Habeas Courts Retain Jurisdiction to Sanction Pre‑Compliance Violations of Conditional and Unconditional Writs, Even After Belated State Compliance; “Penalty Bar” Reserved for Substantial Inequitable Conduct

Introduction

In Malik Allah-U-Akbar v. Margaret Bradshaw, the Sixth Circuit resolves a recurrent, high-stakes question at the intersection of federal habeas enforcement and state criminal process: what jurisdiction do federal courts retain to enforce and sanction noncompliance with conditional or unconditional habeas writs after a state belatedly complies, and when—if ever—may a federal court bar the State from seeking the death penalty at resentencing as a sanction?

The court (Judge Moore, joined by Judge Cole) affirms the district court’s conversion of a conditional writ into an unconditional writ after Ohio failed to meet the resentencing deadline, yet upholds the district court’s refusal to impose the extraordinary sanction of barring the State from seeking the death penalty. Critically, the Sixth Circuit holds that it—and the district court—retained jurisdiction to adjudicate compliance and potential sanctions under Rule 60(b) for conduct occurring up to the date the State fully complied (here, the formal state-court vacatur of the unconstitutional death sentence), even though the State ultimately complied late. Judge Griffin dissents, arguing AEDPA’s custody requirement eliminates federal habeas jurisdiction once the unconstitutional sentence is vacated.

Parties: Petitioner-Appellant Malik Allah-U-Akbar (formerly Odraye G. Jones); Respondent-Appellee Margaret Bradshaw, Warden. The case arrives following a 2022 Sixth Circuit decision granting penalty-phase relief and a 2024 district court unconditional writ ordering vacatur and release within five business days.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit:

Holds it has jurisdiction to review both the district court’s February 29, 2024 order converting the conditional writ to an unconditional writ and refusing to bar the State from seeking the death penalty, and the district court’s June 24, 2024 Rule 60(b) order denying sanctions for the State’s late compliance.
Clarifies that compliance with the unconditional writ did not occur until the state trial court formally vacated the death sentence on May 29, 2024. Transfer to county custody did not suffice because the Warden could not vacate a sentence.
Affirms the district court’s denial of the extraordinary sanction of barring reprosecution of the death penalty. The record reflected complex proceedings, some delay attributable to the petitioner, and no “substantial inequitable conduct” by the State comparable to D’Ambrosio v. Bagley.
Rejects use of Rule 60(b)(6) to attack the State’s continued reliance on Dr. Eisenberg’s testimony in competency proceedings as a basis for sanctions. Any new constitutional claims concerning resentencing must be litigated through state processes.

The dissent would dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction once the unconstitutional sentence was vacated, reading AEDPA as ending federal habeas jurisdiction at that point and viewing Mason v. Mitchell as irreconcilable with Eddleman v. McKee.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Gentry v. Deuth, 456 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2006) and Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, 453 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2006): These decisions supply the basic architecture of conditional writs: the writ “springs to life” if the State misses the deadline, and federal courts retain power to determine compliance and impose sanctions. The majority leans on this enforcement principle to distinguish permissible compliance policing from impermissible “continuing oversight” of state proceedings.
Eddleman v. McKee, 586 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2009): Eddleman limits federal habeas jurisdiction once the unconstitutional judgment has been vacated, warning against ongoing federal supervision. The majority reads Eddleman to apply when the State timely complies and to preclude prospective oversight of state proceedings post-compliance, but not to bar sanctions for pre-compliance noncompliance.
Girts v. Yanai, 600 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2010): Girts couches Eddleman as a reaffirmation that federal courts cannot oversee state proceedings after compliance, but confirms that courts may enforce writ terms up to compliance. The majority uses Girts to harmonize Eddleman with sanction authority for pre-compliance conduct.
D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 656 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2011): The core support for Rule 60(b) jurisdiction. D’Ambrosio affirms continuing jurisdiction to grant Rule 60(b) relief tied to enforcement of habeas judgments, where the State’s substantial inequitable conduct and noncompliance warranted barring reprosecution. The majority analogizes to recognize jurisdiction here (though ultimately finds no comparable inequity on the merits).
Mason v. Mitchell, 729 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2013): Mason is the linchpin for appellate jurisdiction despite belated state compliance. It confirms that a district court retains jurisdiction to determine compliance with a conditional writ and to consider sanctions, including whether the death penalty may be sought, even after the State later vacates outside the deadline. The majority treats Mason as controlling over Gillispie and harmonizing with D’Ambrosio.
Gillispie v. Warden, London Corr. Inst., 771 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2014): Cited by the Warden to argue jurisdiction ends upon vacatur. The majority limits Gillispie to cases of timely compliance and no unconditional writ issued as a noncompliance sanction; it cannot be read to curtail Mason’s enforcement jurisdiction for pre-compliance noncompliance.
Fisher v. Rose, 757 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1985): Early statement against continuing oversight post-compliance. The majority treats Fisher, via Eddleman and Girts, as consistent with the enforcement/oversight distinction.
Charter Township of Muskegon v. City of Muskegon, 303 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2002) and Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2008): Used to explain Rule 60(b) as a continuation of the original proceeding and to justify a separate Rule 58 judgment for clarity on appeal timing when a conditional writ is converted to an unconditional one.
Standards for sanctions and penalty bar: Sourced from Satterlee, Girts, D’Ambrosio, and Mason. They frame the “extraordinary circumstances” threshold and define “substantial inequitable conduct” (including wrongful retention/delay of exculpatory evidence or bad-faith litigation conduct) as the touchstone for barring reprosecution.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in two jurisdictional steps and then turns to the merits.

Appellate jurisdiction to review the unconditional writ conversion and the refusal to bar the death penalty: At the time the district court converted the writ on February 29, 2024, the State undeniably had not met the conditional writ’s deadline (November 22, 2023). Under Mason, the district court retained jurisdiction to convert the writ and to decide the requested sanction (penalty bar), and the court of appeals retains jurisdiction to review that judgment even if the State later complies belatedly. The State’s later vacatur does not retroactively strip jurisdiction to review the conversion decision or the denial of sanctions tied to pre-compliance noncompliance.
Rule 60(b) jurisdiction to consider sanctions for pre-compliance noncompliance even after later compliance: Invoking D’Ambrosio, the court holds Rule 60(b) authorizes the district court to revisit its enforcement judgment and consider sanctions for pre-compliance conduct. The key limit: federal courts may assess and sanction only up to the point of full compliance with the writ; they cannot oversee or regulate state proceedings thereafter. Determining the date of “full compliance” is itself a legal question: here, the court fixes compliance at May 29, 2024—the date the state court formally vacated the sentence—because partial transfer of custody did not and could not effectuate vacatur, and no shared understanding of vacatur existed among the parties as in Eddleman.
Merits: No “extraordinary circumstances” to bar death-penalty reprosecution: Applying Satterlee, Girts, and Mason, the court reiterates that barring reprosecution is an extraordinary remedy reserved for “substantial inequitable conduct.” While the procedural posture was “troubling”—marked by recusals, competency and self-representation issues, aged mitigation evidence, and public scrutiny—much of the delay was attributable to the petitioner, and the record lacked bad faith, wrongful suppression, or comparable misconduct. D’Ambrosio’s paradigm—state concealment of exculpatory information and the death of a key witness undisclosed to the defense and courts—was not present. Thus, the district court did not err (de novo review) in declining to bar the State’s pursuit of the death penalty when converting the writ.
Merits: No abuse of discretion in denying Rule 60(b) sanctions: Although compliance came nearly three months late, the prosecutor filed to vacate in state court (March 22) and the state court delayed acting based on perceived jurisdictional constraints. This was poor practice but not bad faith or “inexcusable neglect.” Resentencing proceedings are advancing, and the delay does not warrant the extraordinary penalty bar. The court also rejects using Rule 60(b)(6) to bootstrap a new constitutional challenge (concerning Dr. Eisenberg’s testimony) that is distinct from the ineffective-assistance claim on which habeas relief was granted; that claim must proceed through state channels.

The Dissent’s Jurisdictional Counterpoint

Judge Griffin would dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction once the state court vacated the unconstitutional sentence. In his view:

AEDPA’s text permits federal habeas jurisdiction only while a petitioner is “in custody” in violation of federal law; upon vacatur, custody under an unconstitutional judgment ends.
Eddleman controls; Mason is “irreconcilable” with Eddleman and should not be followed. Rule 60(b) cannot extend jurisdiction conferred by AEDPA or enable enforcement after the predicate for habeas jurisdiction disappears.
Retaining jurisdiction post-vacatur to police deadlines or punish tardy compliance intrudes on state sovereignty and comity.

Impact

This published decision has several immediate and practical implications within the Sixth Circuit:

Enforcement jurisdiction clarified and preserved: District courts retain jurisdiction to enforce both conditional and unconditional writs and to consider Rule 60(b) sanctions for pre-compliance noncompliance, even if the State later fully complies. Appellate jurisdiction extends to review such enforcement and sanction decisions. This reduces gamesmanship risks that might otherwise arise if states could cure late without exposure to sanctions.
Defining “full compliance”: When an unconditional writ orders vacatur and release, “partial” steps (like custodial transfers) do not suffice. Full compliance requires the formal act that eliminates the unconstitutional judgment. Absent a shared record-based understanding (as in Eddleman), courts will look for a formal state-court vacatur entry.
Sanction bar remains rare: The bar on reprosecution—especially barring the State from seeking the death penalty—remains limited to extraordinary cases of substantial inequitable conduct akin to D’Ambrosio. Delays and procedural complexity, without bad faith or material prejudice of the type described in D’Ambrosio, will not justify the penalty bar.
Operational imperative for state actors: Wardens, prosecutors, and trial courts must coordinate to ensure actual vacatur within the deadlines set by federal writs. The Warden’s transfer authority cannot substitute for judicial vacatur. Belated compliance can still expose the State to sanctions, even if the ultimate relief (penalty bar) is not imposed.
Procedural housekeeping for habeas enforcement: The district court’s separate Rule 58 judgment underscores the prudential value of a clear, separate judgment when converting a conditional writ to an unconditional writ, both to clarify obligations and to anchor appeal timelines.
Potential en banc or Supreme Court attention: The dissent reprises a jurisdictional fault line between Eddleman and Mason/D’Ambrosio concerning the scope of post-vacatur jurisdiction under AEDPA. By endorsing Mason’s approach, the panel maintains a pathway for enforcement sanctions but invites future review to reconcile competing readings of AEDPA’s “in custody” requirement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conditional writ of habeas corpus: A federal court order granting relief but giving the State a fixed time to cure the constitutional error (e.g., by resentencing). If the State fails to comply on time, the writ “springs to life,” and further relief (like release) becomes mandatory.
Unconditional writ: Entered when the State misses the deadline or fails to cure the error. It orders immediate relief—here, vacatur of the death sentence and unconditional release within five business days.
Rule 60(b): A procedural mechanism allowing a court to grant relief from its own judgment (for reasons such as mistake, newly discovered evidence, or “any other reason that justifies relief”). In habeas, it can be used to enforce a writ by sanctioning noncompliance, provided the court had jurisdiction when the writ issued and the relief addresses pre-compliance conduct.
Compliance versus oversight: Federal courts may determine and enforce whether the State complied with a habeas writ and sanction pre-compliance violations. They may not exercise ongoing oversight of state criminal proceedings once the State has fully complied (e.g., after formal vacatur).
“Extraordinary circumstances” and “substantial inequitable conduct”: The high threshold for barring reprosecution, especially barring the death penalty. Examples include bad-faith litigation conduct, wrongful retention or delayed production of exculpatory evidence, or conduct that significantly undermines the fairness or feasibility of a retrial or resentencing—illustrated vividly by D’Ambrosio.
Vacatur: A court’s formal act nullifying a judgment or sentence. For habeas compliance, vacatur is the key event ending custody under an unconstitutional judgment. Transfer alone does not accomplish vacatur.

Conclusion

Allah-U-Akbar v. Bradshaw strengthens and clarifies the enforcement toolkit for federal habeas courts within the Sixth Circuit. The court reaffirms that jurisdiction persists to police and sanction pre-compliance violations of conditional and unconditional writs—even when the State ultimately complies late—while policing the boundary against ongoing oversight once full compliance occurs. The decision also recommits the court to a stringent merits standard for barring reprosecution of the death penalty: only “extraordinary circumstances” marked by “substantial inequitable conduct” warrant that remedy.

Practically, the case warns state actors that “partial compliance” will not do. Formal state-court vacatur is the milestone for ending an unconstitutional sentence, and delays can spur sanction requests. At the same time, petitioners should expect that delays and complexity, without proof of bad faith or material prejudice of the D’Ambrosio variety, will not justify a penalty bar. The sharp dissent underscores an enduring tension in the circuit’s habeas jurisprudence between AEDPA’s custody-based jurisdiction and the need for meaningful enforcement of federal writs—an issue that may invite further en banc or Supreme Court attention. For now, the Sixth Circuit’s message is clear: compliance with habeas writs must be timely and complete, and federal courts retain sufficient jurisdiction to ensure that it is.