seek transfer to facilitate habeas: District courts may order transport to enable live participation, fact-finding, and access to counsel and medical care, especially where constitutional claims require rapid adjudication.
Frame detention claims as independent and constitutional: Clearly distinguish challenges to arrest/detention conditions or motives (e.g., First Amendment retaliation) from challenges to removal; emphasize that resolution does not impede removal adjudication.
Build the record quickly: Because petitions for review are limited to the administrative record of removal, district courts are often the only forums positioned to develop factual records on detention-related constitutional claims.

Conclusion

Öztürk v. Hyde is an important reaffirmation of habeas’ vitality in the immigration detention context. The Second Circuit’s opinion clarifies that:

Habeas jurisdiction turns on the detainee’s physical presence at the moment of filing, and § 1631 can cure an initial misfiling when the government’s secrecy obscures the proper venue.
The “immediate custodian” requirement yields where the government withholds a detainee’s location; § 2242’s “if known” language permits naming higher officials.
District courts retain equitable and All Writs Act authority to order detainee transport to facilitate habeas proceedings and to vindicate the core requirement to “produce the body.”
The INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions are to be read narrowly and do not bar independent constitutional challenges to detention that are collateral to removal.

While the court ruled in the context of a stay pending appeal, its reasoning is comprehensive and provides durable guidance. For government agencies, the opinion cautions that transferring detainees in secrecy will not defeat judicial review. For detainees and advocates, it offers a concrete roadmap to secure prompt, meaningful habeas adjudication of constitutional detention claims even amid fast-moving enforcement actions. In the broader legal landscape, the decision strengthens the principle that, absent a clear congressional command, constitutional challenges to executive detention remain within the ken of Article III courts.