Guilty Plea Is Not Enough: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Denial of §3E1.1 Acceptance Reduction Where Post‑Plea Conduct Undermines Responsibility

Introduction

In United States v. Alexander Leszczynski (11th Cir. Oct. 6, 2025) (per curiam) (Non-Argument Calendar; Not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s refusal to award a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(a). The opinion underscores a practical and recurring sentencing principle: a guilty plea, even accompanied by brief statements of contrition, does not entitle a defendant to the acceptance reduction when the defendant’s post-plea conduct contradicts genuine acceptance of responsibility.

The decision arises from a case in which the defendant, while detained on fraud charges, attempted to hire a hitman—who was actually an undercover officer—to kill witnesses. After pleading guilty to attempted murder-for-hire and obstruction of justice, he mounted a campaign to shift blame to others, including attempts to induce fellow inmates to falsely confess and presenting a suspect letter at sentencing. The district court denied the acceptance reduction and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err.

Case Background

• Initial charges: Among other offenses, Leszczynski was indicted for wire and bank fraud after filing a fraudulent deed transferring homeowners’ property to a shell entity he controlled.
• Witness tampering plot: While detained pretrial, he sent threatening messages to the homeowners and sought to hire a “hitman” (an undercover agent) to kill them, discussing details and offering $30,000.
• New charges and plea: He was charged with attempted murder-for-hire and obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. §§ 1958(a), 1503(a)) and pleaded guilty.
• Post-plea conduct: After pleading, he told prosecutors he was innocent; claimed other inmates would confess; wrote inmates Tyreece Sturgis and Anthony Vega with threats and offers of payment to take responsibility; and, on the morning of sentencing, presented a letter purportedly from “Kristopher Schuster” claiming guilt. The district court found these claims not credible.
• Initial sentence and vacatur of separate convictions: He received 210 months. Later, in a separate appeal, his fraud convictions were vacated and the murder-for-hire sentence remanded because those convictions had affected his criminal history. See United States v. Leszczynski, No. 23-13335, 2024 WL 3103305 (11th Cir. June 24, 2024); United States v. Leszczynski, No. 23-13743, 2024 WL 3936022 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 2024).
• Resentencing: With the fraud convictions removed, his criminal history category dropped to I (from II), lowering the advisory range to 168–210 months. The district court again denied the acceptance reduction and imposed 200 months. He appealed on procedural reasonableness grounds, arguing the denial of the §3E1.1 reduction was error.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Reviewing for clear error, the court held that the district court properly denied the §3E1.1(a) reduction. While a guilty plea ordinarily is significant evidence of acceptance, it may be outweighed by inconsistent conduct. Here, Leszczynski’s repeated efforts—post-plea—to recast the offense, induce false confessions from other inmates, contact the prosecutor proclaiming innocence, and present a questionable letter on the morning of sentencing, all demonstrated a failure to “truthfully admit the conduct” and were inconsistent with genuine acceptance.

The court emphasized that a “perfunctory acknowledgement” of responsibility at sentencing (“I would like to take responsibility. I did do this. I screwed up.”) does not compel the reduction where the defendant’s broader conduct contradicts acceptance. The district court’s credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence were entitled to deference, and the appellate panel was not left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake occurred.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Mathews, 874 F.3d 698 (11th Cir. 2017): The panel cited Mathews for two key principles: (1) appellate review of acceptance-of-responsibility determinations is for clear error, and (2) a district court’s calculation of the advisory Guidelines range is reviewed for procedural reasonableness. Mathews reinforces the deference owed to district courts on factual assessments tied to a defendant’s acceptance and is central to affirmance here.
• United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006): Wade is invoked for the propositions that a guilty plea is “significant evidence” of acceptance but not dispositive, and that the defendant bears the burden of proving entitlement to the reduction. Wade directly supports the panel’s conclusion that post-plea conduct can outweigh a guilty plea’s probative value.
• United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 2010): The panel invokes Rothenberg’s articulation of the clear-error standard: an appellate court must be left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made to reverse a district court’s factual finding. This demanding standard practically controls the outcome; the district court’s credibility call and weighing of conflicting signals of acceptance were not clearly erroneous.
• U.S.S.G. §3E1.1 and commentary: The court quoted Application Note 1(A) (requiring truthful admission of the offense conduct and abstention from falsely denying relevant conduct) and Note 3 (a guilty plea is evidence of acceptance but can be outweighed by inconsistent conduct). These provisions frame the acceptance inquiry and expressly contemplate precisely the kind of post-plea inconsistency the court found.

Notably, although the Presentence Investigation Report applied an obstruction-of-justice enhancement, the panel had no need to explore any “extraordinary case” interplay between obstruction and acceptance; rather, it resolved the appeal on the narrower ground that the defendant’s post-plea actions, taken as a whole, undercut genuine acceptance and justified denying §3E1.1(a).

Legal Reasoning

• Burden and evidence: The defendant bears the burden to “clearly demonstrate” acceptance. A guilty plea carries weight but is not a guarantee. The court assessed the totality of the defendant’s behavior, focusing on whether he truthfully admitted his conduct or, conversely, falsely denied or minimized it.
• Post-plea inconsistency as dispositive: The district court found that after pleading guilty, the defendant tried to orchestrate false exculpatory narratives by pressuring inmates to confess and by insisting to the prosecutor that he was innocent. These actions directly conflict with the requirement in Note 1(A) that a defendant not falsely deny relevant conduct for which he is accountable. The district court’s credibility determinations regarding the last-minute “Schuster” letter also weighed against him.
• Perfunctory remorse insufficient: The defendant’s statements at sentencing—“I would like to take responsibility,” “I did do this,” “I screwed up”—were deemed perfunctory and outweighed by contradictory, sustained efforts to avoid blame. The panel expressly rejects the notion that such brief remarks, coupled with a plea, compel the reduction in the face of substantial contrary evidence.
• Deferential review controls the outcome: Applying Rothenberg and Mathews, the panel deferred to the district court’s first-hand assessment. The question on appeal was not whether another judge could have reached a different conclusion, but whether the district court clearly erred. Given the extensive post-plea conduct undermining acceptance, the panel was not left with a firm conviction of mistake.

Impact and Practical Significance

• Reinforcement of a strict, conduct-based acceptance inquiry: The case reaffirms that acceptance under §3E1.1 is a holistic, conduct-driven determination. Post-plea actions that suggest blame-shifting, minimization, fabrication, or obstruction will likely forfeit the reduction—even if the defendant pleads guilty and utters contrite words at sentencing.
• Deference to district courts: Because acceptance findings are reviewed for clear error, defendants face a steep uphill climb on appeal. Credibility determinations and the district court’s reading of letters, calls, and jailhouse conduct will almost always receive substantial deference.
• Defense counsel guidance: Counsel should warn clients that any post-plea conduct inconsistent with full and truthful admission—including pressuring others to confess, sending threatening or coercive communications, or submitting dubious exculpatory letters—jeopardizes §3E1.1(a). If a defendant genuinely seeks to retract a plea based on newly discovered evidence or coercion, the lawful route is a motion to withdraw the plea, not extra-judicial attempts to manufacture confessions.
• Sentencing dynamics on remand: Even after the related fraud convictions were vacated and the criminal history recalculated (dropping the Guidelines range to 168–210 months), the denial of acceptance remained intact. This highlights that post-plea conduct can be dispositive for §3E1.1 independent of other Guideline changes, and that courts may still impose substantial within-range sentences.
• Persuasive, though unpublished: The decision is unpublished and thus non-precedential in the Eleventh Circuit, but it provides persuasive guidance consistent with established circuit law on §3E1.1 and will likely be cited by parties in similar disputes over acceptance reductions where post-plea behavior is at issue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Acceptance of responsibility (U.S.S.G. §3E1.1): A potential reduction in the offense level if the defendant “clearly demonstrates” acceptance. It typically requires truthful admission of the offense conduct and avoidance of false denials of relevant conduct. A guilty plea helps but does not guarantee the reduction.
• Post-plea conduct: What a defendant does after pleading guilty matters. If he backtracks, blames others, pressures third parties to take the fall, or makes inconsistent claims of innocence, courts may find he has not truly accepted responsibility.
• Clear error review: An appellate court will affirm a district court’s factual determination unless it is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake was made. This is a highly deferential standard that often leads to affirmance.
• Presentence Investigation Report (PSI): A report compiled by probation that calculates the Guidelines range and notes enhancements or reductions. Courts often rely on the PSI, subject to objections and factual findings at sentencing.
• Obstruction of justice vs. acceptance: Conduct that obstructs justice (e.g., threatening witnesses, suborning perjury) frequently undermines the acceptance reduction. In this case, the PSI applied an obstruction enhancement, and the court denied acceptance based on related facts.
• Advisory Guidelines: The Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. District courts must correctly calculate the range and then consider statutory factors, but they retain discretion within and outside the range.

Conclusion

United States v. Leszczynski reinforces a core tenet of federal sentencing: acceptance of responsibility is shown by deeds, not merely by a plea and rote statements of remorse. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a §3E1.1 reduction where the defendant’s sustained post-plea conduct—fabricating exculpatory narratives, pressuring others to confess, proclaiming innocence to the prosecutor, and presenting a suspect eleventh-hour letter—belied genuine acceptance. Applying deferential clear-error review and settled Guidelines commentary, the court concluded that the district court’s refusal to award the reduction was not mistaken.

The opinion, though unpublished, carries practical weight. It cautions defendants and counsel that post-plea actions inconsistent with full and truthful admission of guilt are likely to defeat §3E1.1 relief and may coexist with obstruction enhancements. It also underscores the limited prospects for disturbing such determinations on appeal, given the district court’s central role in evaluating credibility and the deferential standard of review.