Guidelines as Starting Point; Public Protection as Dominant Factor: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Substantial Upward Variance for §1470 Despite Mandatory §2260A Term

Introduction

In United States v. Imran Ahmed Siddiqi, No. 24-14026 (11th Cir. Oct. 24, 2025) (per curiam) (non-argument calendar) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 60-month sentence imposed for transferring obscene material to a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 1470. The appeal challenged the substantive reasonableness of the 60-month term, which represented a substantial upward variance from the advisory Guidelines range of 0–6 months (offense level 8, criminal history category I). The district court also imposed, as it was required to do, a consecutive 10-year term under 18 U.S.C. § 2260A for committing a felony involving a minor while registered as a sex offender. On appeal, Siddiqi argued the district court: (1) failed to give adequate weight to the Guidelines by treating the statutory maximum as the benchmark and not the starting point; and (2) gave inadequate weight to mitigating evidence (family support, community service, and mental health struggles).

The Eleventh Circuit rejected both arguments. The panel concluded that the district court treated the Guidelines as the “starting point and initial benchmark,” provided a “sufficiently compelling” explanation for the magnitude of the upward variance grounded in the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors (especially the need to protect the public from an offender the court deemed a “grave danger”), and adequately acknowledged the mitigation presented. While unpublished and therefore non-precedential, the decision offers clear, practical guidance on how sentencing judges may justify sizable upward variances—particularly in sex-offense cases involving repeat conduct—while staying within the wide bounds of substantive reasonableness review.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges Rosenbaum, Brasher, and Abudu) applied abuse-of-discretion review to the district court’s upward variance on the § 1470 count from the 0–6 month advisory range to 60 months (five years below the 10-year § 1470 statutory maximum). The court held:

The district court twice acknowledged the Guidelines and used them as the starting point and initial benchmark, then explained in detail why an upward variance was warranted, focusing on the nature and circumstances of the offense, Siddiqi’s closely similar prior sex offense, and the need to protect the public.
The explanation was “sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance,” including the court’s finding that Siddiqi “poses a grave danger to the public,” illustrated by reading portions of his graphic messages to a purported thirteen-year-old.
The district court had discretion to attach great weight to public-safety concerns and Siddiqi’s recidivism, and to give less weight to mitigation, while still acknowledging it considered the § 3553(a) factors and the defense’s arguments.
The fact that the 60-month term on § 1470 was five years below the statutory maximum was an “indication” of substantive reasonableness.

Accordingly, the panel affirmed the 60-month sentence on § 1470. The mandatory 10-year consecutive sentence under § 2260A was not at issue on appeal and remained intact.

Factual and Procedural Background

The record showed Siddiqi’s prior 2015 state conviction after arranging to pay for sex with a fictitious 12-year-old (an undercover operation). He was required to register as a sex offender and completed community control and probation by 2019. In 2024, while a registered sex offender, he exchanged dozens of sexually explicit messages via Kik with undercover Homeland Security agents who represented themselves as a 13-year-old female, repeatedly acknowledged that stated age, transmitted multiple images and videos (including of a penis and adult sex), solicited nude images, and attempted on four occasions to arrange an in-person meeting for sex.

A federal grand jury indicted Siddiqi for (1) transferring obscene material to a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 1470; and (2) committing a felony involving a minor victim while registered as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. § 2260A, which carries a mandatory 10-year term consecutive to any other sentence. Siddiqi pled guilty to both counts without a plea agreement. The PSR calculated a total offense level of 8 (base 10 under U.S.S.G. § 2G3.1(a), minus 2 for acceptance of responsibility) and a criminal history category I, yielding a 0–6 month advisory range for § 1470 and a mandatory consecutive 10-year term for § 2260A.

At sentencing, after hearing mitigation from family members and Siddiqi regarding his community ties and mental-health issues, the district court stated that it had considered “all of the factors” in § 3553(a) and Siddiqi’s arguments. It imposed the required 10-year term for § 2260A and a 60-month sentence for § 1470, explaining that Siddiqi’s recidivism and the graphic nature of the communications with a purported thirteen-year-old showed he “poses a grave danger to the public.” The court noted it had contemplated an upward variance of nine-and-a-half years above the Guidelines but reduced the variance to four-and-a-half years in light of Siddiqi’s guilty plea and mitigation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Established abuse-of-discretion review for federal sentences and recognized that variance sentences are permissible if justified by the § 3553(a) factors. The panel follows Gall’s framework by deferring to the district court’s weighing of factors unless the decision falls outside the range of reasonable sentences.
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013): Emphasized that the Guidelines are the “starting point and initial benchmark” in federal sentencing and recognized their anchoring role even after Booker. Here, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Peugh to reject the claim that the district court treated the statutory maximum as its benchmark; the record showed the court began with the Guidelines.
Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) (plurality): Cited for the proposition that if a judge uses the Guidelines as the “beginning point” to explain a deviation, the Guidelines “are in a real sense the basis for the sentence.” The panel quotes this concept to underscore that the district court’s explicit engagement with the Guidelines gave them “real weight.”
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Supplies the Eleventh Circuit’s touchstone for substantive reasonableness: reversal for “clear error of judgment” only if there is a “definite and firm conviction” that the sentence lies outside the range of reasonable outcomes. The panel measured the upward variance against this forgiving standard and found no clear error.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Recognizes a district court’s discretion to attach great weight to one § 3553(a) factor over others. The panel leans on this principle in upholding the district court’s heavy reliance on public-protection needs and recidivism.
United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021): Notes that a sentence below the statutory maximum can be an “indication” of substantive reasonableness. The panel invokes this to support affirmance of the 60-month sentence, which was five years below § 1470’s 10-year maximum.
United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010 (11th Cir. 2014): Reaffirms that the Guidelines must be the starting point and that any variance must be supported by a justification “sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” The panel finds that standard satisfied given the district court’s detailed explanation.
United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2023): Recent Eleventh Circuit articulation of abuse-of-discretion review in sentencing. The panel cites Curtin as the controlling standard-of-review framework.
United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266 (11th Cir. 2025): Cited for the proposition (rooted in Rosales‑Bruno) that a court may attach great weight to one factor. This reinforces the permissibility of the district court’s emphasis on public danger.
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009): These cases confirm that a sentencing court need not specifically address each mitigating argument on the record; a general acknowledgment of having considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ positions suffices. The panel relies on this line to reject Siddiqi’s complaint that the district court did not dwell on his family-related mitigation.
United States v. Hall, 965 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2020): Clarifies that the defendant bears the burden to show unreasonableness under the § 3553(a) factors. The panel uses this allocation of burden to frame Siddiqi’s challenge.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning tracks the familiar two-step logic of substantive reasonableness review: (1) Did the district court select the proper framework—Guidelines as the starting point and the § 3553(a) factors as the governing criteria? (2) Given that framework, was the resulting sentence within the range of reasonable outcomes in light of the facts?

First, the court found that the district judge scrupulously used the Guidelines as the “starting point and initial benchmark.” The judge twice stated the advisory range and explained that a variance was necessary because the range did not reflect the seriousness of Siddiqi’s conduct and the clear public-safety risk evidenced by past and present behavior. In explaining the variance, the court read several of Siddiqi’s graphic communications into the record, directly tying the evidence to the “nature and circumstances of the offense” under § 3553(a)(1).

Second, the judge attached great weight to two § 3553(a) considerations: (a) Siddiqi’s history and characteristics, particularly his prior conviction for similar conduct involving an even younger fictitious victim (twelve years old), and (b) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, § 3553(a)(2)(C). Although the PSR yielded a criminal history category I, the district court permissibly looked beyond the scoring to the underlying similarity and recency of the prior offense in assessing recidivism risk. The opinion expressly recognizes the court’s discretion to give these factors “great weight” over competing mitigating evidence, squarely in line with Rosales-Bruno and Olson.

Third, the district court fully acknowledged defense mitigation—family support, community service, mental health issues—and moderated its contemplated variance accordingly, reducing a potential nine-and-a-half-year variance to four-and-a-half years. Under Butler, Amedeo, and Sarras, that general acknowledgment sufficed; the court was not required to parse each mitigating point on the record or to assign it determinative weight.

Fourth, the panel noted that the 60-month sentence fell well below the 120-month statutory maximum for § 1470, treating that as an “indication” of reasonableness under Riley (while not, of course, a dispositive factor). Combined with the record-based explanation and the explicit engagement with the § 3553(a) factors, the panel concluded it lacked the “definite and firm conviction” that the district court committed a “clear error of judgment” as Irey defines the threshold for reversal.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although unpublished and therefore non-binding, Siddiqi offers several practical guideposts for district courts and litigants in the Eleventh Circuit:

Substantial upward variances from very low advisory ranges can be affirmed when rooted in concrete, record-backed public-safety concerns and recidivist history, especially in child-exploitation contexts.
District courts may give “great weight” to the need to protect the public and to prior similar conduct even if criminal-history scoring yields a low category. The Guidelines do not cabin the court’s § 3553(a) analysis to scored history.
To sustain large variances, courts should explicitly:
- State the Guidelines range at the outset,
- Explain why the range is inadequate,
- Tie the variance to specific § 3553(a) factors with concrete facts (e.g., reading or summarizing the actual communications), and
- Acknowledge mitigation and show how it affected the sentence, even if the court ultimately gives it limited weight.
The presence of a mandatory consecutive sentence under § 2260A does not bar an additional upward variance on the underlying count. While the Supreme Court’s decision in Dean permits sentencing courts to consider mandatory consecutive terms when calibrating other counts, Siddiqi underscores that courts remain free to impose additional punishment on the underlying offense when justified by § 3553(a) considerations.
For defense counsel, generalized mitigation (family support, community service, mental health difficulties) may not overcome a strong record of danger and recidivism unless tied to a concrete, individualized plan addressing risk reduction and treatment prospects.
The panel’s reliance on the fact that the sentence is below the statutory maximum continues an Eleventh Circuit tradition of treating that fact as one indicator of reasonableness, though not a substitute for a § 3553(a)-grounded explanation.

In short, Siddiqi reinforces a practical template for sustaining significant upward variances in sex-offense cases: start with the Guidelines, build a fact-rich record demonstrating public danger and recidivism, acknowledge mitigation, and articulate why the chosen term fits the statutory purposes of sentencing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantive reasonableness: Appellate review that asks whether, given the facts and § 3553(a) factors, the sentence falls within a broad range of reasonable outcomes. It is highly deferential; reversal requires a “clear error of judgment.”
Abuse of discretion standard: The appellate court defers to the trial judge’s decision unless the judge ignored important factors, relied on improper factors, or made a clear judgment error in weighing proper factors.
Guidelines as “starting point and initial benchmark”: Even though the Guidelines are advisory, a sentencing court must begin with them, calculate correctly, and then decide whether to vary up or down based on § 3553(a).
Upward variance: A sentence above the advisory Guidelines range based on the judge’s view that the range does not fulfill statutory sentencing goals (e.g., deterrence, public protection, respect for the law, just punishment).
“Sufficiently compelling” justification: The larger the variance, the more thorough and persuasive the court’s explanation should be, anchored in case-specific facts and § 3553(a) factors.
Public-protection factor (§ 3553(a)(2)(C)): A mandatory consideration requiring courts to account for the need to protect the public from further crimes by the defendant; prior similar conduct and recidivism can carry great weight here.
Mitigation acknowledgment: A judge need not comment on every mitigation point; a general statement that the court considered the parties’ arguments and § 3553(a) factors typically suffices.
Statutory maximum as “indicator”: A sentence materially below the statutory maximum does not prove reasonableness but may suggest it, especially when combined with a solid § 3553(a) explanation.
Mandatory consecutive term (§ 2260A): Certain statutes require a fixed additional sentence to run consecutive to other counts. Courts may still impose a meaningful sentence on the underlying count, taking the mandatory term into account but not being controlled by it.
Criminal History Category I: The lowest criminal-history category under the Guidelines. Even if the scoring is low, a court may consider unscored or older conduct under § 3553(a) when gauging risk and culpability.

Conclusion

United States v. Siddiqi reaffirms that in the Eleventh Circuit, a district court may impose a substantial upward variance from a very low Guidelines range when the record shows serious, repeated sexual misconduct targeting minors and a corresponding need to protect the public. The key is method, not arithmetic: begin with the Guidelines; candidly explain why they understate the offense and risk; tether the variance to specific § 3553(a) factors with concrete facts; and acknowledge mitigation, even if it ultimately yields limited weight. The panel’s affirmance, while unpublished, is a clear and practical roadmap for sustaining significant upward variances in recidivist child-exploitation cases—especially where the conduct closely mirrors prior offenses, and the danger to the public is immediate and pronounced.